In the Matter of A.W. v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth)
• Decided: February 26, 2026
• Docket: 02-25-00259-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00259-CV ___________________________

IN THE MATTER OF A.W.

On Appeal from the 323rd District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 323-122055-23

Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Womack, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant A.W. appeals from a juvenile-court order transferring him to the

Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) to

complete the remainder of his determinate sentence. We affirm.

In November 2023, according to an agreement with the State, A.W. judicially

confessed to engaging in delinquent conduct by committing murder; the trial court

found him delinquent and sentenced him to the agreed twenty-year determinate

sentence. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(1); see also Tex. Fam. Code

Ann. § 53.045(a)(1) (providing that a murder offense is eligible for determinate

sentencing).

On March 5, 2025, the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD) requested by

letter that the trial court decide whether to transfer A.W. to TDCJ because his

conduct at TJJD “indicate[d] that the welfare of the community require[d] the

transfer.” See Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 244.014(a); see also Tex. Fam. Code

Ann. §§ 54.04(d)(3), 54.11. After a May 14, 2025 hearing,1 the trial court ordered

A.W. transferred to TDCJ to serve the remainder of his sentence.

A.W.’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a

brief in which he asserts that, after thoroughly examining the record, he “does not

believe that there are legally non-frivolous issues constituting reversible error in this

1 The District Clerk’s file stamp on TJJD’s letter is April 24, 2025. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.11(h) (requiring transfer hearing to be held “not later than the 60th day after the date the court receives the referral” (emphasis added)).

2 appeal.” Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,

744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of the

record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced on

appeal. See In re D.A.S., 973 S.W.2d 296, 299 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (applying

Anders procedure to juvenile proceedings). Counsel also (1) provided A.W. with

copies of the brief and accompanying motion to withdraw and a form pro se motion

to access the appellate record and (2) informed A.W. of his rights to review the

record, to file a pro se response to the Anders brief, and to file a petition for review

with the Texas Supreme Court should we affirm the order. See Kelly v. State, 436

S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

A.W. filed a pro se response indicating only that he wishes to continue this

appeal. The State declined to file a brief but indicated in a letter that it agreed that

A.W. “has no meritorious grounds upon which to advance an appeal in this case.”

Because A.W’s counsel filed an Anders brief, we must independently examine

the record to decide whether counsel correctly concluded that the appeal is frivolous.

See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). After carefully

reviewing the record, counsel’s brief and A.W.’s pro se response, we find nothing in

the record, but for the modifiable court costs discussed below, that might arguably

support the appeal. Thus, we agree with counsel that the appeal is frivolous. See

Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

3 Regarding the court costs assessed, (1) the clerk’s record contains a bill of costs

for $123, and (2) the supplemental clerk’s record contains a bill of costs for $23; these

costs are for preparation of the clerk’s records for appeal, certification-and-seal fees,

and “District Clerk’s Fees.” But the transfer order did not assess costs; A.W.’s

mother had filed an uncontested affidavit of indigency in the trial court; and the trial

court found that A.W. could not afford an attorney and appointed him one. See Tex.

Fam. Code Ann. § 51.10(f); Tex. R. Civ. P. 145(a). Nothing in the record shows that

A.W. has ceased to be indigent. See generally In re K.C.A., 36 S.W.3d 501 (Tex. 2000).

“For a party who files an affidavit of inability to pay costs, there are no costs to

bill . . . .” Campbell v. Wilder, 487 S.W.3d 146, 151 (Tex. 2016) (explaining that, under

Rule 145, the affidavit is in lieu of paying or giving security for costs and that an

uncontested affidavit of inability to pay is conclusive as a matter of law). Accordingly,

we delete a total of $146––all the fees assessed by the trial-court clerk in this appeal—

from the two bills of costs. See In re C.J., No. 02-24-00070-CV, 2024 WL 3978048, at

*1–2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 29, 2024, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.).

We affirm the trial court’s order and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. If

A.W. wishes to seek further review of this case, he must either file a pro se petition

for review in the Texas Supreme Court or retain an attorney to file a petition for

review in the Texas Supreme Court. See In re D.J., No. 02-20-00386-CV, 2021 WL

2586610, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 24, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also

Tex. R. App. P. 53.2 (listing required contents of petition for review), 53.7(a)

4 (providing that petition for review must be filed 45 days after the date of this court’s

judgment or—if a timely motion for rehearing or a timely motion for en banc

reconsideration is filed in this court—within 45 days of this court’s last ruling on such

motions).

/s/ Dabney Bassel

Dabney Bassel Justice

Delivered: February 26, 2026