COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH
NO. 02-11-00122-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF S.G. AND S.J.G.
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FROM THE 158TH DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY
MEMORANDUM OPINION1 ---------- Appellant A.G. (Father) appeals the termination of his parental rights to his
children S.G. and S.J.G. We will affirm.
Background Facts
Father is the biological father of S.G., who was six years old at the time of
trial, and S.J.G., who was almost three years old. The mother of the children is
Father’s former girlfriend (Mother), who had two older children from an earlier
relationship. The Department of Family and Protective Services (the
1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. Department) was notified in April 2010, of alleged abuse of the four children by
Mother.2 At the time, Father was incarcerated for assaulting Mother.
Child Protective Services (CPS) investigator Lishawa Jackson interviewed
the children. S.G. told her that they were being spanked with hangers and that
the children had to sleep in the garage because Mother was running a massage
business out of the house. M.G., the children’s nine year old half-brother, told
Jackson that when it was hot, they would plug in a fan, and when it was cold they
would plug in a heater. When the garage got too hot, the children would put ice
bags on the bed to cool it off. When Mother had a client, the children had to wait
outside for eight minutes before they were allowed to come in. Other women
worked with Mother out of the house, and the bedrooms were numbered ―One,‖
―Two,‖ and ―Three.‖ S.G. told Jackson that sometimes he would stay home alone
with S.J.G., his then two year old sister. Jackson also interviewed Mother at the
home. Mother denied that the children slept in the garage, or had to use a fan or
ice packs on beds in the garage, although she did acknowledge that the children
2 The April 2010 investigation was the fifth investigation of Mother and the fourth of Father. The Department was first notified of Mother and her two older children in 2002, before Father’s two children were born. The Department was notified again in 2004, regarding a mark on one of the children’s backs and on one of their lips. That investigation was ruled unable to determine. The third investigation was also in 2004 regarding improper feeding. In July 2008, the Department was notified again because ―there was no food in the home, the family was borrowing electricity from a neighbor, [and] it was cluttered, it smelled, [and there were] dirty clothes all over the home.‖ The investigation was ruled reason to believe.
2 would plug in an electric heater in the winter. M.G. also confirmed that Mother
spanked them with a hanger, which Mother did not deny.
The CPS investigation also revealed ads Mother had posted on websites
advertising her services with pictures of her in lingerie. While Jackson was at the
home interviewing Mother, the police arrived to arrest Mother on outstanding
warrants. When the police told Mother that they suspected she was engaging in
prostitution out of her home, Mother replied that she ―had to do what she had to
do.‖ Jackson visited Father in jail and asked him if he had concerns about
Mother’s prostitution. He said he did, ―but what [could he] do about it, [he was] in
jail.‖
In April 2010, the Department took the children into its care and filed for
termination. They were put in a foster home because there was no suitable
family placement. The court ordered the parents to complete CPS-designed
service plans.
After a bench trial on March 14 and 15, 2011, the trial court found by clear
and convincing evidence that Father engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the
children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or
emotional well-being of the children, failed to comply with the provisions of a
court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the parent to
3 obtain the return of the children, and that termination was in the best interest of
the children.3 Father now appeals.
Standard of Review
A parent’s rights to ―the companionship, care, custody, and management‖
of his or her children are constitutional interests ―far more precious than any
property right.‖ Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59, 102 S. Ct. 1388,
1397 (1982); In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 547 (Tex. 2003). ―While parental rights
are of constitutional magnitude, they are not absolute. Just as it is imperative for
courts to recognize the constitutional underpinnings of the parent-child
relationship, it is also essential that emotional and physical interests of the child
not be sacrificed merely to preserve that right.‖ In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26
(Tex. 2002). In a termination case, the State seeks not just to limit parental rights
but to erase them permanently—to divest the parent and child of all legal rights,
privileges, duties, and powers normally existing between them, except for the
child’s right to inherit. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.206(b) (West 2008); Holick v.
Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). We strictly scrutinize termination
proceedings and strictly construe involuntary termination statutes in favor of the
parent. Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20–21; In re R.R., 294 S.W.3d 213, 233 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.).
3 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of Mother and the biological father of Mother’s two oldest children. Neither Mother nor the other father are a party to this appeal.
4 In proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship brought under
section 161.001 of the family code, the petitioner must establish one ground
listed under subsection (1) of the statute and must also prove that termination is
in the best interest of the child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001 (West Supp.
2011); In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005). Both elements must be
established; termination may not be based solely on the best interest of the child
as determined by the trier of fact. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727
S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987).
Termination decisions must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 161.001 (West Supp. 2011), 161.206(a)
(West 2008). Evidence is clear and convincing if it ―will produce in the mind of
the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought
to be established.‖ Id. § 101.007 (West 2008). Due process demands this
heightened standard because termination results in permanent, irrevocable
changes for the parent and child. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002);
see In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. 2007) (contrasting standards for
termination and modification).
Discussion
I. Legal and Factual Sufficiency of the Evidence
A. Grounds for Termination
In evaluating the evidence for legal sufficiency in parental termination
cases, we determine whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could
5 reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that the grounds for termination were
proven. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). We review all the
evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and judgment. Id. We resolve
any disputed facts in favor of the finding if a reasonable factfinder could have
done so. Id. We disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have
disbelieved. Id. We consider undisputed evidence even if it is contrary to the
finding. Id. That is, we consider evidence favorable to termination if a
reasonable factfinder could, and we disregard contrary evidence unless a
reasonable factfinder could not. Id.
We cannot weigh witness credibility issues that depend on the appearance
and demeanor of the witnesses, for that is the factfinder’s province. Id. at 573,
574. And even when credibility issues appear in the appellate record, we defer
to the factfinder’s determinations as long as they are not unreasonable. Id. at
573.
In reviewing the evidence for factual sufficiency, we give due deference to
the factfinder’s findings and do not supplant the judgment with our own. In re
H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). We determine whether, on the entire
record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that the
parent violated subsections (E) or (O) of section 161.001(1) and that the
termination of the parent-child relationship would be in the best interest of the
child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001; C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28. If, in light of the
entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have
6 credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not
reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction in the truth of its finding, then
the evidence is factually insufficient. H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108.
In his first two points, Father argues that the evidence is legally and
factually insufficient to support termination under subsections (E) and (O). See
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(E), (O). Subsection (O) provides for
termination when a parent fails to comply with the provisions of a court order that
specifically establishes the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return
of the child who has been in the permanent or temporary managing
conservatorship of the Department for not less than nine months as a result of
the child’s removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of
the child. See Id. § 161.001(1)(O). Father was court ordered to, among other
things,
(1) establish and maintain safe, stable, and appropriate housing for a period of at least six months;
(2) establish and maintain suitable employment for a period of at least six months;
(3) register with the Texas Workforce Commission within three work days of becoming unemployed;
(4) submit to a drug and alcohol assessment with Brief Therapy Institute and follow all recommendations from that assessment;
(5) attend weekly counseling sessions through Brief Therapy Institute and cooperate fully in all recommendations made through the counseling sessions;
(6) complete parenting classes with the Child and Family Guidance Center;
7 (7) submit to drug testing;
(8) submit to a psychological evaluation and follow all recommendations from the evaluation; and
(9) have supervised visitation with the children once a week.
Father admitted at trial that he had been unemployed since he was
released from jail. He testified that he was hired for a position but was
terminated the same day because he had a visitation with his children scheduled
for that day. He provided no documentation or witness to corroborate that
testimony. He said he was waiting until after trial to get a job. He also admitted
that he did not register with the Texas Workforce Commission. Despite being
unemployed, the testimony established that Father missed multiple visits with his
children, which Father acknowledged.
Father also admitted that he never went to the required counseling
sessions. He testified that he tried, but the counselor was ill and the substitute
counselor was booked. Father never notified the Department of his problem or
asked for their assistance, even though he had his caseworker’s cell phone
number at all times. He testified that he could not go to another counselor
because they were too far and he did not have a driver’s license. He blamed the
―State of Texas‖ for his lack of license because the State would not waive tickets
he had not paid. Father claimed he was going to a private counselor, but he later
explained that the doctor was just a psychiatrist who was monitoring Father’s
8 medication. He also testified that he had requested an MHMR counselor while in
jail but never saw one.
It is well settled that the family code does not provide for excuses for
failure to complete court ordered services, nor does it consider ―substantial
compliance‖ to be the same as completion. See In re M.C.G., 329 S.W.3d 674,
675–76 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied); In re T.T., 228
S.W.3d 312, 319 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (noting
Texas courts have uniformly found substantial compliance with provisions of
court order inadequate to avoid termination finding under subsection (O)); In re
T.N.F., 205 S.W.3d 625, 630–31 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, pet. denied)
(emphasizing that parents must comply with every requirement of the court order
and that subsection (O) does not allow for consideration of excuses for
noncompliance); Wilson v. State, 116 S.W.3d 923, 929 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003,
no pet.) (―Wilson’s economic argument does not create a factual dispute as to
her compliance: it is, instead, in the nature of an excuse for her failure to
comply.‖). Rather, any excuse for failing to complete a family services plan goes
only to the best interest determination. See T.N.F., 205 S.W.3d at 631; see also
Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371 (Tex.1976); In re C.M.C., 273 S.W.3d
862, 874–75 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (holding that
mother’s argument that she did not take a parenting class because none were
available ―[did] not create a factual dispute as to her compliance; rather, it is in
the nature of an excuse for her failure to comply‖).
9 The evidence established that at the time of trial Father had not maintained
employment, had not registered with the Texas Workforce Commission since his
release from jail, did not consistently attend visitation with his children, and had
not attended counseling sessions pursuant to the court order. We conclude that
a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Father
failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established
the actions necessary for him to obtain the return of his children. We overrule
Father’s second point. Because, along with a best interest finding, a finding of
only one ground alleged under section 161.001(1) is necessary to support a
judgment of termination, we need not address Father’s first point. See Tex. R.
App. P. 47.1; see also In re E.M.N., 221 S.W.3d 815, 821 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2007, no pet.); In re S.B., 207 S.W.3d 877, 886 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no
pet.).
B. Best Interest
In his fifth point, Father challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the
evidence that termination is in the best interest of the children.
There is a strong presumption that keeping a child with a parent is in the
child’s best interest. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006). Prompt and
permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is also presumed to be
in the child’s best interest. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(a) (West 2008). The
following factors should be considered in evaluating the parent’s willingness and
ability to provide the child with a safe environment:
10 (1) the child’s age and physical and mental vulnerabilities;
(2) the frequency and nature of out-of-home placements;
(3) the magnitude, frequency, and circumstances of the harm to the child;
(4) whether the child has been the victim of repeated harm after the initial report and intervention by the department or other agency;
(5) whether the child is fearful of living in or returning to the child’s home;
(6) the results of psychiatric, psychological, or developmental evaluations of the child, the child’s parents, other family members, or others who have access to the child’s home;
(7) whether there is a history of abusive or assaultive conduct by the child’s family or others who have access to the child’s home;
(8) whether there is a history of substance abuse by the child’s family or others who have access to the child’s home;
(9) whether the perpetrator of the harm to the child is identified;
(10) the willingness and ability of the child’s family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services and to cooperate with and facilitate an appropriate agency’s close supervision;
(11) the willingness and ability of the child’s family to effect positive environmental and personal changes within a reasonable period of time;
(12) whether the child’s family demonstrates adequate parenting skills, including providing the child and other children under the family’s care with:
(A) minimally adequate health and nutritional care;
(B) care, nurturance, and appropriate discipline consistent with the child’s physical and psychological development;
11 (C) guidance and supervision consistent with the child’s safety;
(D) a safe physical home environment;
(E) protection from repeated exposure to violence even though the violence may not be directed at the child; and
(F) an understanding of the child’s needs and capabilities; and
(13) whether an adequate social support system consisting of an extended family and friends is available to the child.
Id. § 263.307(b); R.R., 209 S.W.3d at 116.
Other, nonexclusive factors that the trier of fact in a termination case may
use in determining the best interest of the child include:
(A) the desires of the child;
(B) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future;
(C) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future;
(D) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody;
(E) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child;
(F) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody;
(G) the stability of the home or proposed placement;
(H) the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and
(I) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent.
12 Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
These factors are not exhaustive; some listed factors may be inapplicable
to some cases; other factors not on the list may also be considered when
appropriate. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. Furthermore, undisputed evidence of just
one factor may be sufficient in a particular case to support a finding that
termination is in the best interest of the child. Id. On the other hand, the
presence of scant evidence relevant to each factor will not support such a
finding. Id.
The Department investigator Jackson testified that all of the children who
were of school age were behind in their education. She testified that neither
Mother nor Father was maintaining contact with the children’s school. The
children were supposed to be receiving free lunches, but the paperwork had
never been completed. The school reported that S.G. was doing well, but Father
testified that he supervised the older children’s homework and they were both
two grade levels behind.
Father has been involved in four Department investigations since 2004.
The CPS referral in 2008 was for the children wearing dirty clothes to school.
When CPS investigated the house, there was no electricity and the house
smelled. Father testified that it took two weeks to get the electricity back on.
Father has a long criminal history dating back to 1996, including
convictions for possession of marijuana; possession of cocaine; possession of
Xanax; and delivery of cocaine, for which he served thirteen months in the
13 penitentiary. Father also served two hundred days in jail for assaulting Mother.
Mother had registered with the Victim Information and Notification Everyday
(VINE) network to be notified when he was released. Father admitted that his
criminal behavior was harmful to his children. But when he was asked whether
anyone got hurt the night he assaulted Mother, Father said, ―If you read the
police report, there’s no marks or no scratches or nothing on her . . . so I would
say no one got hurt.‖ In fact, Father claimed he was not guilty of the domestic
violence charge but pleaded guilty because his court-appointed attorney was not
helping him and in light of his previous felonies, one more misdemeanor ―doesn’t
do anything for [him].‖
When Mother described the assault at trial, she claimed that Father ―lost
his temper and he punched some holes around my head and kind of grabbed me
by my throat.‖ Father also destroyed Mother’s cell phone that night because he
found messages on it from another man. Mother walked to the police station and
reported Father. S.G. witnessed the assault and confirmed Mother’s story to the
police. CPS investigator Jackson testified that it is harmful for children to witness
domestic violence in their home and that children often mimic the behavior they
learn from their parents. Father’s mother (Grandmother) does not believe that
Father hurt Mother in the assault. She also testified that there had been one
other incident of family violence before.
Father was referred to Leticia Moreland for counseling. Father did not
attempt to contact her for the first few months after his release from jail.
14 Moreland suffered an aneurysm in December 2010, and thereafter was
unavailable. The Department caseworker Nikithia Thomas testified that if Father
called Brief Therapy, they would have given him the name of another therapist in
his area, but Father never attended any counseling. Father contacted the Child
and Family Guidance Center about parenting classes but gave them his mother’s
phone number instead of his own. When they tried to return his call, they got no
response. Thomas testified that in January of 2010, Father told her he had
gotten a car and would be able to start doing his services. Yet Father did not
complete his parenting class until nine days before trial in March 2011. Thomas
testified that she gave Father her cell phone number in case he had any
problems or questions, and he never called her to help with his services.
Jackson testified that she had concerns that Father knew about Mother’s
prostitution but did nothing to protect the children. Jackson testified that although
Father was in jail, he could have called the 1-800 number for CPS and made a
referral to protect his children. Father argues on appeal that he did not know that
Mother was prostituting out of the children’s home because he was in jail, but his
testimony at trial was that as early as April 2009 he thought ―she was doing more
than just massage therapy‖ because she ―started making a lot of money.‖ Father
also acknowledged that family members visited him while in jail and he did not
ask them to report or investigate his concerns.
Thomas testified that she believed Father ―was more concerned [with]
what [Mother] was going to do and how she was going to act versus what he
15 needed to do to get his kids back.‖ He would ask when Mother was visiting the
children so that he could schedule his visits on the same day. Thomas also
testified that ―lately, he just hadn’t been visiting at all.‖
Thomas testified that once when Father visited and had brought food for
his two children, the other two children were present and ―he actually was pretty
good about having kids share the food.‖ She testified that Father ―would sit in a
chair and tell the kids to bring him books or toys. When it was time to clean up,
[Father] would sit in a chair and tell the kids to clean up. That was pretty much
the extent of his interaction with the kids.‖ She claimed that ―he really didn’t
move, he didn’t get on the floor and interact with the kids and play with the kids.
It was more of, you know, I’m here, they’re here, they see me, I see them. Okay,
is my hour up yet? It’s time to go.‖ Thomas testified that she would offer him
extra time with his children to make up for missed visits but he would tell her he
had to leave. She described one visit when she offered him extra time and his
mother, who had driven Father to the visit, encouraged him to stay but he still
insisted on leaving. Although the children enjoyed their visits with Father, this
evidence is marginally relevant at best because of their young age. See In re
S.N., 272 S.W.3d 45, 51–52 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, no pet.) (―[I]t is doubtful
that such evidence is indicative of the [child]’s conscious, volitional desire to
maintain a parent-child relationship or to permanently sever that relationship.‖).
The CASA caseworker supervisor Kristen James also testified that Father
did not always show up for his visitation. She stated that Father did not hold the
16 kids and that Grandmother ―did more interacting with the kids than he did.‖ She
said that when the children would bring him books, ―[h]e wouldn’t read through
the book, [he’d] look through the book with the child. I wasn’t sure if he could
read or not.‖ She also testified that she never heard Father say he wanted the
kids to be with him.
James testified that she had concerns about Father because ―he needed
to address his anger issues and domestic violence, and that wasn’t even touched
on‖ in the services he completed. She also testified that Father never told her he
wanted the children in his care but that ―it was always that they should be with
their mom and not with him.‖ Thomas believed that Father, by not doing his
services, had failed to alleviate the risk of abuse or neglect to the children. She
did not believe it was in the children’s best interest to be returned to their parents.
See In re T.M.J., 315 S.W.3d 271, 278–79 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.)
(holding the evidence legally and factually sufficient to support finding that
termination was in the best interest of the children when, among other things,
mother failed to complete her service plan, and her counselor believed that
mother expressed little concern about the children, lacked interest in them, and
lacked motivation to help herself or the children).
Mother testified that Father took the children ―to the park, Chuck E.
Cheese, to his mom’s house, pretty much anywhere the kids wanted to go.‖
Father’s aunt testified that Father always fed the children ―nourishing foods.‖
She testified that he took the children to school and to play in the park and ―took
17 care of them like a father should.‖ Father testified that he took the kids to play at
the park and the pool and played video games with them. He also testified that
he took the children to the doctor and the dentist and the hospital when they
were sick late at night. Yet he could not recall the name of the children’s
pediatrician. At the family group conference in August 2010, Father expressed
concerns that the children were not being taken care of in their foster home and
that he was not being updated on the status of his case while incarcerated.
Father never made any child support payments because he was not court
ordered to do so and because he ―figured y’all [the Department] were taking care
of them.‖ Grandmother testified that she wanted S.G. and S.J.G. to live with her
and Father. Neither Grandmother nor Father’s aunt felt they could care for the
children on their own if Father’s parental rights were terminated.
As noted above, Father’s excuses are also considered in a best interest
determination. See T.N.F., 205 S.W.3d at 631; see also Holley, 544 S.W.2d at
371; C.M.C., 273 S.W.3d at 874–75. Father argues that his ―recent turnaround‖
is evidence that it is in the children’s best interest to stay with him. He points to
his completion of the parenting class and that he was looking for work. However,
Father testified at trial that he was waiting until trial was over to start a job.
Father completed his parenting class only nine days before trial, despite being
out of jail for five months. Despite having no job and admittedly not looking for
one during the trial, Father still did not show up to trial until the second day
because he ―was never sent anything that [he] was supposed to be [there].‖ This
18 is not evidence of a ―turnaround.‖ See In re C.C., No. 13-07-00541-CV, 2009 WL
866822, at *11 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Apr. 2, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(holding that mother had not made a turnaround when ―the undisputed evidence
showed that she had failed to alleviate the main concern underlying the children’s
removal‖).
Considering the relevant statutory factors in evaluating Father’s willingness
and ability to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services and to
cooperate with and facilitate an appropriate agency’s close supervision, his
willingness to effect positive environmental and personal changes within a
reasonable period of time, and the other relevant Holley factors, we hold that, in
light of the entire record, and giving due consideration to evidence that the trial
court could have reasonably found to be clear and convincing, the trial court
could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of
Father’s parental rights to the children is in the children’s best interests.
Accordingly, the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial
court’s family code section 161.001(2) best interest finding. We overrule Father’s
fifth point.
II. Due Process and Family Reunification Services
In Father’s third point, he argues that his right to due process was violated
by the State’s failure to timely communicate the results of his drug and alcohol
assessment and his psychological evaluation. He argues that without the results,
he was unaware of the specific actions he was required to take to obtain the
19 return of his children.4 In his fourth point, Father argues that the Department
failed to provide sufficient family reunification services as required by the family
code. Section 263.102(e) of the family code states,
Regardless of whether the goal stated in a child’s service plan as required under Subsection (a)(5) is to return the child to the child’s parents or to terminate parental rights and place the child for adoption, the department shall concurrently provide to the child and the child’s family, as applicable:
(1) time-limited family reunification services as defined by 42 U.S.C. Section 629a for a period not to exceed the period within which the court must render a final order in or dismiss the suit affecting the parent-child relationship with respect to the child as provided by Subchapter E . . . .
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.102(e) (West 2008).
Father argues that because he did not receive the results of his drug and
alcohol assessment and his psychological evaluation (including any further steps
he was required to complete based on the results of the evaluations), the
Department failed to provide sufficient family reunification services as required by
the statute.
4 Father relies on In re B.L.R.P., 269 S.W.3d 707 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, no pet.). That case held that because there was no court order specifically establishing the necessary actions the parent needed to take to obtain the return of his child, Father’s parental rights could not be terminated under subsection (O). Id. at 711. In this case, there was a court order. B.L.R.P. is thus inapposite here.
20 Even if Father should have received the results of his drug and alcohol
assessment and his psychological evaluation, he has suffered no harm because
he failed to complete a number of other specific actions listed in his service plan,
including maintaining employment, registering with the Texas Workforce
Commission, visiting with his children as ordered, and attending counseling
sessions. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a)(1) (requiring that an error complained of
cannot be reversed on appeal unless it is shown to have probably caused the
rendition of an improper judgment). That is, even if he had received the results
of his assessments and completed any recommendations, he still would have
failed to meet the other requirements for the return of his children. We overrule
Father’s third and fourth points.
Conclusion
Having overruled all of Father’s points on appeal, we affirm the judgment
of the trial court.
LEE GABRIEL JUSTICE
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; MEIER and GABRIEL, JJ.
DELIVERED: November 10, 2011