In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-26-00094-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF I.G., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 316th District Court Hutchinson County, Texas Trial Court No. 46,060, Honorable James M. Mosley, Presiding
June 16, 2026 OPINION Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and PRATT, JJ.
In this accelerated appeal, appellant, Mother, seeks reversal of the trial court’s
judgment terminating her parental rights to her child, I.G., in a suit brought by the Texas
Department of Family and Protective Services. 1 By her appeal, Mother challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the statutory grounds for termination and the best-
interest finding. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
1 To protect the privacy of the parties involved, we will refer to the appellant as “Mother,” to the
child’s father as “Father,” and to the child by his initials. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b). BACKGROUND
Shortly after I.G.’s birth, law enforcement and the Department were called out to
Mother and Father’s home to investigate allegations of physical neglect of I.G. and
methamphetamine use by Mother. Mother refused to cooperate with law enforcement
and left the home. During the Department’s investigation, the concerns of Mother’s
methamphetamine use were validated. The home was found to be in disrepair with no
running water and no crib, diapers, baby wipes, or “anything to indicate that they were
able to take care of a child there.” The Department also learned that three-and-a-half-
month-old I.G. was left with his paternal grandparents. The Department took emergency
possession of I.G., filed its petition for protection, conservatorship, and termination, and
requested emergency temporary managing conservatorship. 2 The trial court entered an
order of emergency protection of I.G. citing a continuing danger to the physical health or
safety of I.G. if he is returned to a parent. Following an adversary hearing, the Department
was appointed temporary managing conservator of I.G. and his placement was continued
with the paternal grandparents. Two of I.G.’s older siblings are also living with the
paternal grandparents, and another sibling is living with the maternal grandparents.
The Department developed a family service plan for Mother, but she was
incarcerated in the Carson County Jail and unable to complete any of the recommended
services. During the pendency of this case, Mother was convicted of possession of
methamphetamine with intent to deliver and sentenced to forty-five years’ incarceration.
Mother did not attend the final hearing.
2 Father’s parental rights were also terminated in this proceeding. Father does not appeal.
2 At the time of the final hearing, I.G. was almost two years old. The permanency
specialist with St. Francis Ministries testified that I.G. is happy, content, and doing very
well in his placement with the paternal grandparents. Upon entering this placement, I.G.
was enrolled in Early Childhood Intervention (ECI) services three times per week to
improve his motor skills and speech development. I.G. is walking and becoming more
verbal. The paternal grandparents are in the process of becoming licensed so that they
can adopt I.G.
The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to I.G. on the grounds of
endangering conditions, endangerment, engaging in criminal conduct resulting in her
conviction, imprisonment, and inability to care for I.G. for at least two years from the
original petition’s file date, and causing the child to be born addicted to a controlled
substance. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (P), (Q). 3 The trial court also
found termination was in the best interest of I.G. See § 161.001(b)(2). The Department
was appointed permanent managing conservator of I.G., and the placement with the
paternal grandparents was continued. Mother timely filed this appeal of the resulting
judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A parent’s right to the “companionship, care, custody, and management” of his or
her child is a constitutional interest “far more precious than any property right.” Santosky
3 Further references to provisions of the Texas Family Code will be by reference to “section ___”
or “§ ___.”
3 v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982); see In re
M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 547 (Tex. 2003). We strictly scrutinize termination proceedings
and strictly construe the involuntary termination statutes in favor of the parent. Holick v.
Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). However, “the rights of natural parents are not
absolute” and “[t]he rights of parenthood are accorded only to those fit to accept the
accompanying responsibilities.” In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 2003) (citing In re
J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 195 (Tex. 1994)). Recognizing that a parent may forfeit his or
her parental rights by his or her acts or omissions, the primary focus of a termination suit
is protection of the child’s best interests. See id.
In a case to terminate parental rights under section 161.001 of the Family Code,
the petitioner must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the parent
committed one or more of the enumerated acts or omissions justifying termination, and
(2) termination is in the best interest of the child. § 161.001(b). Clear and convincing
evidence is “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of
fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.”
§ 101.007; In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264 (Tex. 2002). Both elements must be
established, and termination may not be based solely on the best interest of the child as
determined by the trier of fact. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533
(Tex. 1987); In re K.C.B., 280 S.W.3d 888, 894 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. denied).
“Only one predicate finding under section 161.001[(b)](1) is necessary to support a
judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child’s best
interest.” In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362. We affirm a termination order if the evidence is
both legally and factually sufficient to support any alleged statutory ground the trial court
4 relied upon in terminating parental rights if the evidence also establishes that termination
is in the child’s best interest. In re K.C.B., 280 S.W.3d at 894–95.
In reviewing for legal sufficiency, we look at all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed
a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344−45
(Tex. 2009). In reviewing for factual sufficiency, we give due consideration to evidence
that the factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing. In re C.H., 89
S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002). If, considering the entire record, the disputed evidence that
a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that
a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the
evidence is factually insufficient. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.
The clear and convincing evidence standard does not mean the evidence must
negate all reasonable doubt or that the evidence must be uncontroverted. In re R.D.S.,
902 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995, no writ). The reviewing court must recall
that the trier of fact has the authority to weigh the evidence, draw reasonable inferences
therefrom, and choose between conflicting inferences. Id. The factfinder also enjoys the
right to resolve credibility issues and conflicts within the evidence and may freely choose
to believe all, part, or none of the testimony espoused by any witness. Id. Where
conflicting evidence is present, the factfinder’s determination on such matters is generally
regarded as conclusive. In re B.R., 950 S.W.2d 113, 121 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, no
writ).
5 The appellate court cannot weigh witness credibility issues that depend on
demeanor and appearance as the witnesses are not present. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d
570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam). Even when credibility issues are reflected in the
written transcript, the appellate court must defer to the factfinder’s determinations, if those
determinations are not themselves unreasonable. Id.
APPLICABLE LAW
A trial court may order termination of a parent-child relationship if the court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that a parent has knowingly placed or knowingly
allowed a child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or
emotional well-being of the child and/or engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the
child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional
well-being of the child. See § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). Both subsections (D) and (E)
require proof of endangerment. To “endanger” means to expose the child to loss or
injury or to jeopardize the child’s emotional or physical health. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at
533. A child is endangered when the environment creates a potential for danger that
the parent is aware of but consciously disregards. J.S. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family &
Protective Servs., 511 S.W.3d 145, 159 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.). Endanger
means more than a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill effects of a less-
than-ideal family environment, but it is not necessary that the conduct be directed at
the child or that the child suffer injury. In re N.K., 399 S.W.3d 322, 330 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2013, no pet.).
6 While both subsections (D) and (E) focus on endangerment, they differ regarding
the source of the physical or emotional endangerment to the child. See In re B.S.T., 977
S.W.2d 481, 484 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.). Subsection (D)
requires a showing that the environment in which the child is placed endangered the
child’s physical or emotional health. Doyle v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory
Servs., 16 S.W.3d 390, 394 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, pet. denied). Conduct of a parent
or another person in the home can create an environment that endangers the physical
and emotional well-being of a child as required for termination under subsection (D). In
re W.S., 899 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). “ Inappropriate,
abusive, or unlawful conduct by persons who live in the child’s home or with whom the
child is compelled to associate on a regular basis in his home is a part of the ‘conditions
or surroundings’ of the child’s home” under subsection (D). In re M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d
494, 502 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) (op. on reh’g). The factfinder may infer
from past conduct endangering the child’s well-being that similar conduct will recur if the
child is returned to the parent. Id. Thus, subsection (D) addresses the child’s
surroundings and environment rather than parental misconduct, which is the subject of
subsection (E). Doyle, 16 S.W.3d at 394.
Under subsection (E), the cause of the danger to the child must be the parent’s
conduct alone, as evidenced not only by the parent’s actions, but also by the parent’s
omission or failure to act. In re M.J.M.L., 31 S.W.3d 347, 350–51 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2000, pet. denied); Doyle, 16 S.W.3d at 395. To be relevant, the conduct does
not have to have been directed at the child, nor must actual harm result to the child from
the conduct. Dupree v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 907 S.W.2d 81, 84
7 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no writ). Additionally, termination under subsection (E) must be
based on more than a single act or omission; a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious
course of conduct by the parent is required. In re E.P.C., 381 S.W.3d 670, 683 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2012, no pet.). The specific danger to the child’s well-being need not
be established as an independent proposition but may be inferred from parental
misconduct. In re B.C.S., 479 S.W.3d 918, 926 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.).
A determination of best interest necessitates a focus on the child, not the parent.
Id. at 927. Appellate courts examine the entire record to decide what is in the best interest
of the child. In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 250 (Tex. 2013). There is a strong
presumption that it is in the child’s best interest to preserve the parent-child relationship.
In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam).
In assessing whether termination is in a child’s best interest, the courts are guided
by the non-exclusive list of factors in Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex.
1976). 4 “[T]he State need not prove all of the factors as a condition precedent to parental
termination, ‘particularly if the evidence were undisputed that the parental relationship
endangered the safety of the child.’” In re C.T.E., 95 S.W.3d 462, 466 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27). Evidence
that supports one or more statutory grounds for termination may also constitute evidence
4 These factors include: (1) the child’s desires; (2) the child’s present and future emotional and
physical needs; (3) any present or future emotional and physical danger to the child; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist the individuals seeking custody to promote the child’s best interest; (6) the plans for the child by the individuals or agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the parent’s acts or omissions which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is improper; and (9) any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions. Id.
8 illustrating that termination is in the child’s best interest. See In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at
249. The best interest analysis may consider circumstantial evidence, subjective factors,
and the totality of the evidence as well as direct evidence. In re N.R.T., 338 S.W.3d 667,
677 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). We must also bear in mind that a child’s need
for permanence through the establishment of a stable, permanent home has been
recognized as the paramount consideration in determining best interest. See In re K.C.,
219 S.W.3d 924, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.).
ANALYSIS
The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to I.G. on the grounds set out in
subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (P), and (Q). Only one predicate ground is required
to support termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child’s best
interest. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362. Pursuant to the Texas Supreme Court opinion in
In re N.G., we review the trial court’s findings under subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E)
when raised on appeal, because a finding under those grounds may justify termination of
parental rights to other children under subsection (M). In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 235–
37 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam); see § 161.001(b)(1)(M).
Sufficiency of the Evidence under Subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E)
In her first issue, Mother challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the
evidence to support the termination of her parental rights under subsections (D) and (E).
Specifically, Mother argues that if I.G. was already placed with the paternal grandparents
at the time of the removal, and not living at the “offending residence,” the condition of the
residence could not support termination under (D) or (E). Mother further argues that if
9 she did not have “care, custody, or control,” of I.G. at the time of removal, any “alleged
drug use or other bad conduct” on her part could not have endangered I.G. According to
Mother, “[l]ogic would dictate you have to have possession of the child before the
Department can take action to remove the child from your care and terminate your rights.”
We first address Mother’s argument that she did not have physical possession of
I.G. at the time of the removal. Prior to the Department’s involvement, Mother, as a parent
of I.G., had certain legal rights and duties afforded to her as the parent of a child. These
rights and duties include the right to have physical possession, direct the moral and
religious training, and designate the residence of the child; the duty of care, control,
protection, and reasonable discipline; and the duty to support the child, including providing
the child with clothing, food, shelter, medical and dental care, and education. See §
151.001. In In re A.A., the Texas Supreme Court explained that “[r]emoval is effectuated
by a temporary court order that transfers not just the right to physical possession from a
parent to [the Department] but an entire bundle of conservatorship rights from one or both
parents” to the Department. In re A.A., 670 S.W.3d 520, 567 (Tex. 2023). Consequently,
even if Mother did not have physical possession of I.G. at the time of the removal, she
had other specified legal rights to I.G. See § 151.001.
In this case, the Department took possession of I.G. under Family Code section
262.104, which authorizes possession without a court order if circumstances lead a
person of ordinary prudence and caution to believe that the child faced “an immediate
danger to [his] physical health or safety.” § 262.104(a)(1). The next day, the Department
filed a petition seeking conservatorship of I.G. and termination of Mother’s parental rights.
The petition was supported by a six-page affidavit from the Department investigator 10 recounting the circumstances necessitating I.G.’s removal. The affidavit described
allegations of neglectful supervision of I.G. by Mother: I.G. was dirty, smelled “like
cigarettes,” and had unmet medical needs, and there were no “baby items” in the home
for the infant. The affidavit also noted concerns that Mother is “abusing
methamphetamine again,” and drug paraphernalia was observed inside the home. The
home was infested with roaches, “looked dirty,” and had “trash and clothes all over the
place.” The affidavit documented Mother’s extensive history with the Department
involving three of I.G.’s siblings, who had been removed from her care and were living
with the paternal and maternal grandparents. 5 After the petition and affidavit were filed,
the trial court issued an emergency temporary order of protection that found, among other
things, sufficient evidence that “continuation in the home of the Parents would be contrary
to [I.G.’s] welfare,. . . [and] there is a continuing danger to the physical health or safety of
[I.G.] if [he] is returned to the parent . . . who is presently entitled to possession . . . .” See
§ 262.102.
The emergency order does not just address physical possession. Chapter 262
equates it to “a temporary order for the conservatorship of a child under Section
105.001(a)(1) . . . .” § 262.102(a). In an emergency order issued under Chapter 262, the
trial court appoints the Department as the temporary sole managing conservator of the
child at issue and addresses what rights of conservatorship are transferred from the
parent to the Department as a result of that appointment. § 153.371 (listing rights and
duties that, “[u]nless limited by court order,” attach to Department when appointed
5 The affidavit shows what the trial court relied on in determining whether removal was justified.
See In re E.C.R., 402 S.W. 3d at 248.
11 managing conservator of child.). Thus, the emergency removal of I.G. encompassed not
only Mother’s possession, but conservatorship rights as well. Even if Mother did not have
physical possession of I.G. at the time of the removal, she had the “right to have physical
possession . . . and to designate the residence” of I.G. See § 151.001. The emergency
nature of the circumstances made it necessary to enter a temporary order awarding “the
rights and duties listed in § 153.371” to the Department, including the right of physical
possession and to designate the residence of I.G., until an adversary hearing could be
held. See § 262.201. 6
In evaluating termination under subsection (D), we are to examine the time prior
to the child’s removal by the Department to determine whether the environment of the
home posed a danger to his physical or emotional well-being. See In re L.E.S., 471
S.W.3d 915, 926 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.); In re C.R., Nos. 07-20-00314-
CV, 07-20-00316-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 1286, at *6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb. 23,
2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Under subsection (E), the conduct to be examined
includes what the parent did both before and after the child was born. Because the
evidence pertaining to subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) is interrelated, we may
conduct a consolidated review. In re M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d at 503.
As detailed above, the trial court’s grant of the Department’s request for removal
was based on the investigator’s affidavit. It is clear from the affidavit that Mother and
Father had been living in the “offending residence” with I.G. before the Department
6 There is no indication in the record that Mother challenged the order by mandamus. See Dancy v. Daggett, 815 S.W.2d 548, 549 (Tex. 1991) (mandamus relief appropriate because trial court’s temporary orders not subject to interlocutory appeal).
12 became involved. Moreover, the Department presented evidence that shortly after I.G.’s
birth, it received a report citing concerns for the safety of I.G. because of the deplorable
condition of the home and Mother’s continuing use of methamphetamine. The home was
littered with trash, infested with cockroaches, and lacked running water. Notably, there
was an absence of basic baby-care items for a newborn, such as a crib, diapers, or baby
wipes. After I.G. was removed from Mother’s care, he required ECI services upon
placement with the paternal grandparents. Exposing a child to unsanitary living conditions
constitutes evidence that a parent has endangered the child. In re M.C., D.C., and C.W.,
917 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam).
The record further shows that during the pendency of this suit, Mother was
incarcerated in the county jail and convicted of felony possession and distribution of
methamphetamine, resulting in a 45-year prison sentence. The permanency specialist
testified that Mother failed to provide any child support, exercised no visitation with I.G.,
and failed to demonstrate any stability. A parent’s use of illegal substances may qualify
as an endangering course of conduct. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345. This is because
illegal drug use exposes a child to the possibility that his parent could be impaired or
imprisoned, which would endanger the child’s physical and emotional well-being. In re
M.C., 482 S.W.3d 675, 685 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, pet. denied). “[I]ntentional
criminal activity which exposed the parent to incarceration is relevant evidence tending to
establish a course of conduct endangering the emotional and physical well[-]being of the
child.” In re A.W.T., 61 S.W.3d 87, 89 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, no pet.) (per curiam);
In re A.F., No. 07-19-00435-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 4152, at *17 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
May 29, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (parent’s failure to regularly participate in visitation
13 demonstrates lack of concern for child’s well-being and can reasonably be found to be
emotionally endangering to child’s well-being).
Having examined the entire record, we find that the trial court could reasonably
form a firm belief or conviction that Mother knowingly placed or knowingly allowed I.G. to
remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered his physical or emotional well-
being and engaged in conduct which endangered I.G.’s emotional and physical well-
being. The same evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court’s affirmative
finding. We overrule Mother’s first issue. Having found that the evidence is legally and
factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding under subsections 161.001(b)(1) (D)
and (E), we need not address issues two and three challenging the trial court’s findings
under subsections 161.001(b)(1) (P) and (Q). See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 363; see
also TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 (allowing courts of appeals to limit discussions in opinions to
issues necessary to disposition of appeal).
Best Interest
In her fourth issue, Mother challenges the factual and legal sufficiency of the
evidence to support the best-interest finding made under section 161.001(b)(2).
At the time of the final hearing, I.G. was almost two years old and thus too young
to express his desires. When a child is too young to express his desires, the factfinder
may consider whether the child has bonded with the placement, is well-cared for by them,
and has spent minimal time with a parent. In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 369 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). The evidence showed that I.G. had spent minimal
time, a scarce three months, with Mother. Mother did not participate in any visitation with
14 I.G. after the Department began its investigation. The evidence showed that I.G. is
strongly bonded with his grandparents and is thriving in their care. The trial court could
have reasonably found that Mother’s minimal contact with I.G. constituted evidence that
Mother is incapable or unwilling to meet I.G.’s needs now and in the future. See In re
R.J., 568 S.W.3d 734, 752−53 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (minimal
visitation relevant to multiple Holley factors including child’s current and future physical
and emotional needs and parent’s ability to care for child).
Stability and permanence are paramount in the upbringing of children. In re J.D.,
436 S.W.3d 105, 120 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The factfinder may
compare the parent’s and the Department’s plans for the child and determine whether the
plans and expectations of each party are realistic or weak and ill-defined. Id. at 119–20.
At the time of the final hearing, Mother was serving a forty-five-year prison sentence with
a parole eligibility date of August 10, 2029. Her continued incarceration subjects I.G. to
a life of uncertainty and instability. A parent’s imprisonment is a factor that may be
considered in determining a child’s best interest. In re M.L., No. 07-20-00195-CV, 2020
Tex. App. LEXIS 9483, at *16 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 4, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Conversely, the paternal grandparents have been providing a safe and stable
environment for almost two years, along with the structure and consistency that I.G.
needs. The paternal grandparents have actively sought to meet I.G.’s needs, including
taking steps to remedy his developmental delays. The placement of I.G. with the paternal
grandparents allows him to be raised with two older siblings, and the grandparents plan
to adopt I.G. if parental rights are terminated.
15 We conclude that multiple Holley factors support the trial court’s best-interest
finding. Considering all the evidence in the record, we hold that the evidence is legally
and factually sufficient to establish a firm conviction in the mind of the trial court that
termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of I.G. We overrule Mother’s
fourth issue challenging the best-interest determination.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled the issues raised by Mother, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court terminating Mother’s parental rights to I.G.
Judy C. Parker Chief Justice