In the Matter of: E.H. State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. Kenneth Harazak

CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedJanuary 26, 2005
DocketW2004-00514-COA-R3-PT
StatusPublished

This text of In the Matter of: E.H. State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. Kenneth Harazak (In the Matter of: E.H. State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. Kenneth Harazak) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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In the Matter of: E.H. State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. Kenneth Harazak, (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON Assigned on Briefs November 18 2004

IN THE MATTER OF: E.H. STATE OF TENNESSEE, DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN’S SERVICES v. KENNETH HARAZAK

An Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Henry County No. 7285 Hansel J. McAdams, Judge

No. W2004-00514-COA-R3-PT - Filed January 26, 2005

This involves the termination of parental rights. The child at issue was taken into protective custody after police raided the parents’ home and found an active methamphetamine lab. Drug charges were filed against the child’s mother and father. The father was on parole from a prior murder conviction in Illinois, and his drug-related activities were a violation of his parole. As a result, the father was returned to Illinois to serve further time in prison on the prior murder conviction. The mother’s parental rights were terminated by default judgment. The father’s parental rights were terminated based on having the child in the home with a meth lab, and the father’s resulting incarceration in Illinois. The father appealed, arguing that the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services did not make reasonable efforts to reunite him with his child. We affirm, finding that under the circumstances of this case, the Department of Children’s Services was not required to make reasonable efforts to reunite the father with the child.

Rule 3 Appeal; Judgment of the Juvenile Court is affirmed

HOLLY M. KIRBY , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which W. FRANK CRAWFORD , P.J., W.S., and ALAN E. HIGHERS, J., joined.

Gary J. Swayne, Paris, Tennessee, for Respondent/Appellant Kenneth Harazak

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, and Douglas Earl Diamond, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee, for the Petitioner/Appellee, State of Tennessee, Department of Children’s Services

OPINION

On or before August 8, 2002, police conducted a raid at the home of Sandra Harazak (“Mother”) and Respondent/Appellant Kenneth Hazarak (“Father”). They found an active methamphetamine (“meth”) lab. Present in the home at the time of the raid was Mother and Father’s daughter, E.H., the subject of this appeal. E.H., born March 20, 1998, was four years old at the time. She was referred to Petitioner/Appellee the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), and was subsequently taken into protective custody. DCS learned that, in the raid of Mother’s and Father’s home, police found the ingredients for making meth throughout the house, easily accessible to their young daughter. A tank of anhydrous ammonia, a component of meth, was hidden in the weeds not far from E.H.’s swing set.

Both parents have a substantial history of drug involvement and Father has an extensive criminal history. At the time of the police raid, Father was on parole from a murder conviction in Illinois.

A permanency plan was developed, in which Father was required to attend drug counseling, submit to random drug screenings, resolve any pending legal proceedings against him, attend parenting class, and attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings. The stated goal of the permanency plan was to return E.H. to her parents.

On December 16, 2002, Father pled guilty to manufacturing meth with the intent to sell. Since the drug conviction was a violation of his parole on the Illinois murder conviction, Father was then turned over to the Illinois Department of Corrections for further imprisonment in Illinois. Prior to this, Father had only a few visits with E.H., and completed no requirements of the permanency plan.

On July 9, 2003, DCS petitioned for termination of the parental rights of both Mother and Father. The Juvenile Court of Henry County conducted a hearing on the matter on December 12, 2003. Mother was notified of the hearing by telephone and by publication in the local newspaper but did not attend. A default judgment was taken against her. At the time of the hearing, Father was still incarcerated in Illinois.

At the hearing, the Juvenile Court heard testimony from DCS Child Protective Services worker Pam Moss (“Moss”) and DCS case manager Elaine Hart (“Hart”). Both Moss and Hart interviewed E.H. about conditions in the parents’ home before the police raid. E.H. told Moss that she understood that the police had come to her home because her mother and her parents’ friends were smoking “bad stuff.” She described the bad stuff as something her father hid in the woods. E.H. said Father took the bad stuff, and Mother told her it was his medicine.

Hart described her conversations with E.H. as well. E.H. described helping stir the meth as it was cooking. She said the bad stuff made her sick a lot. A number of “aunts” and “uncles” would visit her home; they would dip needles in the bad stuff and give themselves shots. E.H. knew about the buried tank of anhydrous ammonia. She reported seeing her parents engaged in intercourse, and could demonstrate sexual movements.

-2- Hart testified that Father was notified of all staff meetings and court hearings, and though incarcerated, could have input through letters.1 She said that, because of his incarceration, Father had not demonstrated any progress on the permanency plan.

Father testified at the hearing by telephone from prison in Illinois. He acknowledged that he had been arrested for manufacturing meth and, while out on bond, received a second charge for possession of meth. Father conceded that E.H. had witnessed him injecting meth into his arm. Father admitted that he kept a tank of anhydrous ammonia, a component of meth, in the weeds approximately 75 feet from E.H.’s swing set. Father denied that he and Mother allowed E.H. to witness sexual intercourse between them but acknowledged that E.H. had walked in on them once.

Father testified that he completed an anger management program in prison and that he attended Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous meetings in prison, both of which were objectives under the permanency plan. Father also testified that he was certain he could meet the goals and objectives set out in the permanency plan after being released from prison.

After the hearing, the Juvenile Court entered an order dated May 17, 2004. In the order, the Juvenile Court found: (1) Father had committed severe child abuse against E.H.; (2) Father manufactured meth in the home where the child lived; (3) Father was substantially noncompliant with the permanency plan; (4) Father had failed to remedy the persistent conditions that caused E.H. to be taken from his custody and prevented her safe return to him at an early date; (5) DCS had made a reasonable effort to help Father make necessary adjustments; and (6) that it had been established by clear and convincing evidence that the termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of E.H. Based on these findings, the Juvenile Court terminated Father’s parental rights. Father now appeals this order. Mother does not appeal the default judgment against her.

On appeal, Father asserts that DCS did not exert reasonable efforts to reunite him with E.H., even though Mother received these services. Father maintains that he should be given an opportunity to achieve the goals set out in the parenting plan after he is released from incarceration.

Our review of this case is governed by T.R.A.P. 13(d), which provides that review of findings of fact by the trial court shall be de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the factual findings, unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. T.R.A.P. 13(d); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993).

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Related

Stanley v. Illinois
405 U.S. 645 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston
854 S.W.2d 87 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1993)
In Re Drinnon
776 S.W.2d 96 (Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 1988)

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