OPINION OF THE COURT BY
LEVINSON, J.
This case involves a challenge by a juvenile to the constitutionality of Honolulu’s curfew ordinance, section 13-3A.1 of the Revised Ordinances of Honolulu (1969), which reads:
Curfew. No person under the age of eighteen years shall loiter about any public street, avenue, alley, park or other public place between the hour of 10:00 p.m., arid the time of sunrise of the following day unless accompanied by his or her parent or legal guardian having legal custody and control of his or her person, or by his or her spouse.
The appellant, then 16 years of age, was arrested for violation of the ordinance at 11:20 p.m. on September 18, [648]*6481971, while sitting in front of a house. Because HRS § 571-11(1) grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Family Court over any child alleged to have violated any federal, state, or local law or municipal ordinance, a Family Court hearing was held on February 3, 1972. The referee1 found that the appellant had been a passenger in a car involved in a high speed chase through the city, that he had not gone directly home from a movie, as his parents had instructed him to do, and that he was a law violator.
The appellant then moved to dismiss the referee’s Findings and Recommendations on the ground that the curfew ordinance was unconstitutional. The referee denied the motion, and the appellant made a timely request for a hearing by a judge. On September 6, 1972, following an earlier hearing, the judge of the Family Court confirmed the referee’s Findings and Recommendations and denied the Motion to Dismiss.
On appeal to this court the appellant argues that the ordinance violates the due process guarantees of the Fifth2 and Fourteenth3 Amendments of the United States Constitution because it is so vague and overbroad that it fails to provide sufficient notice as to what conduct constitutes a violation. The requirements of Article I, Section 4 of the Hawaii Constitution4 are no less stringent than those of the United States Constitution.
The State answers that the terms of the ordinance are clear and certain enough to apprise anyone of pre[649]*649scribed conduct, and, in addition, that minors may be treated differently from adults as a class.
Challenges to vagrancy-type statutes have had a long history in Hawaii, and such precedents are dispositive of the loitering element in the ordinance before us.
In an early case, Territory v. Anduha, 31 Haw. 459 (1930), aff’d 48 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1931), this court considered the constitutionality of a 1929 statute making it illegal to “habitually loaf, loiter and/or idle upon any public street or highway or in any public place.” We found the statute unconstitutionally overbroad because it drew “no distinction between conduct that is calculated to harm and that which is essentially innocent.” 31 Haw. at 461.
The arguments advanced by the appellant likewise have been the basis of several recent opinions by this court. In State v. Abellano, 50 Haw. 384, 441 P.2d 333 (1968), we held that a statute proscribing presence at a cockfight or gambling game was unconstitutionally vague, stating at 50 Haw. 385, 441 P.2d at 334:
A fundamental aspect of the somewhat amorphous concept of due process of law is that a penal statute must state with reasonable clarity the acts it proscribes, Territory v. Naumu, 43 Haw. 66 (1958); Territory v. Anduha, 31 Haw. 459 (1930), aff’d 48 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1931). A criminal statute is unconstitutional if it is not
sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties .... And a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law. Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
[650]*650The foregoing quotation from Abellano was used in State v. Shigematsu, 52 Haw. 604, 606, 483 P.2d 997, 998 (1971), in which we held that a statute making it illegal to be present at a place barricaded so as to make it difficult for police to discover gambling was too vague and overly broad. In State v. Grahovac, 52 Haw. 527, 480 P.2d 148 (1971), we also held unconstitutionally vague and overbroad a statutory sanction against wandering about the streets at late or unusual hours of the night without any visible or lawful business. With respect to the wandering provision, we said at 52 Haw. 535, 480 P.2d at 153:
A law of vague meaning falls short of “due process” demands when it neither gives fair notice to a person what conduct is prohibited nor prescribes fixed standards for adjudging guilt when that person stands accused. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966). Additionally in application, such legislation provides “for government by the moment-to-moment opinions of a policeman on the beat.”
Plainly in light of these precepts, HRS § 772-1, Wandering Provision’s sanction against one who “wanders about the streets at late or unusual hours of the night, without any visible or lawful business” is too limitless and hence unconstitutional. Accord, Ricks v. District of Columbia, 414 F.2d 1097 at 1107 (1968).
The word “wanders” delineates no ambit of conduct susceptible to agreed understanding. Whether any and all walking is included in “wandering” is a definitional mystery that subjects a pedestrian to the unbridled discretion of an officer whose standard for law enforcement is equally as nebulous.
Amorphous conditions of time and purpose lend no specificity. “Late or unusual hours” depend totally upon personal fancy. “Business” could apply to voca[651]*651tional, recreational, or whimsical pursuit.
The State may not require such guesswork from its citizens in the face of criminal liability. This- provision is also void, (footnote omitted)
In view of these authorities, we hold that the Honolulu curfew ordinance prohibiting loitering by juveniles at night is so vague and overbroad as to violate due process standards.
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OPINION OF THE COURT BY
LEVINSON, J.
This case involves a challenge by a juvenile to the constitutionality of Honolulu’s curfew ordinance, section 13-3A.1 of the Revised Ordinances of Honolulu (1969), which reads:
Curfew. No person under the age of eighteen years shall loiter about any public street, avenue, alley, park or other public place between the hour of 10:00 p.m., arid the time of sunrise of the following day unless accompanied by his or her parent or legal guardian having legal custody and control of his or her person, or by his or her spouse.
The appellant, then 16 years of age, was arrested for violation of the ordinance at 11:20 p.m. on September 18, [648]*6481971, while sitting in front of a house. Because HRS § 571-11(1) grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Family Court over any child alleged to have violated any federal, state, or local law or municipal ordinance, a Family Court hearing was held on February 3, 1972. The referee1 found that the appellant had been a passenger in a car involved in a high speed chase through the city, that he had not gone directly home from a movie, as his parents had instructed him to do, and that he was a law violator.
The appellant then moved to dismiss the referee’s Findings and Recommendations on the ground that the curfew ordinance was unconstitutional. The referee denied the motion, and the appellant made a timely request for a hearing by a judge. On September 6, 1972, following an earlier hearing, the judge of the Family Court confirmed the referee’s Findings and Recommendations and denied the Motion to Dismiss.
On appeal to this court the appellant argues that the ordinance violates the due process guarantees of the Fifth2 and Fourteenth3 Amendments of the United States Constitution because it is so vague and overbroad that it fails to provide sufficient notice as to what conduct constitutes a violation. The requirements of Article I, Section 4 of the Hawaii Constitution4 are no less stringent than those of the United States Constitution.
The State answers that the terms of the ordinance are clear and certain enough to apprise anyone of pre[649]*649scribed conduct, and, in addition, that minors may be treated differently from adults as a class.
Challenges to vagrancy-type statutes have had a long history in Hawaii, and such precedents are dispositive of the loitering element in the ordinance before us.
In an early case, Territory v. Anduha, 31 Haw. 459 (1930), aff’d 48 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1931), this court considered the constitutionality of a 1929 statute making it illegal to “habitually loaf, loiter and/or idle upon any public street or highway or in any public place.” We found the statute unconstitutionally overbroad because it drew “no distinction between conduct that is calculated to harm and that which is essentially innocent.” 31 Haw. at 461.
The arguments advanced by the appellant likewise have been the basis of several recent opinions by this court. In State v. Abellano, 50 Haw. 384, 441 P.2d 333 (1968), we held that a statute proscribing presence at a cockfight or gambling game was unconstitutionally vague, stating at 50 Haw. 385, 441 P.2d at 334:
A fundamental aspect of the somewhat amorphous concept of due process of law is that a penal statute must state with reasonable clarity the acts it proscribes, Territory v. Naumu, 43 Haw. 66 (1958); Territory v. Anduha, 31 Haw. 459 (1930), aff’d 48 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1931). A criminal statute is unconstitutional if it is not
sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties .... And a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law. Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
[650]*650The foregoing quotation from Abellano was used in State v. Shigematsu, 52 Haw. 604, 606, 483 P.2d 997, 998 (1971), in which we held that a statute making it illegal to be present at a place barricaded so as to make it difficult for police to discover gambling was too vague and overly broad. In State v. Grahovac, 52 Haw. 527, 480 P.2d 148 (1971), we also held unconstitutionally vague and overbroad a statutory sanction against wandering about the streets at late or unusual hours of the night without any visible or lawful business. With respect to the wandering provision, we said at 52 Haw. 535, 480 P.2d at 153:
A law of vague meaning falls short of “due process” demands when it neither gives fair notice to a person what conduct is prohibited nor prescribes fixed standards for adjudging guilt when that person stands accused. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966). Additionally in application, such legislation provides “for government by the moment-to-moment opinions of a policeman on the beat.”
Plainly in light of these precepts, HRS § 772-1, Wandering Provision’s sanction against one who “wanders about the streets at late or unusual hours of the night, without any visible or lawful business” is too limitless and hence unconstitutional. Accord, Ricks v. District of Columbia, 414 F.2d 1097 at 1107 (1968).
The word “wanders” delineates no ambit of conduct susceptible to agreed understanding. Whether any and all walking is included in “wandering” is a definitional mystery that subjects a pedestrian to the unbridled discretion of an officer whose standard for law enforcement is equally as nebulous.
Amorphous conditions of time and purpose lend no specificity. “Late or unusual hours” depend totally upon personal fancy. “Business” could apply to voca[651]*651tional, recreational, or whimsical pursuit.
The State may not require such guesswork from its citizens in the face of criminal liability. This- provision is also void, (footnote omitted)
In view of these authorities, we hold that the Honolulu curfew ordinance prohibiting loitering by juveniles at night is so vague and overbroad as to violate due process standards. The term “loitering” is simply too vague and imprecise because it fails to give proper notice as to what conduct constitutes unlawful activity and, in addition, its broad sweep has the effect of inhibiting otherwise lawful conduct.
The appellee cites People v. Walton, 70 Cal. App. 2d 862, 161 P.2d 498 (1945) as authority for the proposition that such loitering statutes can be constitutionally justified insofar as their application to juveniles is concerned. That case was essentially decided on the ground that a classification discriminating between adults and minors was not arbitrary and unreasonable. However, the more recent United States Supreme Court opinion in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), greatly circumscribes distinctions between juveniles and adults in terms of constitutional protections.
The Gault case is the most frequently cited decision dealing with the due process protections to be afforded to juveniles because of its lengthy consideration of “constitutional domestication”5 of the juvenile system. In that case, the juvenile, then 15 years of age, was found in an informal hearing before a juvenile court judge to have made a lewd telephone calí and sentenced to spend the balance of his minority in a state industrial school. The maximum sentence for an adult convicted of the same offense was two months. Reversing a refusal to grant habeas corpus, the Supreme Court declared that, in spite of the desirability of flexible procedures in delin[652]*652quency proceedings, a child who is subject to commitment in a state institution is entitled to be advised adequately and in advance of the charges against him, to be protected against self-incrimination by the application of adult criminal standards for valid confessions, to have counsel present in his defense, and to confront sworn witnesses who are subject to cross-examination.
Richard Turbin, Deputy Public Defender (Donald K. Tsukiyama, Public Defender, of counsel) for Juvenile-Appellant.
Olen E. Leonard and M. Gay Conklin, Deputy Attorneys General (George Pai, Attorney General, of counsel) for Appellee.
The trend toward extending full constitutional protection to juveniles has continued since Gault. In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the Court held that juveniles, like adults, are constitutionally entitled to proof beyond reasonable doubt when they are charged with a violation of criminal law.
While there may be some variance between the constitutional rights of minors and those of adults, as evidenced by McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), in which the Supreme Court held that a trial by jury is not constitutionally required in the adjudicative phase of juvenile delinquency proceedings, it is clear from the foregoing decisions that those rights which are involved in the present litigation do have equal application.
It is our opinion that the ordinance involved in this appeal is so vague and overbroad that it violates the appellant’s constitutional due process rights.
Reversed.