OPINION
SUE WALKER, Justice.
I. Introduction
The primary issue we address in this appeal is whether the parental presumption applies when a court-ordered sole managing conservator (Mother) dies and the possessory conservator (Father) and a third party (Grandmother) both seek custody of the children. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.131 (Vernon 2002). The trial court granted a no-evidenee summary judgment awarding Father custody of the children based on the parental presumption. We hold that Grandmother’s and Father’s suits are modification proceedings governed by family code chapter 156 and that, therefore, the parental presumption is not applicable. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this case for trial.
II. Background Facts
P.D.M. and K.E.M.’s Mother and Father divorced in 1989. The divorce decree named Mother sole managing conservator of the children and named Father posses-sory conservator. Mother, fourteen-month-old P.D.M., and six-week-old K.E.M. moved to Krum, Texas, where Grandmother and other relatives lived. Father moved out-of-state and maintained only sporadic contact with the children. Father failed to make some of his ordered child support payments, and on February 5,1999, the trial court entered a $14,129.99 judgment against Father and in favor of Mother for child support arrearage.
In June 2000, Mother was diagnosed with cancer. Grandmother moved into the home occupied by Mother and the children to assist them during Mother’s illness. Mother died on March 31, 2001. On April 6, 2001, Father sought and later received a writ of habeas corpus granting him immediate possession of the children. Father, however, allowed the children to remain in Krum, living with Grandmother.
On April 12, 2001, at the children’s request, Grandmother filed a suit affecting the parent child relationship (SAPCR), requesting that she and Father be named joint managing conservators of the children and that she have the exclusive right to determine the children’s primary residence. P.D.M. and K.E.M., now fifteen and fourteen years old, respectively, executed and filed affidavits choosing Grandmother as their primary conservator.
Five months later, because the children were still living with Grandmother in Krum, the trial court entered an “Order Continuing Duty of Support” requiring Father to make child support payments to Grandmother. About one month later the administrator of Mother’s estate, pursuant to his “fiduciary obligation to gather and collect all assets belonging to the estate,” filed a motion seeking to collect the $14,129.99 child support arrearage judgment owed by Father.
Seven days after Mother’s administrator sought to enforce the child support arrear-[455]*455age obligation, on December 6, 2001, Father filed a “Petition to Modify Parent-Child Relationship.” Grandmother filed three motions, asking the judge to confer with the children, requesting preparation of a social study, and seeking appointment of an attorney ad litem. On January 3, 2002, following a hearing, the trial court entered a temporary order designating Father temporary managing conservator and implicitly overruling all of Grandmother’s motions. See Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a)(2)(A).
The children filed a plea in intervention. Their petition sought modification of the January 10,1989 divorce decree. The children requested that Grandmother be appointed their managing conservator and expressed their desire to continue living in Krum with Grandmother.
Father filed a three page rule 166a(i) no-evidence motion for summary judgment. Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(i). Father asserted that as a matter of law the parental presumption applied to him so that Grandmother bore the burden under family code section 153.131 of proving that his appointment as managing conservator would significantly impair the children’s physical health or emotional well-being. Tex. FaM. Code Ann. § 153.131. Father also filed a motion to strike the children’s plea in intervention and for sanctions, contending that the children’s attorney was not the children’s authorized agent because the court’s temporary order appointing him managing conservator granted him the right to represent the children in any legal action.
Grandmother responded to Father’s no-evidence summary judgment motion, citing the supreme court’s decision in In re V.L.K and explaining that Father’s suit was a modification proceeding, not an original custody proceeding, so that the parental presumption did not apply to Father. 24 S.W.3d 338, 342 (Tex.2000). Accordingly, Grandmother argued that it was not her burden to produce summary judgment evidence showing the appointment of Father as managing conservator would significantly impair the children’s health or emotional well-being.
The trial court granted Father’s no-evidence summary judgment, struck the children’s plea in intervention, and implicitly denied all relief sought by Grandmother in her SAPCR. Grandmother perfected this appeal.
III. Original Suit Under Chapter 153 Versus Modification Suit Under Chapter 156
In her first issue, Grandmother claims that the trial court erred by granting a no-evidence summary judgment against her because application of the parental presumption set forth in family code section 153.131(a) is limited to eases involving an original custody determination. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.131(a). Father agrees that the parental presumption does not apply to modification suits, but contends that his suit is not a suit to modify a prior custody order. Father asserts instead that his suit is an original suit for two reasons: because the first custody proceeding between a parent and a non-parent is an “original proceeding” as contemplated by family code section 153.131 and because the death of Mother caused the prior custody order to “terminate.” The question, therefore, is whether Father’s suit is an original suit falling within family code chapter 153 or a suit to modify a prior custody order falling under chapter 156.
Family code chapter 153 is titled, “Con-servatorship, Possession, and Access.” The provisions of the chapter clearly govern initial child conservatorship, possession, and access issues. See id. §§ 153.001-.434. Family code chapter 156 [456]*456is titled, “Modification.” Section 156.001 is titled, “Orders Subject to Modification,” and provides that “[a] court with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction may modify an order that provides for the conservator-ship, support, or possession of and access to a child.” Id. § 156.001. Section 156.002 is titled, “Who can File” and sets forth the provisions regarding standing to file a modification suit. Id. § 156.002. Section 156.002(b) authorizes a person to file a modification suit following the death of a managing conservator when children and their managing conservator have resided with the person for at least six months ending not more than ninety days prior to the filing of the modification suit. Id. §§ 156.002(b), 102.008(a)(ll). The provisions of chapter 156 clearly govern suits that attempt to effect a change in custody following the entry of an initial custody order.1 Id. §§ 156.001-.105.
Grandmother filed her SAPOR in the 158th District Court of Denton County, the court with continuing jurisdiction of the Children, in the same cause number as Father’s divorce from Mother, alleging that the children and their managing conservator had lived with her for at least six months, that the children’s managing conservator had died, and that the children still resided with her. See id. §§ 156.002(b), 102.003(a)(ll). Father instituted his suit by filing a “Petition to Modify Parent-Child Relationship.” Father’s pleading avers and admits that this is a “suit to modify a prior order.... The requested modification will be in the best interest of the children. The order to be modified is entitled Decree of Divorce and was rendered on January 10, 1989.” [Emphasis added.] Father also filed his petition to modify in the 158th District Court of Denton County, the court that rendered his divorce decree, under the same cause number as his divorce, and pleaded that “[t]his Court has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of this suit.” Likewise, the children filed a “Petition in Intervention in Petition to Modify Parent-Child Relationship” under the divorce cause number. The children contended that “[t]he order to be modified is entitled Decree of Divorce and was rendered January 10,1989.” [Emphasis added.] The children’s petition in intervention also alleged that “[t]his Court has continuing exclusive jurisdiction of the children the subject of this suit.” Finally, the children pleaded statutory grounds for modification of their custody based on affidavits they filed indicating their preference that Grandmother be appointed managing conservator with the exclusive right to determine their primary residence. See id. § 156.101(2). Thus, it appears that all parties sought to modify the January 10, 1989 decree of divorce and, in fact, filed their petitions in the court that rendered that decree, i.e., the court with continuing jurisdiction over the children, to accomplish the modification. See Tex Fam.Code Ann. § 156.001. If the [457]*457parties were not seeking to modify a prior custody order, there would have been no need to file suit in the court with continuing jurisdiction over the children under the divorce cause number.2 See id. § 155.001 (requiring that subsequent suit be commenced as an original proceeding unless final custody order has been rendered by court of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction).
Although here a final custody order was rendered by a court of continuing exclusive jurisdiction, Father contends that a suit between two parents, like his divorce from Mother, can never be an original custody proceeding for purposes of the one-time application of family code section 153.131(a)’s parental presumption. See id. § 153.131. Father asserts that section 153.131(a)’s parental presumption always applies to the first custody suit between a parent and a nonparent. In support of his position, Father relies upon some language in the supreme court’s In re V.L.K. decision. 24 S.W.3d at 340. Specifically, Father focuses on the jury instruction given by the trial court in V.L.K.:
There is no presumption that a parent should be appointed managing conservator if there has previously been an order of custody awarding conservatorship to a third party, or if the parent has voluntarily relinquished actual care, control, and possession of the child to a nonpar-ent for a period of one year or more....
Id. at 340-41 (emphasis added). Father interprets the supreme court’s holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by giving this instruction to mean that if no order awarding conservatorship to a third party exists, then the parental presumption always applies.
An examination of the supreme court’s analysis in V.L.K evidences the supreme court’s rejection of the very position asserted by Father here:
Likewise, the Family Code does not provide that the presumption is affected by the parties involved in the suit. Rather, the Legislature included the presumption in Chapter 153 which governs original proceedings, but did not include the presumption in Chapter 156 which governs modifications.
Chapter 153 and Chapter 156 are distinct statutory schemes that involve different issues. Chapter 156 modification suits raise additional policy concerns such as stability for the child and the need to prevent constant litigation in child custody cases. The Legislature has determined that the standard and burden of proof are different in original and modification suits. A natural parent has the benefit of the parental presumption in an original proceeding, and the nonparent seeking conservatorship has a higher burden. However, the Legislature did not impose different burdens on parents and nonparents in modification suits.... Because the Legislature did not express its intent to apply the presumption in Chapter 156 modification suits, courts should not apply the presumption in those cases.
Id. at 343 (citations omitted). Thus, contrary to Father’s position, it is not the identity of the parties that determines whether a suit is an original suit or a suit to modify. Rather, the Legislature decided that based on policy concerns, such as stability for the child, once custody, even between two parents, is established by court order, the parental presumption does [458]*458not apply to any subsequent custody proceeding regardless of the parties involved. See id.; see also In re M.N.G., 113 S.W.3d 27, 31-32 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (rejecting argument that when modification proceedings pit parent against nonparent the parental presumption applies).
Pursuant to the custody provisions in the January 10, 1989 divorce decree, P.D.M. and K.E.M. lived with Mother in Krum from 1989 until 2002, almost thirteen years. Father exercised his visitation rights approximately fourteen times during the children's lives. Grandmother and Father both testified at the hearing on Father’s request for temporary orders that K.E.M. vehemently opposed going to live with Father in Tennessee. Grandmother testified:3
Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether or not it would be detrimental to [K.E.M.]’s emotional well-being or development to be extracted suddenly from her total environment?
A. I think it would be highly detrimental to her because there is so much pain within her that she — right now it would be highly detrimental to her.
Q. When you’re talking about pain, what kind of pain?
A. Pain from being this terrified, hurt to think that she was going to be removed from her home, and it was painful for her to think she had to leave everything that she loves; her friends, her church, her school, her home. That’s the only one she has ever known.
Q. How does [K.E.M.] react when she finds out that [Father] has filed something else and intends to want to take her away from here?
A. She becomes highly agitated and she says, why can’t he leave me alone. That’s exactly what she says. Why can’t he just leave me alone. He never cared anything about me, why can’t he just leave me alone.
Q. Does she cry?
A. Often.
Grandmother’s testimony regarding K.E.M. demonstrates the exact policy concerns recognized by the Texas Legislature and articulated by the supreme court in V.L.K supporting nonapplication of the parental presumption in modification suits. We are not persuaded that the parental presumption applies to Father in his suit to modify the parent-child relationship. We decline to adopt Father’s contention that the first custody suit between a parent and a nonparent is always an original suit.
Next, Father argues that his suit was really an original suit under chapter 153 of the family code because the custody award set forth in the January 10, 1989 divorce decree terminated upon Mother’s death. In support of this position, Father relies upon Greene v. Schuble, 654 S.W.2d 436, 438 (Tex.1983) and Dohrn v. Delgado, 941 S.W.2d 244, 248 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1996, orig. proceeding). Father’s argument that the prior custody order disappears, as if it had never existed, upon Mother’s death runs counter to the family code’s modification scheme and is not supported by Greene. We decline to follow Dohm.
The family code specifically authorizes modification of a prior order following the death of a managing conservator. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. §§ 156.002(b), 102.003(a)(ll). Upon the death of a managing conservator, a person like Grand[459]*459mother may file a modification suit when the children and their managing conservator have resided with the person for at least six months ending not more than ninety days prior to the filing of the petition to modify. Id. Thus, the family code statutorily embraces the concept that a custody order is subject to modification even following the death of the order’s named managing conservator.
Here, Grandmother’s SAPOR, filed in the divorce cause number, in the court with continuing jurisdiction, sought modification of the prior custody order pursuant to section 156.002(b) and section 102.003(a)(ll). Id. P.D.M., K.E.M., and Mother resided with Grandmother for more than six months and the children continued to reside with Grandmother when she filed her SAPOR. Because Grandmother’s SAPOR is a modification suit, Father’s motion to modify his relationship with his children cannot be an original suit. Such a holding would nonsensically result in two differing burdens of proof on Grandmother in the same custody suit: the modification burden in Grandmother’s SAPOR of showing that the circumstances of the children have materially and substantially changed and that modification would be in the children’s best interest; and the burden in Father’s purported original suit of showing that the appointment of Father would significantly impair the children’s physical health or emotional development. See id. §§ 156.101, 158.131(a). Thus, the family code itself belies Father’s position that a custody suit following the death of a court-ordered managing conservator is always an original suit.
Nor does Greene support Father’s position. In Greene, the children’s father, their managing conservator, died. 654 S.W.2d at 437. The father’s new wife, Dorothy, retained possession of the children and filed a motion to modify the custody order entered between her deceased husband and the children’s mother. Id. Dorothy sought to be named as the children’s managing conservator. Id. The children’s mother, who had been named possessory conservator in the divorce decree from the children’s father, sought a writ of habeas corpus entitling her to possession of her children. Id. The trial court denied the mother’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, and she sought a writ of mandamus compelling the trial court to ■issue a writ of habeas corpus. Id.
The supreme court, after reciting the fact that Dorothy’s motion for appointment as managing conservator of the children was pending in the trial court, held: “[T]he death of the managing conservator ends the conservatorship order and it no longer constitutes a valid, subsisting court order for purposes of section lk.10 [the prior habeas statute].” 4 Id. at 437-38 (emphasis added); see also Lewis v. McCoy, 747 S.W.2d 48, 49-50 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1988, orig. proceeding) (recognizing Greene’s holding to be that, upon death of managing conservator, custody portion of divorce decree no longer constitutes valid possession order that would preclude issuance of writ of habeas corpus for possessory conservator father). The supreme court explained that the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus in these situations should be automatic, immediate, and ministerial. Greene, 654 S.W.2d at 437-38. The rationale is that because the managing conservator parent has died, someone must take [460]*460immediate possession of the children, and the possessory conservator parent’s right of immediate possession is superior to others’ rights. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 157.372 (recognizing that right to possession of child in habeas corpus proceeding is governed by any existing custody order); see id. § 157.376 (recognizing that, if no order exists governing right to possession of the child, child shall be returned to parent if the right of possession is between a parent and a nonparent).
Thus, the supreme court held in Greene that the possessory conservator mother could obtain a writ of habeas corpus entitling her to immediate possession of her children despite the pendency of Dorothy’s motion to modify the prior custody order:
Even a court of continuing jurisdiction is bound by the mandatory language of section 14.10 [the former habeas statute]. It must grant a writ of habeas corpus for the delivery of possession of a child to the person with the superior right of possession without any delay for separate or simultaneous consideration of a pending motion for modification of the prior court order, unless an exception under section 14.10 is shown to exist.
Greene, 654 S.W.2d at 438 (emphasis added). By virtue of the emphasized language, the supreme court explicitly recognized that, although the managing conservator had died, the prior order was nonetheless subject to modification. Accord Tex. Fam.Code Ann. §§ 156.002(b), 102.003(a)(ll). To reiterate its limited holding that the death of a managing conservator renders the custody order not valid or subsisting only for purposes of a habeas proceeding, the supreme court held: “Our opinion does not reflect consideration of the merits of the other proceedings pending in the court below. ... The office of habeas corpus is limited to restoring possession of the children to the person legally entitled to present possession, and may not be used to relitigate custody.” Greene, 654 S.W.2d at 438; see also Saucier v. Pena, 559 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex.1977) (recognizing that habeas proceedings under former family code section 14.10 cannot be concerned with changing custody, so the best interest of the child is not an issue); McElreath v. Stewart, 545 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Tex.1977) (same); M.R.J. v. Vick, 753 S.W.2d 526, 528 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1988, orig. proceeding) (same).
We cannot agree with Father’s interpretation of Greene — also the position promulgated by the dissent — that a custody suit following the death of the managing conservator is always an original suit. In fact, the supreme court in Greene specifically contemplated that a suit for modification of the parent-child relationship could follow the death of the managing conservator and the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to the possessory conservator parent. While Greene holds that, following the death of a managing conservator, the existing custody order is not a valid and subsisting order that operates to preclude issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to someone other than the deceased managing conservator, the order nonetheless clearly is still a “prior court order” for purposes of a motion to modify. 654 S.W.2d at 438; see also Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 156.101(1) (authorizing trial court to modify “portion of a decree” providing for custody when circumstances of conservator have materially and substantially changed, i.e., via the death of the conservator).
The dissent characterizes the supreme court’s circumspect word choice in Greene as dicta. Greene was an original proceeding, and the supreme court could have simply ruled that, following the death of the managing conservator, the custody or[461]*461der was void. But it did not. Instead, the supreme court narrowly held that following the death of a managing conservator, an existing custody order “no longer constitutes a valid subsisting court order for purposes of section H.10 [the prior habeas statute].” Greene, 654 S.W.2d at 438 (emphasis added). In light of Dorothy’s pending motion to modify, we view this purposeful holding by the supreme court not as dicta, but as articulately stating the binding rule of law controlling in this case: following the death of a managing conservator, a custody order is no longer a valid and subsisting order that will operate to preclude issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to the possessory conservator parent, but it is nonetheless a prior custody order for purposes of a suit to modify custody.
The dissent also characterizes our opinion as “not comport[ing] with traditional notions of parental rights,” likening our opinion to the Greene dissent. But the Greene dissenters would have held that the children’s mother was not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus, and it was this proposed holding that the dissenters acknowledged did not comport with traditional notions of parental rights. Id. at 489 (Ray, J., dissenting). Here pursuant to traditional notions of parental rights, Father obtained a writ of habeas corpus, but then agreed to allow the children to continue living in Krum with Grandmother and does not even now seek possession of the children pursuant to the writ. Thus, the Greene dissenters’ not-comporting-with-traditional-notions-of-parental-rights rationale is in-apposite here because Father did obtain a writ of habeas corpus.
We now address Dohm, the second ease relied upon by Father for the proposition that a custody suit following the death of the managing conservator is always an original suit. 941 S.W.2d at 248. We decline to follow Dohrn. Dohrn was decided before V.L.K., and, in our view, cannot be reconciled with V.L.K The supreme court in V.L.K. explained that the parental presumption does not apply in custody suits seeking to change a child’s living arrangements:
We noted that there is a difference between an original conservatorship determination and a modification: “Because a change of custody disrupts the child’s living arrangements and the channels of a child’s affection, a change should be ordered only when the trial court is convinced that the change is to be a positive improvement for the child.”
24 S.W.3d at 343. The supreme court recognized that the critical distinction between an original suit and a modification suit is the fact that a modification suit seeks a change in the child’s existing living arrangements. Id; see also Taylor v. Meek, 154 Tex. 305, 276 S.W.2d 787, 790 (Tex.1955) (holding that whatever effect the parental presumption may have in an original custody action, it cannot control a suit to change custody). The supreme court then held in V.L.K that “[b]ecause the Legislature did not express its intent to apply the presumption in Chapter 156 modification suits, courts should not apply the presumption in those cases.” 24 S.W.3d at 343 (emphasis added). Consequently, in light of V.L.K, we cannot agree with the holding in Dohm that a suit filed after the death of a court-ordered managing conservator seeking a change in the children’s living arrangements is nonetheless an original suit to which the parental presumption applies.
The dissent adopts the Dohm position. Dohm and the dissent both suppose that if a prior custody order is no longer a valid, subsisting court order “for purposes of section H.10 [the prior habeas statute]” per Greene, it also loses its status as a prior order that is subject to a chapter 156 [462]*462motion to modify. We cannot agree. A writ of habeas corpus to obtain possession of a child focuses on whether or not “the right to possession of a child” is “governed” by court order. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. §§ 157.372,157.376; see also Saucier, 559 S.W.2d at 656; McElreath, 545 S.W.2d at 957; M.R.J., 753 S.W.2d at 528. Clearly, a custody order no longer governs the right to possession of a child when the managing conservator named in the order dies. Thus, the possessory conservator parent is free to seek a writ of habeas corpus compelling his “present possession,” not necessarily “custody,” of the children. Greene, 654 S.W.2d at 438. But the fact that a prior order may no longer effectively govern the present right of possession to a child simply does not alter its status as a prior order or the reality of its prior existence, i.e., the effect it had on the subject children’s lives. In other words, following the death of the managing conservator, a custody order is not a valid and subsisting order that operates to preclude issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to anyone other than the order’s named, deceased managing conservator, but it nonetheless is a prior custody order for purposes of a chapter 156 suit to modify the parent-child relationship. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 102.003(a)(ll), 156.002(b), 156.101(1).
The dissent criticizes us for placing controlling emphasis on the children’s need for stability rather than, as the dissent would, making the rights of the surviving natural parent our “paramount concern.” The Texas Legislature and the Texas Supreme Court, however, have made it abundantly clear that in suits seeking to change the child’s living arrangements, the child’s need for stability does take precedence over the “paramount right” of a natural parent to his child. The supreme court has explained:
The paramount right of a natural parent to a child comes from a legal presumption that to be raised by its natural parents is to the child’s best interest. This presumption is based upon the natural affection usually flowing from parentage. Although this presumption should be considered by the trial judge in weighing the evidence, it cannot be controlling in the face of a final judgment to the contrary, and, whatever effect such a presumption may have in an original custody action, it cannot control a suit to change custody.
Taylor, 154 Tex. at 310, 276 S.W.2d at 790 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex.2002) (recognizing that emotional and physical interests of a child should not be sacrificed merely to preserve parental rights). The Legislature, via family code section 153.131 and chapter 156, has determined that the rights of a parent are not paramount once children have been the subject of a custody order. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. §§ 153.131, 156.001-.105. Instead, after custody issues have been litigated once, to prevent the detriment repeated custody litigation has on children, the Legislature has decided that the controlling emphasis is on the children’s need for stability. V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d at 343; see also Knowles v. Grimes, 437 S.W.2d 816, 817 (Tex.1969) (holding that “[a]s a matter of public policy, there should be a high degree of stability in the home and surroundings of a young child”); see also Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.001 (stating that public policy of this state is to provide stable environment for children). Thus, we are required in this second custody case involving these children, i.e., Father’s suit to modify his relationship with them, to place controlling emphasis on the children’s need for stability-
[463]*463The dissent proposes hypothetical scenarios concerning the implications of our decision today. Most of these scenarios misconstrue our holding here that, pursuant to the family code and V.L.K., the parental presumption does not apply in a second custody suit seeking a change in the child’s living arrangement. Some of the hypotheticals fail to recognize that standing to bring a modification suit is statutorily restricted. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 156.002(b). The balance of the dissent’s scenarios overlook the fact that a typical application of the family code’s statutory scheme favors parents over non-parents in modification suits, although not via a repeated application of the parental presumption. In a typical custody case, both parents are appointed joint managing conservators. See id. § 153.131(b). Assuming both parents are appointed joint managing conservators, the family code then operates to preserve the benefit parents attain through the application of the parental presumption by statutorily favoring the managing conservator-who is usually a parent by virtue of application of the parental presumption — in any later modification suit. See id. § 156.101(1) (imposing burden on party seeking modification to show that circumstances of child, a conservator, or other party affected by the order have materially and substantially changed and that modification would be in the best interest of the child); see also M.N.G., 113 S.W.3d at 33-34 (explaining: “The modification statute’s requirement of a material and substantial change of circumstances is predicated upon the doctrine of res judica-ta as to the best interest of the child at the time of the original decree awarding con-servatorship.”). That is, any person seeking to alter a managing conservator’s custody must jump the statutory hurdles of showing that the circumstances of a child, a conservator, or other party affected by the order have materially and substantially changed and of showing that modification would be in the best interest of the child. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 156.101. The party seeking to alter custody must come forward with evidence concerning the best interest of the child that has developed since the initial custody order because appointment of the existing managing conservator, typically a parent, is res judicata as to the best interest of the child at the time of the original decree awarding con-servatorship. M.N.G., 113 S.W.3d at 33-34. Other than to clarify these points in our analysis, because the fictionalized facts recited by the dissent are not before us, we do not address them.
Finally, we feel compelled to respond to the dissent’s contention that this case “requires us to construe the modification provisions of chapter 156 of the family code” and the charge that we have misconstrued this chapter by “substituting judicial intent for legislative intent.” First, this no-evidence summary judgment appeal is not a statutory-construction case. Instead, the issue before us is whether Father’s “Petition to Modify Parent-Child Relationship” is in fact a petition to modify governed by family code chapter 156 or is instead an original suit falling under chapter 153. No one, not even the parties, disputes that section 153.131’s parental presumption applies to original suits and does not apply to modification suits. In determining whether Father’s suit falls within family code chapter 153 or 156, we have reviewed these chapters’ statutory schemes and the stated intent of the Legislature in enacting them. We have not, however, been called upon by the parties to construe any particular provision of the family code. Nor have we construed any specific provision of the family code. At most, we simply have construed Father’s “Petition to Modify Parent-Child Relationship.”
[464]*464Second, we view the dissent’s statutory construction diatribe as nothing more than an implementation of the when-you-don’t-have-the-fact s-and-you-don’t-have-the-law-then-pound-the-table strategy. Because it is the dissent’s position — i.e., that a second suit, filed thirteen years after an original custody determination under same cause number as the original custody determination under same cause number as the original suit, in the court with continuing jurisdiction over the children, is somehow an original suit affecting the parent child relationship — that fails to follow the primary rule of statutory construction: to implement the Texas Legislature’s stated intent. See, e.g., Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.001(a)(2) (stating, “The public policy of this state is to ... provide a ... stable ... environment for the child); id. § 153.002 (stating that “[t]he best interest of the child shall always be the primary consideration” in any conservatorship case.”); see also C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26; V.L.K, 24 S.W.3d at 342. To further its goal of providing stable home environments for Texas children, the Legislature specifically granted standing to file a modification suit following the death of a managing conservator to persons, like Grandmother, with whom children and their managing conservator have resided for at least six months prior to the filing of the modification suit. Tex Fam.Code Ann. §§ 156.002(b), 102.003(a)(ll). Thus, the Legislature specifically contemplated that even after the death of a managing conservator a custody order may be subject to modification. The dissent undermines the Texas Legislature’s statutorily stated, express intent by construing Father’s “Petition to Modify Parent-Child Relationship” as an original suit affecting the parent-child relationship. Under the dissent’s analysis, the children aré uprooted, not provided with the legislatively intended stable environment. Cf. id. § 153.001(a)(2). Under the dissent’s analysis, the trial court is forced to rely on a stale presumption that Father’s appointment as managing conservator is in the best interests of children instead of actually reviewing the children’s current circumstances to make the legislatively intended best interest determination. See id. § 153.002. Under the dissent’s analysis, the trial court must blindly apply the parental presumption to a parent whose appointment as managing conservator the trial court has already determined to be not in the best interest of the children; res judicata as to the children’s best interest at the time the original final custody order was entered. See M.N.G., 113 S.W.3d at 33-34. Under the dissent’s analysis, the statutory standing provisions authorizing Grandmother to bring a modification suit following Mother’s death are judicially eliminated — the dissent would hold that no one has standing to file a modification suit under these circumstances because “there are no live custody provisions.” Cf. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. §§ 156.002(b), 102.003(a)(ll).
Our analysis, on the other hand, gives effect to the stated intent of the Texas Legislature set forth in the Texas Family Code to promote stability for children and to make the best interests of the children the trial court’s primary consideration in any custody dispute. See, e.g., id. §§ 153.001(a)(2)-.002. Our analysis gives effect to the Texas Legislature’s adoption of a statutory scheme authorizing modification suits following the death of a court-ordered managing conservator under circumstances like the present case. Id. §§ 156.002(b), 102.003(a)(ll). We have carefully reviewed our opinion and analysis and we are confident that we have properly interpreted the legislative intent underlying family code chapters 153 and 156.
[465]*465Father’s suit seeks to move the children from Krum, Texas, where they have now lived with Mother and Grandmother for over thirteen years, to Chattanooga, Tennessee to reside with Father — a definite change in the children’s living arrangements. Additionally, a prior final custody order was entered concerning the children, the January 10, 1989 divorce decree. Thus, Father’s suit is a second custody suit, seeking to alter custody provisions set forth in the divorce decree that gave Father only possessory conservatorship of the children, and is governed by family code chapter 156, not family code chapter 153. Therefore, chapter 153’s parental presumption is not applicable. See V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d at 344. Because the parental presumption does not apply to Father, the trial court erred by granting a no-evidence summary judgment for Father on the ground that Grandmother produced no summary judgment evidence that Father’s appointment as managing conservator would significantly impair the children’s physical health or emotional development. We sustain Grandmother’s first issue.
IV. Conclusion
Having sustained Grandmother’s first issue, we need not reach her second through fifth issues. See Tex.R.App. P. 47.1. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this case for trial.
CAYCB, C.J. filed a dissenting opinion in which DAY and HOLMAN, JJ. join.