in the Interest of T.C. and J.C., Children
This text of in the Interest of T.C. and J.C., Children (in the Interest of T.C. and J.C., Children) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo ________________________
No. 07-18-00232-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF T.C. AND J.C., CHILDREN ________________________
No. 07-18-00233-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF T.C., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 108th District Court Potter County, Texas Trial Court Nos. 88,731-E & 89,364-E; Honorable Douglas Woodburn, Presiding
June 12, 2018
ABATEMENT AND REMAND
Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and PARKER, JJ.
Appellant mother, S.C., and Appellant father, T.C., both appealed from the trial
court’s orders terminating their parental rights to their children, T.C., J.C., and T.C.1 The
appellate record has been filed in each case and the father’s court-appointed counsel has
1 Appellant father and his two sons all have the same initials. To protect the privacy of the parents, the children, and other parties, we refer to the children by their initials. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d) (West Supp. 2017). See also TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b). filed a brief in each cause of action, pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U. S. 738, 87
S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967), in support of a motion to withdraw, by which she
represents there are no meritorious issues to present on appeal. Because we find the
sole ground presented in T.C.’s brief presents a potentially meritorious ground for relief,
we grant T.C.’s appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw and she is relieved as T.C.’s
appellate attorney of record. We abate these appeals and remand the causes to the trial
court for appointment of new counsel to address any other potentially meritorious issues.
BACKGROUND
The parents of the children the subject of these proceedings have a history of drug
abuse. S.C. also has two convictions for abandoning or endangering a child for which
she was placed on five years community supervision. The Texas Department of Family
and Protective Services had previously placed the children with their maternal
grandmother, T.H., but they were removed from her home after they tested positive for
significant levels of cocaine. The grandmother was supposed to be supervising all
contact between S.C. and the children but could not explain why they tested positive. The
third child, a newborn at the time, was removed due to testing positive for cocaine from
ongoing exposure to drugs before his birth.
In October 2016, just weeks after giving birth to T.C., the Department received a
report that S.C. was selling drugs from her car while all three children were in the car.
The Department had an open case file on the family dating back to November 15, 2015,
so the parents were already working family service plans. S.C. completed most but not
all of her services and continued to test positive for drugs. T.C. did not complete most of
his services and also failed to maintain a drug-free lifestyle.
2 The caseworker testified that the children were placed in foster care in December
2017 and were doing well. The foster parents hope to adopt the children if the trial court
terminates the parent-child relationship.
Based on the parents’ continued drug use and failure to complete their service
plans, the Department proceeded to terminate their parental rights. Regarding the father,
the trial court signed termination orders based on the statutory grounds set forth in section
161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), and (P). TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (P)
(West Supp. 2017). 2 The trial court also found that termination of the father’s rights was
in the children’s best interests. Id. at § 161.001(b)(2).
ANALYSIS
Although the Texas Supreme Court has yet to directly consider the issue, this court
has found the procedures set forth in Anders v. California applicable to appeals of orders
terminating parental rights. See In re A.W.T., 61 S.W.3d 87, 88 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
2001, no pet.). When presented with an Anders brief, we are required, just as in criminal
cases, to make an independent examination of the entire record to determine whether
there are any arguable grounds that might support an appeal. Stafford v. State, 813
S.W.503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
The Texas Family Code permits a court to terminate the parent-child relationship
if the Department establishes (1) one or more acts or omissions enumerated under
section 161.001(b)(1) and (2) termination of that relationship is in the child’s best interest.
See § 161.001(b)(1), (2). See also Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 370 (Tex. 1976).
2 All further references to “§” or to “section” are to the Texas Family Code. 3 Recognizing that only one statutory ground is needed to support a termination
order; In re K.C.B., 280 S.W.3d 888, 894-95 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. denied),
father’s counsel presented her argument that these appeals are frivolous based solely on
an analysis of section 161.001(b)(1)(O) and the trial court’s best interest finding. That
subsection provides that a trial court may terminate the parent-child relationship if it finds
by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has failed to comply with the provisions
of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the parent to obtain
the return of his children. (Emphasis added).
From this court’s independent examination of the records in both appeals, we find
there is no court order detailing the actions necessary for T.C. to obtain the return of his
children.3 This court has held that to support a termination order based on section
161.001(b)(1)(O), there must be a court order rather than simply a Department-generated
service plan. See In re B.L.R.P., 269 S.W.3d 707, 710-11 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, no
pet.). See also In re Z.B. & Z.B., No. 07-16-00026-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 7420, at
*13 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 12, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that failure of the
appellate record to contain a court order establishing the actions necessary for a parent
to obtain the return of his child defeats a termination order based on subsection (O)). A
family service plan that is not incorporated in a court order does not suffice. In re Z.B. &
Z.B., 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 7420, at *14.
Without a court order, the Department failed to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that T.C.’s parental rights could be terminated under subsection (O). T.C.’s
3The clerk of this court has also made an inquiry to the District Clerk to determine if the order in question had been inadvertently omitted from the clerk’s record. No order was located. 4 counsel’s argument that the appeals are frivolous based on subsection (O) alone is
inaccurate and termination under that ground does not merely present an arguable issue
but a potentially reversible one. In re B.L.R.P., 269 S.W.3d at 711.
Consequently, we remand these appeals to the trial court. Upon remand, due to
the time sensitive nature of appeals from parental termination orders; see TEX. R. JUD.
ADMIN. 6.2(a),4 the trial court shall immediately appoint new counsel to represent T.C in
these appeals.
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