In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION THREE
) No. ED109556 ) ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of IN THE INTEREST OF: K.A.M.L. ) St. Louis County ) ) Honorable Heather R. Cunningham ) ) ) Filed: April 12, 2022
Introduction
M.L.R. (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s judgment terminating his parental rights of his
children, T.M.L., K.A.L., and K.M.L. (collectively “the Children”). Father raises five points on
appeal. In Point I, Father argues the trial court erred and abused its discretion in denying his
motions for a continuance of trial and to reopen the evidence, violating his right to due process.
We deny Point I. In Points II-V, Father argues the trial court erred in terminating his parental
rights under Sections 211.447.5(2), abuse or neglect, 211.447.5(3) failure to rectify, 211.447.5(5)
parental unfitness, and 211.447.7, best interests, respectively. We deny Points III and V.
Because Points III and V, failure to rectify and best interests, are dispositive we need not address
Points II and IV, abuse or neglect and parental unfitness.
We affirm. Factual and Procedural Background
M.L.R. is the Children’s father. The Children are between six and ten years old. On
October 26, 2016, the Juvenile Officer of St. Louis County ("Officer") filed a petition alleging
the Children's mother had a history of substance use and neglected the children because her
home lacked heat or electricity and was unsanitary. When the petition was filed, the Children’s
father was unknown. Father lived in a separate residence from the Children. M.L.R. was later
identified as the Children’s father. The trial court found the allegations against the Children's
mother true on December 20, 2016.
On January 19, 2017, the court took jurisdiction over the Children and ordered Father to
participate in services with the Children’s Division (the “Division”). The court-ordered services
included mental health and parenting assessments; individual counseling; substance abuse
treatment; and drug screens. On April 1, 2019, the Officer filed a petition to terminate Father’s
parental rights under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.447.5(2), § 211.447.5(3), and § 211.447.7.1
On November 29, 2019, the trial court conducted a hearing on the petition, but Father
failed to appear. Father’s court-appointed attorney orally requested a continuance. Father’s
counsel stated he spoke with Father the day before trial by telephone and Father confirmed he
would be present. Counsel was unsure why Father failed to appear. The Juvenile Officer of St.
Louis County (“Respondent”) objected, and the trial court denied the request for a continuance.
At trial, the evidence showed Father had a history of substance abuse and multiple criminal
convictions for possession of controlled substances, was on probation through the Missouri
Department of Corrections, failed to complete the court ordered substance abuse treatment
program, had multiple positive drug screenings, and missed about seventy drug screenings.
1 All statutory citations are to RSMo (2018), unless otherwise indicated.
2 On December 18, 2019, Father’s counsel filed a Motion to Reopen Trial Evidence,
alleging he missed the November 29 hearing due to the flu. The trial court did not rule on
Father’s motion to reopen but entered judgment terminating his parental rights on February 5,
2020. The court’s judgment found Father suffers from a chemical dependency which has not
been treated and prevents him from consistently providing care for the Children; has repeatedly
and continuously failed, although physically and financially able, to provide the Children with
adequate food, clothing, shelter, or other care necessities for the Children; failed to participate
and complete court-ordered services successfully; and, for the reasonably foreseeable future, is
unable to appropriately care for the ongoing physical, mental and emotional needs of the
Children. The court further found that the termination of Father’s parental rights was in the
Children's best interest, as the continuation of the parent-child relationship greatly diminished the
Children’s prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home.
Father appealed, challenging the trial court’s denial of his request for continuance and
motion to reopen the evidence. On December 22, 2020, this Court reversed and remanded for the
trial court to conduct a hearing on Father’s motion to reopen the evidence and make a credibility
determination regarding Father’s explanation for missing trial. The trial court conducted a
hearing on Father’s Motion to Reopen Trial Evidence on January 30, 2021, but the recording was
inaudible, so the court held a second hearing on May 25, 2021. Father testified he failed to
appear at trial because he was seeking medical treatment at Urgent Care for the flu and hip pain. 2
Father presented no documentation supporting his claim he was ill or visited Urgent Care on the
date of trial. With no supporting evidence, the trial court found Father’s testimony not credible
2 Father’s testimony conflicts with the allegation in his motion to reopen the evidence which only alleged he had the flu.
3 and denied his motion to reopen. This appeal follows. Additional factual and procedural history
will be provided as necessary to address Father’s arguments.
Standard of Review
In termination of parental rights cases, we will sustain the trial court's judgment unless
there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it
erroneously declares or applies the law. S.S.S. v. C.V.S., 529 S.W.3d 811, 815 (Mo. banc 2017)
(citing Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976)). The evidence is viewed in the
light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment and will be reversed only if we are firmly
convinced the judgment is erroneous. In re S.Y.B.G., 443 S.W.3d 56, 59 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014).
The party seeking termination bears the burden of proof. Id. We recognize the trial court is better
positioned than this Court to determine witness credibility and weigh evidence in the context of
the whole record. J.A.R. v. D.G.R., 426 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Mo. banc 2014). The grounds for
termination must be supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence, meaning the evidence
must “instantly tilt the scales in favor of termination when weighed against the evidence in
opposition and the finder of fact is left with the abiding conviction that the evidence is true.”
S.Y.B.G., 443 S.W.3d at 59. The standard of proof for the “best interest” inquiry is a
preponderance of the evidence; on appeal, the standard of review is abuse of discretion. J.A.R.,
426 S.W.3d at 626.
Discussion
Point I: Denial of Father’s Motions for Continuance and to Reopen the Evidence
A. Motion for Continuance
This Court previously reviewed and affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny Father’s
Motion for Continuance of Trial. Interest of T.M.L., 615 S.W.3d 100, 103 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020)
4 (T.M.L. I). We noted Rule 65.03 requires the submission of a written motion for continuance
“accompanied by the affidavit…unless the adverse party consents that the application for
continuance may be made orally.” Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 65.03.3 Failure to meet Rule 65.03
requirements will not constitute an “abuse of discretion in denying a continuance.” In Interest of
C.L.L., 776 S.W.2d 476, 477 (Mo. App. E.D. 1989). Father's attorney failed to follow the
procedural requirements of Rule 65.03, and all adverse parties objected to the oral motion. 615
S.W.3d at 103. Therefore, this Court held Father’s noncompliance with Rule 65.03 established
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his counsel’s oral request for a continuance
on the day of the trial. Id.
B. Motion to Reopen the Evidence
In T.M.L. I, this Court remanded to the trial court with instructions to conduct a hearing
on the merits of Father’s motion to reopen and make a credibility determination about his
explanation for missing trial. Id. On remand, Father testified he missed trial because he had
debilitating nerve pain in his hip and the flu. Father testified he sought medical treatment for his
illness and pain. Father provided no documentary evidence, such as a doctor’s note, in support of
his testimony. On June 1, 2021, the trial court denied Father’s motion. The court found Father’s
testimony “unconvincing and not credible” and stated Father failed to present a legal basis to
reopen the case.
Father argues the trial court erroneously denied his Motion to Reopen the Evidence
because his testimony provided sufficiently credible evidence to entitle him to reopen the
evidence. Father claims the trial court should have granted his Motion to Reopen the Evidence
because his motion would not have prejudiced either party. Father asserts the termination of his
parental rights tantamounted to a “civil death penalty,” and thus was entitled to relief. 3 All rule citations are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2021), unless otherwise indicated.
5 We disagree. A court’s decision to terminate parental rights is an exercise of an awesome
power which we do not review lightly. T.M.L. I, 615 S.W.3d at 103 (citing In re J.R., 347
S.W.3d 641, 645 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011)). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
trial court’s judgment and reverse only if we are firmly convinced the verdict is
erroneous. S.Y.B.G., 443 S.W.3d at 59 (citing In re C.J.G., 75 S.W.3d 794, 797 (Mo. App. W.D.
2002)). We recognize the trial court’s ability to freely determine evidence credibility and refrain
from re-evaluating the evidence through our own perspective. Interest of R.D.M., 576 S.W.3d
318, 323 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019) (citing In the Interest of J.P.B., 509 S.W.3d 84, 90 (Mo. banc
2017)).
Father never supplied the trial court with any evidence to support his illness or his visit to
the Urgent Care, despite having several months to collect and organize such evidence, if it
existed. With no supportive evidence, a fact finder could have reasonably found Father’s
testimony not credible. The trial court was “better equipped to judge credibility than those who
did not witness the testimony." Shockley v. State, 579 S.W.3d 881, 908 (Mo. banc 2019). We
refuse to question the trial court’s determination on a witness's credibility. R.D.M., 576 S.W.3d
at 323.
Further, reopening the evidence after two years would substantially inconvenience the
opposing parties. In Interest of S--- G., 779 S.W.2d 45, 55 (Mo. App. S.D. 1989). The trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying Father’s motion to reopen the evidence after the
hearings. Id.
C. Due Process Violation
Father argues the trial court violated his substantive and procedural due process right in
having a trial that terminated his parental rights without his physical presence. Father
6 emphasizes, and we agree, courts have long acknowledged the relationship between a natural
parent and child as a fundamental right and liberty interest and thus constitutionally
protected. Matter of A.R.V., 561 S.W.3d 817, 825 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018); Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). Father, without citing to any case law, claims his mere
absence at trial proves the court’s violation of his due process right.
“The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests
encompassed by the constitutional protection of liberty and property, and the range of interests
protected by procedural due process is not infinite.” Laubinger v. Laubinger, 5 S.W.3d 166, 176
(Mo. App. W.D. 1999). A two-step analysis is required to determine whether a party was denied
their constitutional right to procedural due process. Id. Courts must first determine whether the
party was deprived of a constitutionally protected interest. Belton v. Board of Police
Comm'rs, 708 S.W.2d 131, 136 (Mo. banc 1986). Courts must then determine whether the
procedures followed provided the individual an opportunity for a hearing before being deprived
of any significant interest. Jamison v. State, Dep't of Soc. Servs., Div. of Fam. Servs., 218 S.W.3d
399, 407 (Mo. banc 2007) (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81, 82 (1972)).
No rule requires a parent’s physical presence at a termination of parental rights trial, so
long as the court provided the parent appropriate procedural due process. In re D.L.W., 413
S.W.3d 2, 12 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012). Due process requires the trial court give Father notice of the
hearing, with sufficient time to prevent his absence, and the opportunity to be heard. Jamison,
218 S.W.3d at 407 (citing Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 81-82). Father conceded he was timely notified
and aware of the trial date. Despite knowing the date, Father failed to notify the court of his
alleged illness and absence, missed trial, and, thus, waived his due process right to be heard “by
voluntarily absenting himself from the proceedings.” Moore v. Bd. of Educ. of Fulton Pub. Sch.
7 No. 58, 836 S.W.2d 943, 947 (Mo. banc 1992). Father’s due process right only afforded him the
opportunity to be heard, which the court granted. Id. The trial court did not violate Father’s due
process rights.
Point I is denied.
Points III & V: Failure to Rectify and Best Interests of the Children
In Points II-IV, Father argues the trial court lacked clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence to support the grounds for termination under sections 211.447.5(2) abuse or neglect,
211.447.5(3) failure to rectify, and 211.447.5(5) parental unfitness. In his Point V, Father
contends there was insufficient evidence to show it was in the children’s best interest to
terminate his parental rights under section 211.447.7. Because Points III and V, failure to rectify
and best interests, constitute sufficient grounds to affirm the termination of Father’s parental
rights, we need not address Points II or IV, abuse or neglect or parental unfitness.
To terminate a party's parental rights, a trial court must: (1) find by “clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence” that one or more grounds for termination of parental rights exists, and (2)
determine whether it is in the child’s best interest to terminate a party’s parental
rights. Id. Evidence that is “clear, cogent, and convincing” instantly tilts the scales in favor of
termination when weighed against the evidence in opposition, and the trier of fact is left with an
abiding conviction that the evidence is true. In re S.M.H., 160 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Mo. banc 2005).
Section 211.447 provides the statutory grounds for judicial termination of parental rights. The
trial court found grounds existed for the termination of Father’s parental rights under section
211.447.5(2) abuse or neglect, section 211.447.5(3) failure to rectify, and 211.447.5(5) parental
unfitness. These are separate grounds for termination, and we will affirm the trial court’s ruling
if one is appropriate. Missouri Dep’t of Soc. Servs., Children’s Div. v. B.T.W., 422 S.W.3d 381,
8 394 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013) (citing In re B.J.H., Jr., 356 S.W.3d 816, 825 (Mo. App. W.D.
2012)) (“[O]nly one statutory ground need be proven to support termination[.]”). If the trial court
finds at least one statutory ground for termination exists, the court must then determine whether,
by a preponderance of the evidence, the termination of parental rights is in the child's best
interest. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.447.7; S.Y.B.G., 443 S.W.3d at 59 (citing In re K.A.C., 246 S.W.3d
537, 543 (Mo. App. S.D. 2008)).
Section 211.447.5(3)- Failure to Rectify
For parental rights to be terminated under § 211.447.5(3), the court must have had
jurisdiction over the Children for one year, and it must be determined that:
[T]he conditions which led to the assumption of jurisdiction still persist, or conditions of a potentially harmful nature continue to exist; and that there is little likelihood that those conditions will be remedied at an early date so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future, or the continuation of the parent- child relationship greatly diminishes the child's prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.447.5(3).
In determining whether to terminate parental rights under 211.447.5(3), the court must
consider and make findings on these four factors:
(a) The terms of a social service plan entered into by the parent and the division
and the extent to which the parties have made progress in complying with those
terms;
(b) The success or failure of the efforts of the juvenile officer, the division, or
other agency to aid the parent on a continuing basis in adjusting his circumstances
or conduct to provide a proper home for the child;
(c) A mental condition which is shown by competent evidence either to be
permanent or such that there is no reasonable likelihood that the condition can be
9 reversed and which renders the parent unable to knowingly provide the child the
necessary care, custody, and control;
(d) A chemical dependency which prevents the parent from consistently providing
the necessary care, custody, and control over the child and which cannot be
treated so as to enable the parent to consistently provide such care, custody, and
control(.)
These factors “are not separate grounds for termination by themselves, but rather
categories of evidence that the court may consider along with all other relevant evidence in
determining whether grounds for termination exist under Section 211.447.5(3).” In Interest of
K.M.A.-B., 493 S.W.3d 457, 474 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) (citing In Interest of S.D., 472 S.W.3d
572, 577 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015)). While a court must make findings on all four factors, evidence
supporting just one factor is sufficient to terminate parental rights. In the Interest of D.L.P., 638
S.W.3d 82, 90-91 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021) (citing S.Y.B.G., 443 S.W.3d at 60-61).
(a) Social Service Plan Compliance
Concerning the first factor, Father never voluntarily agreed to a service plan with the
Division and, instead, was court-ordered to comply with services. The court-ordered services
required Father to complete individual counseling, substance abuse treatment, drug screens, and
attend supervised visits with the Children. The court-ordered service plan further required Father
to cooperate with and utilize the services offered by the Division.
Father argues his participation in individual counseling and visits with the Children prove
his compliance with services without considering the entirety of his court-ordered services.
Within the thirty-five months the Children were in the Division’s care, Father failed to complete
substance abuse treatment, tested positive for illegal substances, including methamphetamine,
10 cocaine, opiates, and marijuana, on multiple occasions, and missed approximately seventy drug
screens. The evidence showed Father was aware his failure to complete substance abuse
treatment and drug screens prevented reunification and could lead to his parental rights being
terminated. While Father engaged in one of the required court-ordered services, he failed to
engage in services addressing his substance abuse issues and the Division's safety concerns.
S.Y.B.G., 443 S.W.3d at 63. Thus, the court had sufficient evidence to find Father failed to
comply with court-ordered services. Id.
(b) Agency Efforts
Neither party disputed the trial court finding regarding the Division’s efforts. The
evidence supported the Division's reasonable efforts to fulfill its responsibility under the court-
ordered service plan.
(c) Mental Condition
Neither party disputed the court's finding Father complied with individual counseling and
there was no evidence showing he suffered from a mental condition that was unreversible or that
rendered him incapable of knowingly providing for the Children.
(d) Chemical Dependency
The court determined Father’s noncompliance with services, as discussed above in
subsection (a), and other additional evidence sufficiently proved Father suffers from a chemical
dependency which cannot be successfully treated and prevents him from consistently providing
the necessary care, custody, and control over the Children. The court specifically noted that
Father’s failure to complete the required substance abuse treatment, history of substance abuse,
positive drug screens, missed drug screens, and lack of commitment to address his substance
abuse issues were all factors that supported its finding.
11 Father does not dispute that the Children have been under the court’s jurisdiction for over
a year, or he suffers from a chemical dependency. Instead, Father argues the court's chemical
dependency determination failed to consider Father’s “significant progress in completing
services” and his ability to sustain gainful employment and appropriate housing as factors
mitigating his chemical dependency.
Father’s claim asks this Court to reweigh the evidence showing Father’s completed
services, employment, and appropriate housing as more significant than the evidence the trial
court relied on. Trial courts can freely weigh the statute’s factors and other relevant evidence to
determine if grounds for termination exist, but sufficient evidence proving one factor is enough.
K.M.A.-B., 493 S.W.3d at 764; D.L.P., 638 S.W.3d at 90-91. Father heavily relies on In re
D.L.M. to argue the court erred in terminating his parental rights when his chemical dependency
does not presently prevent him from having stable employment or providing appropriate housing
for the Children. 31 S.W.3d 64, 70 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000). However, In D.L.M., the court
determined the parent’s chemical dependency did not prevent her from providing the child with
necessary care because, despite her subsequent relapse, the mother had successfully completed a
substance abuse treatment and scheduled drug screens. Id.
D.L.M. is factually distinguishable. Contrary to Father’s assertions, the evidence at the
termination hearing supported the court’s chemical dependency determination. At trial, Division
caseworkers testified Father continuously failed to attend scheduled drug screens, despite the
caseworkers' attempts to accommodate Father’s needs, and refused to even try to complete a
substance abuse treatment program. One Division caseworker testified Father’s home smelled
like marijuana during a home visit. The evidence showed Father missed approximately seventy
scheduled drug screens, tested positive for illegal substances, including methamphetamine,
12 cocaine, opiates, and marijuana on numerous occasions, and admitted to ingesting marijuana to
the caseworker. Further, Father’s criminal and probation records established Father has a lengthy
substance abuse history, including marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine, and unprescribed
opiates. Division caseworkers further testified they informed Father his failure to complete drug
screens and substance abuse treatment prevented reunification with the Children and could lead
to his parental rights being terminated.
There was substantial evidence in the record from which the court could conclude
Father’s chemical dependency issues were untreatable, preventing him from consistently
providing adequate care, custody, and control over the Children, within an ascertainable period
of time. In the thirty-five months the Children were under the court’s jurisdiction, Father
demonstrated an inability to appropriately alter his conduct and repeatedly refused to complete
the court-ordered drug screens and substance abuse treatment, further supporting the court’s
finding Father’s chemical dependency issues could not be adequately remedied in the near future
to allow reunification with the Children. S.Y.B.G, 443 S.W.3d at 65. The court's findings were
supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. Id. Hence, the court did not err in finding
the grounds for termination of Father's parental rights under § 211.447.5(3) failure to
rectify. Id at 65-66.
Point III denied.
Section 211.447.7- Best Interest Determination
Once grounds for termination of parental rights are identified, a trial court must then
analyze the seven factors under § 211.447.7 and determine whether termination is in the child’s
“best interest.” In re J.S.W., 341 S.W.3d 881, 886-87 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011). The “best interest”
determination is a subjective assessment based on the totality of the circumstances and is
13 discretionary. S.Y.B.G., 443 S.W.3d at 59, 66. In reviewing the trial court’s best interest
determination, our standard of review is abuse of discretion. J.A.R., 426 S.W.3d at 626. An abuse
of discretion occurs only when the trial court's ruling is “clearly against the logic of the
circumstances and so unreasonable and arbitrary that it shocks the sense of justice and indicates a
lack of careful, deliberate consideration.” D.L.P., 638 S.W.3d at 89 (quoting In re S.R.J., Jr., 250
S.W.3d 402, 406 (Mo App. E.D. 2008)). The seven factors courts evaluate in the “best interest”
determination are:
(1) Emotional ties to the birth parent;
(2) The extent to which the parent has maintained regular visitation or other contact with
the child;
(3) The extent of payment by the parent for the cost of care and maintenance of the child
when financially able to do so including the time that the child is in the custody of the
division or other child-placing agency;
(4) Whether additional services would be likely to bring about lasting parental adjustment
enabling a return of the child to the parent within an ascertainable period of time;
(5) The parent's disinterest in or lack of commitment to the child;
(6) The conviction of the parent of a felony offense that the court finds is of such a nature
that the child will be deprived of a stable home for a period of years; provided, however,
that incarceration in and of itself shall not be grounds for termination of parental rights;
(7) Deliberate acts of the parent or acts of another of which the parent knew or should
have known that subjects the child to a substantial risk of physical or mental harm.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.447.7.
14 The trial court found (1) the Children were emotionally bonded to Father; (2) Father had
consistent contact with the Children; (3) Father, although financially able, failed to substantially
provide towards the cost of care and maintenance of the Children and has not provided minimal
financial support for the Children since coming under the court’s jurisdiction in January 2017;
(4) it is unlikely that additional services would bring about a lasting adjustment by Father
enabling reunification with his Children within an ascertainable period of time; (5) Father’s
failure to participate in substance abuse treatment, participate in drug screens, and continuing to
test positive for illegal substances demonstrated his disinterest in or lack of commitment to the
Children; (6) Father had no felony convictions that would deprive the Children from a stable
home for a period of years; and (7) Father subjected the Children to substantial risk of physical
and mental harm and his failure to participate in treatment and address his substance abuse issues
place the Children at risk of harm. Hence, the court determined it was in the Children’s best
interest to terminate Father’s parental rights.
First, Father claims the trial court erroneously found he failed to contribute financial
support for the Children. Father argues the trial court minimized the significance of the gifts and
clothing he gave the Children and failed to support its findings with facts regarding his ability to
financially contribute while the children were under the court’s jurisdiction.
We disagree. Contrary to Father’s claim, he retained the duty to provide financial support
for the Children while they were involuntarily under the court’s jurisdiction, even if no court-
ordered support existed. In re G.G.B., 394 S.W.3d 457, 474 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013). The record
demonstrated Father failed to utilize his income fully and provide “some” financial contribution
to the Children, other than the clothes, toys, and “gifts” he provided. Id. at 473-74. While the
evidence of Father’s actual salary or ability to provide financial contributions was unclear, the
15 multiple positive drug screens demonstrated Father’s ability to fund his substance abuse issues
with his income instead of financially supporting the Children. Id. Further, the trial court was
free to weigh all the presented evidence, and this Court does not question the significance or
weight placed on any evidence, including evidence showing Father provided clothes, toys, and
"gifts." R.D.M., 576 S.W.3d at 323. Thus, the trial court had sufficient evidence to determine
Father was able to contribute financial support for the Children and failed to do so. G.G.B., 394
S.W.3d at 473-74.
Second, Father argues the trial court's finding additional services were unlikely to bring
about lasting changes and allow reunification were unsupported by sufficient evidence. Father
cites to D.L.M. to claim the trial court erred in focusing on Father’s substance abuse issues and
assert a parent’s substance abuse, alone, is insufficient basis to show additional services would
unlikely lead to lasting changes in Father’s behavior.
We disagree. As explained in subsection (d), D.L.M. is factually distinguishable, as the
parent completed substance abuse treatment. 31 S.W.3d at 70. Here, Father was court-ordered to
complete individual therapy, substance abuse treatment, and drug screens. Although Father
engaged in individual therapy, he failed to complete substance abuse treatment, missed
approximately seventy drug screens, and had multiple positive drug screenings. The evidence
revealed Father’s consistent refusal to engage in services, address his substance abuse, and
ongoing drug usage indicated placing the Children with Father would expose them to future risk
of harm. While Father’s future behavior is unascertainable, Father’s consistent refusal to address
his substance abuse is predictive of future issues and indicative of his future ability to care for
the Children. In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Mo. banc 2004). Father’s refusal to complete
substance abuse services reasonably supports the trial court determining the unlikelihood of
16 Father engagement in future additional services. Id. Accordingly, the trial court had sufficient
evidence showing extra services were unlikely to bring about lasting changes to Father’s
behavior within an ascertainable time, and reunification would expose the Children to future risk
of harm. See id.
Third, Father disputes the court’s finding he lacked commitment to the Children. Father
asserts this finding was against the logic of the circumstances and an abuse of the court’s
discretion because he tried to comply with court-ordered services and remained involved in the
Children’s lives.
We disagree. As previously addressed, Father consistently failed to complete substance
abuse services and was aware his drug usage prevented reunification and could lead to
termination of parental rights; still, his behavior remained unchanged. A Division caseworker
testified Father knew the Children desired to live with him and would get sad when his positive
drug screening prevented visits. Despite that knowledge, Father continued to engage in drug
usage, placing his needs before the Children’s interests and wishes for reunification. See Interest
of J.G.W., 613 S.W.3d 474, 490 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020). Similarly, while Father contends his
attendance at supervised visits with the Children and participation in therapy were sufficient to
demonstrate his commitment to the Children, he refused to address his substance abuse issues or
engage in substance abuse treatment. This conduct indicates he prioritized his desires before the
Children’s interest in reunification. Id. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
because the court had sufficient evidence to logically conclude Father lacked interest in and
commitment to the Children. G.G.B., 394 S.W.3d at 474.
Last, Father argues the trial court lacked evidence to support the finding that he
deliberately engaged in behavior which placed the Children at risk of harm. We disagree. Father
17 was aware his drug abuse issues prevented reunification and could lead to termination of parental
rights. But Father continued to use drugs and test positive for illegal substances. Father’s
voluntary consumption of illegal substances meets the statutory meaning of a “deliberate” act,
which he knew or should have known would subject the Children to a substantial risk of harm. In
Interest of T.G., 965 S.W.2d 326, 337 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998). The evidence established Father
refused to engage in substance abuse services or stop ingesting illegal substances, placing the
Children at future risk of harm. Father’s failure to comply with court-ordered programs qualify
as deliberate acts he knew or should have known subject the Children to a substantial risk of
harm. See In Interest of Z.L.G., 531 S.W.3d 653, 661 (Mo. App. S.D. 2017). Hence, the trial
court did not err in finding Father engaged in deliberate acts he knew or should have known
subject the Children to a substantial risk of harm. Id.; T.G., 965 S.W.2d at 337.
Sufficient evidence existed to support the court's findings on the statutory factors and
"best interest" determination. “There is no requirement that all seven statutory “best interest”
factors must be negated before termination of parental rights can take place; likewise there is no
minimum number of negative factors necessary for termination.” In re C.M.H., 408 S.W.3d 805,
815 (Mo. App. S.D. 2013). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in determining it was in the
Children's best interest to terminate Father's parental rights.
Point V is denied.
Decision
For the reasons stated above, the judgment is affirmed.
_______________________________ Philip M. Hess, Presiding Judge Angela T. Quigless, Judge and Colleen Dolan, Judge concur.