304 Ga. 632 FINAL COPY
S19Y0032. IN THE MATTER OF DENISE F. HEMMANN.
PER CURIAM.
Denise F. Hemmann (State Bar No. 345025) has been a member of the Bar
since 1981 and previously has been sanctioned for misconduct four times. In
an August 9, 2018 report and recommendation, special master Adam Hames
recommends that this Court accept Hemmann’s amended petition for voluntary
discipline, filed after the filing of a formal complaint, see Bar Rule 4-227 (c),
and impose a public reprimand for her admitted violations of Georgia Rules of
Professional Conduct 1.3, 1.4, and 1.16 found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d) related to
her misconduct in representing a client in personal injury and workers’
compensation matters. The State Bar supports that recommendation. As
explained below, the recommended sanction appears insufficient in light of
Hemmann’s prior disciplinary history, although the existing record makes it
unclear whether Hemmann is continuing to engage in the same type of
misconduct. Accordingly, we reject the petition. As recounted by the special master, Hemmann admits that in January
2015, she executed a written agreement with a client to represent him on a claim
for damages against an at-fault driver for a minor soft tissue injury to his
shoulder that he sustained in an August 2014 automobile accident, as well as a
workers’ compensation claim because the accident occurred while he was
operating his employer’s vehicle. Less than a month after the representation
agreement was executed, Hemmann sent letters notifying Allstate Insurance
Company (the at-fault driver’s insurance company) and Travelers Insurance
Company (the employer’s workers’ compensation carrier) that she was
representing the client, and she also filed a WC-14 Notice of Claim with the
State Board of Workers’ Compensation on the client’s behalf. In March 2015,
Hemmann sent the client a copy of the filed WC-14 Notice of Claim and a letter
she received from Travelers confirming the claim number and the adjuster’s
name in the workers’ compensation case.
Thereafter, however, Hemmann took no further action to advance either
the personal injury case or the workers’ compensation case. In May 2015,
Hemmann spoke to the client on the phone regarding the matters she was
handling on his behalf and confirmed the conversation in a letter to the client on
2 the same date. After that, the client was unable to obtain information from
Hemmann regarding either matter, even though he left phone messages with
Hemmann’s secretary and sent Hemmann an e-mail in July 2015.1 On
December 11, 2015, the client sent Hemmann a letter expressing his
dissatisfaction with her failure to communicate with him, and on December 30,
2015, Hemmann sent him a letter stating that she would take no further action
on his behalf in relation to the personal injury and workers’ compensation cases.
The client alleges that he never received the December 30 letter, and Hemmann
admits that the client may not have received it. Hemmann further admits that
she did not notify the Board of Workers’ Compensation until June 2018 that she
was withdrawing from representing the client, having the mistaken belief that
no withdrawal was necessary in workers’ compensation matters, and that she
never notified Allstate or Travelers that she was no longer representing the
client.
The special master concludes that Hemmann violated Rule 1.3 by willfully
abandoning the client’s personal injury and workers’ compensation cases. In
1 Although Hemmann does not use e-mail and had so informed the client, she did have an e-mail address that was monitored by her secretary.
3 addition, the special master concludes that Hemmann violated Rule 1.4 when
she failed to communicate with the client about the status of his legal matters.
Finally, the special master concludes that Hemmann violated Rule 1.16 (c) by
ceasing work on the client’s legal matters and in effect withdrawing without
taking steps to protect his interests. The maximum penalty for a violation of
Rule 1.3 is disbarment, while the maximum penalty for a violation of Rules 1.4
and 1.16 is a public reprimand.
The special master correctly noted that the appropriate sanction in an
attorney disciplinary case serves as “a penalty to the offender, a deterrent to
others, and . . . an indication to laymen that the courts will maintain the ethics
of the profession.” In the Matter of Dowdy, 247 Ga. 488, 493 (277 SE2d 36)
(1981). The special master found that Hemmann’s request for a public
reprimand meets the standard set forth in Dowdy. The special master
recognized that this Court relies on the American Bar Association’s Standards
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions for general guidance in determining the
appropriate level of discipline, see In the Matter of Morse, 265 Ga. 353, 354
(456 SE2d 52) (1995), and that ABA Standard 4.43 provides that a reprimand
is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent and does not act with
4 reasonable diligence in representing a client and causes injury or potential injury
to a client.
The special master found in mitigation the absence of a dishonest or
selfish motive, see ABA Standard 9.32 (b); Hemmann’s cooperative attitude
toward the disciplinary proceedings, see ABA Standard 9.32 (e); her remorse,
see ABA Standard 9.32 (l); and the remoteness in time of prior disciplinary
proceedings, see ABA Standard 9.32 (m), noting that Hemmann received an
investigative panel reprimand in 1997. Additionally, the special master stated
that Hemmann had contacted the State Bar Law Practice Management Program,
scheduled a July 2018 audit to acquire recommendations for improvement of her
office management practices, and agreed to follow the recommendations; and
she also submitted character letters from clients and members of her community,
suggesting that she is a well-respected member of her community.
The special master identified as aggravating factors Hemmann’s
substantial experience in the practice of law, see ABA Standard 9.22 (i), and her
prior disciplinary offenses, including formal letters of admonition she received
in 2005 and 2010, see ABA Standard 9.22 (a). The special master did not
mention, however, an additional formal letter of admonition that Hemmann
5 admits she received in 2004 or — in the context of aggravation — the 1997
investigative panel reprimand. ABA Standard 4.4 explains that the sanction said
to be generally appropriate under ABA Standard 4.43 applies “[a]bsent
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.”
Having reviewed the record, we agree that Hemmann’s admitted facts are
sufficient to support a finding that she violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, and 1.16 of the
Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. However, based on the current record,
we cannot conclude that a public reprimand is an appropriate level of discipline,
given Hemmann’s extensive prior disciplinary history. Moreover, the current
record does not reveal whether those prior incidents of misconduct involved
similar violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which could show that
Hemmann continues to engage in misconduct involving the abandonment of
legal matters entrusted to her by clients, failure to communicate with those
clients, and failure to properly withdraw from representation despite her prior
admonitions and reprimand.
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304 Ga. 632 FINAL COPY
S19Y0032. IN THE MATTER OF DENISE F. HEMMANN.
PER CURIAM.
Denise F. Hemmann (State Bar No. 345025) has been a member of the Bar
since 1981 and previously has been sanctioned for misconduct four times. In
an August 9, 2018 report and recommendation, special master Adam Hames
recommends that this Court accept Hemmann’s amended petition for voluntary
discipline, filed after the filing of a formal complaint, see Bar Rule 4-227 (c),
and impose a public reprimand for her admitted violations of Georgia Rules of
Professional Conduct 1.3, 1.4, and 1.16 found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d) related to
her misconduct in representing a client in personal injury and workers’
compensation matters. The State Bar supports that recommendation. As
explained below, the recommended sanction appears insufficient in light of
Hemmann’s prior disciplinary history, although the existing record makes it
unclear whether Hemmann is continuing to engage in the same type of
misconduct. Accordingly, we reject the petition. As recounted by the special master, Hemmann admits that in January
2015, she executed a written agreement with a client to represent him on a claim
for damages against an at-fault driver for a minor soft tissue injury to his
shoulder that he sustained in an August 2014 automobile accident, as well as a
workers’ compensation claim because the accident occurred while he was
operating his employer’s vehicle. Less than a month after the representation
agreement was executed, Hemmann sent letters notifying Allstate Insurance
Company (the at-fault driver’s insurance company) and Travelers Insurance
Company (the employer’s workers’ compensation carrier) that she was
representing the client, and she also filed a WC-14 Notice of Claim with the
State Board of Workers’ Compensation on the client’s behalf. In March 2015,
Hemmann sent the client a copy of the filed WC-14 Notice of Claim and a letter
she received from Travelers confirming the claim number and the adjuster’s
name in the workers’ compensation case.
Thereafter, however, Hemmann took no further action to advance either
the personal injury case or the workers’ compensation case. In May 2015,
Hemmann spoke to the client on the phone regarding the matters she was
handling on his behalf and confirmed the conversation in a letter to the client on
2 the same date. After that, the client was unable to obtain information from
Hemmann regarding either matter, even though he left phone messages with
Hemmann’s secretary and sent Hemmann an e-mail in July 2015.1 On
December 11, 2015, the client sent Hemmann a letter expressing his
dissatisfaction with her failure to communicate with him, and on December 30,
2015, Hemmann sent him a letter stating that she would take no further action
on his behalf in relation to the personal injury and workers’ compensation cases.
The client alleges that he never received the December 30 letter, and Hemmann
admits that the client may not have received it. Hemmann further admits that
she did not notify the Board of Workers’ Compensation until June 2018 that she
was withdrawing from representing the client, having the mistaken belief that
no withdrawal was necessary in workers’ compensation matters, and that she
never notified Allstate or Travelers that she was no longer representing the
client.
The special master concludes that Hemmann violated Rule 1.3 by willfully
abandoning the client’s personal injury and workers’ compensation cases. In
1 Although Hemmann does not use e-mail and had so informed the client, she did have an e-mail address that was monitored by her secretary.
3 addition, the special master concludes that Hemmann violated Rule 1.4 when
she failed to communicate with the client about the status of his legal matters.
Finally, the special master concludes that Hemmann violated Rule 1.16 (c) by
ceasing work on the client’s legal matters and in effect withdrawing without
taking steps to protect his interests. The maximum penalty for a violation of
Rule 1.3 is disbarment, while the maximum penalty for a violation of Rules 1.4
and 1.16 is a public reprimand.
The special master correctly noted that the appropriate sanction in an
attorney disciplinary case serves as “a penalty to the offender, a deterrent to
others, and . . . an indication to laymen that the courts will maintain the ethics
of the profession.” In the Matter of Dowdy, 247 Ga. 488, 493 (277 SE2d 36)
(1981). The special master found that Hemmann’s request for a public
reprimand meets the standard set forth in Dowdy. The special master
recognized that this Court relies on the American Bar Association’s Standards
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions for general guidance in determining the
appropriate level of discipline, see In the Matter of Morse, 265 Ga. 353, 354
(456 SE2d 52) (1995), and that ABA Standard 4.43 provides that a reprimand
is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent and does not act with
4 reasonable diligence in representing a client and causes injury or potential injury
to a client.
The special master found in mitigation the absence of a dishonest or
selfish motive, see ABA Standard 9.32 (b); Hemmann’s cooperative attitude
toward the disciplinary proceedings, see ABA Standard 9.32 (e); her remorse,
see ABA Standard 9.32 (l); and the remoteness in time of prior disciplinary
proceedings, see ABA Standard 9.32 (m), noting that Hemmann received an
investigative panel reprimand in 1997. Additionally, the special master stated
that Hemmann had contacted the State Bar Law Practice Management Program,
scheduled a July 2018 audit to acquire recommendations for improvement of her
office management practices, and agreed to follow the recommendations; and
she also submitted character letters from clients and members of her community,
suggesting that she is a well-respected member of her community.
The special master identified as aggravating factors Hemmann’s
substantial experience in the practice of law, see ABA Standard 9.22 (i), and her
prior disciplinary offenses, including formal letters of admonition she received
in 2005 and 2010, see ABA Standard 9.22 (a). The special master did not
mention, however, an additional formal letter of admonition that Hemmann
5 admits she received in 2004 or — in the context of aggravation — the 1997
investigative panel reprimand. ABA Standard 4.4 explains that the sanction said
to be generally appropriate under ABA Standard 4.43 applies “[a]bsent
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.”
Having reviewed the record, we agree that Hemmann’s admitted facts are
sufficient to support a finding that she violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, and 1.16 of the
Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. However, based on the current record,
we cannot conclude that a public reprimand is an appropriate level of discipline,
given Hemmann’s extensive prior disciplinary history. Moreover, the current
record does not reveal whether those prior incidents of misconduct involved
similar violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which could show that
Hemmann continues to engage in misconduct involving the abandonment of
legal matters entrusted to her by clients, failure to communicate with those
clients, and failure to properly withdraw from representation despite her prior
admonitions and reprimand. Accordingly, while the special master noted that
some previous disciplinary cases involving similar misconduct have resulted in
public reprimands of lawyers with a disciplinary history, see In the Matter of
Hartin, 295 Ga. 859 (764 SE2d 542) (2014); In the Matter of Edmondson, 292
6 Ga. 893 (742 SE2d 740) (2013); In the Matter of R. A. H., 285 Ga. 870 (684
SE2d 631) (2009), this matter involves Hemmann’s fifth offense, and
particularly if the prior misconduct was similar in nature, a higher level of
discipline would be appropriate. See, e.g., In the Matter of Starling, 297 Ga.
359 (773 SE2d 768) (2015); In the Matter of Buckley, 291 Ga. 661 (732 SE2d
87) (2012). See also Bar Rule 4-103 (providing that a finding of a third or
subsequent disciplinary violation constitutes discretionary grounds for
suspension or disbarment, even if the violation normally provides for a lesser
maximum sanction); Bar Rule 4-208 (waiving the confidentiality of confidential
discipline like formal admonitions in the event of a subsequent disciplinary
proceeding and allowing that information to be used in aggravation of
discipline). We therefore reject Hemmann’s amended petition for voluntary
discipline.
Amended petition for voluntary discipline rejected. All the Justices
concur.
7 Decided October 22, 2018.
Petition for voluntary discipline.
Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K. Mittelman,
Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of Georgia.
Spencer Law, David S. Lipscomb, for Hemmann.