In the Interest of D.W., J.W., and I.W., Children v. the State of Texas

Texas Court of Appeals, 10th District (Waco)·Decided August 20, 2026·No. 10-26-00099-CV·Published

Opinion

Court of Appeals

Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-26-00099-CV

In the Interest of D.W., J.W., and I.W., Children,

On appeal from the

18th District Court of Johnson County, Texas Judge David A. Barkley, presiding Trial Court Cause No. DC-D202100360

JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The parental rights of J.W. (Father) and A.W. (Mother) to the children, D.W., J.W., and I.W., were terminated. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Father had violated Family Code subsection 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (F), that Mother had violated Family Code subsection 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), and that termination was in the children's best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b). Father and Mother appealed. We will affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Discussion

Father raises just one issue on appeal: that there was not legally and factually sufficient evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children. Mother raises four issues on appeal. Specifically, she argues there was legally and factually insufficient evidence to terminate her parental rights to the children under Family Code subsection 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) as well as the best interest of the children. She also argues the trial court erred by entering the order of termination and allowing evidence of occurrences or omissions that took place prior to the entry of a prior order denying termination of Mother’s parental rights. Mother’s Issue One – Prior Order The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the “Department”) initially became involved on or about June 2020. On April 19, 2021, the Department filed suit seeking the emergency removal of the children. Following a mediated settlement agreement, the Department abandoned its request for termination, and an agreed Order in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship was signed on July 25, 2022 (the “2022 Order”), naming the Department as Permanent Managing Conservator and Mother as Possessory Conservator.

Mother argues that the trial court erred by considering evidence, including affidavits dated prior to July 25, 2022, that were presented at a previous termination hearing. Mother classifies the 2022 Order as a denial order. The Department abandoned its request for termination of parental rights following a mediated settlement agreement, so we are not persuaded that termination was adjudicated at the time of the 2022 Order. Because we do not find the 2022 Order to be a prior order denying termination of Mother’s parental rights, Mother’s issue one is overruled. Mother’s Issues Two and Three In order to terminate parental rights of a mother or a father, a court must find: (1) that the parent has committed one of the acts prohibited under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1); and (2) that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001. The standards of review for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence in cases involving the termination of parental rights are well established and will not be repeated here. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264–68 (Tex. 2002) (legal sufficiency); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002) (factual sufficiency).

Termination of parental rights under subsection (D) or (E) requires proof of endangerment, which means to expose the child to loss or injury, or

to jeopardize. Tex. Dep't. of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987). The endangerment analysis under subsection (D) focuses on evidence relating to the child's environment to determine if the environment was a source of endangerment to the child's physical or emotional well-being. In re M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d 494, 502 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.). A child is endangered when the environment creates a potential for danger that the parent is aware of but disregards. Id. A parent's conduct in the home can create an environment that endangers the well-being of a child. In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).

Termination under subsection (E) requires clear and convincing evidence that the parent has “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endan`gers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). The relevant inquiry under subsection (E) is whether sufficient evidence exists that the endangerment of the child's well-being was the direct result of the parent's conduct, including acts, omissions, or failures to act. In re E.M., 494 S.W.3d 209, 222 (Tex. App.—Waco 2015, pet. denied). However, it is not necessary that the parent's conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually suffer injury. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533. Scienter is not required for a parent's own acts to constitute endangerment under subsection (E). See In re

L.S., No. 10-22-00119-CV, 2022 WL 3655395, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 24, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). Furthermore, we may consider conduct both before and after the child's removal in an analysis under subsection (E). In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 360 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).

The evidence here shows many circumstances relevant under Paragraph (D) and (E). Because the evidence is interrelated concerning these two statutory grounds for termination, we consolidate our examination of the evidence as to both grounds. In re K.A.S., 131 S.W.3d 215, 222 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).

Evidence shows that prior to the removal of the children, there was drug use in the home as admitted by both Mother and Father. There were known reports of sexual abuse by one child of another child. The parents admit domestic violence occurred in the home. Mother moved out of state leaving the children with Father despite the above-known circumstances. Following the removal of the children, Father was arrested and his drug use continued—both facts known by Mother. Mother was aware of multiple felonies by Father. Allegations emerged of sexual abuse by the father against at least one of the children. Father was arrested in December 2023 for sexual abuse of a child. Although those charges were later dismissed, it was made

known to Mother at court hearings and otherwise that Father was to have no contact with the children. However, Mother continued to associate with Father and let Father in her home despite representations to the Department to the contrary. Mother and Father are now remarried and living together again.

In 2024, when one of the children, D.W., was placed in Mother’s home again, Mother left the country for a week without D.W., and there was evidence that D.W. was left alone on repeated occasions. There was evidence of at least one physical altercation between D.W. and Mother. D.W. was subsequently removed in 2025. Since 2022, the evidence showed that Mother has moved at least seven times, and Father has been incarcerated for extended periods of time.

These concerns remained throughout the pendency of the case and were still concerns at the final hearing. Considering all the evidence presented in this case in the light most favorable to the trial court's finding and considering the evidence as a whole, we conclude that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support termination of Mother's parental rights under Paragraphs (D) and (E). See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1). Thus, Mother’s second and third issues are overruled.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

In the Interest of D.W., J.W., and I.W., Children v. the State of Texas, (Tex. Ct. App. 2026).

In the Interest of D.W., J.W., and I.W., Children v. the State of Texas (In the Interest of D.W., J.W., and I.W., Children v. the State of Texas) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Williams v. Williams
150 S.W.3d 436 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2004)
Holley v. Adams
544 S.W.2d 367 (Texas Supreme Court, 1976)
Ray v. Burns
832 S.W.2d 431 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1992)
Texas Department of Human Services v. Boyd
727 S.W.2d 531 (Texas Supreme Court, 1987)
in the Interest of S.R., S.R. and B.R.S., Children
452 S.W.3d 351 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2014)
In the Interest of J.T.G., H.N.M., Children
121 S.W.3d 117 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2003)
in the Interest of K.A.S., J.G.S. and W.S., II
131 S.W.3d 215 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2004)
in the Interest of M.R.J.M., a Child
280 S.W.3d 494 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2009)
in the Interest of E.M. and J.M., Children
494 S.W.3d 209 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2015)
In the interest of C.H.
89 S.W.3d 17 (Texas Supreme Court, 2002)
In the Interest of J.F.C.
96 S.W.3d 256 (Texas Supreme Court, 2002)
In the Interest of J.M.T.
519 S.W.3d 258 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2017)