IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-1173 Filed April 10, 2024
IN THE INTEREST OF P.A., D.A., A.A., and C.A., Minor Children,
C.A., Father, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mitchell County,
Karen Kaufman Salic, Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his four children.
AFFIRMED.
C.A., Osage, self-represented appellant father.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Mark A. Milder of Mark Milder Law Firm, Denver, attorney and guardian ad
litem for minor children.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ. 2
CHICCHELLY, Judge.
A father appeals the termination of parental rights to his four children: A.A.,
born in 2018; P.A., born in 2019; C.A., born in 2020; and D.A., born in 2022. The
father asks us to reverse the termination based on alleged constitutional violations
and a lack of reasonable efforts.1
The four children came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) based on allegations of the parents’ substance use,
domestic violence, and child neglect. The parents were initially motivated to work
towards reunification, but this progress was short-lived. The father struggled to
maintain sobriety. He told HHS that he was participating in multiple services, but
he provided no evidence of this progress and did not sign the necessary releases.
He further failed to comply with HHS’s requests for drug testing and was
unsuccessfully discharged from substance-use treatment. Over the life of the
case, the parents had multiple charges for domestic violence against each other,
and this resulted in a no-contact order that prevented the father from engaging in
services and visits. When his visits were reinstated, HHS’s concerns grew
because the children’s behaviors became more aggressive.
During the proceedings, the father went through four attorneys, stating, “I
have not been satisfied with the performance of the prior assigned public
defenders appointed to represent me in these cases.” He chose to forego
appointed counsel and represented himself for the remainder of the proceedings.
1 The mother’s rights were also terminated to the four children at the same time.
While she filed a notice of appeal, she voluntarily dismissed her appeal. We therefore do not discuss her in our analysis. 3
The juvenile court gave him multiple opportunities to have counsel appointed, but
the father maintained that he wanted to represent himself.
By the permanency hearing, the father still had not complied with either drug
or paternity testing. At the termination hearing, HHS testified that the father had
only attended one of the children’s many therapy sessions, failed to regularly
comply with drug testing, never graduated from fully supervised visits, and had not
fully addressed the domestic-violence concerns. But by this point, he had
complied with paternity testing and was confirmed as the biological father of all
four children. The father also testified on his own behalf that he was making
progress with securing a job, driver’s license, and housing. But because he had
not adequately addressed HHS’s other major concerns, the juvenile court
terminated the father’s parental rights to all four children. The father appeals.
Our review of termination proceedings is de novo. See In re C.B.,
611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). Though not binding, we give weight to the
court’s fact findings, especially those regarding witness credibility. See Iowa R.
App. P. 6.904(3)(g); C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 492. Generally, termination-of-parental-
rights proceedings involve a “three-step analysis,” where we determine whether
statutory grounds for termination have been met, if the best interests of the child
support termination, and whether we should apply permissive exceptions to
termination. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 294 (Iowa 2021) (citation omitted). The
father fails to address any of these steps, and we limit our analysis to the contested
issues. Cf. In re J.F., No. 19-1647, 2020 WL 110404, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9,
2020) (“But when, as here, the parent’s claims only relate to one step in our
analysis, we only address that step.”). 4
The father first contends that he was provided “inadequate representation
through any of the assigned attorneys” throughout the proceedings and was
effectively forced to self-represent. See Iowa Code § 232.89(1) (2023) (granting
parents a statutory right to counsel in child-in-need-of-assistance proceedings).
But the father chose to represent himself at the proceedings despite the juvenile
court’s warnings that the decision “carries with it some risk” and “could result in the
termination of your parental rights.” The father expressed he understood that he
would “be basically navigating [the proceedings] without the assistance of an
attorney” and was still willing to self-represent. The juvenile court asked him again
just before the termination hearing, and the father repeated that he wanted to
represent himself. We therefore find no merit in this claim because he voluntarily
waived his statutory right to counsel.
Next, the father argues he was restricted from accessing “crucial evidence”
in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to fair trial. There are three issues with
this contention. First, the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial is limited to criminal
matters, and this is a termination-of-parental-rights proceeding. See U.S. Const.
amend. VI (granting “the right to a speedy and public trial” “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions”). Second, while we recognize his due process rights, see In re T.S.,
868 N.W.2d 425, 432 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (recognizing a “protected liberty or
property interest at stake” in termination-of-parental-rights proceedings), the father
was never denied access to the evidence in this case. The electronic document
management system (EDMS) was available to him, but the father chose not to use
it. While the district court generously offered the clerk of court’s assistance in
mailing some documents and filings, this was not required. In fact, all 5
self-represented litigants must register for and use EDMS. Iowa R. Elec.
P. 16.302(1). The father is no exception. Third, this issue is not properly preserved
for our review. When the evidence was introduced at the termination hearing, the
self-represented father did not object to its admission. See Meier v. Senecaut,
641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (finding “that issues must ordinarily be both
raised and decided by the district court” to preserve them for appellate review).
The father has not shown that his constitutional rights were violated.
The father then alleges the juvenile court wrongly relied on inaccuracies in
the record when terminating his parental rights. For example, in the court’s ruling
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-1173 Filed April 10, 2024
IN THE INTEREST OF P.A., D.A., A.A., and C.A., Minor Children,
C.A., Father, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mitchell County,
Karen Kaufman Salic, Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his four children.
AFFIRMED.
C.A., Osage, self-represented appellant father.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Mark A. Milder of Mark Milder Law Firm, Denver, attorney and guardian ad
litem for minor children.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ. 2
CHICCHELLY, Judge.
A father appeals the termination of parental rights to his four children: A.A.,
born in 2018; P.A., born in 2019; C.A., born in 2020; and D.A., born in 2022. The
father asks us to reverse the termination based on alleged constitutional violations
and a lack of reasonable efforts.1
The four children came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) based on allegations of the parents’ substance use,
domestic violence, and child neglect. The parents were initially motivated to work
towards reunification, but this progress was short-lived. The father struggled to
maintain sobriety. He told HHS that he was participating in multiple services, but
he provided no evidence of this progress and did not sign the necessary releases.
He further failed to comply with HHS’s requests for drug testing and was
unsuccessfully discharged from substance-use treatment. Over the life of the
case, the parents had multiple charges for domestic violence against each other,
and this resulted in a no-contact order that prevented the father from engaging in
services and visits. When his visits were reinstated, HHS’s concerns grew
because the children’s behaviors became more aggressive.
During the proceedings, the father went through four attorneys, stating, “I
have not been satisfied with the performance of the prior assigned public
defenders appointed to represent me in these cases.” He chose to forego
appointed counsel and represented himself for the remainder of the proceedings.
1 The mother’s rights were also terminated to the four children at the same time.
While she filed a notice of appeal, she voluntarily dismissed her appeal. We therefore do not discuss her in our analysis. 3
The juvenile court gave him multiple opportunities to have counsel appointed, but
the father maintained that he wanted to represent himself.
By the permanency hearing, the father still had not complied with either drug
or paternity testing. At the termination hearing, HHS testified that the father had
only attended one of the children’s many therapy sessions, failed to regularly
comply with drug testing, never graduated from fully supervised visits, and had not
fully addressed the domestic-violence concerns. But by this point, he had
complied with paternity testing and was confirmed as the biological father of all
four children. The father also testified on his own behalf that he was making
progress with securing a job, driver’s license, and housing. But because he had
not adequately addressed HHS’s other major concerns, the juvenile court
terminated the father’s parental rights to all four children. The father appeals.
Our review of termination proceedings is de novo. See In re C.B.,
611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). Though not binding, we give weight to the
court’s fact findings, especially those regarding witness credibility. See Iowa R.
App. P. 6.904(3)(g); C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 492. Generally, termination-of-parental-
rights proceedings involve a “three-step analysis,” where we determine whether
statutory grounds for termination have been met, if the best interests of the child
support termination, and whether we should apply permissive exceptions to
termination. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 294 (Iowa 2021) (citation omitted). The
father fails to address any of these steps, and we limit our analysis to the contested
issues. Cf. In re J.F., No. 19-1647, 2020 WL 110404, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9,
2020) (“But when, as here, the parent’s claims only relate to one step in our
analysis, we only address that step.”). 4
The father first contends that he was provided “inadequate representation
through any of the assigned attorneys” throughout the proceedings and was
effectively forced to self-represent. See Iowa Code § 232.89(1) (2023) (granting
parents a statutory right to counsel in child-in-need-of-assistance proceedings).
But the father chose to represent himself at the proceedings despite the juvenile
court’s warnings that the decision “carries with it some risk” and “could result in the
termination of your parental rights.” The father expressed he understood that he
would “be basically navigating [the proceedings] without the assistance of an
attorney” and was still willing to self-represent. The juvenile court asked him again
just before the termination hearing, and the father repeated that he wanted to
represent himself. We therefore find no merit in this claim because he voluntarily
waived his statutory right to counsel.
Next, the father argues he was restricted from accessing “crucial evidence”
in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to fair trial. There are three issues with
this contention. First, the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial is limited to criminal
matters, and this is a termination-of-parental-rights proceeding. See U.S. Const.
amend. VI (granting “the right to a speedy and public trial” “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions”). Second, while we recognize his due process rights, see In re T.S.,
868 N.W.2d 425, 432 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (recognizing a “protected liberty or
property interest at stake” in termination-of-parental-rights proceedings), the father
was never denied access to the evidence in this case. The electronic document
management system (EDMS) was available to him, but the father chose not to use
it. While the district court generously offered the clerk of court’s assistance in
mailing some documents and filings, this was not required. In fact, all 5
self-represented litigants must register for and use EDMS. Iowa R. Elec.
P. 16.302(1). The father is no exception. Third, this issue is not properly preserved
for our review. When the evidence was introduced at the termination hearing, the
self-represented father did not object to its admission. See Meier v. Senecaut,
641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (finding “that issues must ordinarily be both
raised and decided by the district court” to preserve them for appellate review).
The father has not shown that his constitutional rights were violated.
The father then alleges the juvenile court wrongly relied on inaccuracies in
the record when terminating his parental rights. For example, in the court’s ruling
on termination, the dates of removal and adjudication were incorrect (each used
dates subsequent court orders were filed), and the petition was mistakenly dated
May 23, 2034. These are clear clerical errors, and we therefore decline to consider
the father’s contention that the court somehow acted improperly based on the
mistakes. See In re H.C., No. 16-1961, 2017 WL 512798, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.
Feb. 8, 2017) (“[W]e decline to place form over substance and waste judicial
resources on what was clearly a [typographical] error.”). To the extent that the
father disagrees with any credibility findings, we give deference to the juvenile
court’s fact findings. See C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 492.
Finally, the father loosely asserts that the reasonable-efforts requirement
has not been met. See Iowa Code § 232.102(6) (requiring HHS to “make every
reasonable effort to return the child to the child’s home as quickly as possible
consistent with the best interests of the child”). But a reasonable-efforts challenge
requires the parent to make an affirmative objection to the services offered as
inadequate, which the father did not do. See In re L.M., 904 N.W.2d 835, 839–40 6
(Iowa 2017). Because he failed to object “prior to the termination hearing,” he
“waives the issue” and can no longer challenge it on appeal. See T.S., 868 N.W.2d
at 442 (citation omitted). We therefore find the father’s reasonable-efforts claim is
waived.
Because the father’s constitutional rights were not violated and his
remaining issues are waived, we affirm the termination of the father’s parental
rights.