In the Interest of J.O., N.L., and A.O., Minor Children

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: September 4, 2025
• Docket: 25-1008
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-1008 Filed September 4, 2025

IN THE INTEREST OF J.O., N.L., and A.O., Minor Children,

R.O., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Matthew A.

Schuling, Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her children under

Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e), (h), and (l) (2025). AFFIRMED.

Whitney A. Estwick, Omaha, Nebraska, for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Abby L. Davison of the Office of the State Public Defender, Council Bluffs,

attorney and guardian ad litem for minor children.

Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and

Sandy, JJ. 2

SANDY, Judge.

A mother appeals1 the termination of her parental rights to her three children

under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) and (l) (2025) and to the youngest under

paragraph (h) as well. She argues the State failed to prove the grounds for

termination, termination is not in the children’s best interests, the juvenile court

should have applied permissive exceptions to termination, and the Iowa

Department of Health and Human Services failed to fulfill its obligation to make

reasonable efforts towards reunification. We affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

A.O., J.O., and N.L. were born in 2017, 2021, and 2023, respectively. The

children first came to the attention of the department in 2021 when J.O. tested

positive for THC, cocaine, and methamphetamine at birth. A.O., who was four

years old, tested positive for methamphetamine, cocaine, cannabinoids, and THC.

Following J.O.’s birth, the State petitioned to have A.O. and J.O adjudicated

children-in-need-of-assistance (CINA). The children were adjudicated as CINA,

removed from parental custody, and placed with their maternal uncle and his

partner, A.M. The children were returned to the mother nine months later following

her completion of mental-health treatment and her separation from the legal father.

The children again came to the attention of the department in 2022 when it

and the Council Bluffs police received reports that the parents were using cocaine

around the children. The department and police showed up at the children’s home

1 The legal father’s parental rights to the children were also terminated, and he

does not appeal. The parental rights of the unknown biological fathers were also terminated. 3

unannounced and found the mother with “a black right eye with blood pooling in

the white of her eye.” The children were again placed with A.M., a suitable other.

Both children tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine, and J.O.

tested positive for cocaine. The department uncovered evidence of multiple

incidents of the father beating the mother, spanking J.O., as well as once setting

fire to objects in the backyard upon becoming angry. The children were again

adjudicated as CINA and were not returned to the parents until fourteen months

after initiation of the CINA proceedings, “when the mother had fully engaged in

mental health treatment” and separated again from the father.

Following N.L.’s birth in 2023, the children yet again came to the

department’s attention. J.O tested positive for methamphetamine, and N.L. tested

positive for THC. In the 2024 order adjudicating the children as CINA, the juvenile

court found the mother was using methamphetamine and marijuana in the family

home. The children had access to those illegal substances and associated

paraphernalia. The mother also “admitted that her mental health is not stable and

render[ed] her unable to safely provide care for the children.” And “[i]n violent

rages [the father] pulled [the mother]’s hair, pushed [her], and hit and strangled

[her].” The mother completed a substance-use evaluation but restricted the CINA

court or the department from reviewing it. The mother continued to be in an active

relationship with the father despite the abuse. The court emphasized the

importance that the parents adhere to the case plan for reunification due to the

extensive prior history of dangerous substance use and physical abuse.

Since the 2024 adjudication order, the mother has been offered many

services by the department. She was offered family centered services (FCS), 4

SafeCare, psychology evaluation, parenting assessment, and recommendations

based on her evaluation reports. But the mother did not utilize those services. The

mother intermittently engaged in FCS but also cancelled appointments and failed

to reschedule without explanation. Although she has faced extensive domestic

violence, she refused to participate in SafeCare or other offered domestic violence

services. Despite being offered budgeting assistance, she was not willing to

complete a budget with FCS. The mother completed another set of substance-

use evaluations but refused to follow the recommendations, which included weekly

sessions and inpatient treatment. The mother tested positive for fentanyl as

recently as November 2024 and “no-showed” for two drug screens subsequent to

that. Yet, she continues to deny substance use. She was unable to move past

supervised visits, “[did] not engage in verbal communication with [N.L.],” and N.L

cried during the visits.

The children’s therapist raised concerns with the visits, which were

supported by the guardian ad litem. J.O. became extremely distressed in

anticipation of visits, which caused him to “pee[] his pants,” “hit[] his sister,” and

display other acts of increased aggression which, in turn, have “contribute[d] to

functional impairments” in his development. A.O. exhibited “severe anxiety” when

the topic of his mother was raised and insisted the mother would “call him a liar”

for candidly reporting his experiences with her to his therapist. “He reported that

he would run away and hide to prevent himself from going to visitation with his

mother.”

Visits were subsequently suspended. The mother continued to decline

substance-abuse treatment. She also suggested that she may lose her 5

employment and housing. Her therapist informed her that inpatient treatment

could potentially offer her an apartment, but she continued to decline the service.

The State then filed the petition to terminate parental rights to the children, citing

the mother’s refusal of services, domestic violence, drug use, and the children’s

continued struggles with visits.

The juvenile court subsequently terminated the mother’s parental rights as

to all three children under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) and (l) and as to N.L.

under section 232.116(1)(h).

II. Standard of Review

We review termination proceedings de novo. In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703,

706 (Iowa 2010). “We are not bound by the juvenile court’s findings of fact, but we

do give them weight, especially in assessing the credibility of witnesses.” Id. Our

review on termination proceedings follows a three-step process to determine if

(1) a statutory ground for termination has been established, (2) termination is in

the children’s best interests, and (3) any permissive exceptions should be applied

that preclude termination. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 294 (Iowa 2021).

III. Discussion

A. Grounds for Termination

When the district court terminates an individual’s parental rights on more

than one statutory ground, we may affirm termination on any one of the cited

grounds we find supported in the record. In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa

2012).

Under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e), a parent’s parental rights to a child

may be terminated when the juvenile court finds all the following: 6

(1) The child has been adjudicated [CINA] pursuant to section 232.96. (2) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child’s parents for a period of at least six consecutive months. (3) There is clear and convincing evidence that the parents have not maintained significant and meaningful contact with the child during the previous six consecutive months and have made no reasonable efforts to resume care of the child despite being given the opportunity to do so. For the purposes of this subparagraph, “significant and meaningful contact” includes but is not limited to the affirmative assumption by the parents of the duties encompassed by the role of being a parent. This affirmative duty, in addition to financial obligations, requires continued interest in the child, a genuine effort to complete the responsibilities prescribed in the case permanency plan, a genuine effort to maintain communication with the child, and requires that the parents establish and maintain a place of importance in the child's life.

The mother provides a two-sentence argument on this ground. In response

to the third element—failure to maintain significant and meaningful contact with the

children—she contends she “consistently attended her visits with the children and

brought snacks and food for the children. The children interacted well with [the

mother] and know her as their mom.”

But the juvenile court suspended the mother’s visits in early February—

nearly three months before the termination trial took place. . And she failed to

make a genuine effort to complete the responsibilities prescribed in the case

permanency plan,” which would in turn demonstrate “a genuine effort to maintain

communication with the child[ren].” See id. Her continued refusal to complete

substance-use treatment, SafeCare, psychology evaluation, other FCS, and failure

to reach the recommendation stage of those evaluations, all demonstrate her

wavering to nonexistent commitment to participation in the permanency plan. See

In re T.S., 868 N.W.2d 425, 437 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (affirming termination under

paragraph (e) where parent did not address “domestic abuse, substance abuse or 7

mental health issues, and have not made a genuine effort to address these

issues”). And the mother’s last-minute mental-health evaluation the week before

the termination trial does not convince us she is committed to “permanent changes

signaling a safe and stable future for these children.” In re A.H., 950 N.W.2d 27,

41 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020). The grounds for termination under section 232.116(1)(e)

were met.

B. Best Interests

The second step in our analysis is to consider the factors under

section 232.116(2). Section 232.116(2) requires us to “give primary consideration

to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing

and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and

needs of the child.”

We “look to the child’s long-range as well as immediate interests.” In re

J.H., 952 N.W.2d 157, 171 (Iowa 2020) (citation omitted). The best-interests

analysis requires we look to “what the future holds for the child if returned to the

parents. When making this decision, we look to the parents’ past performance

because it may indicate the quality of care the parent is capable of providing in the

future.” Id. (citation omitted).

There is no doubt to us that termination is in the children’s best interests

here. Although the mother was intermittently participating in visits prior to their

suspension, the children have been visibly traumatized by her prior care. The older

children have been subject to multiple CINA adjudications and removals. All

children have tested positive for dangerous substances. The children’s positive

results for methamphetamine are particularly alarming—“[m]ethamphetamine is a 8

scourge.” In re K.L., No. 17-0346, 2017 WL 2465817, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. June 7,

2017). We have consistently stated that “[a] parent’s methamphetamine use, in

itself, creates a dangerous environment for children.” In re J.P., No. 19-1633, 2020

WL 110425, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020). But this case surpasses mere

“use” of methamphetamine by the mother—the substances have directly come in

contact with the children as evidenced by their positive drug screens, and the

mother has not taken action to address her substance-use issues. Additionally,

the children have been subject to abuse and J.O. and A.O., in particular,

demonstrate distress during visits with their mother. Between the substance-use,

domestic abuse, and mother’s failure to utilize services, there are a host of issues

blocking any reasonable path to permanency with the mother.

Lastly, the department reported that the children are thriving in their current

placement and that placement would like to provide the children a permanent

home. “It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after

the State has proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping

someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home

for the child.” In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 41 (Iowa 2010).

Termination is in the children’s best interests.

C. Permissive Exceptions and Department’s Reasonable Efforts

We must next decide if any exceptions to termination exist under

section 232.116(3). The mother contends that the closeness of the parent-child

relationship precludes termination. Regardless of whether the parent “loves her

[children], our consideration must center on whether the child will be

disadvantaged by termination and whether the disadvantage overcomes [the 9

parent]’s inability to provide for [the children]’s developing needs.” D.W., 791

N.W.2d at 709.

We do not doubt the mother’s claim that she loves the children. But she

has not demonstrated any ability to provide for the children’s needs, which would

be particularly challenging considering their adverse reactions to her visits and her

refusal to address the permanency goals. According to their therapist, the

children’s needs have been best served by suspending visits with the mother. The

children are currently in a loving placement that provides them a path to

permanency. We decline to apply any permissive exception.

D. Reasonable Efforts

Lastly, the mother contends that the department “did not work with [her] at

maximizing contact between her and the children” and argues she “engaged in

services, attended her visits, attended drug screen, which were negative [from]

December 2024 [to] February 2025.” The State has a duty to make “reasonable

efforts” towards reunification by working “to preserve and unify a family prior to the

out-of-home placement of a child in foster care or to eliminate the need for removal

of the child or make it possible for the child to safely return to the family’s home.”

Iowa Code § 232.102A(1)(a). But “parents have a responsibility to object when

they claim the nature or extent of services is inadequate. A parent’s objection to

the sufficiency of services should be made early in the process so appropriate

changes can be made.” In re L.M., 904 N.W.2d 835, 839–40 (Iowa 2017) (cleaned

up).

Because the mother failed to contest reasonable efforts prior to the

termination hearing, and even now she fails to identify specific services which were 10

not provided, she has failed to preserve error on the issue. But her argument fails

on the merits as well. As we have already extensively addressed, any visitation

failures were not caused by the department’s failure to facilitate visits. The mother

failed to consistently attend visits for the entirety of the scheduled times and did

not engage with the children during the visits. The children’s distress from visits

necessitated the suspension—suspension did not result from the department’s

failure to engage with the family. The mother has not made a genuine effort to

complete the responsibilities prescribed in the case permanency plan, and her

continued refusal to complete substance-use treatment, SafeCare, psychology

evaluation, other FCS, and failure to reach the recommendation stage of those

evaluations are all examples of discrete services the department has offered but

she has failed to utilize.

Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.