IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-1232 Filed January 9, 2019
IN THE INTEREST OF L.V., M.V., and L.V., Minor Children,
A.V., Mother, Appellant,
R.V., Father, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mahaska County, Rose Anne
Mefford, District Associate Judge.
The mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental
rights. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
Jeffrey A. Smith, Oskaloosa, for appellant mother.
Michael S. Fisher of Fisher Law Office, Oskaloosa, for appellant father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and John McCormally, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Misty White Willis of White Law Office, Sigourney, guardian ad litem for
minor children.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and McDonald, JJ. 2
VOGEL, Presiding Judge.
The mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental
rights to their minor children: L.V.1, born in January 2010; M.V., born in July 2012;
and L.V.2, born in February 2014. Both argue termination is not in the best
interests of the children and the State failed to provide adequate services to both
parents. Finding neither precludes termination, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
The Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) first took notice of this
family on February 26, 2016, after allegations the father repeatedly spanked L.V.1
with a belt, leaving welts and bruising. L.V.1 was treated for her injuries in the
emergency room. A safety plan was created, which provided the father would not
return to the family home, and the mother was allowed to take L.V.1, M.V., and
L.V.2 home. The mother agreed to contact DHS if the father returned. The father
told DHS L.V.1 did not do anything wrong before he spanked her, he was just
angry. However, the father later retracted this assertion and stated his attorney
told him to lie and say he acted out of anger.
On or around March 9, DHS received a phone call from a confidential
informant claiming the father had continued to be around the children since
February 26. According to the informant, L.V.1 had fresh fingerprint-shaped
bruises, L.V.1 stated her father hit her with his hand “because the policeman took
his belt,” and the father had previously kicked M.V. Because the mother violated
the safety plan and there were reports of further abuse, the children were removed
on March 10 and placed in the care of their maternal grandmother. The children
were adjudicated children in need of assistance on March 29. After more than one 3
year of offered services, the father’s incarceration, and little progress by the mother
to support reunification, the State filed a petition to terminate parental rights on
May 31, 2017. A termination hearing was held on December 13. On July 16, 2018,
the district court found the State had proved by clear and convincing evidence the
grounds for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f), (h), and (i) (2017).
The mother and father separately appeal.1
II. Standard of Review
We review termination-of-parental-rights proceedings de novo. In re M.W.,
876 N.W.2d 212, 219 (Iowa 2016). “We are not bound by the juvenile court’s
findings of fact, but we do give them weight . . . .” In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703,
706 (Iowa 2010). “We will uphold an order terminating parental rights if there is
clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination under Iowa Code section
232.116.” Id.; accord Iowa Code § 232.117(3) (“If the court concludes that facts
sufficient to sustain the petition have been established by clear and convincing
evidence, the court may order parental rights terminated.”). “‘Clear and convincing
evidence’ means there are no serious or substantial doubts as to the correctness
[of] conclusions of law drawn from the evidence.” In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492
(Iowa 2000).
1 Neither the mother nor the father raise an argument that the grounds for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f), (h), or (i) were not met. Thus, we do not consider this step. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010) (providing the court need not consider the existence of the grounds for termination under section 232.116(1) because parent did not dispute the issue). 4
III. Best Interests
The mother and father both argue the district court improperly determined
termination is in the best interests of the children. “In considering whether to
terminate the rights of a parent . . . , the court shall give primary consideration to
the child[ren]’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing
and growth of the child[ren], and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition
and needs of the child[ren].” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). First, the mother asserts
termination is not in the best interests of the children because “the children know
their parents, love their parents, and have bonded with their parents.” Second, the
father argues “[p]ermanently separating a father from his children due to his current
incarceration is not in the children’s long-term best interest, especially when there
are other options to ensure the children’s safety while continuing the relationship
with their father.”
In addition to the original injuries, L.V.1, months later, informed DHS the
mother sometimes hits her and leaves scratches on her arms and face. A DHS
worker also noticed a mark on L.V.2’s face, which caused L.V.2 to become upset
and state it was caused by her mother. The DHS worker also opined the children
could not be returned to the mother because of the children’s reports that she was
physically abusing them and they did not feel safe with her. Additionally, the record
shows the children feel safe with their grandmother, are well cared for, and are
well bonded to her.
As for the father’s best-interests claim, a DHS worker opined the children
could not be returned to the father due to his failure to both accept responsibility
for the physical abuse he caused and foster a bond with his children. Considering 5
the physical abuse involving both parents, including their failure to acknowledge
and prevent additional abuse, we agree with the district court termination is in the
children’s best interests. See id.; see also In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 802 (Iowa
2006) (Cady, J., specially concurring) (noting the children’s safety and need for a
permanent home are the “defining elements” when determining the best interests
of the children).
IV. Services Provided to the Parents
The mother and father separately raise the issue of lack of reasonable
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-1232 Filed January 9, 2019
IN THE INTEREST OF L.V., M.V., and L.V., Minor Children,
A.V., Mother, Appellant,
R.V., Father, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mahaska County, Rose Anne
Mefford, District Associate Judge.
The mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental
rights. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
Jeffrey A. Smith, Oskaloosa, for appellant mother.
Michael S. Fisher of Fisher Law Office, Oskaloosa, for appellant father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and John McCormally, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Misty White Willis of White Law Office, Sigourney, guardian ad litem for
minor children.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and McDonald, JJ. 2
VOGEL, Presiding Judge.
The mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental
rights to their minor children: L.V.1, born in January 2010; M.V., born in July 2012;
and L.V.2, born in February 2014. Both argue termination is not in the best
interests of the children and the State failed to provide adequate services to both
parents. Finding neither precludes termination, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
The Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) first took notice of this
family on February 26, 2016, after allegations the father repeatedly spanked L.V.1
with a belt, leaving welts and bruising. L.V.1 was treated for her injuries in the
emergency room. A safety plan was created, which provided the father would not
return to the family home, and the mother was allowed to take L.V.1, M.V., and
L.V.2 home. The mother agreed to contact DHS if the father returned. The father
told DHS L.V.1 did not do anything wrong before he spanked her, he was just
angry. However, the father later retracted this assertion and stated his attorney
told him to lie and say he acted out of anger.
On or around March 9, DHS received a phone call from a confidential
informant claiming the father had continued to be around the children since
February 26. According to the informant, L.V.1 had fresh fingerprint-shaped
bruises, L.V.1 stated her father hit her with his hand “because the policeman took
his belt,” and the father had previously kicked M.V. Because the mother violated
the safety plan and there were reports of further abuse, the children were removed
on March 10 and placed in the care of their maternal grandmother. The children
were adjudicated children in need of assistance on March 29. After more than one 3
year of offered services, the father’s incarceration, and little progress by the mother
to support reunification, the State filed a petition to terminate parental rights on
May 31, 2017. A termination hearing was held on December 13. On July 16, 2018,
the district court found the State had proved by clear and convincing evidence the
grounds for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f), (h), and (i) (2017).
The mother and father separately appeal.1
II. Standard of Review
We review termination-of-parental-rights proceedings de novo. In re M.W.,
876 N.W.2d 212, 219 (Iowa 2016). “We are not bound by the juvenile court’s
findings of fact, but we do give them weight . . . .” In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703,
706 (Iowa 2010). “We will uphold an order terminating parental rights if there is
clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination under Iowa Code section
232.116.” Id.; accord Iowa Code § 232.117(3) (“If the court concludes that facts
sufficient to sustain the petition have been established by clear and convincing
evidence, the court may order parental rights terminated.”). “‘Clear and convincing
evidence’ means there are no serious or substantial doubts as to the correctness
[of] conclusions of law drawn from the evidence.” In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492
(Iowa 2000).
1 Neither the mother nor the father raise an argument that the grounds for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f), (h), or (i) were not met. Thus, we do not consider this step. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010) (providing the court need not consider the existence of the grounds for termination under section 232.116(1) because parent did not dispute the issue). 4
III. Best Interests
The mother and father both argue the district court improperly determined
termination is in the best interests of the children. “In considering whether to
terminate the rights of a parent . . . , the court shall give primary consideration to
the child[ren]’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing
and growth of the child[ren], and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition
and needs of the child[ren].” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). First, the mother asserts
termination is not in the best interests of the children because “the children know
their parents, love their parents, and have bonded with their parents.” Second, the
father argues “[p]ermanently separating a father from his children due to his current
incarceration is not in the children’s long-term best interest, especially when there
are other options to ensure the children’s safety while continuing the relationship
with their father.”
In addition to the original injuries, L.V.1, months later, informed DHS the
mother sometimes hits her and leaves scratches on her arms and face. A DHS
worker also noticed a mark on L.V.2’s face, which caused L.V.2 to become upset
and state it was caused by her mother. The DHS worker also opined the children
could not be returned to the mother because of the children’s reports that she was
physically abusing them and they did not feel safe with her. Additionally, the record
shows the children feel safe with their grandmother, are well cared for, and are
well bonded to her.
As for the father’s best-interests claim, a DHS worker opined the children
could not be returned to the father due to his failure to both accept responsibility
for the physical abuse he caused and foster a bond with his children. Considering 5
the physical abuse involving both parents, including their failure to acknowledge
and prevent additional abuse, we agree with the district court termination is in the
children’s best interests. See id.; see also In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 802 (Iowa
2006) (Cady, J., specially concurring) (noting the children’s safety and need for a
permanent home are the “defining elements” when determining the best interests
of the children).
IV. Services Provided to the Parents
The mother and father separately raise the issue of lack of reasonable
efforts toward reunification and services provided by the State.
Although DHS must make reasonable efforts in furtherance of reunification, . . . parents have a responsibility to object when they claim the nature or extent of services is inadequate. A parent’s objection to the sufficiency of services should be made early in the process so appropriate changes can be made. In general, if a parent fails to request other services at the proper time, the parent waives the issue and may not later challenge it at the termination proceeding.
In re L.M., 904 N.W.2d 835, 839–40 (Iowa 2017) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
First, the mother asserts the father is responsible for all the physical-abuse
concerns, his incarceration has given her “the ability to separate herself from her
and the children’s abuser,” and DHS only required her to “secure employment and
housing, both of which she procured.” After the February 26, 2016 abuse incident,
the mother violated the safety plan by allowing the father visitation with the
children, which resulted in further abuse. After the children were placed in their
grandmother’s care, the mother was free to visit the children frequently; however,
the grandmother reported she rarely did so, even on holidays. Furthermore, the 6
children began to report the mother abused them and opined they did not feel safe
in her presence. The visits returned to being fully supervised as of December 4,
2017, because of the abuse allegations directed at the mother as well as the
mother’s continual need to be prompted by service providers to tend to the
children’s basic needs. Further, the mother did not object at any point to the level
of services that were being provided. In re L.M.W., 518 N.W.2d 804, 807 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1994) (“[P]arents have a responsibility to demand services prior to the
termination hearing.”).
Second, the father asserts he “was not provided reasonable efforts to
continue his relationship with his children during his incarceration.[2] No services
were provided to the father to strengthen his relationship with his children, and no
visits occurred during his term of imprisonment.” However, a no-contact order is
currently in place between the father and L.V.1 and is not set to expire until
September 29, 2021. The department of corrections denied visits by M.V. and
L.V.2 since the children are “direct relatives” of the father’s victim and because the
father had not participated in a prison treatment program to address domestic
abuse and child endangerment. The father was allowed to appeal the May 3, 2017
denial of visitations, but as of the December 4, 2017 DHS report to the court, which
was just prior to the termination hearing, the father had failed to do so. Further,
although the father was allowed to send letters to M.V. and L.V.2, he only did so
on a few occasions. Therefore, we find the services provided by DHS—including
2 The father pled guilty to domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury, third or subsequent offense, a Class “D” felony, on May 27, 2016. A five-year sentence was imposed to run concurrent with another sentence. 7
family safety, risk, and permanency services; substance-abuse treatment for the
mother; behavior health services for the mother; family team meeting; family
interaction plan; play therapy; behavioral health intervention specialist for L.V.1;
and assistance with transportation—were adequate with regards to both parents.
V. Conclusion
We conclude termination is in the best interests of the children and the State
provided adequate services.
AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.