In THE INTEREST OF M.F., a Child
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Opinion
305 Ga. 820 FINAL COPY
S18G1338. IN THE INTEREST OF M. F., a child.
BETHEL, Justice.
We granted certiorari in this case to address whether the Court
of Appeals erred in dismissing as moot the appeal of a juvenile
delinquency adjudication.
On May 11, 2017, the Juvenile Court of Richmond County
entered an order of disposition finding M. F. delinquent for criminal
attempt to enter an automobile and placing M. F. on probation for
12 months. On May 31, 2017, M. F. filed his notice of appeal, and
his case was docketed in the Court of Appeals on October 23, 2017.
On appeal, M. F. argued that the evidence was insufficient to
support the juvenile court’s adjudication of delinquency. On May
11, 2018, M. F.’s probationary sentence concluded, and, on May 22,
2018, the Court of Appeals issued an order in which it declined to
reach the merits of M. F.’s appeal, concluding that his case was moot
because his probationary sentence had expired and because M. F. “has not shown, on this record, any adverse collateral consequences
arising from the juvenile court’s adjudication of him as delinquent.”
For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the order of the Court of
Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings.
“[M]ootness is an issue of jurisdiction and thus must be
determined before a court addresses the merits of a claim.” Shelley
v. Town of Tyrone, 302 Ga. 297, 308 (3) (806 SE2d 535) (2017). When
the resolution of a case would be tantamount to “the determination
of an abstract question not arising upon existing facts or rights,”
then that case is moot. Collins v. Lombard Corp., 270 Ga. 120, 121
(1) (508 SE2d 653) (1998); see also Jayko v. State, 335 Ga. App. 684,
685 (782 SE2d 788) (2016) (“When the remedy sought in litigation
no longer benefits the party seeking it, the case is moot and must be
dismissed.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). Dismissal of moot
cases is mandatory. See Collins, 270 Ga. at 121 (1).
However, we have recognized circumstances where cases that
may appear to be moot are nonetheless viable due to the particular
nature of the litigated issue. Specifically, in the criminal context, apparent mootness can be defeated where “adverse collateral
consequences continue to plague the affected party.” In the Interest
of I. S., 278 Ga. 859, 862 (607 SE2d 546) (2005). Where a party
challenges the legality of his conviction after his sentence has
expired, collateral consequences are presumed if the party was
convicted of a felony. See Atkins v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 330, 333 (2) (216
SE2d 89) (1975). On the other hand, a party convicted of a
misdemeanor is required to demonstrate, in the record, adverse
collateral consequences that have continued beyond the expiration
of his sentence to show that his case is not moot. Abebe v. State, 304
Ga. 614, 615 (820 SE2d 678) (2018). Of course, M. F. was convicted
of neither a felony nor a misdemeanor because his adjudication of
delinquency is not a criminal conviction. See OCGA § 15-11-606.
The State urges this Court to treat adjudications of juvenile
delinquency as it treats misdemeanor convictions and to require
that a juvenile appealing his adjudication of delinquency
demonstrate collateral consequences in the record. In support of its
position, the State points to OCGA § 15-11-606, which provides that “[a]n order of disposition or adjudication shall not be a conviction of
a crime and shall not impose any civil disability ordinarily resulting
from a conviction.” But this argument ignores other consequences
flowing from an adjudication of delinquency. Simply because a
juvenile who has been adjudicated delinquent may later be able to
vote, serve on a jury, lawfully possess a firearm, and say that he has
not been convicted of a crime does not negate the fact that significant
adverse collateral consequences inherently and unquestionably can
flow from the adjudication.
As we held in In the Interest of M. D. H., 300 Ga. 46, 48 n.2 (793
SE2d 49) (2016), an adjudication of delinquency “could affect [a
juvenile] in later juvenile or criminal proceedings.” See also In the
Interest of B. L., 333 Ga. App. 860, 861 n.7 (777 SE2d 705) (2015).
For instance, juvenile courts are permitted to consider prior
delinquency adjudications during sentencing. See OCGA § 15-11-
601 (a) (directing a juvenile court to consider, among other things,
the prior record of a child adjudicated delinquent when entering its
disposition order). Prior adjudications permit a juvenile court to treat a delinquent act as eligible for designated-felony status, even
where the delinquent act would not ordinarily be treated as such.
See OCGA § 15-11-2 (12) (K), (L); (13) (K), (O). Further, the Juvenile
Code specifically provides that “the disposition of a child and
evidence adduced in a hearing in the juvenile court” may be used
against the child “in the establishment of conditions of bail, plea
negotiations, and sentencing in criminal offenses.” OCGA § 15-11-
703. Similarly, the federal sentencing guidelines treat prior juvenile
adjudications as aggravating factors for calculating a defendant’s
sentence in federal court. See United States Sentencing
Commission Guidelines Manual § 4A1.2 (d) (2). And juvenile
records, while closed to inspection by the general public, are
available to various parties for a wide range of purposes. See OCGA
§§ 15-11-703; 15-11-708.
Clearly, the consequences of a juvenile’s adjudication of
delinquency continue to reverberate even after the expiration of his disposition. 1 See M. D. H., 300 Ga. at 48 n.2. Accordingly, we hold
that a juvenile who appeals his adjudication of delinquency is not
required to show adverse collateral consequences in the record; such
consequences will be presumed. 2
Based on the foregoing, the Court of Appeals erred, and we
reverse its order and remand this case for consideration on the
merits.
Judgment reversed and case remanded. All the Justices
concur.
1 Because we conclude the consequences discussed herein are sufficiently
tangible and adverse to provide a presumption to juvenile defendants, we do not attempt to address the full list of consequences suggested by M. F. on appeal and argued to this Court by amicus curiae. 2 On the other hand, where a juvenile challenges only the disposition of
his adjudication of delinquency but the disposition order has expired, the case is moot. See In the Interest of E. B., 343 Ga. App. 823, 831 (806 SE2d 272) (2017); see also Jayko, 335 Ga. App. at 686 (same for challenges to completed felony sentences). Decided May 20, 2019.
Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Katherine M. Mason, Gregory J. Gelpi, Lucy D. Roth, for
appellant.
Natalie S. Paine, District Attorney, Joshua B. Smith, Assistant
District Attorney, for appellee.
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