In the Interest of N.L., a Child v. the State of Texas

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedOctober 27, 2025
Docket02-25-00205-CV
StatusPublished

This text of In the Interest of N.L., a Child v. the State of Texas (In the Interest of N.L., a Child v. the State of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In the Interest of N.L., a Child v. the State of Texas, (Tex. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00205-CV ___________________________

IN THE INTEREST OF N.L., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 367th District Court Denton County, Texas Trial Court No. 23-9813-158

Before Bassel, Womack, and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

The mother and father of N.L. (Nicole)1 each appeal from a judgment––

rendered after an eight-day jury trial––that terminated their parent–child relationships

with Nicole. At trial, the jury heard that when Nicole was seven months old, she

suffered several acute leg fractures––and showed signs of healing rib fractures and a

possible thumb fracture––while in Mother’s and Father’s primary care but also while

in the sole care of her maternal grandmother (Grandmother) for short periods of

time. After (1) hearing testimony from Mother, Father, and Grandmother––during

which all three denied causing the child’s injuries; (2) considering other evidence

regarding Mother’s and Father’s changing stories about the days leading to Nicole’s

acute leg fractures and Grandmother’s generally consistent story throughout the

litigation’s course; (3) considering evidence of Father’s admitted, persistent

untruthfulness during the investigation and service-plan period and Mother’s refusal

to consider Father as a potential actor; and (4) being provided with voluminous

medical records and other exhibits, ten out of twelve jurors determined that Mother’s

and Father’s parent–child relationships should be terminated but that Grandmother––

1 We use aliases to refer to the child and anyone by whom she might be identified. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).

2 who had intervened in the suit––should be named the child’s sole managing

conservator instead of the Department of Family and Protective Services.2

In their appeals, Mother and Father primarily raise legal and factual sufficiency

challenges to the predicate-conduct grounds found by the jury––(D) and (O)3 for

Mother and (D), (E), and (O) for Father; Father also challenges the finding that

termination of his parent–child relationship with Nicole is in her best interest. See

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D)–(E), (O). Because we conclude that the

evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s endangerment and best-interest findings,

that Father’s jury-charge complaint should be overruled, and that we need not address

Mother’s and Father’s other complaints, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

II. GENERAL BACKGROUND4

On October 21, 2023, Nicole was seen at an urgent care clinic where she was

diagnosed with a “tibia compression fracture” and sent to Dallas Children’s Medical

Center. Subsequent X-rays taken at the hospital revealed additional fractures to both

femurs near the knee, a fracture on Nicole’s eighth right-side rib, and two likely rib

In addition to the Department, Grandmother has filed briefs in response to 2

Mother’s and Father’s briefs. 3 Although the (O) predicate-conduct ground has since been deleted from Section 161.001(b)(1), it was still applicable to this case at the time it was tried. See Act of May 14, 2025, H.B. 116, 89th Leg., R.S., ch. 211, § 2. 4 We dispense with an extended introductory background because we discuss the facts at length in our analysis of Mother’s and Father’s sufficiency complaints.

3 fractures on the left side. A possible fracture of Nicole’s hand was also noted. The

femur and tibia fractures were acute and new while the rib fractures were healing and

probably at least ten days old. The hospital’s REACH5 team––which responds when

there is a concern that a “child [might] be at risk . . . for abuse”––was notified.

A nurse practitioner on the REACH team spoke to Mother and Father about

Nicole’s injuries; both of them told her that the only thing that might have happened

was that the day before Nicole had fallen forward while pulling up. According to the

nurse practitioner, that story was not consistent with the types of fractures that Nicole

had; usually, a child with such injuries is “symptomatic right away,” and according to

the parents, she was “asymptomatic for a time after[]” the fall and pulled to a stand

later in the day. The nurse practitioner did not think a fall from a standing position

caused the breaks, which would have required more force. Additionally, the rib

fractures concerned the REACH team “because their primary cause is encircling the

rib cage and squeezing. So they are what [the team] consider[s] highly specific for

inflicted injury.”

Although Nicole’s vitamin D levels were on the low side of normal, the X-rays

showed that her bones were well-formed and well-mineralized; she did not show signs

of osteopenia, or softer bones.

5 REACH is an acronym for Referral and Evaluation of At-Risk Children.

4 The parents’ lack of an adequate explanation for Nicole’s fractures, especially

considering their different stages of healing, raised the concern for abuse. After the

Department and law enforcement questioned the parents, Nicole was removed from

their care. Although the parents completed many of the court-ordered services

necessary for Nicole’s return to their care and sought a monitored return, the trial

court decided not to return Nicole to their custody, and the Department eventually

sought termination of their parental rights.

III. GENERAL LAW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

For a trial court to terminate a parent–child relationship, the party seeking

termination must prove two elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the

parent’s actions satisfy one ground listed in Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1); and

(2) that termination is in the child’s best interest. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b);

In re Z.N., 602 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Tex. 2020). Evidence is clear and convincing if it

“will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth

of the allegations sought to be established.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007; Z.N.,

602 S.W.3d at 545.

Due process demands the heightened standard of clear and convincing

evidence because “[a] parental rights termination proceeding encumbers a value ‘far

more precious than any property right.’” In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552, 555 (Tex. 2012)

(quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1397 (1982)); In re

J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002); see also In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 802

5 (Tex. 2012). In a termination case, the State seeks not just to limit parental rights but

to erase them permanently—to divest the parent and child of all legal rights,

privileges, duties, and powers normally existing between them, except the child’s right

to inherit. Tex. Fam.

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