In the Interest of W.S.

899 S.W.2d 772, 1995 Tex. App. LEXIS 1110, 1995 WL 302899
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMay 18, 1995
Docket2-94-151-CV
StatusPublished
Cited by213 cases

This text of 899 S.W.2d 772 (In the Interest of W.S.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In the Interest of W.S., 899 S.W.2d 772, 1995 Tex. App. LEXIS 1110, 1995 WL 302899 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).

Opinion

OPINION

LIVINGSTON, Justice.

Following a suit affecting the parent-child relationship brought by the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services (“DPRS”), the court ordered termination of the parental rights of Bonnie and Dawayne Sharp to their four children, A.L., W.S., R.S., and A.S. Appellants challenge the termination of their parental rights in W.S., R.S., and A.S. 1 arguing that: 1) there was no evidence or factually insufficient evidence to support a finding that appellants knowingly placed and allowed the children to remain in dangerous conditions; 2) there was no evidence or factually insufficient evidence to support a finding that appellants engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the children; 3) the admission of the videotape of A.L.’s testimony was error because the tape was inherently leading in nature; and 4) the trial court improperly commented and gave weight to Dawayne Sharp’s failure to take a plethysmograph test. We affirm because there was sufficient evidence to support the findings, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by admitting the videotape, and the trial court’s findings do not indicate that the court gave weight to Dawayne Sharp’s failure to take a plethysmograph.

The facts that gave rise to this case began on the evening of September 5, 1991, when *775 Bonnie Sharp was awakened and discovered that her eight-year-old daughter, A.L., and her husband, Dawayne, were awake. A.L. was pulling up her panties, and Dawayne explained that he was watching A.L. masturbate. Later that same evening, Bonnie left A.L. and her other three children with Da-wayne and went out to get some food. When Bonnie returned, she saw Dawayne getting on top of A.L. to have sex with her. Several of the other children were in the same room at the time. Bonnie called the police, and A.L. was taken to the hospital for a sexual assault examination. The results of the examination supported a finding of sexual abuse. At the time of trial, Dawayne and Bonnie were still living together as husband and wife.

The trial court found that Dawayne sexually abused A.L. on more than one occasion, Bonnie was aware of the abuse and continued to place her daughter with Dawayne, and all of the children showed signs of sexual abuse. The trial court concluded that both Bonnie and Dawayne:

Knowingly placed and knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions and surroundings which endangered the physical and emotional well-being of the children; and
Engaged in conduct and knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical and emotional well-being of the children.

Appellants’ rights were terminated as to W.S., R.S., and A.S.

EVIDENTIARY REVIEW

In points of error one and two, appellants argue there is no evidence or factually insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact that appellants endangered the well-being of their children. 2 The Texas Family Code allows for involuntary termination of parental rights where the court finds a parent has:

(D) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child; or (E) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child; [and]
(2) termination is in the best interest of the child.

TexFaM.Code Ann. § 15.02(a)(1)(D), (a)(1)(E), (a)(2) (Vernon Supp.1995).

Findings of fact entered in a case tried to the court are of the same force and dignity as a jury’s answers to jury questions. Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex.1991). The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewable for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support them by the same standards that are applied in reviewing the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury’s answer to a jury question. Arena v. Arena, 822 S.W.2d 645, 650 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1991, no writ); Raposa v. Johnson, 693 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).

Standard of Review

In determining a “no evidence” point, we are to consider only the evidence and inferences that tend to support the finding and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. T.O. Stanley Boot Co., Inc. v. Bank of El Paso, 847 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex.1992); Orozco v. Sander, 824 S.W.2d 555, 556 (Tex.1992); In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661-62 (1951). A “no evidence” point of error may only be sustained when the record discloses one of the following: 1) a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; 2) the court is barred by rules of law or evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; 3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla of evidence; or 4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact. Juliette *776 Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Assoc., Inc., 793 S.W.2d 660, 666 n. 9 (Tex.1990).

Proceedings to terminate parental rights under section 15.02 of the Texas Family Code require proof by clear and convincing evidence. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1391-92, 71 L.Ed.2d 599, 603 (1982); Richardson v. Green, 677 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex.1984); Swinney v. Mosher, 830 S.W.2d 187, 195 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1992, writ denied). This higher burden of proof at the trial court does not, however, alter the appellate standard of review for factual sufficiency. See Faram v. Gervitz-Faram, 895 S.W.2d 839, 843 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1995, n.w.h.) (rejecting the “intermediate standard of appellate review” in cases involving the clear and convincing burden of proof); D.O. v. Texas Dep’t of Human Serv., 851 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Tex.App.—Austin 1993, no writ).

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Bluebook (online)
899 S.W.2d 772, 1995 Tex. App. LEXIS 1110, 1995 WL 302899, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-the-interest-of-ws-texapp-1995.