FIRST DIVISION BARNES, P. J., MILLER, P. J., and LAND, J.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
June 20, 2023
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A23A0111. IN THE INTEREST OF H. P., A CHILD.
BARNES, Presiding Judge.
H. P. was adjudicated delinquent based on her admission of an act which, if
committed by an adult, would have constituted family violence battery. She appeals
from that judgment and contends that the juvenile court’s disposition was “illegal”
in that, in addition to the Probation Management Program (“PMP”), the disposition
also included secure probation sanctions. She maintains that the sentence thus
subjected her to the risk of custodial time for a single misdemeanor adjudication in
violation of Georgia law and the Juvenile Code, which require a felony offense prior
to incarceration. H. P. also contends that, even if the disposition is lawful, a juvenile
probation officer is not authorized to incarcerate her in a Regional Youth Detention
Center (“YDC”). Following our review, we affirm. “[C]onstrued in favor of the juvenile court’s findings,” In the Interest of J. W.,
309 Ga. App. 470, 470-471 (711 SE2d 48) (2011)1, the record demonstrates that the
State filed a delinquency petition against then 16-year-old H. P. alleging that she had
committed a battery pursuant to the Family Violence Act. H. P. was alleged to have
caused “visible injury” to her father by punching, kicking, and scratching him. H. P.
denied the allegation, and subsequently an adjudication hearing was scheduled. At the
hearing, H. P. admitted to the battery, and the juvenile court delayed adjudication and
disposition of the case to obtain a social history. H. P.’s social history report noted
no prior law enforcement or court history, but that she currently received treatment
for a mood disorder, used marijuana, acid, and “other drugs,” and had issues in her
family life, including little contact with her mother and a strained relationship with
her father.
Thereafter, the rescheduled adjudicatory hearing was held, and at the request
of H. P.’s counsel, the juvenile court agreed to hold the case in abeyance for H. P. to
complete certain conditions, including participate in wrap-around services and
counseling, avoid violent contact with anyone, attend school, and complete girls
1 We note that no transcripts from any related hearings were included with the appellate record.
2 group/life skill classes. However, before the hearing date, the court held a review
hearing at which H. P. admitted to violating the conditions of her abeyance by having
another violent contact with her father, and refusing to go to school or take her
medications. The juvenile court also noted that H. P. may have committed a battery
against the mother in another county. Following the hearing, the trial court placed H.
P. on PMP probation with secure probation sanctions.2 In the disposition order, the
juvenile court acknowledged H. P.’s objection to secure probation sanctions for a
misdemeanor offense, and that the parties had briefed the court on the issue before
entry of the final judgment.
1. The appellant first contends that the juvenile court erred by imposing a
secure sanctions program for a misdemeanor adjudication. According to H. P., by
subjecting her to the risk of incarceration, the juvenile court imposed an illegal
sentence that is not supported by a proper construction of Georgia law. H. P. asserts
that PMP without the secure probation sanctions was the appropriate disposition.
2 On the pre-printed “Adjudication and Disposition” form, the juvenile court placed H. P. on probation with the “following programs and conditions”: health relations classes, individual counseling, take medication as prescribed, attend girls group, avoid violent contact with anyone, and “Probation Management Program/Secure Probation Sanctions.” There is no separate condition on the disposition form for the court to only select PMP.
3 Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo, giving
no deference to the trial court’s ruling. State v. Hammonds, 325 Ga. App. 815, 815
(755 SE2d 214) (2014). In interpreting the statutes at issue,
we look to the literal language of the statutes, the rules of statutory construction and rules of reason and logic, the most important of which is to construe the statute[ ] so as to give effect to the legislature’s intent. But as our Supreme Court has instructed, the search for legislative intent must begin with the words of the statute, and if those words are clear and unambiguous, the search also must end there. Put another way, when we consider the meaning of a statute, we must presume that the legislature meant what it said and said what it meant. We cannot substitute judicial interpretation language of our own for the clear, unambiguous language of the statute, so as to change the meaning.
(Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Collins v. Davis, 318 Ga. App. 265, 268 (1) (733
SE2d 798) (2012), overruled in part on other grounds, Voyles v. Voyles, 301 Ga. 44,
47 n. 5 (799 SE2d 160) (2017).
Turning to the statutes in question, OCGA § 15-11-601 (a) (3) provides, in
relevant part, that
[a]t the conclusion of the disposition hearing, if a child who committed a delinquent act is determined to be in need of treatment or rehabilitation, then after considering the results of such child’s risk assessment if the court is contemplating placing such child in restrictive
4 custody, the court shall enter the least restrictive disposition order appropriate in view of the seriousness of the delinquent act, such child’s culpability as indicated by the circumstances of the particular case, the age of such child, such child’s prior record, and such child’s strengths and needs. The court may make any of the following orders of disposition, or combination of them, best suited to such child’s treatment, rehabilitation, and welfare[,including an] order placing such child on probation under conditions and limitations the court prescribes and which may include the probation management program.3
(Emphasis Supplied.)
The statute also provides that the juvenile may be placed in the Georgia
Department of Juvenile Justice’s (“DJJ”) custody pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-601 (a)
(11) “only if such child was adjudicated for a delinquent act involving” either
(A) [a]n offense that would be a felony if committed by an adult; or
(B) [a]n offense that would be a misdemeanor if committed by an adult and such child has had at least one prior adjudication for an offense that would be a felony if committed by an adult and at least three
3 “‘Probation management program’ means a special condition of probation that includes graduated sanctions.” OCGA § 15-11-471 (11).
5 other prior adjudications for a delinquent act as defined in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (19) of Code Section 15-11-2.
OCGA § 15-11-601 (a) (10).
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FIRST DIVISION BARNES, P. J., MILLER, P. J., and LAND, J.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
June 20, 2023
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A23A0111. IN THE INTEREST OF H. P., A CHILD.
BARNES, Presiding Judge.
H. P. was adjudicated delinquent based on her admission of an act which, if
committed by an adult, would have constituted family violence battery. She appeals
from that judgment and contends that the juvenile court’s disposition was “illegal”
in that, in addition to the Probation Management Program (“PMP”), the disposition
also included secure probation sanctions. She maintains that the sentence thus
subjected her to the risk of custodial time for a single misdemeanor adjudication in
violation of Georgia law and the Juvenile Code, which require a felony offense prior
to incarceration. H. P. also contends that, even if the disposition is lawful, a juvenile
probation officer is not authorized to incarcerate her in a Regional Youth Detention
Center (“YDC”). Following our review, we affirm. “[C]onstrued in favor of the juvenile court’s findings,” In the Interest of J. W.,
309 Ga. App. 470, 470-471 (711 SE2d 48) (2011)1, the record demonstrates that the
State filed a delinquency petition against then 16-year-old H. P. alleging that she had
committed a battery pursuant to the Family Violence Act. H. P. was alleged to have
caused “visible injury” to her father by punching, kicking, and scratching him. H. P.
denied the allegation, and subsequently an adjudication hearing was scheduled. At the
hearing, H. P. admitted to the battery, and the juvenile court delayed adjudication and
disposition of the case to obtain a social history. H. P.’s social history report noted
no prior law enforcement or court history, but that she currently received treatment
for a mood disorder, used marijuana, acid, and “other drugs,” and had issues in her
family life, including little contact with her mother and a strained relationship with
her father.
Thereafter, the rescheduled adjudicatory hearing was held, and at the request
of H. P.’s counsel, the juvenile court agreed to hold the case in abeyance for H. P. to
complete certain conditions, including participate in wrap-around services and
counseling, avoid violent contact with anyone, attend school, and complete girls
1 We note that no transcripts from any related hearings were included with the appellate record.
2 group/life skill classes. However, before the hearing date, the court held a review
hearing at which H. P. admitted to violating the conditions of her abeyance by having
another violent contact with her father, and refusing to go to school or take her
medications. The juvenile court also noted that H. P. may have committed a battery
against the mother in another county. Following the hearing, the trial court placed H.
P. on PMP probation with secure probation sanctions.2 In the disposition order, the
juvenile court acknowledged H. P.’s objection to secure probation sanctions for a
misdemeanor offense, and that the parties had briefed the court on the issue before
entry of the final judgment.
1. The appellant first contends that the juvenile court erred by imposing a
secure sanctions program for a misdemeanor adjudication. According to H. P., by
subjecting her to the risk of incarceration, the juvenile court imposed an illegal
sentence that is not supported by a proper construction of Georgia law. H. P. asserts
that PMP without the secure probation sanctions was the appropriate disposition.
2 On the pre-printed “Adjudication and Disposition” form, the juvenile court placed H. P. on probation with the “following programs and conditions”: health relations classes, individual counseling, take medication as prescribed, attend girls group, avoid violent contact with anyone, and “Probation Management Program/Secure Probation Sanctions.” There is no separate condition on the disposition form for the court to only select PMP.
3 Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo, giving
no deference to the trial court’s ruling. State v. Hammonds, 325 Ga. App. 815, 815
(755 SE2d 214) (2014). In interpreting the statutes at issue,
we look to the literal language of the statutes, the rules of statutory construction and rules of reason and logic, the most important of which is to construe the statute[ ] so as to give effect to the legislature’s intent. But as our Supreme Court has instructed, the search for legislative intent must begin with the words of the statute, and if those words are clear and unambiguous, the search also must end there. Put another way, when we consider the meaning of a statute, we must presume that the legislature meant what it said and said what it meant. We cannot substitute judicial interpretation language of our own for the clear, unambiguous language of the statute, so as to change the meaning.
(Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Collins v. Davis, 318 Ga. App. 265, 268 (1) (733
SE2d 798) (2012), overruled in part on other grounds, Voyles v. Voyles, 301 Ga. 44,
47 n. 5 (799 SE2d 160) (2017).
Turning to the statutes in question, OCGA § 15-11-601 (a) (3) provides, in
relevant part, that
[a]t the conclusion of the disposition hearing, if a child who committed a delinquent act is determined to be in need of treatment or rehabilitation, then after considering the results of such child’s risk assessment if the court is contemplating placing such child in restrictive
4 custody, the court shall enter the least restrictive disposition order appropriate in view of the seriousness of the delinquent act, such child’s culpability as indicated by the circumstances of the particular case, the age of such child, such child’s prior record, and such child’s strengths and needs. The court may make any of the following orders of disposition, or combination of them, best suited to such child’s treatment, rehabilitation, and welfare[,including an] order placing such child on probation under conditions and limitations the court prescribes and which may include the probation management program.3
(Emphasis Supplied.)
The statute also provides that the juvenile may be placed in the Georgia
Department of Juvenile Justice’s (“DJJ”) custody pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-601 (a)
(11) “only if such child was adjudicated for a delinquent act involving” either
(A) [a]n offense that would be a felony if committed by an adult; or
(B) [a]n offense that would be a misdemeanor if committed by an adult and such child has had at least one prior adjudication for an offense that would be a felony if committed by an adult and at least three
3 “‘Probation management program’ means a special condition of probation that includes graduated sanctions.” OCGA § 15-11-471 (11).
5 other prior adjudications for a delinquent act as defined in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (19) of Code Section 15-11-2.
OCGA § 15-11-601 (a) (10).
In conjunction with the juvenile court’s authority under OCGA § 15-11-601
to place the child on probation, the juvenile court can order that the child be placed
on probation under PMP with graduated sanctions, including secure probation
sanctions at the request of the probation officer supervising the child.4 See OCGA §
15-11-605 (a) (1) and (2) (providing that “[i]n addition to any other terms or
conditions of probation provided for under this article, the court may require that
children who receive a disposition of probation: (1) Be ordered to a probation
management program; or (2) Be ordered to a secure probation sanctions program by
a probation officer or hearing officer.”). OCGA § 15-11-605 (f) (1) explains that a
probation officer supervising a child under PMP can request secure probation
sanctions only upon “provid[ing] an affidavit to the court specifying: (A) The
elements of such child’s probation program;(B) Such child’s failures to respond to
graduated sanctions in the community; and (C) Such child’s number of violations and
4 “‘Secure probation sanctions program’ means confinement in a secure residential facility or nonsecure residential facility for seven, 14, or 30 days.” OCGA § 15-11-471 (12).
6 the nature of each violation.” The statute further specifies that if the probation officer
“fails to document the violations and specify how a child has failed to complete a
probation management program, such child shall be ineligible to enter the secure
probation sanctions program.” OCGA § 15-11-605 (f) (2).
Contrary to H. P.’s contention, the aforementioned statutes do not require that
the offense be a felony before the child, who is on probation under PMP, enters the
secure probation sanctions program. Instead, read in conjunction, the statutes
contemplate that a child has been placed on probation under PMP– a special
condition of probation– and has failed to complete PMP before being eligible for
secure probation sanctions.
Although asserted by H. P. that the disposition was illegal in that “Probation
Management Program/Secure Probation Sanctions “ was checked on the pre-printed
disposition sheet, “it is the substance and not mere nomenclature which determines
the nature and finality of the order.” In re Estate of Simes, 246 Ga. App. 451, 452
(540 SE2d 650) (2000). See Mughni v. Beyond Mgmt. Group, 349 Ga. App. 398, 399
(1) (825 SE2d 829) (2019) (noting that the denomination of order as “Final Order and
Judgment,” does not control whether order is final for purposes of direct appeal).
7 The record clearly demonstrates that H. P. was not placed on secure probation
sanctions, and the juvenile court did not, as H. P. contends, “order incarceration.”
Rather, as reflected on the document outlining the conditions of H. P.’s probation, she
was under the supervision of her parents, and not in DJJ custody. See OCGA § 15-11-
471 (12) (“‘Secure probation sanctions program’ means confinement in a secure
residential facility or nonsecure residential facility” for specified time periods). The
document further outlined all of the special conditions of her probation, and included
only “PMP”, and not secure probation sanctions. Thus, for purposes of discerning the
legality of H. P.’s disposition, there is no conflict with any other statutory provisions
providing that a child must be adjudicated for a crime that would be a felony if
committed before a disposition of incarceration is authorized. See OCGA § 15-11-
601 (a) (10), (11); In the Interest of J. W., 363 Ga. App. 616, 621-625 (2) (871 SE2d
886) (2022) (reversing juvenile court after concluding that court was not authorized
to commit child to DJJ custody when child was not charged with designated felony
act). While H. P.’s PMP disposition includes the risk of the trial court later ordering
secure probation sanctions if H. P. fails to complete her PMP and if such sanction is
requested by her probation officer, such an adjudication is not an order of
8 incarceration pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-601 (10), and thus not an illegal disposition
as maintained by H. P.5
Moreover, although H. P. contends that a juvenile court is not authorized to
issue a disposition which includes PMP and secured probation sanctions, “[u]nder
these circumstances, issuing an opinion on this issue would be, in essence, rendering
an advisory opinion,” because H. P. was not placed on secure probation sanctions.
WellStar Health System v. Sutton, 318 Ga. App. 802, 805 (3) (734 SE2d 764) (2012).
2. Regarding the H. P.’s contention that a probation officer does not have the
authority to sanction the incarceration of a juvenile with a single misdemeanor in the
YDC pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-605 (a) (2), the record does not demonstrate that she
was, in fact, ever incarcerated at a YDC, nor that her probation officer ever exercised
such authority to request such a detention. H. P. only alleges such a risk.6 Again,
“[w]e are a court for the correction of errors and are not authorized to issue an
advisory opinion about a potential error . . . .” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
5 See Jones v. State, 278 Ga. 669, 670 (604 SE2d 483) (2004) (Under Georgia law, “[a] sentence is void if the court imposes punishment that the law does not allow.”) (citations and punctuation omitted). 6 N. P. acknowledges that she has not yet “suffered an immediate harm of being incarcerated” and faces only a “potential threat of incarceration.”
9 Tiffany and Tomato, Inc. v. Wells and McElwee, P. C., 358 Ga. App. 311, 316 (1), n.
6 (855 SE2d 55) (2021).
Moreover, the statute clearly states that a probation officer may only request
secure probation sanctions, such that the authority to order those sanctions ultimately
rests with the juvenile court. See OCGA § 15-11-605 (f) (1). The statute is clear that
“[a] child may enter the secure probation sanctions program if ordered by the court.”
(Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 15-11-605 (f) (3). Likewise, if the probation officer
“fails to document the violations and specify how a child has failed to complete a
probation management program, such child shall be ineligible to enter the secure
probation sanctions program.” OCGA § 15-11-605 (f) (2). Accordingly, this
enumeration fails.
Judgment affirmed. Miller, P. J., and Land, J., concur.