In the Interest of: M.M.-A., a Minor

CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedDecember 1, 2017
Docket928 MDA 2017
StatusUnpublished

This text of In the Interest of: M.M.-A., a Minor (In the Interest of: M.M.-A., a Minor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In the Interest of: M.M.-A., a Minor, (Pa. Ct. App. 2017).

Opinion

J-S68013-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.M.-A., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: LACKAWANNA COUNTY : CHILDREN AND YOUTH : : : : No. 928 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered May 10, 2017 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Civil Division at No(s): CP-35-DP-0000154-2016

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 01, 2017

The Lackawanna County Office of Youth and Family Services (“Agency”)

appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna

County, denying a finding of child abuse and ordering bone density and genetic

testing of the minor, M.M.-A. (“Child”). Upon careful review, we affirm.

On November 12, 2016, Child, then three months old, was taken by her

parents to Moses Taylor Hospital for treatment of a possible cold. During

treatment, hospital staff discovered that Child had multiple rib fractures,1 for

which her parents, V.A. and A.M. (collectively, “Parents”) had no explanation.

Child and her sister – who did not present with any injuries – were taken into

protective custody based upon Child’s unexplained injuries.

____________________________________________

1 It was ultimately determined that Child had approximately 38 rib fractures. ____________________________________ * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S68013-17

On November 15, 2016, the Agency filed a petition seeking a finding of

dependency of Child and also seeking a finding of child abuse against Parents

pursuant to the Child Protective Services Law, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6301-6386

(the “Act”). After a multi-day adjudication hearing, on May 10, 2017, the trial

court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, as well as an order

adjudicating Child to be dependent pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302, based

on evidence that Child suffered 38 rib fractures while in Parents’ care and

control, as well as the fact that Child had been diagnosed with failure to thrive.

The court declined, however, to issue a finding that Child was a victim of

abuse. The court also ordered further health evaluations in the form of testing

for genetic disorders and/or bone deficiency disorders.

On June 7, 2017, the Agency filed a notice of appeal and concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a)(2). The Agency raises the following claims for our review:

1. Whether the [t]rial [j]udge erred . . . and/or abused her discretion by not determining credibility of witnesses, including expert witnesses and resolving conflicts in the testimony?

2. Whether the trial judge erred and/or abused her discretion by not making a finding of child abuse against the parents.

3. Whether the trial judge erred and/or abused her discretion in reviewing the medical testimony by admitting novel medical testimony from Doctors Holick, Hyman and Gootnick in violation of the Frye[2] standard, and by accepting Dr.

2 Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding novel scientific evidence admissible if methodology underlying evidence has general acceptance in relevant scientific community).

-2- J-S68013-17

Gootnick as a pediatric radiology expert despite a lack of qualifications or training in said specialty[?]

4. Whether the trial judge erred and/or abused her discretion by finding that pediatrician Dr. Burke had diagnosed the child as fail[ing] to thrive (finding of fact #167) which is not supported by the evidence; and further erred and disregarded test results showing no evidence that the child had OI (osteogenesis imperfecta) and had normal Vitamin D levels, by ordering genetic testing, bone density disorders testing and [that the Agency] follow any and all recommendations when the experts agree [Ehlers-Danlos Syndrome] has no test to identify it, and no metabolic disease or genetic disorders of the child have been diagnosed by treating physicians[?]

Brief of Appellant, at 8.

The Agency first asserts that the trial court erred and/or abused its

discretion by failing to make determinations as to the credibility of witnesses,

including expert witnesses, and failing to resolve conflicts in the testimony.

This claim is meritless.

In this case, four different experts testified regarding the cause of Child’s

fractures. One of those experts, Kent Hymel, M.D., testifying on behalf of the

Agency as an expert in child abuse pediatrics and pediatrics, concluded that

the injuries were the result of child abuse. The other three experts concluded

that Child’s injuries had clinical explanations and were not caused by abuse.

Susan Gootnick, M.D., an expert in pediatric radiology, testified that she was

certain that Child’s fractures were caused by rickets and that there was no

evidence of non-accidental trauma. Charles Hyman, M.D., an expert in child

abuse, testified that Child suffered from bone fragility and that rickets was a

possible contributing factor. Doctor Hyman further testified that there were

“absolutely no objective criteria that there was abuse.” N.T. Hearing, 7/5/17,

-3- J-S68013-17

at 68. Finally, Michael Holick, M.D., Ph.D., testified as an expert in

endocrinology, metabolism and nutrition, calcium, collagen disorders,

metabolic bone disease, and Vitamin D deficiencies. Doctor Holick diagnosed

both of Child’s parents with EDS, hypermobility type 3. As a result, Dr. Holick

determined that Child had a 75% chance of also suffering from that genetic

disorder, which would place her at higher risk of bone fracture.

In its opinion, the trial court stated that it “considered the direct and

circumstantial evidence and expert medical opinions” presented by the

Agency. However, the court ultimately found more compelling the testimony

of the three other experts who each concluded, to a reasonable degree of

medical certainty, that Child’s injuries were not the result of non-accidental

trauma. In making this determination, the court factored in other evidence,

including that Parents regularly took Child for medical visits to both her

pediatrician and specialists and that Child’s physician, a mandatory reporter,

never made any reports of child abuse. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/7/17, at

5-6. In sum, it is apparent that the trial court weighed the evidence before

it, resolved any conflicts in testimony to the best of its ability based on the

totality of the evidence presented, and concluded that the Agency failed to

establish by clear and convincing evidence that Parents had abused Child. We

can discern no abuse of discretion.

The Agency next claims that the trial court erred and/or abused its

discretion by failing to make a finding of child abuse against Parents. The

Agency asserts that it presented clear and convincing evidence that Parents

-4- J-S68013-17

were reckless with respect to Child’s torn frenulum as well as her fractured

ribs and, as a result, the court should have made a finding of abuse under

section 6303(b.1) of the Act. This claim is meritless.

We begin by noting our standard and scope of review in dependency

cases:

The standard of review which this Court employs in cases of dependency is broad. However, the scope of review is limited in a fundamental manner by our inability to nullify the fact-finding of the lower court.

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