In the Interest of R.R., a Child v. the State of Texas

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-25-00380-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF R.R., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 393rd District Court Denton County, Texas1

Trial Court No. 22-6912-393, Honorable Tiffany Haertling, Presiding

August 19, 2026

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before DOSS and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ.

Appellant, Dazie Diaz, appeals from the final order in a suit affecting the parent-

child relationship. Appellee, Valente Ramirez Avila, did not file a response. The order appointed Diaz and Avila joint managing conservators of R.R., set a week-on, week-off possession schedule, allocated independent rights concerning the child’s medical, dental, and other care, and required neither parent to pay child support. Diaz presents what we construe as three issues: that material inaccuracies in the reporter’s record prevent

1 This case was transferred from the Second Court of Appeals in Fort Worth pursuant to a docket

equalization order from the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 73.001. We apply that court’s precedent to the extent it conflicts with our own. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.

meaningful appellate review, that the trial court abused its discretion by appointing Avila a joint managing conservator with week-long periods of possession, and that the trial court denied her due process. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Diaz filed an original petition to determine conservatorship, possession, access, and child support for R.R. Avila answered and counterpetitioned. Each parent asked to be appointed sole managing conservator. Diaz further asked that Avila have no access to the child, alleging a history or pattern of domestic violence. Avila asked that Diaz’s possession be limited to daytime periods until she obtained stable housing.

R.R. was four years old at the time of trial. Her diagnoses include autism, cerebral palsy, juvenile idiopathic arthritis, periventricular leukomalacia, and a seizure disorder described as borderline epilepsy.

Diaz testified that R.R. came home from a visit with Avila with bruises on her leg, which Diaz attributed to abuse. She never asked Avila how the bruises occurred, explaining that she wished to keep the peace. She also acknowledged withholding R.R. for the child’s safety, which cost Avila numerous weekends, Father’s Day, and his entire summer possession up to the day of trial. R.R. lost her therapy, Diaz testified, “[p]rimarily because of the nightmares [she] has been having . . . from the child abuse that occurred” and because Avila failed to maintain health insurance. Of the “hundreds” of therapy appointments R.R. had attended, Diaz estimated that Avila attended “maybe two handfuls.” Avila gave a similar estimate, agreeing he had attended “about 10 or a few

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more,” and explained that he could take R.R. to her appointments if he had possession of her.

Diaz testified that she left the relationship because Avila’s behavior “escalated to violence” and because the isolation, control, and financial withholding worsened over time. She clarified, however, that he was not physically abusive, and that what she experienced was “a lot of property damage, intimidation tactics, [and] leaving his gun out to make sure [she] could see it.” She also described a recording2 of Avila beating a dog with a chain and throwing it out the front door after it urinated on the floor, but she agreed the incident did not occur in front of R.R.

The trial court admitted two sets of messages between the parties. Diaz characterized the first as showing Avila “blatantly and right out admitting to medical negligence for [R.R.].” The message appears to concern his leaving the child’s helmet in his vehicle; the record says little about the significance of that lapse. Diaz described the second exchange as her “trying to be civil and trying to have a conversation,” which “ends up where it’s him intimidating and trying to threaten [her].” In that exchange, Diaz asked for Avila’s updated address, he declined to give it.3 Diaz then replied she would withhold R.R. from the July visit, and Avila answered, “[Y]ou have until 6pm to bring [R.R.] or the next time we go to court or [sic] the judge won’t be happy.”

2 No video was offered or admitted into evidence.

3 Although Appellee refused to provide his home address, he told Appellant that R.R. would be at his parents’ house during the visit and provided that address.

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Avila is employed by the Love County Sheriff’s Office and Marshall County EMS, both in Oklahoma, and lives less than an hour’s drive from Denton. He testified that R.R.’s bruises came from playing in the park. When he works, R.R. stays with his parents in nearby Ponder, Texas, and he commutes from their home.

A Department of Family and Protective Services investigator also testified. She stated that the allegations against Avila had been ruled out and that no safety plan restricting his access to R.R. had been imposed. Neither party requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, and none were filed.

ANALYSIS

A. The Reporter’s Record

Because Diaz’s remaining issues turn on the evidence developed at the final hearing, we begin with her argument that the reporter’s record does not accurately reflect the trial evidence. A party who believes the record is inaccurate must ordinarily seek correction in the trial court. If the parties dispute the accuracy of the record, the appellate court has discretion to submit the dispute to the trial court for resolution. TEX. R. APP. P. 34.6(e)(3). Diaz did not comply with the process for challenging the record.

Moreover, even if we accepted Diaz’s contention as true, we do not find any error requiring correction. See Hilliard v. Holland, No. 02-03-00287-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 10515, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 24, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.). Diaz directs us to a single statement. Asked to identify the protective parent, the investigator is recorded as saying, “I haven’t been able to personally speak with the biological father, but he seems concerned and protective.” Diaz maintains the investigator said, “she seems concerned

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and protective.” We decline to submit the question to the trial court. Assessing which parent struck the investigator as concerned and protective would not alter our disposition, because the trial court remained free to weigh that impression against the balance of the evidence. We overrule this issue.

B. Conservatorship and Possession

Diaz also contends the trial court abused its discretion by appointing Avila a joint managing conservator, by awarding him week-long periods of possession, and by allocating independent rights to each parent. We review possession and access orders in suits affecting the parent-child relationship for an abuse of discretion. In re A.G.D.M., No. 07-24-00397-CV, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 4, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). A trial court abuses its discretion when the decision is arbitrary and unreasonable or lacks reference to guiding principles. In re A.M., 604 S.W.3d 192, 196– 97 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2020, pet. denied). Legal and factual sufficiency are not independent grounds of reversal in this setting, but are factors bearing on whether the court abused its discretion. In re Marriage of Tuttle, 602 S.W.3d 9, 12 (Tex. App.— Amarillo 2020, no pet.). This standard requires us to affirm the trial court’s decision if it is meritorious on any ground, including those not mentioned by either the trial court or the parties. In re A.G.D.M., 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS, at *3.4

The child’s best interest is always the primary consideration in determining conservatorship, possession, and access. TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.002; Holley v. Adams,

4 We consider only the evidence presented at the final hearing.

See Moreno v. Perez, 363 S.W.3d 725, 735 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.); In re M.B.D., 344 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2011, no pet.).

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544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). The Legislature has declared it the policy of this State to assure children frequent and continuing contact with parents who have shown the ability to act in the child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.001(a). It has stated that a court shall appoint both parents joint managing conservators “unless the court finds that appointment of the parent or parents would not be in the best interest of the child because the appointment would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development” TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.131.

Diaz frames her appellate argument around the facts as she sees them, that R.R.

is a medically and developmentally vulnerable child and that Avila is a negligent and abusive father. The trial court, as factfinder, was the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and of the weight to give their testimony, was free to believe one witness over another, and was charged with resolving conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Renteria, 726 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.). As this Court has explained, “[b]ecause of the fact-intensive nature of reviewing family law issues, [we] must afford great deference to the factfinder on issues of credibility and demeanor because the child’s and parents’ behavior, experiences, and circumstances are conveyed through words, emotions, and facial expressions that are not reflected in the record.” In re Marriage of Featherston, 675 S.W.3d 330, 334 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2023, no pet.). Because no party requested findings of fact, we imply every finding necessary to support the judgment. In re W.C.B., 337 S.W.3d 510, 513 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.).

Applied here, the evidence of physical abuse was for the trial court to weigh. The proof that Avila harmed R.R. consists of the child’s return from a visit with bruises on her leg. Diaz’s own evidence established that R.R. bruised frequently from falls, including

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repeated landings on the fireplace hearth. Avila denied hurting the child and testified that the bruises came from playing in the park. The investigator testified that the allegations against Avila had been ruled out without any restriction on his access. On that record, the trial court could have declined to find abuse. See Garza, 726 S.W.3d at 898.

The evidence of medical neglect was likewise subject to the trial court’s assessment. That allegation rests on Avila leaving R.R.’s helmet in his vehicle. The record contains little about what the helmet does, how long it stayed in the vehicle, or what consequence followed. The therapy-attendance evidence was similarly two-sided. Avila did not dispute that he attended few appointments, and he explained that possession would allow him to take R.R. himself.

The allegations of intimidation permitted more than one reading as well. Diaz told Avila she would not send R.R. for his summer possession because he would not supply his updated address. When Avila replied that the judge would not be happy, Diaz characterized the statement as an intimidation tactic. Avila, for his part, denied allegations of property destruction and the fits of rage Diaz described. From this evidence, and from Diaz’s concession that he was never physically abusive to her, the trial court could have concluded that Avila’s testimony was more credible. See id.

These conclusions leave the order well within the trial court’s discretion. We cannot say the possession and access order or the independent rights granted to each parent was arbitrary or unreasonable. We overrule Diaz’s issue.

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C. Due Process

By her final issue, Diaz argues the trial court violated her due process rights by failing to provide accommodations, procedural modifications, communication-related inquiry, or other safeguards in light of her self-disclosed autism diagnosis and trauma- related behaviors.5

The governing question is not whether such accommodations were available, but whether she asked for them. A party must preserve error, including error of constitutional dimension, by presenting a timely request, objection, or motion to the trial court and obtaining a ruling. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); In re L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d 707, 711 (Tex. 2003). Diaz appeared at the final hearing with counsel, testified at length, offered exhibits, and cross-examined the witnesses against her. Assuming without deciding that Diaz held some right to special consideration of her alleged disability, the record contains no request for accommodation of any kind and no indication of what form such an accommodation would have taken. Nothing was presented for the trial court to rule on, and nothing is preserved for our review. The final issue is overruled.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Lawrence M. Doss

Justice

5 Appellant also complains that the trial court treated violations of temporary orders unequally and

improperly or inadequately considered evidence of the child’s best interest. However, these matters are considered and subsumed into our analysis of the trial court’s possession and access orders.