In the Matter of George Meadows

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: October 16, 2024
• Docket: A-0902-22
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0902-22

IN THE MATTER OF GEORGE MEADOWS, PATERSON, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. ____________________________

Submitted September 24, 2024 – Decided October 16, 2024

Before Judges Perez Friscia and Bergman.

On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service Commission, Docket No. 2021-1955.

O'Toole Scrivo, LLC, attorneys for appellant City of Paterson, Department of Economic Development (Nicole M. DeMuro, of counsel and on the briefs; Kenneth Goodman, on the briefs).

AFSCME New Jersey Council 63, attorneys for respondent George Meadows (Seth Gollin, on the brief).

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent The New Jersey Civil Service Commission (Brian D. Ragunan, Deputy Attorney General, on the statement in lieu of brief).

PER CURIAM Appellant the City of Paterson, Department of Economic Development

(Department), appeals from the September 21, 2022 final administrative action

of the New Jersey Civil Service Commission (Commission) reversing the

removal of respondent George Meadows from his position as a principal planner.

We affirm.

In 2012, Meadows began working as a principal planner for the

Department. Meadows received a bachelor's degree for "planning and

architecture" from Columbia University. He was responsible for reviewing

applications, plans, ordinances, Paterson's master plan, and other land

development projects. During his years of service, Meadows received no

negative employment reviews.

In 2018, Meadows required eye surgery for glaucoma. His continued

blurred vision post-surgery required the use of eyedrops, which partially

worsened his condition. He suffered from varying degrees of visual impairment

since 2015. Because of his visual limitations, Paterson sent Meadows for a

fitness-for-duty evaluation. After the physician's examination, it was

determined Meadows needed accommodations to complete his work, but the

duration of his impairment was in question. Meadows required accommodations

for typing and reading. He had been paying for transportation to and from work.

A-0902-22 2 Paterson then placed Meadows on administrative leave, effective September 24,

2018, and required a further fitness-for-duty exam with an ophthalmologist,

Saveren Scannapiego, M.D.

Dr. Scannapiego examined Meadows in November and authored a nine-

sentence report over a year later in December 2019, concluding Meadows was

"unemployable" because of his statutory blindness. Dr. Scannapiego found

Meadows's optic nerves were "completely atrophic."

On March 11, 2019, Meadows's treating physician, glaucoma specialist

Omar Mobin-Uddin, M.D., opined in a temporary disability return-to-work

medical certification that Meadows could perform his work duties, though he

had "functional capacity" limitations requiring "accommodation for reading[,]

writing[,] and typing clerical work." In September, Dr. Mobin-Uddin issued a

report requesting an extension of Meadows's temporary disability stating, "I

believe . . . [Meadows] is mentally capable of handling his employment affairs

as long as he has accommodations." In March 2020, Dr. Mobin-Uddin issued

another report stating Meadows had "[p]rimary [o]pen [a]ngle [g]laucoma." He

opined that although Meadows was legally blind, he "may continue to work

safely if the job is modified to" accommodate "reading, writing, typing, clerical

work[, and] transportation."

A-0902-22 3 On January 17, Paterson's business administrator notified Meadows he

had been suspended due to his inability to fulfill the requirements of a principal

planner. On January 21, Paterson issued a Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary

Action to Meadows alleging his inability to perform duties pursuant to N.J.A.C.

4A:2-2.3 and seeking his immediate removal. On June 10, Paterson issued

Meadows a Final Notice of Disciplinary Action. After Meadows challenged the

final notice, the Commission transferred the action to the Office of

Administrative Law.

On June 28, 2022, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conducted a

hearing during which Michael Deutsch, Paterson's Director of the Division of

Zoning and Planning (Division), and Meadows testified. Having worked with

Meadows since 2012, Deutsch testified Meadows's work entailed reviewing

plans and site visits. Further, because Meadows was legally blind, Deutsch

believed he required the assistance of another principal planner to complete the

detailed technical work required. He testified Meadows received

accommodations but could not recite the specific accommodations provided.

Meadows testified he did not "ask for ambulation," reading, or work

transportation assistance. He only "ask[ed] for typing assistance" to perform his

work. Meadows advised that reviewing plans and ascertaining the necessary

A-0902-22 4 information could be accomplished by asking a clerk about the plan's details.

For site visits, he had previously received transportation from other employees

working on the projects. He contradicted Deutsch's testimony that many of the

civil service job descriptions of a planner applied to him. 1 Meadows believed

Paterson used his medical disability as an excuse to terminate him and explained

he previously filed an Equal Employment Opportunity complaint in April 2017.

On August 12, 2022, the ALJ issued a thirteen-page initial decision

reversing Meadows's removal based on his inability to perform the necessary

principal planner duties and reinstating him. The ALJ found Paterson "ha[d] not

met its burden of proof to demonstrate that [Meadows] [wa]s unemployable and

ha[d] an inability to perform his duties as a [p]rincipal [p]lanner." The ALJ

1 The Commission's job specification, N.J. Civ. Serv. Comm'n, Job Specification: Principal Planner (Mar. 17, 2018), https://info.csc.state.nj.us/jobspec/16491.htm, provides the definition for a principal planner:

Under direction of a [s]upervising [p]lanner or other supervisor in a State or local government agency, participates in the development of a master, functional, or project plan intended primarily to guide government policy for the assurance of orderly and coordinated development of municipal, county, regional, and metropolitan land areas or portions thereof; supervise staff and work activities; prepares and signs official performance evaluations for subordinate staff; does other related duties as required. A-0902-22 5 found Paterson relied only on Dr. Scannapiego's letter as he was not produced

to testify at the hearing. Further, she found questions arose because Dr.

Scannapiego "inexplicably issued [the letter] more than a year after allegedly

evaluating Meadows." She afforded no weight to the opinion because Dr.

Scannapiego's conclusory report provided no foundation. Specifically, Dr.

Scannapiego offered no recitation of "records or information" relied upon in

determining Meadows was unemployable.

The ALJ found Meadows testified credibly. She found his job required:

writing; public meetings; reviewing documents, ordinances, a master plan, and

redevelopment plans; and occasional site visits. Specifically, the ALJ

determined "[t]here is no evidence that . . . [Paterson] made any attempt to

accommodate Meadows'[s] disability."

After independently evaluating the record, the Commission issued a final

administrative action adopting the ALJ's findings of fact and conclusions of law

and reinstating Meadows. Further, the Commission ordered Meadows "be

granted back pay, benefits, and seniority from the first date of separation until

the date of reinstatement."

On appeal, Paterson argues reversal of the Commission's final

administrative action is warranted because: the ALJ's decision was based on an

A-0902-22 6 inaccurate recitation of the factual record; it was not required to provide

Meadows an accommodation; and to the extent the record was insufficient for a

meaningful review, the matter should be remanded for further proceedings.

Our scope of review of a final administrative action is limited . Bd. of

Educ. of Sparta v. M.N., 258 N.J. 333, 342 (2024). An appellate court may only

reverse an agency's decision where it finds that the decision is "arbitrary,

capricious, or unreasonable or . . . not supported by substantial credible evidence

in the record as a whole." Azzaro v. Bd. of Educ. of Trenton, 477 N.J. Super.

427, 436 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting G.D.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Ramapo

Indian Hills Reg'l High Sch. Dist., 427 N.J. Super. 246, 259-60 (App. Div.

2012)). "While we must defer to the agency's expertise, we need not surrender

to it." In re Thomas Orban/Square Props., LLC, 461 N.J. Super. 57, 72 (App.

Div. 2019) (quoting N.J. Chapter of Nat'l Ass'n of Indus. & Off. Parks v. N.J.

Dep't of Env't Prot., 241 N.J. Super. 145, 165 (App. Div. 1990)). The party

challenging the final administrative action has the burden to demonstrate

grounds for reversal. Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 171 (2014).

In determining if an agency's action is arbitrary, capricious or

unreasonable, we examine "(1) whether the agency's action violates express or

implied legislative policies," (2) whether there is substantial evidence in the

A-0902-22 7 record to support the agency's action, and (3) whether in applying the law to the

facts, the agency reached a conclusion "that could not reasonably have been

made on a showing of the relevant factors." Allstars Auto Grp., Inc. v. N.J.

Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 234 N.J. 150, 157 (2018) (quoting In re Stallworth, 208

N.J. 182, 194 (2011)). We "afford[] a 'strong presumption of reasonableness' to

an administrative agency's exercise of its statutorily delegated responsibilities."

Lavezzi, 219 N.J. at 171 (quoting City of Newark v. Nat. Res. Council, Dep't of

Env't Prot., 82 N.J. 530, 539 (1980)). "This is particularly true when the issue

under review is directed to the agency's special 'expertise and superior

knowledge of a particular field.'" Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 195 (quoting In re

Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007)). We "'may not substitute [our] own judgment

for the agency's even though [we] might have reached a different result. '" In re

Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 483 (2007) (quoting Greenwood v. State Police Training

Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992)). An appellate court does not automatically

accept an agency's interpretation of a statute or a regulation and reviews legal

questions de novo. See Bowser v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Fireman's Ret. Sys., 455

N.J. Super. 165, 170-71 (App. Div. 2018).

Our Supreme Court has recognized "the obligation of employers to

reasonably accommodate an employee with a disability." Richter v. Oakland

A-0902-22 8 Bd. of Educ., 246 N.J. 507, 530 (2021) (citing N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.5(b)). N.J.A.C.

13:13-2.5(b) provides "[a]n employer must make a reasonable accommodation

to the limitations of an employee . . . who is a person with a disability, unless

the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue

hardship." Further, "[a]lthough the LAD statute does not specifically address

failure to accommodate, 'our courts have uniformly held that the [LAD]

nevertheless requires an employer to reasonably accommodate an employee's

handicap.'" Royster v. N.J. State Police, 227 N.J. 482, 499 (second alteration in

original) (quoting Potente v. County of Hudson, 187 N.J. 103, 110 (2006)). We

note under the LAD, reasonable accommodations are "'designed to make certain

changes in the work environment or structuring of employees' time that will

allow disabled employees to remain at work without their physical handicaps

impeding their job performance.'" Caraballo v. Jersey City Police Dep't, 237

N.J. 255, 268 (2019) (quoting Jones v. Aluminum Shapes, Inc., 339 N.J. Super.

412, 426-27 (App. Div. 2001)).

Paterson contends the Commission erred in adopting the ALJ's initial

decision because the decision was based on inaccurate factual findings. We are

unpersuaded. A review of the record yields the Commission's factual findings

are amply supported. Meadows, whose testimony the ALJ deemed credible,

A-0902-22 9 maintained he was able to complete his duties as a principal planner with

accommodations, primarily with clerical reading and writing assistance.

Further, he asserted he could continue to attend site visits with co-workers when

needed.

It is undisputed Paterson, as the appointing authority, was permitted to

seek Meadows's termination if there was an "inability to perform duties,"

N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(3). Paterson, however, bears the burden of proof by a

preponderance of the evidence. See N.J.S.A. 11A:2-21; N.J.A.C. 4A:2-1.4(a);

In re Polk, 90 N.J. 550, 560 (1982). At the hearing, Paterson relied on Dr.

Scannapiego's scant opinion to establish Meadows's inability to fulfill the duties

of a principal planner. The Commission's adoption of the ALJ's finding that Dr.

Scannapiego rendered a net opinion is well-supported. The nine-sentence

report, issued more than one year after Dr. Scannapiego evaluated Meadows,

failed to reference the records and documents reviewed, as well as the methods

relied upon in formulating the opinion. The net opinion rule requires "experts

'be able to identify the factual bases for their conclusions, explain their

methodology, and demonstrate that both the factual bases and the methodology

are reliable.'" Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 55 (2015) (quoting Landrigan

v. Celotex Corp., 127 N.J. 404, 417 (1992)). The Commission's decision to

A-0902-22 10 afford no weight to Dr. Scannapiego's cursory opinion is grounded in legal

precedent and was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.

We further observe Paterson produced only one witness to testify—

Deutsch. It is undisputed a planner reviews detailed "applications for

development." Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning & Land Use Administration

§ 2-5, at 10 (2024). As referenced in the Commission's job specifications, a

principal planner's duties include reviewing land use plans and meeting with the

public. Paterson's burden was not simply to establish Meadows's job duties but

rather to also prove his inability to perform those duties with reasonable

accommodations. See N.J.S.A. 11A:2-21. While Deutsch was familiar with the

work requirements and testified Meadows could not perform the job, he

conceded to not handling or addressing Meadows's request for accommodations

and to being unaware of any accommodations Paterson offered. Thus, as held

by the Commission, Deutsch's limited knowledge of the necessary level of

accommodations undermined his testimony. Providing the requisite deference

and considering the totality of the findings, we discern no error.

Paterson also avers it was not required to provide Meadows an

accommodation. Yet, reasonable efforts of accommodation are required.

N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.5(b); Richter, 246 N.J. at 530. Paterson specifically argues an

A-0902-22 11 accommodation was not required because Meadows's disability unreasonably

required hiring additional staff for the Division to accommodate Meadows. This

contention is unsupported. The record lacks sufficient competent evidence to

establish Paterson needed to hire an employee to provide Meadows with clerical

support or as an additional principal planner. The Commission adopted the

ALJ's finding that Paterson did not "sufficiently demonstrate" Meadows

required "unreasonable [accommodations] or that Meadows require[d] more

extensive accommodations that . . . [Paterson] [wa]s unable to reasonably

provide." Further, "no evidence" established "an interactive process was ever

initiated" to determine what level of accommodation was needed. We do not

find "the agency's decision to be 'arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable or . . .

not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.'" In re

Ambroise, 258 N.J. 180, 197 (2024) (omission in original) (quoting Stallworth,

208 N.J. at 194). The Commission's final administrative action is amply

supported; therefore, we decline to disturb the Commission's determination that

Paterson failed to prove it offered or reasonably attempted to provide an

accommodation to Meadows.

A-0902-22 12 Finally, Paterson's request for a remand for further proceedings is without

merit. Again, Paterson had the burden to establish Meadows's removal was

warranted. Any "insufficien[cy] . . . in the record" falls on Paterson.

To the extent not addressed, Paterson's remaining arguments lack

sufficient merit to be discussed in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

A-0902-22 13