IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-1806 Filed January 24, 2024
IN THE INTEREST OF N.C. and E.C., Minor Children,
A.D., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Cheryl Traum, District
Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Patricia Rolfstad, Davenport, for appellant mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Jean Capdevila, Davenport, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor
children.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Schumacher and Badding, JJ. 2
BOWER, Chief Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to two children, born
in 2013 and 2017.1 She claims termination is not in the best interests of the
children and the juvenile court should have established a guardianship in lieu of
termination.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
This family came to the attention of the department of health and human
services (department) in 2020, due to concerns of methamphetamine use by the
parents and domestic abuse between them.2 The children were adjudicated in
need of assistance and placed in the care of the maternal grandparents. When
concerns were raised about the maternal grandmother’s drug use, the children
were moved to the care of the paternal grandmother, and later, to the care of a
maternal aunt. When all these placements posed concerns, the children were
eventually placed with a “suitable other,” Trisha, the sister of the paternal
grandfather’s fiancée. The children continue to reside with Trisha.
Over the next few years, concerns persisted relating to domestic violence,
substance abuse and mental health, parenting, homelessness, criminal activity,
and the mother allowing the children to be around a registered sex offender.
Services were offered to address these concerns. The mother tested positive for
substances, including methamphetamines, on several occasions, and she was a
no-show or noncompliant with other tests. The mother completed substance-
1 The father’s parental rights were also terminated. He does not appeal. 2 Specifically, “the father knocked the mother unconscious while the children were
present,” and he was “charged in at least five domestic violence incidents.” 3
abuse evaluations, which recommended outpatient treatment, but “[s]he was not
consistently attending treatment.” In October 2021, she entered treatment but was
unsuccessfully discharged six days later.
By spring 2022, the mother appeared to be making progress. She had
“re-engaged in substance abuse treatment,” “reported talking to a domestic
violence advocate,” and led the department to believe “she was separating herself
from the father” (who was not participating in services or visiting the children and
“continued to be violent”). The court allowed the parents additional time to work
towards reunification with the children. The permanency hearing was held over
three days, which allowed the parents “an additional eight months to show their
commitment to the children.” The mother’s progress stagnated; she continued to
use drugs, did not appear for drug screens, failed to participate in treatment, and
did not make consistent contact with the children. The State initiated termination-
of-parental-rights proceedings in March 2023.
The termination hearing was continued from July and eventually held in
October 2023. The mother was present at the hearing, but she did not testify. The
father was in jail. The caseworker testified the mother had not completed any of
the initial case plan requirements. Significantly, the mother had not participated in
domestic-violence therapy, had not complied with drug screens or completed
substance-abuse treatment, and had no contact with the children since July. The
mother “concede[d] she struggles with substance use” and asked the court to
consider establishing a guardianship with Trisha in lieu of termination. The
caseworker resisted that option, reporting the children were “very aware of what’s 4
going on,” and they were “angry,” “sad,” and “tired of the back-and-forth.” The
department and guardian ad litem recommended termination of parental rights.
The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights under Iowa Code
section 232.116(1)(d), (e), (f), and (l) (2023). She appeals.
II. Standard of Review
Appellate review of termination-of-parental-rights proceedings is de novo.
In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 293 (Iowa 2021). Our paramount concern in
termination proceedings is the best interests of the children. In re L.T., 924
N.W.2d 521, 529 (Iowa 2019). We give weight to, but are not bound by, the
juvenile court’s fact findings. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018).
III. Analysis
In our review, we use a three-step analysis: first, determine if a ground for
termination exists under section 232.116 paragraph (1); next, apply the best-
interest framework from paragraph (2); and last, consider if any exceptions from
paragraph (3) apply to preclude termination. Id. at 472–73.
A. Grounds for Termination. Because the mother does not contest the
existence of the grounds for termination, we need not discuss this step. See In re
P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010).
B. Best Interests of the Children. Our statutory best-interests framework
considers “the child[ren]’s safety, . . . the best placement for furthering the long-
term nurturing and growth of the child[ren], and . . . the physical, mental, and
emotional condition and needs of the child[ren].” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). “It is
well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has
proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a 5
parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.”
In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 112 (Iowa 2014) (citation omitted).
The children were adjudicated in need of assistance and removed from the
parents’ custody over two years ago. Since then, the mother has not consistently
engaged in services or made any significant progress. In considering whether
termination is in the children’s best interests, “we look to the parents’ past
performance because it may indicate the quality of care the parent is capable of
providing in the future.” In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa 1997). On this
issue, the court found:
The children have been court ordered out of parental care since July of 2021. [E.C.] has spent a good portion of her life outside the care of her parents. . . . The parents have been given ample time and services to demonstrate their ability to parent these children, yet they are still unable to parent these children. The children’s best interests are served by termination.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-1806 Filed January 24, 2024
IN THE INTEREST OF N.C. and E.C., Minor Children,
A.D., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Cheryl Traum, District
Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Patricia Rolfstad, Davenport, for appellant mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Jean Capdevila, Davenport, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor
children.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Schumacher and Badding, JJ. 2
BOWER, Chief Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to two children, born
in 2013 and 2017.1 She claims termination is not in the best interests of the
children and the juvenile court should have established a guardianship in lieu of
termination.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
This family came to the attention of the department of health and human
services (department) in 2020, due to concerns of methamphetamine use by the
parents and domestic abuse between them.2 The children were adjudicated in
need of assistance and placed in the care of the maternal grandparents. When
concerns were raised about the maternal grandmother’s drug use, the children
were moved to the care of the paternal grandmother, and later, to the care of a
maternal aunt. When all these placements posed concerns, the children were
eventually placed with a “suitable other,” Trisha, the sister of the paternal
grandfather’s fiancée. The children continue to reside with Trisha.
Over the next few years, concerns persisted relating to domestic violence,
substance abuse and mental health, parenting, homelessness, criminal activity,
and the mother allowing the children to be around a registered sex offender.
Services were offered to address these concerns. The mother tested positive for
substances, including methamphetamines, on several occasions, and she was a
no-show or noncompliant with other tests. The mother completed substance-
1 The father’s parental rights were also terminated. He does not appeal. 2 Specifically, “the father knocked the mother unconscious while the children were
present,” and he was “charged in at least five domestic violence incidents.” 3
abuse evaluations, which recommended outpatient treatment, but “[s]he was not
consistently attending treatment.” In October 2021, she entered treatment but was
unsuccessfully discharged six days later.
By spring 2022, the mother appeared to be making progress. She had
“re-engaged in substance abuse treatment,” “reported talking to a domestic
violence advocate,” and led the department to believe “she was separating herself
from the father” (who was not participating in services or visiting the children and
“continued to be violent”). The court allowed the parents additional time to work
towards reunification with the children. The permanency hearing was held over
three days, which allowed the parents “an additional eight months to show their
commitment to the children.” The mother’s progress stagnated; she continued to
use drugs, did not appear for drug screens, failed to participate in treatment, and
did not make consistent contact with the children. The State initiated termination-
of-parental-rights proceedings in March 2023.
The termination hearing was continued from July and eventually held in
October 2023. The mother was present at the hearing, but she did not testify. The
father was in jail. The caseworker testified the mother had not completed any of
the initial case plan requirements. Significantly, the mother had not participated in
domestic-violence therapy, had not complied with drug screens or completed
substance-abuse treatment, and had no contact with the children since July. The
mother “concede[d] she struggles with substance use” and asked the court to
consider establishing a guardianship with Trisha in lieu of termination. The
caseworker resisted that option, reporting the children were “very aware of what’s 4
going on,” and they were “angry,” “sad,” and “tired of the back-and-forth.” The
department and guardian ad litem recommended termination of parental rights.
The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights under Iowa Code
section 232.116(1)(d), (e), (f), and (l) (2023). She appeals.
II. Standard of Review
Appellate review of termination-of-parental-rights proceedings is de novo.
In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 293 (Iowa 2021). Our paramount concern in
termination proceedings is the best interests of the children. In re L.T., 924
N.W.2d 521, 529 (Iowa 2019). We give weight to, but are not bound by, the
juvenile court’s fact findings. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018).
III. Analysis
In our review, we use a three-step analysis: first, determine if a ground for
termination exists under section 232.116 paragraph (1); next, apply the best-
interest framework from paragraph (2); and last, consider if any exceptions from
paragraph (3) apply to preclude termination. Id. at 472–73.
A. Grounds for Termination. Because the mother does not contest the
existence of the grounds for termination, we need not discuss this step. See In re
P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010).
B. Best Interests of the Children. Our statutory best-interests framework
considers “the child[ren]’s safety, . . . the best placement for furthering the long-
term nurturing and growth of the child[ren], and . . . the physical, mental, and
emotional condition and needs of the child[ren].” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). “It is
well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has
proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a 5
parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.”
In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 112 (Iowa 2014) (citation omitted).
The children were adjudicated in need of assistance and removed from the
parents’ custody over two years ago. Since then, the mother has not consistently
engaged in services or made any significant progress. In considering whether
termination is in the children’s best interests, “we look to the parents’ past
performance because it may indicate the quality of care the parent is capable of
providing in the future.” In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa 1997). On this
issue, the court found:
The children have been court ordered out of parental care since July of 2021. [E.C.] has spent a good portion of her life outside the care of her parents. . . . The parents have been given ample time and services to demonstrate their ability to parent these children, yet they are still unable to parent these children. The children’s best interests are served by termination. The parents have been unable to make sufficient progress throughout the life of the case even after the court granted additional time to work toward reunification. The parents have been unable to address mental health, substance abuse, domestic violence and criminal activity issues that have plagued them during this case and before this case was opened. The parents’ inability to progress shows they are unlikely to ever become capable of providing a safe and stable home for these children.
We agree with the court’s finding that “[f]ailure to terminate parental rights would
be contrary to the welfare of the children, as the termination of parental rights is
the only reasonable means to establish permanency for them.” Termination is in
the best interests of the children.
C. Exceptions and Guardianship. Once the State has proven grounds for
termination, the burden shifts to the parent to prove a permissive exception under
section 232.116(3). A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 475–76. The mother claims the 6
department “failed to show by clear and convincing evidence why a guardianship
would not be appropriate in this case, as an exception to termination of parental
rights, given the age of the children and the long-term bond between the girls and
their mother.”
While the children and the mother do have a bond, to apply the exception
under paragraph (c) “requires clear and convincing evidence that ‘termination
would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-
child relationship.’” In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 169 (quoting Iowa Code
§ 232.116(3)(c)). For the reasons set forth above, the mother has not established
termination of her rights will be detrimental to the children.
Insofar as we interpret the mother’s argument as a claim permanency
should have been achieved through a guardianship with Trisha, guardianship is
not the preferred method of permanency, particularly when children are young.
See A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 477 (“[A] guardianship is not a legally preferable
alternative to termination.” (citation omitted)). On this issue, the guardian ad litem
opined:
[N.C.] is very matter of fact about staying with Trisha permanently if she cannot return to her mother’s care now. . . . [E.C.] is enthusiastic about being adopted and enlarging her family. She has all the new relationships figured out. [E.C.] is completely embracing the idea of having more family. Both girls seek Trisha’s attention and approval. . . . The girls have literally aged years while this case has been open. They are developmentally in a very different place than when I first met them. [N.C.] had a strong bond with her mother, but [the mother] has damaged [N.C.]’s trust by being unreliable. Several months ago, when [the mother] was making some progress apart from [the father], I was willing to consider a guardianship. The moment passed and [the mother] showed that even without [the father] dragging her down, she doesn’t have the ability to stabilize for 7
her girls. Even as an absent parent, she hurts them by not showing up to visit or calling them. The girls are together in an adoptive home that can provide for them and love them. Trisha is able and willing to raise them, even though she has raised a generation of children already. Despite the love the girls have for their parents, they clearly have formed a bond with Trisha as well. . . .
And as the caseworker put it:
So with guardianship and the chance of that possibly being turned over, that doesn’t give them any stability. It says, Okay this is where you’re going to stay for a year, but you may still have to go back to an unstable environment. You may still have to go back to parents who can’t show sobriety, can’t show stability.
We affirm the denial of the mother’s request for a guardianship, and we find
a permissive exception should not be applied to preclude termination.
D. Reasonable Efforts. The mother also challenges the “unreasonable”
visit schedule set by the department, claiming the department “ask[ed] the parents
to make an impossible choice” between having visits together despite domestic-
violence concerns or not seeing the children. Reasonable efforts “covers both the
efforts to prevent and eliminate the need for removal.” In re C.B., 611
N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000). “The reasonable efforts concept would broadly
include a visitation arrangement designed to facilitate reunification while protecting
the child[ren] from the harm responsible for the removal.” In re L.M., 904
N.W.2d 835, 839 (Iowa 2017) (citation omitted).
The mother may not challenge reasonable efforts for the first time on appeal
or during the termination hearing, as she did here. See In re E.H., No. 21-0467,
2021 WL 2709486, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 30, 2021). Rather, the mother was
required to alert the juvenile court of any perceived deficiency in services “at the
removal, when the case permanency plan [wa]s entered, or at later review 8
hearings.” In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Iowa 2002). Because the mother
failed to do so, her reasonable-efforts challenge is waived. In re A.S., No. 23-1755,
2024 WL 111266, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2024).
We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED.