In the Interest of K.N., M.N., and M.N., Children v. the State of Texas
This text of In the Interest of K.N., M.N., and M.N., Children v. the State of Texas (In the Interest of K.N., M.N., and M.N., Children v. the State of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth) primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00438-CV ___________________________
IN THE INTEREST OF K.N., M.N., AND M.N., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 367th District Court Denton County, Texas Trial Court No. 23-11236-158
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Wallach and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellants M.N. (Father) and H.N. (Mother) have appealed the trial court’s
order terminating their parental rights to their three children, to whom we will refer in
this opinion as Kelly, Maci, and Mandy.1 Father’s appointed appellate counsel filed an
Anders brief stating that the appeal is frivolous and wholly without merit. See Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967); see also In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d
774, 776–77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, order) (holding that Anders procedures
apply in cases terminating parental rights). Mother’s appointed appellate counsel filed
a merits brief raising four appellate issues––three challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the trial court’s endangerment and best-interest findings and one
complaining that the trial court denied Mother due process by allowing the trial to
proceed despite a missing witness. We will affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. THE CHILDREN’S REMOVAL
Father’s and Mother’s history with Child Protective Services (CPS)2 dates back
to 2015. The present case, though, began with a CPS intake in 2023. In July 2023,
police were called out to Cedar Hill State Park, where Mother was allegedly “trying to
1 To protect the children’s identities, we refer to them and their relatives by aliases. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). 2 CPS is a subdivision of the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services. See In re N.L., No. 02-25-00205-CV, 2025 WL 3008022, at *10 n.20 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth Oct. 27, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.).
2 bite relatives.” Father was not present for the incident but came from Denton to pick
up the children. Mother was arrested for public intoxication.
There were more CPS intakes involving the family in August 2023, including “a
concern for the parents being drunk and driving with the children” and a separate
incident the following week in which CPS was called because “there was a lot of
arguing amongst all the family members” while the children were in the home. Then,
one night in mid-August, CPS received an intake report from a 911 call that Mother
had locked Kelly––then eleven years old and the oldest of the children––out of their
home.
The family was referred to the Department’s family-based safety services
(FBSS)3 on September 8, 2023. Niaah Hutchison, an FBSS caseworker, tried to assess
the home where Mother and the children lived with Mother’s parents. According to
Hutchison, roaches were falling from the home’s ceiling, and the home had “trash,
piles of dirty clothes, dirty mattresses on the floor, dishes everywhere,” and animal
feces outside. Also, “the floor was sinking in and wet, with a foul odor.”
As part of the family’s FBSS safety plan, Mother and Father were not to be
together––unsupervised––with the children. While participating in FBSS services,
The Department provides family-based safety services when a child is “at risk 3
of abuse or neglect but is not in the Department’s conservatorship. The Department provides these services to protect the child from abuse and neglect, to help the family reduce the risk of future abuse or neglect, and to prevent the child’s removal from the family’s home.” In re J.M., No. 02-21-00346-CV, 2022 WL 872542, at *1 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 24, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).
3 Mother got into a physical fight with Kelly, and Maci called 911 because she thought
that Kelly was dead. Then, on December 6, 2023, the Department received a report
stating that law enforcement had been called to a restaurant the day before because
Father “was assaulting [M]other [while] the children were present” and Mother was
intoxicated. Father was arrested for continuous violence against the family, and an
emergency protective order was issued, prohibiting him from contacting Mother or
the children.
Department investigator Scott Lang interviewed Father, Mother, Kelly, and
Maci. Father and Mother each blamed the other for instigating the physical
altercation, but both parents denied assaulting the other. Both parents also confirmed
that during the incident, the children were in the back seat of the car and crying.
Father told Lang that Mother had smelled like alcohol that day, but Mother told Lang
that she had not been drinking.
On December 8, 2023,4 the Department filed suit seeking temporary managing
conservatorship of the children and termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental
rights.5 The trial court issued an emergency order, and the children were removed
from Mother’s possession and placed with Father’s parents. According to the
4 The trial court granted one six-month extension of the initial December 9, 2024 dismissal date. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.401(a), (b). 5 At this time, Kelly was twelve years old, Maci was nine years old, and Mandy was three years old.
4 Department’s service plan, Mother was not allowed unsupervised visitation with the
children, partly because of her having hit Kelly.
B. PRETRIAL HEARING
In March 2025, Mother filed a Motion to Return and Monitor (MRM), asking
that the children be returned to her but that the Department continue to serve as the
children’s temporary managing conservator and monitor their placement “to ensure
the children [were] in a safe environment.” The trial court heard the MRM in
May 2025, less than a month before trial. Mother called two witnesses at the hearing:
herself and Jennifer Hutchison,6 who had been the caseworker since April 2024. The
Department called one additional witness: Robert C de Baca7 of Court Appointed
Special Advocates (CASA)8 of Denton County. These witnesses testified generally
regarding Mother’s progress and work on her service plan and the children’s
6 At the MRM hearing and at trial, the trial court and multiple attorneys referred to this witness as “Hutchinson.” However, during the MRM hearing, she identified herself as “Jennifer Hutchison,” and her name is spelled likewise in the clerk’s record. We will refer to this caseworker by her first name to avoid confusing her with witness Niaah Hutchison. 7 This is how the witness spelled his name on the report he filed with the trial court. Because the Department addressed him in the trial court as “Mr. C de Baca,” we construe his surname as “C de Baca” and so refer to him in this opinion. 8 Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASA) consists of county, state, and federal associations comprised of individuals who advocate for effective public policy for children in the child-protection system. In re J.G., No. 02-20-00038-CV, 2020 WL 3410503, at *4 n.7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 28, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
5 behaviors and needs while in the Department’s care. At the conclusion of the
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00438-CV ___________________________
IN THE INTEREST OF K.N., M.N., AND M.N., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 367th District Court Denton County, Texas Trial Court No. 23-11236-158
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Wallach and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellants M.N. (Father) and H.N. (Mother) have appealed the trial court’s
order terminating their parental rights to their three children, to whom we will refer in
this opinion as Kelly, Maci, and Mandy.1 Father’s appointed appellate counsel filed an
Anders brief stating that the appeal is frivolous and wholly without merit. See Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967); see also In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d
774, 776–77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, order) (holding that Anders procedures
apply in cases terminating parental rights). Mother’s appointed appellate counsel filed
a merits brief raising four appellate issues––three challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the trial court’s endangerment and best-interest findings and one
complaining that the trial court denied Mother due process by allowing the trial to
proceed despite a missing witness. We will affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. THE CHILDREN’S REMOVAL
Father’s and Mother’s history with Child Protective Services (CPS)2 dates back
to 2015. The present case, though, began with a CPS intake in 2023. In July 2023,
police were called out to Cedar Hill State Park, where Mother was allegedly “trying to
1 To protect the children’s identities, we refer to them and their relatives by aliases. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). 2 CPS is a subdivision of the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services. See In re N.L., No. 02-25-00205-CV, 2025 WL 3008022, at *10 n.20 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth Oct. 27, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.).
2 bite relatives.” Father was not present for the incident but came from Denton to pick
up the children. Mother was arrested for public intoxication.
There were more CPS intakes involving the family in August 2023, including “a
concern for the parents being drunk and driving with the children” and a separate
incident the following week in which CPS was called because “there was a lot of
arguing amongst all the family members” while the children were in the home. Then,
one night in mid-August, CPS received an intake report from a 911 call that Mother
had locked Kelly––then eleven years old and the oldest of the children––out of their
home.
The family was referred to the Department’s family-based safety services
(FBSS)3 on September 8, 2023. Niaah Hutchison, an FBSS caseworker, tried to assess
the home where Mother and the children lived with Mother’s parents. According to
Hutchison, roaches were falling from the home’s ceiling, and the home had “trash,
piles of dirty clothes, dirty mattresses on the floor, dishes everywhere,” and animal
feces outside. Also, “the floor was sinking in and wet, with a foul odor.”
As part of the family’s FBSS safety plan, Mother and Father were not to be
together––unsupervised––with the children. While participating in FBSS services,
The Department provides family-based safety services when a child is “at risk 3
of abuse or neglect but is not in the Department’s conservatorship. The Department provides these services to protect the child from abuse and neglect, to help the family reduce the risk of future abuse or neglect, and to prevent the child’s removal from the family’s home.” In re J.M., No. 02-21-00346-CV, 2022 WL 872542, at *1 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 24, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).
3 Mother got into a physical fight with Kelly, and Maci called 911 because she thought
that Kelly was dead. Then, on December 6, 2023, the Department received a report
stating that law enforcement had been called to a restaurant the day before because
Father “was assaulting [M]other [while] the children were present” and Mother was
intoxicated. Father was arrested for continuous violence against the family, and an
emergency protective order was issued, prohibiting him from contacting Mother or
the children.
Department investigator Scott Lang interviewed Father, Mother, Kelly, and
Maci. Father and Mother each blamed the other for instigating the physical
altercation, but both parents denied assaulting the other. Both parents also confirmed
that during the incident, the children were in the back seat of the car and crying.
Father told Lang that Mother had smelled like alcohol that day, but Mother told Lang
that she had not been drinking.
On December 8, 2023,4 the Department filed suit seeking temporary managing
conservatorship of the children and termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental
rights.5 The trial court issued an emergency order, and the children were removed
from Mother’s possession and placed with Father’s parents. According to the
4 The trial court granted one six-month extension of the initial December 9, 2024 dismissal date. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.401(a), (b). 5 At this time, Kelly was twelve years old, Maci was nine years old, and Mandy was three years old.
4 Department’s service plan, Mother was not allowed unsupervised visitation with the
children, partly because of her having hit Kelly.
B. PRETRIAL HEARING
In March 2025, Mother filed a Motion to Return and Monitor (MRM), asking
that the children be returned to her but that the Department continue to serve as the
children’s temporary managing conservator and monitor their placement “to ensure
the children [were] in a safe environment.” The trial court heard the MRM in
May 2025, less than a month before trial. Mother called two witnesses at the hearing:
herself and Jennifer Hutchison,6 who had been the caseworker since April 2024. The
Department called one additional witness: Robert C de Baca7 of Court Appointed
Special Advocates (CASA)8 of Denton County. These witnesses testified generally
regarding Mother’s progress and work on her service plan and the children’s
6 At the MRM hearing and at trial, the trial court and multiple attorneys referred to this witness as “Hutchinson.” However, during the MRM hearing, she identified herself as “Jennifer Hutchison,” and her name is spelled likewise in the clerk’s record. We will refer to this caseworker by her first name to avoid confusing her with witness Niaah Hutchison. 7 This is how the witness spelled his name on the report he filed with the trial court. Because the Department addressed him in the trial court as “Mr. C de Baca,” we construe his surname as “C de Baca” and so refer to him in this opinion. 8 Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASA) consists of county, state, and federal associations comprised of individuals who advocate for effective public policy for children in the child-protection system. In re J.G., No. 02-20-00038-CV, 2020 WL 3410503, at *4 n.7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 28, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
5 behaviors and needs while in the Department’s care. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the trial court denied Mother’s MRM.
C. TRIAL AND RULING9
The Department’s first three witnesses at trial were police officers. Officer
Arun Koshy of the Lewisville Police Department had responded to the December 6,
2023 disturbance. He testified that Mother had “seemed very nervous and scared”
and that he had noticed “fresh” bruising on her left arm. He testified that she
“originally kind of was denying any kind of physical altercation, but then she later
admitted that she got backhanded by her husband. And then she got grabbed on --
by the left arm, so that’s what caused the bruise on her left tricep.” He further
testified that he had picked up a scent of alcohol from Mother when he was speaking
with her.
Officer Koshy said that he then spoke with Father, who “essentially said that it
was just a verbal argument and that nothing real [had] happened.” But after Officer
Koshy confronted Father with what Mother had said, Father “said he was the one
that got hit in the back of the head.” Officer Koshy relayed that Father had called
Mother “crazy” and said that she was “all over the place” mentally. Officer Koshy
9 The four-day trial took place over three consecutive days in June 2025; after a two-month recess, it resumed and concluded on August 19, 2025. The trial court signed its Order of Termination on August 26, 2025. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.4011(a). We limit our summary of the facts developed at trial to those necessary to inform our analysis of “every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.” See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
6 arrested Father for continuous family violence. Certified court documents showing
that Father later pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily injury were admitted into
evidence without objection.
Officer Kyle Gray of the Denton Police Department testified that he “was
dispatched to a disturbance call” on December 23, 2023. Mother was with another
man at his apartment, and Father had been sending her threatening text messages,
including “a screenshot of a map that showed her pin, her location, to indicate that he
was able to track her location or see where she was.” Mother reported to Officer
Gray that she and the man she was with had awoken that morning “to the sound of
screaming and yelling from outside the apartment . . . , which she believed to be [from
Father].” Father was not there when Officer Gray arrived, but Mother showed
Officer Gray the texts that Father had sent her. Father was charged with violation of
a protective order. Court documents showing that he pleaded guilty to that charge
and received a probated sentence were admitted into evidence without objection.
Officer Travis Nicholas of the Denton Police Department testified that he had
arrested Mother for driving while intoxicated (DWI) following a car accident in
August 2023. While questioning Mother, Officer Nicholas noticed that “she had
bruises and . . . a black eye,” and she made vague references to domestic violence.
Officer Nicholas testified that he “offered medics, if she wanted medics to
come check her out,” but Mother declined. Court documents showing that Mother
pleaded guilty to the DWI charge and was placed on probation were admitted into
7 evidence without objection. A redacted copy of Officer Nicholas’s incident report
was also admitted into evidence.
The Department then called Hutchison, who testified that when she initially
visited Mother’s home in early September 2023, it “was unlivable” and that the
Department “couldn’t even complete the . . . initial visit . . . due to the roaches falling
from the ceiling.” From what Hutchison saw, she did not think that the home could
ever be fixed to be a safe place for children. According to Hutchison, Mother had
“said she was not making enough to get stable housing for her and the children.”
Mother confirmed that there had been “ongoing domestic violence” between
her and Father, which Mother acknowledged had gone on in front of the children.
Hutchison said that Mother also “admitted [that] her alcohol use was out of control”
and stated that Kelly had “attacked her.” Hutchison testified that a safety plan was
put into place “[d]ue to the physical altercation between [Mother] and [Kelly] and also
[Mother]’s excessive drinking of alcohol.” Hutchison also testified that Mother had
been arrested for public intoxication “[t]wo or three times” and that, on one occasion,
the children were present.
Lang testified about his investigation into the December 2023 physical
altercation between Mother and Father. He testified that Mother had stated that
Father belittled her, called her names in front of the children, and took a swing at her.
She had also reported “that he got physical and yanked her hair and pulled her arm.”
While testifying about Mother’s and Father’s criminal histories and the family’s CPS
8 history, Lang responded, “Correct,” when asked whether he recalled reports of one
incident in which Father had “bec[o]me intoxicated . . . and [had] attempted to strike
[Mother] but instead punched [Mandy].”
C de Baca testified that “CASA’s position [was] in support of terminating
parental rights.” He testified that Mandy had recently turned four years old and was
“doing really well” and “thriving” in her then-current placement. He also testified
that Maci had “fairly recent[ly]” been placed in a foster home with Kelly and was also
doing “[r]eally well.” He averred that Maci, who was ten years old at the time, and
Kelly, who was thirteen, were “heavily bonded.” He also said that their current
placement was adoption-motivated and was also interested in being a placement for
Mandy as well if that was in the children’s best interest. But C de Baca thought that it
was in Mandy’s best interest to remain in her then-current placement because it had
been the best one “by far.”
C de Baca was concerned about Mother’s past alcohol usage and continuing
relationship with Father.10 He also expressed concerns based on what he had
observed during Mother’s visits with the children:
10 C de Baca’s exact testimony about Mother and Father’s relationship was, “Another concern that I have is they are -- it appears that they’re still seeing each other, so that kind of seems like not removing herself from the situation, especially with that being a big part of the reason for removal.” He testified that he was concerned that Mother had testified at the MRM hearing that she planned to still maintain that relationship.
9 [Maci] seemed to be kind of ignored and left off in the corner, primarily using electronic devices to entertain her. [Mandy] got a lot of attention. There were tantrums being thrown if children didn’t get what they wanted, specifically regarding -- typically it was like candy or an electronic device to play with.
[Kelly] was typically kind of the figure in the room that tried to maintain control over it. Being a child, it’s not really -- it’s not really appropriate, and just overall kind of -- it just didn’t feel like -- it didn’t feel like the kind of gathering you’d have if you hadn’t seen your children in a week. There wasn’t -- there w[ere] no group activities. There w[ere]n’t any meaningful conversations. Just kind of felt like three people hanging out and nobody really had control of the situation.
He added that the children “would sometimes fight and [that] it was a little bit
beyond roughhousing” in his opinion. According to C de Baca, one reason the
children were separated to begin with was that Maci and Mandy were fighting a lot
physically, which was a concern for Mandy’s safety when they were placed together.
He explained that the behaviors that the children had exhibited were one of the
reasons that they had been in multiple different placements throughout this case but
that they had recently “been improving.” He testified that Maci had been released
from psychiatric care since that hearing and was doing “[m]uch better” since her
release. He understood that Maci and Kelly needed a higher level of care than Mandy.
C de Baca indicated that, the weekend before trial began, Kelly had expressed
that she did not want to see Mother anymore. Ultimately, he believed that it was in
the children’s best interest that Mother’s parental rights be terminated “[b]ecause
none of [Mother’s] behaviors ha[d] changed[, t]he reasons for removal ha[d]n’t been
10 addressed,” and even though her “services ha[d] been done for the most part,” he had
“witnessed no change in [her] behaviors[ or] in [her] interactions with the children.”
The Department then called Mother as a witness. She acknowledged that the
children had experienced “some trauma” while living with her and Father, but she
denied a lot of the accusations against her and Father and claimed to not remember
other events.
Mother acknowledged that the Department had found “reason to believe” that
she had engaged in neglectful supervision.”11 In June 2015 but denied that she had
left Kelly in a car while she was passed out in a breezeway. She admitted that “some
stuff [had] happened” in Cedar Hill in July 2023 and that she had been charged with
public intoxication as a result, but she deflected when asked about threatening to bite
her relatives. She admitted getting another public-intoxication charge and a DWI that
same year. When asked if she had a drinking problem, Mother answered, “I do not
anymore. I’m -- I’m in recovery.” When asked if she considered herself to be an
alcoholic, she responded, “From my past, yes, but I’m in recovery. I have not had a
drink.” She later clarified that she had been sober from alcohol since October 2024.
11 After investigating allegations of child abuse or neglect, CPS will assign one of five possible dispositions: (1) reason to believe (based on a preponderance of the evidence); (2) ruled out; (3) unable to complete; (4) unable to determine; or (5) administrative closure. In re C.W., No. 02-21-00252-CV, 2022 WL 123221, at *6 n.7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 13, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).
11 Mother admitted that there was a lot of domestic violence in her home and that
the children had “witnessed some of it.” When asked about the altercation with
Father at a restaurant in December 2023, Mother acknowledged that she had
previously testified that there had been no physical altercation that day. When asked
if she was lying then, Mother answered, “I made a mistake, so yes.” She testified that
in December 2023, she realized that she was a victim of domestic violence and that
Father was her abuser. However, she also testified that there had been only one other
incident in which Father had hit her. When asked if all of the CPS reports for
domestic violence were lies, Mother responded, “Yeah, kind of, because some stuff
was reported as -- it was false. And just like the incident with -- they said there was in
the report of him being arrested for domestic violence when it wasn’t true.” She
further testified that she had not filed for divorce or for a protective order against
Father but would “if it [came] down to it . . . to protect [the] girls.”
Mother said that Father was a good father. She testified that she had asked her
prior caseworker for family counseling and that the caseworker had said that she
would get back to Mother but never did. Mother also testified that her father had
passed away in January 2025 and that Father had come to the funeral. Mother
explained that she “could not tell him not to go to [her] dad’s funeral, out of respect
for him.”
Mother described an “altercation” with Kelly in August 2023 but claimed that
“[i]t wasn’t a physical, like, altercation.” She testified that she “was trying to calm
12 [Kelly] down” but denied slapping Kelly or locking her outside of the house. She also
denied that Kelly had called 911.
Mother testified that in May 2025 she had submitted to a hair-strand test,
believing “it was going to be negative.” But it was positive.12 She denied using drugs–
–specifically methamphetamine––or having been around people using
methamphetamine and declared that the test result “was a false positive.”
Mother conceded that exposing the children to domestic violence had created
an unsafe environment for them, that allowing the children to be exposed to drugs
created an unsafe environment for them, and that allowing the children to live in an
unsanitary and unsafe home had created an unsafe environment for them. But she
thought that they would “be happy again” to be back in her care. Mother believed
that the children had suffered emotional harm in the care of the Department. She
expressed concerns “with [Mandy’s] being in a different home than the other girls
and . . . [Maci’s] . . . being put on all these medications six times a day.” Still, Mother
understood that the children had been in therapy since removal and that they had
benefited from that therapy.
Mother also testified that she had completed an intensive outpatient program, a
parenting class, and a treatment plan with Merit Family Services that involved
12 Although the drug-test results had not yet been admitted at this point in the trial, they were later admitted over Mother’s objection. The results indicated that Mother had tested positive for methamphetamine in May 2025.
13 individual therapy sessions. She explained that she had “not completed” the
counseling component of her service plan because Jennifer had told her to continue
doing it. But when asked if she had downplayed to her therapist the domestic
violence that had been going on in her home, Mother testified that in her sessions
they “didn’t talk too much about the domestic violence.” And Mother had difficulty
articulating what she had learned in the domestic-violence class to prevent the
children from witnessing the same situation again.
After Mother finished testifying, the Department called Lisa Grelle, the
conservatorship supervisor assigned to this case. Grelle testified about several other
CPS cases that the family had over the years; FBSS had provided services to the
family in two of them. Grelle was already familiar with the family and had been their
FBSS caseworker in a prior case.
Grelle testified that the June 2015 CPS intake that had received a “reason to
believe” disposition was based on the “concern that the children [had been] exposed
to drugs and . . . fighting in the home and . . . were not getting proper care.” In
April 2018, “there were concerns that . . . [Maci] was coming to school with improper
footwear, and [Kelly and Maci] were coming to school smelling . . . like they hadn’t
showered.” Like the 2015 case, that case was found “reason to believe.”
In April 2021, “there were concerns with the children coming to school dirty
and without proper footwear and . . . [there was] a report of a bruise on [Maci]’s
cheek.” That case received a disposition of “reason to believe for neglectful
14 supervision.” The next intake, received in October 2021, “was for domestic violence
allegations. It was reported that [Father] was at the emergency room with [Mandy].
She[13] had been struck by [Father], and [Mandy] had also been struck in . . . the
altercation. And then it was . . . also reported that they violated a safety plan.” Grelle
explained that as part of a safety plan that she had put in place for that case, Mother
and Father were not supposed to have any unsupervised contact with their children.
Grelle had also explained the purpose of the safety plan to Mother and Father: that
the Department was “looking for behavioral changes in order to keep their children
safe.”
Grelle testified that in 2022, she visited Mother at her parents’ home. Grelle
remembered at that time “discussing a hole in . . . between the kitchen and living
room that needed to be repaired. They had it covered with heavy objects to keep
[Mandy] away from it. At that time [Mandy] was [in] the home. ”
Grelle testified about the family’s multiple CPS cases in July, August, and
September 2023:
[On] August 4th there was a concern for the parents being drunk and driving with the children. There w[ere] still continued concerns for the state of the home. There was a report that [Maci] had asked to live with a friend because she wanted a normal family. The home still had foul odors. And there was a report of a police call-out due to yelling. And then it was also reported that [Mother] had a black eye.
In the context of the record and the trial court’s fact finding number 27, it 13
appears that the “[s]he” Grelle was referring to is Mother.
15 When asked what services Mother had not completed, Grelle testified that she
had not been discharged successfully from individual counseling. A redacted version
of Mother’s psychological records was admitted into evidence.
When Grelle testified that she had concerns that Mother had not been
forthright in her discussions with the psychologist, Mother’s attorney asked to take
Grelle on voir dire, which the trial court allowed. On voir dire, Grelle stated that she
was basing her testimony “on the case record,” which had been prepared by Jennifer,
whom Grelle had supervised and who had been the caseworker for most of the case.
When asked if Jennifer had been fired, Grelle responded, “She was involuntarily
dismissed,” and stated that Jennifer “no longer work[ed] for OCOK.”14 Mother’s
attorney then objected to “th[e] whole line of questioning”––“if . . . we’re going to
work off what Jennifer . . . said”––as “a violation of the constitutional right to
confrontation.” The trial court recessed the proceedings for the day without ruling.
The following day, after a lengthy discussion with the parties’ attorneys, the
trial court ordered the Department to subpoena Jennifer to testify at trial. Father then
took the witness stand and testified about his criminal history. He equivocated on
whether or not he was still in a romantic relationship with Mother. He admitted that
14 OCOK (Our Community Our Kids) is one of the contractors that now provides conservatorship services on the Department’s behalf, and an OCOK permanency specialist is the equivalent of a CPS caseworker. In re K.J., No. 02-23- 00198-CV, 2023 WL 6475930, at *5 n.10 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth Oct. 5, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
16 he had told the initial investigator from CPS that his relationship with Mother was
toxic but testified that he was still planning to continue his relationship with Mother if
they could “ever do marriage counseling and get this taken care of.” He said that the
children “need[ed] their mother.” But he also believed that Mother’s behaviors
leading up to and during December 2023 were harmful to the children and had
created an immediate risk of harm to them. And Father testified that although
Mother had been able to remain sober in the past, there had been multiple situations
in which Mother’s drinking had put the children in danger. Father denied having had
any responsibility in the domestic-violence incidents with Mother. He believed that
his absence from the children’s lives had hurt them, and he blamed that absence on
Mother’s lying about him.
But Father also testified positively about Mother’s recent improvements. He
thought that the children would be safe with Mother. Father explained that Mother’s
father was problematic at times, that his passing was something that had changed the
dynamics of her household, and that he thought that she would be better equipped to
have the children in the home. He admitted attending Mother’s father’s funeral “to
show [his] respects for [her] father.”
Father admitted using drugs, including methamphetamine, and to skipping
court-ordered drug tests. He stated that his actions “ha[d] harmed [his] children
tremendously.” He also testified that he had never seen Mother use
methamphetamine or anyone else give her methamphetamine.
17 On the fourth and final day of trial, the Department told the trial court that it
had unsuccessfully attempted to subpoena Jennifer and that its investigator had
“ma[d]e contact with her briefly” but that she had “said she was not in the area[ and]
would not give a location.” Mother objected “to anybody testifying about anything
that [Jennifer] put in the file.” The trial court at first appeared to grant Mother a
running objection “to anybody testifying about anything that [Jennifer] put in the
file,” specifically “the witness that they have from the Department who has no
personal knowledge about what happened.” However, the trial court then stated, “I
mean that’ll be noted, the objection. I’ll address it. How I’m going to -- how I’m
going to rule on that objection, I will note at that point.” Thus, the trial court did not
definitively rule at that time.
Kennetta Harrison, a permanency specialist for the Department, testified that
she was the family’s current caseworker at the time of trial. She described a visit she
had observed between Mother and the children as “a little chaotic.” She said that
Mother “wasn’t able to control [Mandy, who] was actually hitting her sisters.”
Harrison had also been out to Mother’s residence, which was the same one
from which the children had been removed. Harrison testified that the floors were
“slick and sticky” and “seemed very unsteady.” She had safety concerns. According
to Harrison, Mother said that Kelly and Maci would sleep on couches in the living
room and that Mandy would be sleeping in the Mother’s bedroom in a twin bed.
18 Based on what Harrison observed, the home did not have enough space for the
children’s clothing.
Harrison found Mandy’s placement to be a safe and stable environment and
testified that all her needs were being met in that placement. She also testified that
Kelly and Maci’s placement had been able to address their needs. On cross-
examination, Harrison testified that there was not a plan for all three children to be
adopted by the same placement.
Grelle retook the stand and testified that it was in the best interests of all three
children that Mother’s and Father’s parental rights be terminated, citing “continued
drug use,” domestic violence, and “emotional trauma.” She testified that each child
was in a stable placement with their needs met, which had not been happening when
the children were with their parents.
Grelle testified that in the year and a half between removal and trial, she had
not seen Mother or Father take any accountability that would indicate that they had
learned from the process. She said that they were “not . . . creating a safe
environment for the kids to come home to.” When asked if she had any new
concerns since her last testimony, she answered, “No new concerns, just that there’s
not been -- that they’ve had CPS involvement for ten years, and there’s not been
behavioral changes.” Grelle also testified that she had personally talked to Mother
and asked her how she was going to keep her kids safe from Father. Grelle relayed
19 that Mother had asked her “what she was supposed to do” because they were married
and had been together for a long time.”
Grelle testified if the parents’ rights were terminated, OCOK intended to have
the children adopted and would continue to make sure that the children got to see
each other on a regular basis.
The Department then recalled C de Baca, who testified that he still believed it
was in the best interest of the children that Mother’s and Father’s parental rights be
terminated. He stated that the concerns that CASA had when he testified back in
June—“proximity to domestic violence, alleged and understood drug use, and . . .
alcohol”—had not been addressed and that, “[i]f anything, they[ had] been inflamed.”
He testified that Kelly and Macy’s new placement was “fantastic” and offered the
following update:
[Maci] is still exhibiting some symptoms consistent with trauma. However, they’ve been reduced as time goes on. She’s becoming very well-adjusted.
[Kelly] is ahead of her as far as adjusting to the new living situation.
Both of them seem happy, healthy. All of their needs have been met and some. And the -- the placement seems well-equipped to handle the needs of these children.
C de Baca also testified that Mandy was “getting better every day.” He believed that it
was in the children’s best interests to remain in their respective placements.
20 Mother called one witness: Dr. Melissa Giguere, a forensic toxicologist who
examined Mother’s May 2025 drug-test results. Dr. Giguere explained that “anything
you ingest and you metabolize . . . will go into your . . . keratin, and it will show up in
your nails and . . . your hair.” Because Mother’s nails had tested positive for
methamphetamine but not amphetamines, Dr. Giguere opined that the results were
more indicative of “an exposure versus an ingestion.” She explained that “if the body
were to metabolize methamphetamine, you would get amphetamine.” She testified
that she would never expect to see methamphetamine without the metabolite
amphetamine if methamphetamine had been ingested. She added, “Besides exposure,
if there’s been no exposure, it could potentially be something at the collection site that
is contaminating the samples when they’re being collected.”
The attorney ad litem then recalled Grelle, who had heard Dr. Giguere’s
testimony. Grelle testified that the possibility that Mother had merely been exposed
to methamphetamine but not smoked or ingested it herself was still “very concerning”
to OCOK “[b]ecause that means she would [have been] around people that [were]
using drugs, and that would still be a safety concern for her having her children.”
When questioned by the Department, Grelle confirmed that Father’s drug of choice
was methamphetamine and that both parents had stated that his drug usage was an
issue. Grelle further testified that nothing that she had heard Dr. Giguere testify to
changed her concern for the children if they were to be returned to Mother “because
she[ was] around it apparently, . . . which . . . put[ the] children in danger.”
21 D. TRIAL COURT’S RULING
The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of each
parents’ relationship with the children was in the children’s best interest and that both
parents had
knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger[ed] the physical or emotional well-being of the children, pursuant to § 161.001(b)(1)(D), Texas Family Code; [and]
. . . engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child[ren] with persons who engaged in conduct which endanger[ed] the physical or emotional well-being of the child[ren], pursuant to § 161.001(b)(1)(E), Texas Family Code.
See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (2). The trial court entered a
judgment terminating Mother’s and Father’s parent–child relationships with the
children.
After signing the judgment, the trial court issued extensive findings of fact and
conclusions of law. In them, the trial court specifically found “the testimony of the
officers, [D]epartment workers, . . . OC[]OK workers, CASA advocate, and other
professionals to be credible.” And it found Mother’s and Father’s testimony “to not
be credible.”
Both Father and Mother timely appealed.15
Father and Mother each filed a notice of appeal, but Mother also filed a 15
motion for new trial, which the trial court denied.
22 II. FATHER’S APPEAL
As we indicated at the outset of this opinion, Father’s appellate attorney filed
an Anders brief and accompanying motion to withdraw. The brief meets the Anders
requirements by presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating
why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal. Further, Father’s
counsel (1) provided Father with a copy of the Anders brief, (2) informed Father of his
rights to file a pro se response and to seek further discretionary review from the Texas
Supreme Court, (3) advised Father of his right to access the appellate record, and
(4) took concrete measures to initiate and facilitate Father’s right to review the
appellate record. See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
Father did not file a response, and the Department declined to file a brief.
When an Anders brief is filed, we must independently examine the record to
determine if any arguable grounds for appeal exist. In re C.J., 501 S.W.3d 254, 255
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pets. denied). Our examination should consider the
record, the briefs, and any pro se response. In re L.B., No. 02-19-00407-CV, 2020 WL
1809505, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 9, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
After careful review of the Anders brief and entire record, we agree with
Father’s counsel that there are no arguable grounds for appeal in this case.
III. MOTHER’S APPEAL
Mother argues that the trial court erred by terminating her parent–child
relationships with the children because the evidence was legally and factually
23 insufficient to support the trial court’s endangerment and best-interest findings under
Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b). We first set forth the applicable law and
standards of review and then address the issues that are necessary to final disposition
of Mother’s appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
A. APPLICABLE LAW
When the Department files a suit seeking termination of the parent–child
relationship for more than one parent of the child, the trial court “may order
termination of the parent–child relationship for the parent only if the court finds by
clear and convincing evidence grounds for the termination of the parent–child
relationship for that parent.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.206(a-1). The Department
must prove two elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the parent’s
actions satisfy one ground listed in Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1); and (2) that
termination is in the child’s best interest. Id. § 161.001(b); In re Z.N., 602 S.W.3d 541,
545 (Tex. 2020). Evidence is clear and convincing if it “will produce in the mind of
the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to
be established.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007; Z.N., 602 S.W.3d at 545. Due
process demands the heightened standard of clear and convincing evidence because
“[a] parental rights termination proceeding encumbers a value ‘far more precious than
any property right.’” In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552, 555 (Tex. 2012) (quoting Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1397 (1982)); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d
256, 263 (Tex. 2002); see also In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex. 2012).
24 B. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Legal Sufficiency
To determine whether the evidence is legally sufficient in parental-rights-
termination cases, we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
challenged finding to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could form a firm
belief or conviction that the finding is true. Z.N., 602 S.W.3d at 545. The factfinder
may draw inferences, but they must be reasonable and logical. Id. We assume that the
factfinder settled any evidentiary conflicts in favor of its finding if a reasonable
factfinder could have done so. Id. We disregard all evidence that a reasonable
factfinder could have disbelieved, and we consider undisputed evidence even if it is
contrary to the finding. Id.; J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. That is, we consider evidence
favorable to the finding if a reasonable factfinder could, and we disregard contrary
evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573
(Tex. 2005). The factfinder is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and
demeanor. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009).
2. Factual Sufficiency
We must perform “an exacting review of the entire record” in determining the
factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination of a parent–child
relationship. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 500 (Tex. 2014). Nevertheless, we give due
deference to the factfinder’s findings and do not supplant the judgment with our own.
In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). We review the whole record to decide
25 whether a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that the
Department proved the grounds for termination. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b);
In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002). If the factfinder reasonably could form such
a firm conviction or belief, then the evidence is factually sufficient. C.H., 89 S.W.3d
at 18–19.
C. MOTHER’S FIRST AND SECOND ISSUES: ENDANGERMENT FINDINGS
In her first and second issues, Mother challenges the trial court’s endangerment
findings under Subsections (D) and (E), contending that the evidence is legally and
factually insufficient to prove that she (1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the
children to remain in conditions, or (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the
children with persons who engaged in conduct, that endangered the children’s
physical or emotional well-being. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E).
1. Case Law on Subsection (D) and (E) Endangerment Grounds
When a parent challenges a Subsection (D) or (E) finding, due process and due
course of law demand that we address the finding and detail our analysis. In re N.G.,
577 S.W.3d 230, 235, 237 (Tex. 2019). Id.
Under Subsection (D), it is necessary to examine the evidence related to the
environment of the child to determine if the environment was the source of the
endangerment to the child’s physical or emotional well-being. In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d
117, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). “‘[E]ndanger’ means to expose to
26 loss or injury” or “to jeopardize.” In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021)
(quoting Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987)).
The conduct of a parent in the home can create an environment that endangers
the physical and emotional well-being of a child. J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125. Criminal
activity that exposes the parent to incarceration may also endanger a child. In re I.L.,
No. 02-18-00206-CV, 2018 WL 5668813, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 1,
2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re A.N.D., No. 02-12-00394-CV, 2013 WL 362753, at *2
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 31, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). And a parent’s substance
abuse that affects his or her ability to parent can be endangering. J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d
at 125; In re C.L., No. 2-09-126-CV, 2009 WL 3078588, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Sept. 24, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam).
Given the nature of environment-based endangerment, it logically follows that
the relevant timeframe for an environment-based endangerment finding under
Subsection (D) is prior to the child’s removal. In re A.O., No. 02-21-00376-CV, 2022
WL 1257384, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 28, 2022, pet. denied).
2. Analysis
Regarding the trial court’s endangerment finding under Subsection (D), Mother
contends that “although there had been previous allegations and abuse suspected by
CPS, during the pendency of the current case, Mother has completed the
requirements in her Family Service Plan and continue[d] to attend individual therapy.”
Specifically, Mother contends that “the Department cannot rely on testimony
27 surrounding the state of Mother’s home, or whether Father was around Mother, at
any time when the children were in the care of the Department” and that she “never
knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child[ren] to remain in conditions or
surroundings which endanger[ed their] physical or emotional well-being.” This latter
claim is belied by the evidence, and as we explain below, the former is irrelevant.
Despite repeated intervention by the Department, Mother continued to allow
the children to be exposed to endangering conditions. First, as Grelle testified,
Mother knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions
or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being “[b]y
continuing to have them around domestic violence situations and drug use.” The
children had witnessed at least some of the domestic violence, and Mandy had even
been hit during one of the incidents. In addition to Father’s drug use, the children
had also been exposed to Mother’s alcohol abuse and related arrests. And in
September 2023, months before the children were removed from Mother’s care, they
were living in a home with conditions so deplorable as to be deemed unlivable. This
is legally sufficient evidence supporting the trial court’s endangerment finding under
Subsection (D). See In re Z.R., No. 02-25-00268-CV, 2025 WL 3181160, at *8 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Nov. 13, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Evidence that a parent left
her child in the care of a known drug user supports an endangerment finding under
Subsection (D).”) In re H.N.H., No. 02-11-00141-CV, 2012 WL 117861, at *24 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Jan. 12, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating that evidence that
28 mother chose homes for her family to live in that had roaches, flies, terrible odors,
broken windows that made heating difficult, and rotten food in the kitchen
constituted “some evidence that [she had] knowingly placed or knowingly allowed her
children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or
emotional well-being”) (mem. op); In re M.M., No. 2–08–275–CV, 2009 WL 2196129,
at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 23, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding evidence of
father’s knowledge of mother’s drug use, among other conditions, was legally and
factually sufficient to support finding under Subsection (D)); In re A.O., 2–09–005–
CV, 2009 WL 1815780, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 25, 2009, no pet.) (mem.
op.) (holding father’s knowledge of mother’s use of drugs and failure to take steps to
protect the child from such endangering environment was sufficient to support
finding under Subsection (D)); In re M.R., 243 S.W.3d 807, 819 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2007, no pet.) (holding that evidence of exposing a child to domestic violence
supports an endangerment finding); In re K.M.B., 91 S.W.3d 18, 24–25 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (holding that evidence that mother had exposed children to
homes with roaches, animal feces, terrible odors, and general filth supported
environmental endangerment finding).
Mother notes that her visits with the children had to be supervised while Father
was still given unsupervised access to the children––even though (1) “Father had
multiple arrests and allegations of domestic violence towards Mother, in which
Mother and the children were victims,” and (2) Jennifer had referred Father to a
29 batterer intervention course. She thus contends that because the Department had
“deemed Father to not pose a danger to the children,” she “could not have harmed
the children nor allowed the children to be in a dangerous environment by allowing
[them] to be in Father’s presence” or “by continuing to live with Father prior to the
removal of the children.” We reject this contention for two reasons.
First, Mother does not confine her analysis to the period of time prior to the
children’s removal, which is the relevant timeframe for an environment-based
endangerment finding under Subsection (D). See A.O., 2022 WL 1257384, at *9.16
Second, Mother herself testified at trial that she believed that exposing the children to
domestic violence, allowing them to be exposed to drugs, and allowing them to live in
an unsanitary and unsafe home created an unsafe environment for them.
The remainder of Mother’s argument on this issue focuses heavily on her post-
removal conduct. Mother contends that she
• had “completed the requirements in her Family Service Plan and
continue[d] to attend individual therapy”;
• had “addressed the concerns of domestic violence by not living with Father,
and thereby not exposing the children to any further possible domestic
violence incidents”;
Mother appears to be arguing that because the family was receiving services 16
through FBSS at that time, she bore no responsibility for the children’s physical or emotional well-being. She provides no authority for that argument, and we reject it.
30 • was not using drugs, was “in recovery for alcohol abuse, [and] ha[d] been
sober during the pendency of this case”; and
• had “distanced herself from living with and being around Father,” while
acknowledging a couple “isolated incidents” in which she was around
Father after the children’s removal.
Even if credited in Mother’s favor, this evidence of her post-removal conduct
does not dissipate the evidence we have recounted of the endangering environment
that the children were in pre-removal. See In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 749 n.12 (Tex.
2022) (refusing to “foreclose the possibility that Subsection (D) could apply post-
removal depending on the facts” but noting that, “typically, a parent whose child has
been removed and who has only supervised visitation has no control over the child’s
environment, and the parent’s conduct during that time will thus be unrelated to
Subsection (D)”).
Mother does address some of the evidence of her pre-removal conduct in this
issue. She downplays the evidence of her August 2023 DWI, which she argues “was
not relevant and should not have been admitted.” But there had been multiple CPS
intakes related to Mother’s alcohol use around the time of her DWI arrest, and
Mother agreed at trial that her drinking had been out of control. Thus, even without
the August 2023 DWI evidence, there was sufficient evidence of an endangering
environment.
31 Finally, Mother argues, consistent with the rest of her contentions on this issue,
that “Father’s actions endangered the children, not” hers. But even without
considering Mother’s own conduct related to her alcohol abuse, the evidence shows
that she knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain with Father;
thus, his endangering conduct is relevant to our review of the trial court’s
Subsection (D) finding. See J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 749 (“The suitability of a child’s living
conditions and the conduct of parents or others in the home are relevant to a
Subsection (D) inquiry.”).
Whether we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment or
weigh all of the disputed evidence, see In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 630–31 (Tex. 2018),
a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that Mother knowingly
placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that
endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being. Thus, the evidence is
legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s endangerment finding under
Subsection (D). See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D); In re S.M., No. 02-23-
00079-CV, 2023 WL 4501821, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 13, 2023, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (“Because the record demonstrates that Mother’s past conduct subjected
the children to a life of uncertainty and instability and because we may infer that
similar conduct will recur if the children were returned to Mother, we conclude that
legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the endangering-conduct predicate
ground.”); cf. In re H.H., No. 2-07-345-CV, 2008 WL 2854611, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort
32 Worth July 24, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The evidence established that [the mother]
allowed [one child] to remain in conditions and surroundings that endangered her
physical and emotional well-being and that her continuous drug use constituted
conduct that endangered both [children’s] physical and emotional well-being.”). We
overrule Mother’s first issue. Because only one finding alleged under
Section 161.001(b)(1) is necessary to support a termination judgment, we need not
address Mother’s second issue, in which she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
to support the trial court’s predicate finding under Subsection (E). See In re A.V.,
113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003).
D. MOTHER’S THIRD ISSUE: BEST-INTEREST FINDING
In her third issue, Mother challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the trial
court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interest. See Tex. Fam.
Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(2). Although we generally presume that keeping a child with
a parent is in the child’s best interest, In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006), the
best-interest analysis is child-centered, focusing on the child’s well-being, safety, and
development, A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631. In determining whether evidence is sufficient
to support a best-interest finding, we review the entire record. In re E.C.R.,
402 S.W.3d 239, 250 (Tex. 2013). Evidence probative of a child’s best interest may be
the same evidence that is probative of a Subsection (b)(1) ground. Id. at 249; C.H.,
89 S.W.3d at 28; see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1), (2). We also consider the
33 evidence in light of nonexclusive factors that the factfinder may apply in determining
the child’s best interest:
(A) the [child’s] desires . . . ; (B) the [child’s] emotional and physical needs [at the time of trial] and in the future; (C) the emotional and physical danger to the child [at the time of trial] and in the future; (D) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (E) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the [child’s] best interest . . . ; (F) the plans for the child by these individuals or[, if applicable,] by the agency seeking custody; (G) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (H) the [parent’s] acts or omissions . . . indicat[ing] that the existing parent–child relationship is not a proper one; and (I) any excuse for the [parent’s] acts or omissions. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976) (citations omitted); see E.C.R.,
402 S.W.3d at 249; E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 807. These factors are not exhaustive, and
some listed factors may not apply to some cases. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27.
Furthermore, undisputed evidence of just one factor may be sufficient to support a
finding that termination is in the child’s best interest. Id. On the other hand, the
presence of scant evidence relevant to each factor will not support such a finding. Id.
34 1. The Children’s Desires
C de Baca testified that as recently as the weekend before trial began, Kelly
expressed that she did not want to see Mother anymore. Mother refers to her trial
testimony that a representative of the Department had told her that Maci had drawn a
picture of her family together and contends, “The fact that the child drew a picture of
the family together is telling about her wishes.” But none of the children testified at
trial, and there was no evidence showing that Maci––who had turned eleven years old
during the trial’s long recess––or Mandy––who turned five during the same recess––
had sufficient maturity to express their desires. This factor therefore weighs in favor
of terminating Mother’s parental rights to Kelly and neither in favor of nor against
terminating Mother’s parental rights to Maci and Mandy. See Z.R., 2025 WL 3181160,
at *10 (holding that “this factor weighs neither in favor of nor against the trial court’s
finding because none of the [c]hildren testified at trial, all of them were under ten at
the time of trial, and no evidence showed that they had sufficient maturity to express
their desires”); In re A.P., No. 02-22-00180-CV, 2022 WL 16646478, at *10 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Nov. 3, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that this factor
weighed neither in favor of nor against termination when none of the children
testified at trial and “all four of them were under ten at the time of trial and therefore
too young to express their desires”).
35 2. The Children’s Emotional and Physical Needs
Children need permanency and stability. In re G.V., III, 543 S.W.3d 342, 350
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, pet. denied). At trial Grelle specifically testified that
the children “need[ed] permanency,” and C de Baca agreed. Mother conceded that
they “need[ed] stability.” Mother testified that she was gainfully employed and had
sufficient resources to cover the expenses of the children living with her. She also
believed that she could arrange work schedules to be around when her children
needed her. Harrison testified that Mother knew which schools the children would go
to and which bus that they would need to ride.
But Harrison also testified that each child had specialized mental health or
emotional needs and that Mother did not discuss those specialized needs. Harrison’s
testimony also revealed that the home where Mother intended the children to live did
not have a bed for every child or enough space for all the children’s clothing. By
contrast, Grelle testified that the children were all in stable placements and getting
their needs met, something that was not happening when they were living with their
parents. Further, Mother testified that she believed that the children needed to be
protected from Father, but the trial court could have reasonably determined that
Mother would not do so. We therefore weigh this factor in favor of the trial court’s
best-interest finding. See Z.R., 2025 WL 3181160, at *11 (weighing needs factor in
favor of termination where “some evidence indicated that [m]other could meet the
[c]hildren’s emotional and physical needs” but “ample testimony showed that
36 [adoption-motivated placement] could meet all of [their] needs”); A.P., 2022 WL
16646478, at *10 (holding that needs factor weighed in favor of termination where
permanency specialist testified that children “required more attention and a keener eye
than other children in her caseload”; neither parent was able to provide necessary
level of care; and children’s then-current placements were able to meet their physical
and emotional needs).
3. Emotional and Physical Danger to the Children
Grelle testified that the domestic violence that the children had witnessed had
endangered them. She also testified that she would have concerns, due “to continued
drug use and domestic violence,” about the safety of the children if they were
returned to their parents. And she testified to how the domestic violence posed both
a physical and emotional danger to the children. Cf. In re G.M., No. 02-23-00061-CV,
2023 WL 4243349, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 29, 2023, pet. denied) (mem.
op.) (holding that third Holley factor supported termination where trial court had
heard testimony that eight-year-old child “would want to be protective of his mother
and could be physically injured or even killed trying to protect her in a domestic-
violence incident”).
Mother stresses that she had made changes in regard to her relationship with
Father and that she was protecting herself, and therefore the children, by remaining
separated from Father. She contends that “[t]here is no evidence, only suspicion, that
Mother and Father would continue a romantic relationship in the future.” But the
37 trial court expressly found (1) that Mother had “lied about her contact with [Father]
throughout the trial”; (2) that she “was unwilling to protect the children and herself
from [Father’s] drug usage and domestic violence” and to separate from him; and
(3) that Mother and Father “intended to remain in a relationship and parent the
children together despite the domestic violence and ongoing drug concerns.” Based
on its credibility finding and the testimony at trial about the nature of Mother and
Father’s relationship, which could at the very least be characterized as “turbulent and
unpredictable,” the trial court could have reasonably inferred that Mother’s and
Father’s relationship posed a threat of emotional—and even physical—danger to the
couple’s children. See Z.R., 2025 WL 3181160, at *11; In re M. H., No. 02-22-00048-
CV, 2022 WL 2840266, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 21, 2022, no pet.) (mem.
op.) (“Mother’s on-again/off-again relationship with [the father of another one of her
children] evinced not only an unstable home life but also the emotional and physical
danger to [her older child] should she be placed with Mother.”).
The future emotional and physical danger to the children if they were returned
to Mother was not limited to the threat of domestic violence. According to
Harrison’s testimony, Mother’s home was not safe for the children. As for drug use,
Grelle testified that even if Mother was not personally using methamphetamine, the
children would still be put in danger just by her being “around it.”
Mother testified that she believed that the children had suffered emotional
harm in the care of the Department. But she also testified that she understood that
38 Maci was in a very fragile state and that disrupting that state could cause more harm
to Maci. And although Grelle testified to the possibility that the children might not
ever see their parents again if the parent–child relationships were terminated,
removing the children from their current placements risked causing them emotional
trauma and upsetting their stability. See Z.R., 2025 WL 3181160, at *11; M.J.,
2023 WL 3643673, at *11. On balance, this factor supports termination.
4. Parental Abilities
The trial court did not have to believe Mother’s testimony that she had learned
that her use of alcohol was impacting her ability to be a good parent or Father’s
testimony that Mother had been able to remain sober in the past. And Mother had
not demonstrated an ability to provide and maintain safe, stable, and suitable housing
for the children. Hutchison testified that during her investigation in 2023, Mother
had “said she was not making enough to get stable housing for her and the children.”
C de Baca testified that he had “no reason to believe that [Mother] would provide . . .
an environment different from what [the children] had when they entered the case.”
Additionally, the testimony of multiple witnesses who had observed some of
Mother’s visits with the children raised concerns about Mother’s ability to handle
Maci’s and Mandy’s behavioral issues. Mother appeared to have either not learned or
not applied what she had learned from her classes and counseling. And although
there was sparse evidence of the parental abilities of the children’s foster parents,
Harrison testified that the children’s respective placements were able to meet all their
39 needs. This factor supports termination. See In re K.A., No. 02-22-00442-CV,
2023 WL 2429793, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 9, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(holding that needs and abilities factors weighed in favor of termination where “[t]he
Department did not express any concerns about the parenting abilities of the
children’s current foster parents” but “had many concerns about returning the
children to Mother,” who “had not demonstrated the behaviors that she had learned
in her parenting courses, and she had failed to make substantive changes in her life”);
In re R.M., No. 02-18-00077-CV, 2018 WL 3468464, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
July 19, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding evidence factually and legally sufficient to
support trial court’s affirmative best-interest finding in part because trial court was
presented with evidence of mother’s failure to implement sufficient positive parenting
techniques, children’s serious behavioral needs, and mother’s failure to implement the
lessons learned through classes and counseling).
5. Programs Available
Mother deserves some credit for completing many of the items in her service
plan.17 But again, the trial court did not find Mother’s testimony to be credible, and
C de Baca and Grelle testified that Mother either had not learned from her services or
was not making the desired behavioral changes based on those services. See C.W.,
Mother complains in her brief that Grelle “testified that Mother failed to 17
complete her counseling, [but] she did not fail to complete it[;] it is still on going [sic].”
40 2022 WL 123221, at *9–11 (holding that the programs-available factor slightly favored
trial court’s best-interest finding where the Department caseworker testified “that
Mother would complete services so that she could check the box showing that she
had complied, but despite completing the services and checking the box, Mother
could not show that she had learned anything.”); In re A.W., No. 02-21-00058-CV,
2021 WL 3204955, at *15 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 29, 2021, pet. denied) (mem.
op.) (“Mother had a home and a job with which to support [her child], and she had
‘completed service plan after service plan,’ but the trial court could have found that
completing the plan was not the same as learning from the plan and breaking a
lifetime’s worth of habits.”). The trial court was also entitled to take into account the
families lengthy history with the Department, including the fact that they did not
change their behaviors after having twice before received FBSS assistance.
At the time of trial, Maci was seeing a psychiatrist, and Kelly was also in
counseling. Both girls were also receiving educational services for their special needs.
According to C de Baca’s testimony, Mandy had received all her necessary services,
including play therapy, in a timely fashion since her placement. Mother said she
understood that the children had been in therapy since the case began and that they
had benefited from that therapy. Mother testified at trial that she would “make sure
that [Maci would] still continue to go to all [the] services that she need[ed] to do to
make sure that she [could] get better,” but Mother had not even contacted a provider
for Maci. This factor favors termination. See C.W., 2022 WL 123221, at *10
41 (“Mother was aware that the children were undergoing counseling because both were
prone to violence, and she asserted that if they were placed with her, she would
continue the children’s counseling and manage their medications. . . . Even with
programs available to help Mother and the children, Mother’s willingness to access the
programs and ability to follow through with them appeared questionable.”).
6. Plans for the Children
At the time of trial, the children were all in adoption-motivated placements.
OCOK’s plan was for the children to be adopted. However, as of the last day of trial,
OCOK did not have a plan for all three children to be adopted by the same
placement. Mother’s plan, on the other hand, was for the children to live together
with her. But Mother had failed to demonstrate that she could provide the children
with a safe, stable living environment. And C de Baca testified that there was “a high
non-zero chance that [the children] could be reunited.”
Generally, it is in a child’s best interest to keep siblings together whenever
possible. A.O., 2022 WL 1257384, at *14. But under the Texas Family Code, “the
prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is presumed to
be in the child’s best interest.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(a).
Ultimately, this factor weighs in favor of termination. See Z.R., 2025 WL
3181160, at *12 (“The trial court was entitled to believe the testimony that the
[c]hildren’s respective placements at the time of trial were adoption-motivated and to
be skeptical that Mother could provide the [c]hildren with a safe, stable environment,
42 because of her past willingness to let others take primary responsibility for the
[c]hildren and the doubts expressed that she could care for all the [c]hildren.”); In re
P.W., No. 02-24-00211-CV, 2024 WL 4293564, at *12 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept.
26, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that plans factor favored termination, where
parents had difficulty articulating their future plans for child and foster parents were
adoption-motivated); G.M., 2023 WL 4243349, at *9 (stating that this factor weighed
“slightly in favor of termination” where “Mother’s plan was less well-defined than the
Department’s”).
7. Stability of the Home/Proposed Placement
Here again, the instability in Mother’s home life weighs against her and in favor
of the trial court’s best-interest finding. “Stability and permanence are paramount in
the upbringing of children.” In re M.E.-M.N., 342 S.W.3d 254, 263 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2011, pet. denied). The evidence of the stability of the permanent placements
of the children in their current placements was uncontroverted. See Z.R., No. 02-25-
00268-CV, 2025 WL 3181160, at *13. We have recognized that a parent who is
“[u]nstable herself” cannot offer her children stability. See A.P., 2022 WL 16646478,
at *11 (quoting In re M.S., No. 02-21-00007-CV, 2021 WL 2654143, at *19 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth June 28, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op. on reh’g)). This factor
weighs in favor of termination.
43 8. Mother’s Acts or Omissions
Although Mother visited the children, and they were described as bonded with
her, C de Baca’s and Grelle’s testimony about what they had observed during the
visits indicated that Mother’s parent–child relationships with the children were not
proper. Mother acknowledged having had an “altercation” with Kelly in August 2023.
Grelle testified that Mother had locked Kelly outside the home, and C de Baca
testified that Kelly had expressed to him that she did not even want to see Mother.
Mother also admitted that she and Father had violated the FBSS safety plan by being
together around the children unsupervised. They were alone with the children in
December 2023 when they got into the fight that led to Father’s being arrested for
continuous family violence. Father testified that Mother had lied to the children
about him.
The trial court also heard extensive testimony about Mother’s alcohol abuse.
Father testified that there had been multiple situations where Mother’s drinking had
put the children in danger. Grelle testified that in August 2023 “there was a concern
for the parents being drunk and driving with the children” and “a report that [Maci]
had asked to live with a friend because she wanted a normal family.” Even though
Father also testified that he believed that Mother had become “a better person” and
that “her eyes ha[d] literally opened up,” the trial court found Father not credible and
was not required to rely on his testimony as evidence that Mother had made a lasting
change. See In re K.A.S., 131 S.W.3d 215, 229–30 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet.
44 denied) (“A trial court can measure the future conduct of parents by their recent past
conduct[] but is not required to believe that there has been a lasting change in a
parent’s attitude since h[er] children were taken.”). This factor weighs in favor of
termination. See Z.R., 2025 WL 3181160, at *13 (determining that eighth Holley factor
weighed in favor of terminating mother’s parent–child relationships in part because
mother’s drug use around and impacting children, coupled with her inability to
consistently stay sober, evidenced an improper parent–child relationship).
9. No Excuses for Mother’s Conduct
Mother offered little in the way of excuses for her troubling acts and omissions.
Cf. G.M., 2023 WL 4243349, at *10 (“The record contains little as far as excuses for
[m]other’s acts and omissions. . . . This factor supports termination.”). Rather, she
denied many of the allegations and minimized the domestic violence in her
relationship with Father.
The trial court was not compelled to believe Mother’s self-serving denials. See
K.A., 2023 WL 2429793, at *8 (“Despite [m]other’s numerous denials, a factfinder is
not compelled to believe testimony that comes from a biased or an interested
source.”). We conclude that this factor supports termination.
10. Evidence Supporting Best-Interest Finding Sufficient
In sum, although some of the Holley factors weigh less heavily in favor of
termination than others, not one of the nine factors weighs against the trial court’s
best-interest finding. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
45 court’s best-interest finding, we conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could have
formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in
the children’s best interest. See J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. Further, based on our
exacting review of the entire record and giving due deference to the factfinder’s
findings, we likewise conclude that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the
trial court’s best-interest finding. See C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 18–19. Thus, under the
applicable standards of review, we conclude that the evidence is legally and factually
sufficient to support the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that
termination of the parent–child relationships between Mother and the children is in
the children’s best interest. See J.G., 2020 WL 3410503, at *10. We overrule Mother’s
third issue.
E. MOTHER’S FOURTH ISSUE: DUE PROCESS
In her fourth issue, Mother argues that the trial court denied her due process by
not requiring that trial be continued until the Department was able to subpoena
Jennifer. But Mother did not request a continuance when Jennifer failed to appear on
the final day of trial. Instead, Mother made the following objection:
Well, I mean, I can ask that -- to -- to give me a running objection to anybody testifying about anything that she put in the file.
....
. . . And that means -- and that means the witness that they have from the Department who has no personal knowledge about what happened can’t testify about what she knows because it was provided by somebody in the office.
46 To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must present to the trial
court a timely request, objection, or motion that states the specific grounds for the
desired ruling, if not apparent from the request’s, objection’s, or motion’s context.
Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); see also Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(1). If a party fails to do this,
then error is not preserved. Bushell v. Dean, 803 S.W.2d 711, 712 (Tex. 1991) (op. on
reh’g).
Although Mother objected at various points on Confrontation Clause and
personal-knowledge grounds, she did not raise her due-process argument in the trial
court. Complaints about due-process violations must be raised and ruled on in the
trial court to be preserved for appeal. In re J.P.-L., 592 S.W.3d 559, 575 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2019, pet. denied). Therefore, because Mother did not raise her due-
process-violation claim in the trial court, she has failed to preserve it for our review.
See id.; see also In re N.Y., No. 02-24-00065-CV, 2024 WL 2347639, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth May 23, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.). We overrule Mother’s fourth issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having overruled Mother’s first, third, and fourth issues, and not needing to
address her second issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s
parent–child relationships with the children. Having determined that no arguable
grounds for appeal can be raised on Father’s behalf, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment terminating Father’s parent–child relationships with the children. Father’s
counsel remains appointed in this case through any proceedings in the Texas Supreme
47 Court unless otherwise relieved of these duties. See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27
(Tex. 2016) (order).
/s/ Brian Walker
Brian Walker Justice
Delivered: February 19, 2026
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
In the Interest of K.N., M.N., and M.N., Children v. the State of Texas, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-the-interest-of-kn-mn-and-mn-children-v-the-state-of-texas-txctapp2-2026.