IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-12-00421-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF G.H., A CHILD
From the 74th District Court McLennan County, Texas Trial Court No. 2011-2943-3
MEMORANDUM OPINION
James H. appeals from a judgment that terminated the parent-child relationship
between him and his child, G.H. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (West 2008). In
presenting this appeal, appointed counsel has filed an Anders brief in support of his
motion to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed.2d
493 (1967). We grant counsel's motion and affirm.
The procedures set forth in Anders v. California are applicable to appeals of orders
terminating parental rights. In re E.L.Y., 69 S.W.3d 838, 841 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002,
order) (per curiam) (applying Anders to parental termination appeals). See also Taylor v.
Texas Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 160 S.W.3d 641, 646-647 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied). In support of his motion to withdraw, counsel certifies he has
conducted a conscientious examination of the record and, in his opinion, the record
reflects no potentially plausible basis to support an appeal. Counsel certifies he has
diligently researched the law applicable to the facts and issues and candidly discusses
why, in his professional opinion, the appeal is frivolous. In re D.A.S., 973 S.W.2d 296,
297 (Tex. 1998). Counsel has demonstrated he has complied with the requirements of
Anders by (1) providing a copy of the brief to James and (2) notifying him of his right to
file a pro se response if he desired to do so. Id. James has filed a pro se response to the
Anders brief.
The order of termination recites that James:
knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered her physical or emotional well-being;
engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered her physical or emotional well- being; and
failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the children who had been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department for not less than nine months as a result of the children's removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse and neglect of the children.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(D), (E) & (O) (West Supp. 2012).
Appellate counsel for James was appointed at the time of the final hearing. No
motion for new trial was filed.
In the Interest of G.H., a Child Page 2 By the Anders brief, counsel evaluates potential issues on all three grounds
supporting termination. Counsel acknowledges that only one statutory ground is
necessary to support an order of termination in addition to a finding that termination is
in the children's best interest. See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003). He then
analyzes the evidence to support the termination order under section 161.001(1)(O) and
the best interest of the children and concludes there is no arguable error. Additionally
counsel has specifically evaluated the effectiveness of trial counsel. Counsel's brief
evidences a professional evaluation of the record for error, and we conclude that
counsel performed the duties required of an appointed counsel.
Standard of Review in Termination Cases
Due process requires application of the clear and convincing standard of proof in
cases involving involuntary termination of parental rights. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256,
263 (Tex. 2002). Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof
which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the
truth of the allegations sought to be established. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007
(West 2008). See also In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25-26 (Tex. 2002).
The Family Code permits a court to order termination of parental rights if the
petitioner establishes one or more acts or omissions enumerated under subsection (1) of
the statute and also proves that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the
In the Interest of G.H., a Child Page 3 best interest of the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (West 2008); Holley v.
Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 370 (Tex. 1976).
§ 161.001(1)(O)
Parental rights may be terminated if a parent fails to comply with a court order
that specifically establishes the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of a
child who has been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the
Department for not less than nine months as a result of the child's removal under
Chapter 262 of the Family Code for the abuse or neglect of the child. See TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(O) (West 2008); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 278-79. We agree with
counsel's evaluation that there is clear and convincing evidence to support termination
under section 161.001(1)(O). Further, because only one statutory ground is necessary to
support an order of termination, we need not evaluated the evidence as it pertains to
the other grounds for termination alleged, subsections (D) and (E).
§ 161.001(2) Best Interest
Notwithstanding the sufficiency of the evidence to support termination under
section 161.001(1), we must also find clear and convincing evidence that termination of
the parent-child relationship was in the children's best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 161.001(2). Evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for termination
may also constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the child's best interest.
See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28. There is a long-standing non-exhaustive list of factors for
In the Interest of G.H., a Child Page 4 a court to consider in deciding the best interest of a child in a termination case. See
Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72.
We agree with counsel's evaluations that there is clear and convincing evidence
under the appropriate legal and factual sufficiency standards for the jury to have
determined that termination of the parent-child relationship was in G.H.'s best interest.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
James's appellate counsel has also addressed whether trial counsel for James was
ineffective and has concluded that he was not. James complained about his trial
counsel at a pre-trial hearing but agreed to allow his trial counsel to continue
representation of him. At the trial, at the conclusion of his presentation of evidence,
James asked to address the trial court. At a hearing outside the presence of the jury
James complained that his trial counsel had not called certain witnesses who were
available to testify. However, after consulting with his trial counsel privately, James
affirmatively stated on the record that he was sorry for his outburst, wished for his trial
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IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-12-00421-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF G.H., A CHILD
From the 74th District Court McLennan County, Texas Trial Court No. 2011-2943-3
MEMORANDUM OPINION
James H. appeals from a judgment that terminated the parent-child relationship
between him and his child, G.H. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (West 2008). In
presenting this appeal, appointed counsel has filed an Anders brief in support of his
motion to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed.2d
493 (1967). We grant counsel's motion and affirm.
The procedures set forth in Anders v. California are applicable to appeals of orders
terminating parental rights. In re E.L.Y., 69 S.W.3d 838, 841 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002,
order) (per curiam) (applying Anders to parental termination appeals). See also Taylor v.
Texas Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 160 S.W.3d 641, 646-647 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied). In support of his motion to withdraw, counsel certifies he has
conducted a conscientious examination of the record and, in his opinion, the record
reflects no potentially plausible basis to support an appeal. Counsel certifies he has
diligently researched the law applicable to the facts and issues and candidly discusses
why, in his professional opinion, the appeal is frivolous. In re D.A.S., 973 S.W.2d 296,
297 (Tex. 1998). Counsel has demonstrated he has complied with the requirements of
Anders by (1) providing a copy of the brief to James and (2) notifying him of his right to
file a pro se response if he desired to do so. Id. James has filed a pro se response to the
Anders brief.
The order of termination recites that James:
knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered her physical or emotional well-being;
engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered her physical or emotional well- being; and
failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the children who had been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department for not less than nine months as a result of the children's removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse and neglect of the children.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(D), (E) & (O) (West Supp. 2012).
Appellate counsel for James was appointed at the time of the final hearing. No
motion for new trial was filed.
In the Interest of G.H., a Child Page 2 By the Anders brief, counsel evaluates potential issues on all three grounds
supporting termination. Counsel acknowledges that only one statutory ground is
necessary to support an order of termination in addition to a finding that termination is
in the children's best interest. See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003). He then
analyzes the evidence to support the termination order under section 161.001(1)(O) and
the best interest of the children and concludes there is no arguable error. Additionally
counsel has specifically evaluated the effectiveness of trial counsel. Counsel's brief
evidences a professional evaluation of the record for error, and we conclude that
counsel performed the duties required of an appointed counsel.
Standard of Review in Termination Cases
Due process requires application of the clear and convincing standard of proof in
cases involving involuntary termination of parental rights. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256,
263 (Tex. 2002). Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof
which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the
truth of the allegations sought to be established. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007
(West 2008). See also In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25-26 (Tex. 2002).
The Family Code permits a court to order termination of parental rights if the
petitioner establishes one or more acts or omissions enumerated under subsection (1) of
the statute and also proves that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the
In the Interest of G.H., a Child Page 3 best interest of the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (West 2008); Holley v.
Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 370 (Tex. 1976).
§ 161.001(1)(O)
Parental rights may be terminated if a parent fails to comply with a court order
that specifically establishes the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of a
child who has been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the
Department for not less than nine months as a result of the child's removal under
Chapter 262 of the Family Code for the abuse or neglect of the child. See TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(O) (West 2008); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 278-79. We agree with
counsel's evaluation that there is clear and convincing evidence to support termination
under section 161.001(1)(O). Further, because only one statutory ground is necessary to
support an order of termination, we need not evaluated the evidence as it pertains to
the other grounds for termination alleged, subsections (D) and (E).
§ 161.001(2) Best Interest
Notwithstanding the sufficiency of the evidence to support termination under
section 161.001(1), we must also find clear and convincing evidence that termination of
the parent-child relationship was in the children's best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 161.001(2). Evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for termination
may also constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the child's best interest.
See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28. There is a long-standing non-exhaustive list of factors for
In the Interest of G.H., a Child Page 4 a court to consider in deciding the best interest of a child in a termination case. See
Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72.
We agree with counsel's evaluations that there is clear and convincing evidence
under the appropriate legal and factual sufficiency standards for the jury to have
determined that termination of the parent-child relationship was in G.H.'s best interest.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
James's appellate counsel has also addressed whether trial counsel for James was
ineffective and has concluded that he was not. James complained about his trial
counsel at a pre-trial hearing but agreed to allow his trial counsel to continue
representation of him. At the trial, at the conclusion of his presentation of evidence,
James asked to address the trial court. At a hearing outside the presence of the jury
James complained that his trial counsel had not called certain witnesses who were
available to testify. However, after consulting with his trial counsel privately, James
affirmatively stated on the record that he was sorry for his outburst, wished for his trial
counsel to continue, and was satisfied with his representation to that point. Although
no motion for new trial was filed, James's appellate counsel filed his Anders brief with
this Court on the same day as the deadline for filing a motion for new trial. James's
appellate counsel had already reviewed the record prior to the deadline to file a motion
for new trial and concluded that an ineffective assistance claim against James's trial
counsel was also frivolous. Having reviewed the entire record, appellate counsel's
In the Interest of G.H., a Child Page 5 brief, and James's pro se brief, we agree that an ineffective assistance claim would be
frivolous.
Summary
Upon receiving a "frivolous appeal" brief, this Court must conduct a full
examination of all proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. See
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S. Ct. 346, 349-50, 102 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1988); see also In
re M.A.R., No. 10-10-00237-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 3596, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco May
11, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). After our review of the entire record, counsel's brief, and
James's pro se brief, we agree with counsel that there are no plausible grounds for
appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Accordingly,
we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Motion to Withdraw
In accordance with Anders, counsel has filed a motion to withdraw. See Anders,
386 U.S. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.17 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2008). We grant counsel's motion to withdraw. 1 Within five days of the
date of this Court's opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of the opinion and
judgment to James and to advise him of his right to pursue a petition for review in the
1 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should James wish to seek further review of this case by this Court or the Texas Supreme Court, he must either retain an attorney to file a motion for rehearing or a petition for review or file a pro se motion for rehearing or a petition for review. Any motion for rehearing must be filed within fifteen days of this opinion. Any petition for review must be filed within forty-five days after the date of either this opinion or the last ruling by this Court on all timely-filed motions for rehearing. See TEX. R. APP. P. 53.7(a). Any petition for review must comply with the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 53.2. TEX. R. APP. P. 53.2.
In the Interest of G.H., a Child Page 6 Texas Supreme Court. See In re K.D., 127 S.W.3d 66, 68 n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
Conclusion
The motion to withdraw is granted and the judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.
TOM GRAY Chief Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Scoggins Affirmed and Motion Granted Opinion delivered and filed April 18, 2013 [CV06]
In the Interest of G.H., a Child Page 7