In the Interest of M.M. and M.M., Children v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 7th District (Amarillo)
• Decided: June 29, 2026
• Docket: 07-26-00099-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-26-00098-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF A.F., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 320th District Court Potter County, Texas Trial Court No. 099817-D-FM Honorable Carry Baker, Associate Judge Presiding

No. 07-26-00099-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF M.M. AND M.M., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 108th District Court Potter County, Texas Trial Court No. 097845-E-FM Honorable Carry Baker, Associate Judge Presiding

June 29, 2026 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and PRATT, JJ. Appellant, Mother, seeks reversal of the trial courts’ judgments terminating her

parental rights to her children, A.F., M.M., and M.M. 1 In her sole issue on appeal, Mother

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial courts’ finding that

termination of her rights is in the best interest of the children. We affirm the judgments of

the trial courts.

BACKGROUND

In March of 2025, the Department received a report alleging that Mother was

neglectful in her supervision of A.F., M.M., and M.M., after taking the children to Northwest

Texas Hospital where she met with an undercover police officer and sold him one hundred

fentanyl pills. Mother left the children in her car with her boyfriend while she went into the

hospital to conduct the exchange. When law enforcement located the children, the

boyfriend appeared to be under the influence of an unknown substance. Mother and her

boyfriend were arrested, leaving no one to care for the children. At the time of her arrest,

Mother had an open case with the Department of Family and Protective Services and was

receiving family-based safety services due to concerns of neglectful supervision. The

Department took emergency possession of the children and filed its petition for protection,

conservatorship, and termination. Following an adversary hearing, the Department was

appointed temporary managing conservator of the children, and they were placed with a

paternal aunt.

1 To protect the privacy of the parties, we refer to the appellant as “Mother,” and to the children by

their initials. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b). The parental rights of the fathers of A.F., M.M., and M.M. were also terminated in these proceedings. None of the fathers has appealed.

2 The associate judge held bench trials on January 15 and 22, 2026, adjudicating

the Department’s petitions to terminate Mother’s parental rights. The court heard

testimony from Mother, the Department’s investigator, a caseworker from Saint Francis

Ministries, a paternal aunt, and a maternal aunt.

The court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the children on the grounds of

endangering conditions; endangerment; and engaging in criminal conduct resulting in her

conviction, imprisonment, and inability to care for the children for at least two years from

the original petition’s file date. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (P). 2 The

court also found termination was in the best interest of the children. See § 161.001(b)(2).

The Department was appointed permanent managing conservator and the placement

with the paternal aunt was continued. Mother timely filed these appeals of the resulting

judgments.

APPLICABLE LAW

A parent’s right to the “companionship, care, custody, and management” of his or

her child is a constitutional interest “far more precious than any property right.” Santosky

v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982); see In re

M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 547 (Tex. 2003). We strictly scrutinize termination proceedings

and strictly construe the involuntary termination statutes in favor of the parent. Holick v.

Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). However, “the rights of natural parents are not

2 Further references to provisions of the Texas Family Code will be by reference to “section ___”

or “§ ___.”

3 absolute” and “[t]he rights of parenthood are accorded only to those fit to accept the

accompanying responsibilities.” In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 2003) (citing In re

J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 195 (Tex. 1994)). Recognizing that a parent may forfeit his or

her parental rights by his or her acts or omissions, the primary focus of a termination suit

is protection of the child’s best interests. See id.

In a case to terminate parental rights under section 161.001 of the Family Code,

the petitioner must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the parent

committed one or more of the enumerated acts or omissions justifying termination, and

(2) termination is in the best interest of the child. § 161.001(b). Clear and convincing

evidence is “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of

fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.”

§ 101.007; In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264 (Tex. 2002). Both elements must be

established and termination may not be based solely on the best interest of the child as

determined by the trier of fact. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533

(Tex. 1987); In re K.C.B., 280 S.W.3d 888, 894 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. denied).

“Only one predicate finding under section 161.001[(b)](1) is necessary to support a

judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child’s best

interest.” In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362. We affirm a termination order if the evidence is

both legally and factually sufficient to support any alleged statutory ground the trial court

relied upon in terminating parental rights if the evidence also establishes that termination

is in the child’s best interest. In re K.C.B., 280 S.W.3d at 894–95.

In reviewing for legal sufficiency, we look at all the evidence in the light most

favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed 4 a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344–

45 (Tex. 2009). In reviewing for factual sufficiency, we give due consideration to evidence

that the factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing. In re C.H., 89

S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002). If, considering the entire record, the disputed evidence that

a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that

a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the

evidence is factually insufficient. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.

The clear and convincing evidence standard does not mean the evidence must

negate all reasonable doubt or that the evidence must be uncontroverted. In re R.D.S.,

902 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995, no writ). The reviewing court must recall

that the trier of fact has the authority to weigh the evidence, draw reasonable inferences

therefrom, and choose between conflicting inferences. Id. The factfinder also enjoys the

right to resolve credibility issues and conflicts within the evidence and may freely choose

to believe all, part, or none of the testimony espoused by any witness. Id. Where

conflicting evidence is present, the factfinder’s determination on such matters is generally

regarded as conclusive. In re B.R., 950 S.W.2d 113, 121 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, no

writ).

The appellate court cannot weigh witness credibility issues that depend on

demeanor and appearance as the witnesses are not present. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d

570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam). Even when credibility issues are reflected in the

written transcript, the appellate court must defer to the factfinder’s determinations, if those

determinations are not themselves unreasonable. Id.

5 ANALYSIS

In her sole issue, Mother challenges the factual and legal sufficiency of the

evidence to support the best-interest finding made under section 161.001(b)(2). She does

not contest the predicate grounds for termination under section 161.001(b)(1).

A determination of best interest necessitates a focus on the child, not the parent.

In re B.C.S., 479 S.W.3d 918, 927 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.). Appellate courts

examine the entire record to decide what is in the best interest of the child. In re E.C.R.,

402 S.W.3d 239, 250 (Tex. 2013). There is a strong presumption that it is in the child’s

best interest to preserve the parent-child relationship. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116

(Tex. 2006) (per curiam).

In assessing whether termination is in a child’s best interest, the courts are guided

by the non-exclusive list of factors in Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex.

1976). 3 “[T]he State need not prove all of the factors as a condition precedent to parental

termination, ‘particularly if the evidence were undisputed that the parental relationship

endangered the safety of the child.’” In re C.T.E., 95 S.W.3d 462, 466 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27). Evidence

that supports one or more statutory grounds for termination may also constitute evidence

illustrating that termination is in the child’s best interest. See In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at

3 These factors include: (1) the child’s desires; (2) the child’s present and future emotional and

physical needs; (3) any present or future emotional and physical danger to the child; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist the individuals seeking custody to promote the child’s best interest; (6) the plans for the child by the individuals or agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the parent’s acts or omissions which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is improper; and (9) any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions. Id.

6 249. The best-interest analysis may consider circumstantial evidence, subjective factors,

and the totality of the evidence as well as direct evidence. In re N.R.T., 338 S.W.3d 667,

677 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). We must also bear in mind that a child’s need

for permanence through the establishment of a stable, permanent home has been

recognized as the paramount consideration in determining best interest. See In re K.C.,

219 S.W.3d 924, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.).

The trial court was allowed to consider evidence in support of the predicate

grounds in making the best-interest determination and Mother does not challenge those

findings on appeal. The trial court’s unchallenged predicate grounds are probative in the

best-interest determination, In re E.A.F., 424 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2014, pet. denied), and are significant in our review of the best-interest finding.

Here, the court heard testimony that Mother has a severe drug addiction to fentanyl

and a history of methamphetamine abuse. Her arrest for manufacture/delivery of fentanyl

led not only to the removal of the children, but to the revocation of her probation for

possession of methamphetamine. Mother was sentenced to ten years’ incarceration for

the first-degree felony offense for manufacture/delivery of a controlled substance and to

one year in prison for possession of methamphetamine. She is eligible for parole in 2030.

Mother admitted to using fentanyl and methadone while caring for the children and being

high while transporting the children with her to conduct a drug deal. Due to her

incarceration throughout the pendency of these cases, Mother was unable to visit with the

children, who were ages four, six, and seven.

7 A parent’s illicit drug use and drug-related criminal activity are relevant to multiple

Holley factors, including the children’s emotional and physical needs now and in the

future, the emotional and physical danger to the children now and in the future, Mother’s

parental abilities, the stability of Mother’s home, and the acts or omissions which may

indicate an improper parent-child relationship. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371─72; In re

E.M., 494 S.W.3d 209, 222–23 (Tex. App.—Waco 2015, pet. denied) (explaining parent’s

continued drug use demonstrates inability to provide stable environment for child and

inability to provide for child’s emotional and physical needs); In re L.C.L., No. 14-09-

00062-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 6018, at *22─23 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July

16, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op) (parent’s illegal drug use relevant in gauging parent’s

ability to provide child with safe environment and showing acts or omissions indicating

parent-child relationship is not proper one). A parent’s drug use supports a finding that

termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child. In re E.C.R., 638 S.W.3d

755, 768 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2021, pet. denied). The factfinder can give “great weight”

to the “significant factor” of drug-related conduct. In re K.C., 219 S.W.3d at 927.

A parent’s imprisonment is also a factor that may be considered in determining a

child’s best interest. In re M.L., No. 07-20-00195-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 9483, at *16

(Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 4, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). Mother remained incarcerated

during the entirety of the underlying proceedings. Her continued incarceration subjects

the children to a life of uncertainty and instability.

At the time of trial, the children were living with a paternal aunt who intended to

adopt the children. According to the caseworker, the aunt is providing exceptional care

for the children’s physical and emotional needs. The children are enrolled in school and 8 extracurricular activities. See In re G.V., No. 14-02-00604-CV, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS

4526, at *15 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 29, 2003, pet. denied) (mem. op.)

(noting stability that proposed placement promises “weigh[s] heavily in the court’s finding

that termination is in the best interest” of child).

Stability and permanence are paramount in the upbringing of children. In re J.D.,

436 S.W.3d 105, 120 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The stability of the

proposed home environment is an important consideration in determining whether

termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interest. In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 472

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.). Mother’s sister testified that she was a part of

Mother’s support system and that Mother worked hard as a single mother to keep the

children safe. Mother took the children to school and doctor’s appointments “when she

[could].” After she is released from prison, Mother has options to live with her brother or

other family members. Mother provided no plan for the children’s care and did not

demonstrate she could provide them with a safe and stable home. According to Mother,

she “should work and gain [the children’s] trust back and show them [she] can be the

mom [she is] supposed to be.” In contrast, the caseworker testified that the Department

considered the children’s placement a permanent placement and the aunt’s adoption of

the children was in their best interest. Because there was no evidence showing that

Mother had any plan for the children, this factor weighs in favor of the court’s best-interest

determination.

After viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the best-interest finding,

we conclude that the court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination

of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of A.F., M.M., and M.M. See In re J.F.C., 9 96 S.W.3d at 266. We further conclude that any disputed evidence, viewed in light of the

entire record, could have been reconciled in favor of the court’s best-interest finding or

was not so significant that the court could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or

conviction that termination was in the children’s best interest. Id. Therefore, we hold the

evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the court’s best-interest finding. See

§ 161.001(b)(2).

CONCLUSION

Having overruled Mother’s sole issue on these appeals, we affirm the judgments

of the trial courts.

Judy C. Parker Chief Justice