MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Jan 16 2020, 5:50 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Danielle Sheff Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Katherine A. Cornelius Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of: January 16, 2020
B.W., S.B. and L.W. (Minor Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-JC-1750 Children) Appeal from the Marion Superior And Court T.W. (Mother), The Honorable Marilyn A. Appellant-Respondent, Moores, Judge The Honorable Marcia J. Ferree, v. Magistrate Trial Court Cause Nos. The Indiana Department of 49D09-1901-JC-185, 49D09-1901- Child Services, JC-186, and 49D09-1901-JC-187 Appellee-Petitioner.
Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-1750 | January 16, 2020 Page 1 of 22 STATEMENT OF THE CASE [1] Appellant-Respondent, T.W. (Mother), appeals the trial court’s Order
adjudicating her minor children, B.W., S.B., and L.W. (collectively, Children),
to be children in need of services (CHINS).
[2] We affirm.
ISSUES [3] Mother presents three issues on appeal, which we restate as:
(1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted testimony alluding to results of a drug screen when the drug screen results were not admitted into evidence;
(2) Whether the trial court’s findings and conclusions determining Children to be CHINS were supported by the evidence; and
(3) Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Mother to participate in services as part of its disposition.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY [4] Mother has three children, B.W., born on February 13, 2013, S.B., born on
October 15, 2016, and L.W., born on November 15, 2018. 1 Mother has a
history of heroin abuse, and Mother admitted using heroin while she was
1 B.Y., who is the father of B.W., and M.B., who is the father of S.B., do not participate in this appeal. L.W.’s father is not identified in the record.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-1750 | January 16, 2020 Page 2 of 22 pregnant with L.W. Mother underwent treatment for her substance abuse in
October 2018 and was discharged from treatment into prenatal care at the
hospital where she gave birth. L.W.’s meconium tested positive for opiates,
amphetamines, and buprenorphine. On December 14, 2018, Mother entered
into an informal adjustment with the Department of Child Services (DCS).
Pursuant to that adjustment, Mother agreed to participate in Intensive Out-
Patient substance abuse treatment (IOP). Mother did not undergo this
treatment.
[5] In January 2019, DCS Family Case Manager Christina Vance (FCM Vance)
received a report that Mother was homeless and abusing substances. On
January 16, 2019, FCM Vance went to Mother’s most recent home and
interviewed Mother in order to assess Children’s safety and the risk of neglect to
Children. FCM Vance noted that Mother appeared to be nervous and uneasy
about the presence of a DCS worker in her home. Mother reported that she had
been living in her current residence for a couple of weeks. Mother was drug
tested that day. As part of her assessment, FCM Vance also spoke to S.B.’s
father, M.B., who admitted that he and Mother had abused drugs together in
the past. M.B. related that he knew Mother’s characteristics and mannerisms
when she was abusing drugs and that he had noticed that she was engaging in
those habits recently, leading him to believe that she was abusing drugs. After
completing her assessment, FCM Vance removed Children from Mother’s care.
[6] On January 18, 2019, DCS filed a petition alleging that Children were CHINS
because Mother had failed to provide them with a stable and appropriate living
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-1750 | January 16, 2020 Page 3 of 22 environment free from substance abuse, Mother’s substance abuse seriously
hindered her ability to care for Children, L.W.’s meconium had tested positive
for illegal substances, and Mother was not compliant with the terms of her
informal adjustment. DCS also alleged that Mother continued “to use illegal
drugs, she tested positive for opiates on or about January 16, 2019, and
[Mother] was observed to be erratic and jittery.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p.
91). On January 18, 2019, the trial court held an initial hearing on the CHINS
petition. Mother was sworn in and testified that L.W. was conceived after
Mother had been raped by an unknown individual. After the initial hearing on
the CHINS petition, the trial court entered an order “to provide [Mother] with
services in which she is willing to participate prior to adjudication.”
(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 105). The trial court also ordered Mother to
submit to random drug screening as a precondition to supervised parenting
time, and it ordered Mother to engage in trauma-focused cognitive behavioral
therapy.
[7] After the initial hearing, DCS made referrals for Mother for home-based
individual therapy to address Mother’s issues with domestic violence, substance
abuse, and coping with trauma. Mother was assessed for therapy on January
29, 2019. Mother’s treatment plan included a weekly meeting with her
therapist. Between January 29, 2019, and April 15, 2019, Mother and the
therapist met on two occasions. None of the weekly sessions in that time
period were cancelled by the therapist. On March 6, 2019, which was one of
the two times Mother met with her therapist, Mother signed an attendance
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-1750 | January 16, 2020 Page 4 of 22 agreement and discussed treatment goals. Mother did not undergo a substance
abuse assessment or IOP, both of which were referred by DCS following the
filing of the CHINS petition.
[8] Following the CHINS initial hearing, Mother was also referred for home-based
case management to address Mother’s issues with housing, employment, and
substance abuse. Mother’s attendance was good initially. Mother reported
moving to Greenwood early in April of 2019, but she had not provided a time
for her home-based case manager to inspect the new home. Mother had also
reported to her home-based case manager that she had accepted work as a
telemarketer and as a car re-possessor, but she had yet to provide her case
manager with verification of that employment. Mother had complied with the
random drug screening when requested. After Mother reported being
employed, her case manager agreed to decrease the number of times they met
from twice to once per week. Despite that accommodation for Mother’s
reported employment, Mother’s participation in home-based case management
decreased “dramatically” after the sessions decreased to once per week.
(Transcript Vol. II, p. 25).
[9] On April 15, 2019, the trial court held a fact-finding hearing on the CHINS
petition. FCM Vance testified regarding the January 16, 2019, assessment she
performed which resulted in Children’s removal from Mother’s care. FCM
Vance testified that the safety assessment resulted in a conclusion that Mother’s
home was unsafe for Children and that the risk assessment resulted in a
conclusion that Children were faced with a high probability of neglect without
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-1750 | January 16, 2020 Page 5 of 22 DCS’s intervention. When asked if the results of the drug screen administered
to Mother that day factored into the risk assessment FCM Vance performed,
the following exchange occurred:
[Mother’s Counsel]: Objection. [DCS Counsel is] trying to get drug screen results in the backdoor [sic]. If he wants to introduce drug screen results and authenticate them, he can, but short of that he, you know, it’s not appropriate under rules of evidence for him to try to sneak results in this way.
The [c]ourt: Response.
[DCS Counsel]: She’s entitled to list the things that went into her analysis as to the risk assessment and not even begun [sic] to discuss the contents of the drug screens. Only that there was one taken and there were actions taken because of those results.
The [c]ourt: Overruled. I’ll allow her to answer the question as it was asked.
(Tr. Vol. II, pp. 11-12). FCM Vance testified that the results of Mother’s
January 16, 2019, drug screen had factored into the risk assessment. FCM
Vance further testified without objection that DCS substantiated the neglect
report on January 16, 2019, “[d]ue to [Mother’s] use of illegal substances.” (Tr.
Vol. II, p. 15). FCM Vance clarified that DCS was concerned with Mother’s
substance abuse because, if she was under the influence of drugs, there would
be no sober caregiver in the home for Children.
[10] By the time of the CHINS fact-finding hearing, Mother had been discharged
from her home-based therapy and case management for lack of participation. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-1750 | January 16, 2020 Page 6 of 22 Mother had recently moved into the home of a relative. The permanency
FCM, Ebony Arnold (FCM Arnold), testified, without objection, that she drug
screened Mother on April 10, 2019, and that Mother “indicated that she had
taken an over the counter sleep aid and that was what was causing the results to
be positive.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 32). FCM Arnold related that DCS had
considered a temporary in-home trial visit for Mother at her new home but had
rejected that possibility since two other occupants of Mother’s new home had
substantiated DCS histories.
[11] On June 19, 2019, the trial court issued its Order declaring Children to be
CHINS. The trial court entered the following findings and conclusions:
11. Mother entered into an Informal Adjustment with DCS on December 14, 2018. Mother was not compliant with the Informal Adjustment, therefore, DCS filed the Petition on 1/18/2019.
12. On 1/16/2019, [FCM Vance] was assigned to complete an assessment involving Mother and the Children.
13. FCM Vance began her assessment by going to [M]other’s home where Mother had been living for a couple of weeks. Mother appeared very nervous and uncomfortable with FCM Vance being in the home. On that day, Mother submitted to a drug screen, the results of which factored into the assessment.
14. FCM Vance conducted a safety assessment and the results came back unsafe for the Children.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-1750 | January 16, 2020 Page 7 of 22 15. FCM Vance conducted a risk assessment and the results came back a high probability of future neglect of the Children without DCS intervention.
16. FCM Vance also spoke with [M.B.,] and he stated that he wanted his child in his care. He further explained that he and Mother used to do drugs together and the [sic] he was aware of her behaviors and demeanor when she was using drugs and that she recently started to exhibit those behaviors.
17. At the conclusion of the assessment, DCS recommended removal and placement of the [C]hildren in foster care.
****
21. Mother only met with [her home-based therapist] on 1/29/19 and 3/6/19, and as a result, she was unsuccessfully discharged from his home[-]based therapy service.
24. Initially, Mother was meeting with [her home-based case manager] regularly and complying with random drug screens. However, recently she has not been complying with his services and [home-based case] management services were closed unsuccessfully.
25. On 4/10/2019, Mother attended a child and family team meeting and submitted to an instant drug screen on that day. Mother told FCM Arnold that she took an over-the-counter sleep aid and it caused her screen results to be positive for a drug.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-1750 | January 16, 2020 Page 8 of 22 31. FCM Arnold started the process of checking the appropriateness of Mother’s current residence and learned that a relative member of the household has substantiated [DCS] history.
34. The Children’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or endangered as a result of [Mother’s] inability and neglect to provide the [C]hildren with a safe, stable and appropriate home environment.
35. The Children need a safe and stable home environment that includes a sober caregiver and they are unlikely to receive it without the coercive intervention of the [c]ourt.
36. The intervention of the [c]ourt is required to ensure the Children’s safety and well-being.
(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 176-78).
[12] On June 28, 2019, DCS filed a pre-dispositional report with the trial court that
recommended continued placement for Children outside of Mother’s care with
a permanency plan of reunification. On July 1, 2019, the trial court held the
dispositional hearing. DCS recommended that Mother undergo a substance
abuse assessment, random drug screens, home-based therapy, a parenting
assessment, and home-based casework to address housing instability and
unemployment. Apart from the home-based casework to address Mother’s
housing, Mother objected to these services. As part of its response to Mother’s
objection, DCS represented to the trial court that it had received reports from
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-1750 | January 16, 2020 Page 9 of 22 Mother’s parenting time supervisor that Mother was not bonded to L.W. and
that Mother’s parenting time with Children was chaotic. The parenting time
supervisor recommended that Mother undergo a parenting assessment and
follow up on its recommendations. The trial court found that the services
requested by DCS were rationally related to the reasons for the CHINS and
ordered Mother to complete and follow up on the recommendations of a
parenting assessment, home-based therapy, home-based case management, a
substance abuse assessment, and random drug screens.
[13] Mother now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION I. Admission of Evidence
[14] Mother’s first challenge to the trial court’s Order is that it improperly admitted
certain evidence at the CHINS fact-finding hearing. We review a trial court’s
admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. In re Des. B., 2 N.E.3d 828,
834 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). An abuse of the trial court’s discretion occurs if its
decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
before the court. Id.
[15] Mother argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it allowed
FCM Vance to testify that the results of Mother’s drug screen on January 16,
2019, factored into her assessment that resulted in Children being removed
from Mother’s care. Citing Indiana Evidence Rules 901 and 803, Mother
claims that DCS was impermissibly allowed to refer to the results of the drug
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-1750 | January 16, 2020 Page 10 of 22 screen without having the results themselves admitted. In addressing Mother’s
argument, we begin by noting that Evidence Rule 901 pertaining to
authentication of an item of evidence and Evidence Rule 803 providing the
business record exception to the hearsay rule are irrelevant to this case because
DCS did not attempt to admit the drug screen results themselves into evidence.
Therefore, there was no opportunity for DCS to run afoul of those evidentiary
rules. We also note that Mother did not object at the fact-finding hearing on
the due process grounds she claims as error on appeal. As a general rule, a
failure to raise a specific objection at the CHINS fact-finding hearing waives the
issue for appeal, and a party may not object on one ground at trial and raise a
new ground on appeal. In re Des. B., 2 N.E.3d at 834. By failing to raise the
specific due process objection at trial that she now raises on appeal, we
conclude that Mother has waived her claim.
[16] However, even if Mother’s claims were properly before us and well-taken, we
would not reverse the trial court’s Order in this case. Assuming, without
deciding, that the challenged evidence was erroneously admitted, the mere fact
that evidence was erroneously admitted does not automatically require reversal;
rather, we will only reverse if we conclude the admission affected a party’s
substantial rights. D.B.M. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 20 N.E.3d 174, 179 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.
[17] Here, the trial court found that Children were removed from Mother’s care on
January 16, 2019, following FCM Vance’s safety and risk assessments, and that
“Mother submitted to a drug screen, the results of which factored into the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-1750 | January 16, 2020 Page 11 of 22 assessment.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 177). Apart from the challenged
testimony, FCM Vance also testified at the fact-finding hearing, without
objection from Mother, that at the end of her assessment, FCM completed a
report substantiating neglect by Mother “[d]ue to [Mother’s] use of illegal
substances.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 15). We find that the challenged testimony was
harmless in light of this unchallenged testimony that Children were removed
from Mother’s care because DCS substantiated her drug use on January 16,
2019. In addition, the trial court found that M.B. recently had observed Mother
exhibiting the indicia of drug intoxication, which was additional evidence that
Mother was abusing substances while Children were in her care. As such, even
if the challenged testimony was improperly admitted, we cannot conclude that
Mother’s substantial rights were affected or that reversal is required. Id.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[18] Mother next challenges the evidence supporting the trial court’s determination
that Children are CHINS. More specifically, Mother argues that the evidence
did not show that Children were seriously endangered by Mother or that the
court’s coercive intervention was necessary to meet Children’s needs.
A. Standard of Review and Statutory Requirements
[19] The appellate courts generally accord latitude and deference to trial courts in
family law matters. Matter of E.K., 83 N.E.3d 1256, 1260 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017),
trans. denied. Our standard of review of a trial court’s CHINS determination is
well-settled: we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. In re
S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1286 (Ind. 2014). We consider only the evidence which
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-1750 | January 16, 2020 Page 12 of 22 supports the trial court’s decision and the reasonable inferences to be drawn
from that evidence. Id. at 1287. In addition, where, as here, the trial court has
entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we exercise a two-tiered review.
Matter of K.P.G., 99 N.E.3d 677, 681 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. First,
we consider whether the evidence supports the findings, and, second, we
determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. We will reverse a
trial court’s CHINS determination only if it is clearly erroneous and a review of
the record leaves us firmly convinced that a mistake was made. Id. at 681-82.
A CHINS determination is clearly erroneous “if the record facts do not support
the findings or if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.”
Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1997) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
[20] DCS sought to have Children adjudicated CHINS under Indiana Code section
31-34-1-1, 2 which provides as follows:
A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:
(1) the child’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the
2 DCS also alleged that L.W. was a CHINS pursuant to I.C. § 31-34-1-10 due to having tested positive for illegal substances at birth. The trial court found that L.W. had tested positive for illegal substances at birth. Mother does not contest that finding on appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-1750 | January 16, 2020 Page 13 of 22 child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision . . . and
(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:
(A) the child is not receiving; and
(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.
[21] Thus, an adjudication under this section “requires three basic elements: that
the parent’s actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child, that the
child’s needs are unmet, and (perhaps most critically) that those needs are
unlikely to be met without State coercion.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287. DCS
was required to prove that Children were CHINS by a preponderance of the
evidence. See I.C. § 31-34-12-3. In rendering a CHINS determination, the trial
court considers the family’s condition not just when the petition was filed, but
also when the petition is heard. In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290.
B. Endangerment
[22] The trial court concluded that “Children’s physical or mental condition is
seriously impaired or endangered as a result of [Mother’s] inability and neglect
to provide [Children] with a safe, stable and appropriate home environment[]”
and that “Children need a safe and stable home environment that includes a
sober caregiver[.]” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 178). The evidence showed
that Mother was an admitted heroin abuser whose drug use resulted in L.W.
testing positive for illegal substances at birth. In December 2018, Mother
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-1750 | January 16, 2020 Page 14 of 22 entered into an informal adjustment with DCS to address her substance abuse
through IOP. Mother was not compliant with the informal adjustment. On
January 16, 2019, FCM Vance substantiated Mother’s continued use of illegal
substances and assessed that Children were unsafe and at a high risk for neglect.
After the CHINS petition was filed, Mother was referred to individual therapy
and home-based case management designed to maintain her sobriety. Mother
was discharged from both of those services for lack of participation. Mother did
not complete the substance abuse assessment or the IOP referred to her after the
initiation of the CHINS proceedings. Although Mother had submitted a
number of negative drug screens after being ordered to undergo random testing,
Mother failed a drug screen less than one week prior to the CHINS fact-finding
hearing. This evidence supported a reasonable inference that Mother had failed
to address her substance abuse by the time of the fact-finding hearing and that
this failure deprived Children of a sober caregiver.
[23] In addition, although Mother had reported procuring two jobs, she had not
provided any confirmation of her employment to her home-based caseworker.
The trial court was under no obligation to believe Mother’s claim that she was
employed, and this evidence supports an inference that Mother was not actually
employed by the time of the fact-finding hearing. Mother also had been
discharged unsuccessfully from the home-based case management, the goal of
which was to assist her in maintaining housing for herself and Children, and, at
the time of the fact-finding hearing, Mother was living with a relative who had
a substantiated DCS history. This evidence showed that Mother did not have
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-1750 | January 16, 2020 Page 15 of 22 stable employment or appropriate housing to provide for Children’s needs. We
conclude that the evidence, as embodied by the trial court’s findings, indicated
that Children, the oldest of whom was a six-year-old and the youngest of whom
was a five-month-old baby, continued to be endangered by Mother’s
unaddressed substance abuse, employment instability, and lack of appropriate
housing. Therefore, the trial court’s determination was not clearly erroneous.
See Yanoff, 688 N.E.2d at 1262.
[24] Mother argues that the trial court’s determination regarding endangerment was
unsupported by the evidence because she was compliant with random drug
screens, there was evidence in the record that DCS would have allowed her a
trial temporary home visit if she were not living with someone with a DCS
history, and she had reported having employment. However, these arguments
are unpersuasive because they entail consideration of evidence that does not
support the trial court’s determination, which is contrary to our standard of
review. See In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287. Mother also argues that “absent
evidence regarding [Children’s] unmet needs, DCS wholly failed to present a
nexus between any evidence and potential harm to [Children].” (Appellant’s
Br. pp. 37-38). However, the CHINS statute does not require DCS or a trial
court to wait until a child is physically or emotionally harmed in order to
intervene; rather, a child is a CHINS if his or her physical or mental condition
is endangered by parental action or inaction. In re R.P., 949 N.E.2d 395, 401
(Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Because the evidence supported the trial court’s findings
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-1750 | January 16, 2020 Page 16 of 22 and conclusions, we find no clear error in the trial court’s determination that
Children were endangered by Mother. See Matter of K.P.G., 99 N.E.3d at 681.
C. Coercive Intervention
[25] Mother also challenges the evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that
Children required the coercive intervention of the court in order to have their
needs met. The purpose of a CHINS proceeding is to determine whether a
child’s circumstances require services that are unlikely to be provided without
the intervention of the court. Matter of E.Y., 126 N.E.3d 872, 877 (Ind. Ct. App.
2019). Therefore, the focus of a CHINS inquiry is on the condition of the child,
not on the culpability of the parents. Id. Requiring that DCS show that a
child’s needs are unlikely to be met without the intervention of the court
“guards against unwarranted State interference in family life, reserving that
intrusion for families ‘where parents lack the ability to provide for their
children,’ not merely where they ‘encounter difficulty in meeting a child’s
needs.’” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287 (quoting Lake Cnty. Div. of Family &
Children Servs. v. Charlton, 631 N.E.2d 526, 528 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis
in original). Indeed, the purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to “protect
children, not punish parents.” Id. at 1285.
[26] Here, DCS first became involved with this family when L.W. tested positive for
illegal substances at her birth and Mother admitted that she had used heroin. In
December of 2018, Mother entered into an informal adjustment with DCS and
agreed to enter IOP in an effort to avoid having Children be declared CHINS.
Mother did not engage in IOP. Next, DCS substantiated Mother’s drug use on
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-1750 | January 16, 2020 Page 17 of 22 January 16, 2019, and removed Children from her care. As part of the ensuing
CHINS proceedings, Mother was referred to individual therapy to address her
substance abuse and trauma. Mother was also referred to home-based case
management to assist her in maintaining her sobriety and appropriate housing.
Despite signing an attendance agreement with her therapist on March 6, 2019,
Mother was discharged from that service due to lack of participation. Mother
was also discharged from her other home-based services for lack of engagement.
By the time of the fact-finding hearing, Mother had recently tested positive for
an illegal substance, she had not provided verification of her employment to
DCS, and she was living in a home that was inappropriate for Children because
a roommate had a substantiated DCS history. We conclude that evidence that
Mother was non-compliant with services and continued to struggle with
employment and housing supported the trial court’s determination that
Children required the intervention of the court in order to have their needs for a
sober caregiver and a safe, stable home environment met.
[27] Mother contends otherwise, arguing that she was sober because she was
compliant with her random drug screens, her non-compliance with therapy was
not significant because she had no mental health concerns, and there was no
evidence that she would not correct her housing issues without court
intervention. However, the evidence showed that, while Mother initially
participated consistently in her home-based case management and drug screens,
her participation had dropped off “dramatically” after she reported
employment, she was discharged from home-based case management for
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-1750 | January 16, 2020 Page 18 of 22 nonattendance even after services were altered to accommodate her reported
employment, and she had a positive drug screen less than one week before the
fact-finding hearing. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 25). The evidence also showed that at the
initial hearing on the CHINS petition, Mother reported being raped and that
she discussed treating her trauma with her therapist as a goal of her individual
therapy. In addition, Mother was discharged unsuccessfully from the services
offered to her to assist her in procuring and maintaining appropriate housing
and she had been unable to do so on her own. Accordingly, we cannot say that
the trial court’s conclusion that coercive intervention was necessary was clearly
erroneous or that we are convinced that a mistake was made. See Matter of
K.P.G., 99 N.E.3d at 681.
III. Dispositional Order
[28] Mother also challenges the trial court’s Dispositional Order requiring that she
participate in home-based therapy, home-based case management, 3 a substance
abuse assessment, random drug screens, and a parenting assessment and to
follow up on all treatment recommendations. Following a CHINS
determination and a dispositional hearing, the trial court issues its dispositional
order detailing the plan of care, treatment, or rehabilitation required to address
the CHINS’ needs. I.C. § 31-34-19-10. As part of its dispositional order, the
3 The trial court ordered home-based case management to address employment and housing. Mother does not challenge the imposition of home-based case management to assist her with housing.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-1750 | January 16, 2020 Page 19 of 22 trial court is required to enter findings and conclusions pertaining to a parent’s
need to participate in the plan of care of the CHINS. I.C. § 31-34-19-10(2).
The CHINS statute provides that a trial court that has determined that a parent
should participate in a program of care, treatment, or rehabilitation for the child
may order the parent to do the following:
(1) Obtain assistance in fulfilling the obligations as a parent [].
(2) Provide specified care, treatment, or supervision for the child.
(3) Work with a person providing care, treatment, or rehabilitation for the child.
(4) Participate in a program operated by or through the department of correction.
(5) Participate in a mental health or addiction treatment program.
I.C. § 31-34-20-3. “Although the juvenile court has broad discretion in
determining what programs and services in which a parent is required to
participate, the requirements must relate to some behavior or circumstance that
was revealed by the evidence.” In re A.C., 905 N.E.2d 456, 464 (Ind. Ct. App.
2009). This court has recognized that forcing unnecessary requirements on
parents whose children have been determined to be CHINS could set them up
for failure, resulting in failure of reunification of the family and possibly the
termination of parental rights. Id. at 464-65.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-1750 | January 16, 2020 Page 20 of 22 [29] The gravamen of Mother’s argument is that the need for the ordered services
was not supported by evidence in the record and that because she works “two
or three jobs,” the requirements of the ordered services have set her up for
failure. (Appellant’s Br. p. 39). Home-based therapy, home-based case
management, a substance abuse assessment, and random drug screens were
previously referred for Mother to address her substance abuse. Mother was an
admitted heroin abuser who had not yet undergone a substance abuse
assessment, had her referrals for home-based therapy and home-based case
management closed for lack of participation, and had failed a random drug
screen as recently as April 5, 2019, less than a week before the CHINS fact-
finding hearing. At the July 1, 2019, dispositional hearing, no new evidence
pertaining to Mother’s sobriety was admitted.
[30] Mother had also reported being raped, resulting in the birth of L.W. Home-
based therapy had been referred to assist Mother in coping with her trauma, but
Mother had not engaged in therapy through the CHINS proceedings. Home-
based case management had also been referred for Mother in order to address
her employment. Mother’s employment had not been confirmed by the time of
the fact-finding hearing, and the pre-dispositional report revealed that Mother
still was not reporting any income as of June 27, 2019. In addition, at the
dispositional hearing, Mother’s counsel argued that a parenting-time assessment
would be appropriate if a service provider recommended it. DCS represented to
the trial court that the parenting-time supervisor was recommending a parenting
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-1750 | January 16, 2020 Page 21 of 22 assessment due to observing “chaotic” parenting time and a lack of bonding
between Mother and L.W. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 47).
[31] In light of this evidence, we conclude that a rational basis existed in the record
for ordering these services for Mother to assist her in procuring and maintaining
her sobriety, her mental health, employment, and parenting skills, all of which
continued to be issues up to the dispositional hearing. We find Mother’s
argument that her employment makes the services ordered too onerous to be
unpersuasive for several reasons. Mother never actually established that she
was employed, and there is no evidence in the record regarding what the
circumstances of her reported employment were. In addition, when Mother
reported being employed during the CHINS proceedings, DCS showed a
willingness to accommodate her by decreasing the time requirements of services
and meeting her where she was to eliminate additional travel time for her. On
the record before us, we cannot conclude that the services ordered were unduly
burdensome on Mother, so we affirm the trial court’s Dispositional Order.
CONCLUSION [32] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that any error in the admission of the
challenged testimony was harmless, sufficient evidence supported the trial
court’s determination that Children are CHINS, and that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it ordered Mother to participate in services.
[33] Affirmed.
[34] Baker, J. and Brown, J. concur Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-1750 | January 16, 2020 Page 22 of 22