FIRST DIVISION BARNES, P. J., GOBEIL and PIPKIN, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
July 2, 2025
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A24A1822. IN THE INTEREST OF D. H., et al., CHILDREN (MOTHER) A25A0351. IN THE INTEREST OF D. H. et al., CHILDREN (FATHER).
GOBEIL, Judge.
The biological father (“Father”) and mother (“Mother”) of two minor
brothers each appeal the juvenile court’s determination that the children are
dependent as to each parent. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in both
appeals.
As we have explained before,
the juvenile court may place a minor child in the protective custody of the Department [of Family and Children Services] where the State shows, by clear and convincing evidence, that the child is a dependent child. . . . [O]n appeal from an order finding a child to be a dependent child, we review the juvenile court’s finding of dependency in the light most favorable to the lower court’s judgment to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found by clear and convincing evidence that the child is dependent. In making this determination we neither weigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses, but instead[, we] defer to the factual findings made by the juvenile court, bearing in mind that the juvenile court’s primary responsibility is to consider and protect the welfare of a child whose well-being is threatened.
In the Interest of S. C. S., 336 Ga. App. 236, 244-245 (784 SE2d 83) (2016) (citations,
punctuation, and footnote omitted). So viewed, the record before us shows as follows.
As relevant to this matter, Father and Mother are parents to two boys, Dy. H.,
born in 2017, and Da. H., born in 2020.1 Prior to the events giving rise to this matter,
the boys were in the care and custody of Mother. However, in February 2024, Mother
had an alleged “mental health breakdown,” and, following a hearing, at which Mother
testified, the two boys were removed from her custody on an emergency basis. In a
subsequent dependency petition, the Gwinnett County Department of Family and
Children Services (“the State” or “the Department”) alleged that, in early February
1 In the hearing transcripts, Dy. H. is referred to as “DH-20,” while Da. H. is referred to as “DH-19.” 2 2024, “[M]other had a mental health crisis wherein [she was] reported to have been
in possession of a loaded firearm, led law enforcement on a high-speed chase, drove
her car towards Lake Lanier, and attempted to jump into [the lake] before she was
apprehended by law enforcement.” The petition further alleges that, at the time of her
arrest, Mother told police officers that “the devil was trying to hurt the children[] and
[that] she was trying to save [them].” As to Father, the petition alleged that there was
“an unsubstantiated allegation of sexual abuse involving father and [Dy. H.]” and that
Father had “had no contact with the children for over two years.” The Department
later amended its complaint to reflect that the parents should be required to provide
proof of both housing and employment.
In a subsequent two-day hearing , the juvenile court received testimony from
numerous witnesses. With respect to Mother, the juvenile court heard from law
enforcement that, in February 2024, the Flowery Branch Police Department received
several 911 calls from a local apartment complex that a driver — later identified as
Mother — had rammed the entrance gate with her vehicle, had hit another car, and
was “beating” on the door of an apartment while armed with a loaded firearm.
3 Mother apparently left the apartment complex in her vehicle, and law enforcement
“put a lookout for her vehicle.”
When police observed her vehicle and attempted to initiate a traffic stop,
Mother fled; she led police on a two-to-three mile pursuit and nearly drove into Lake
Lanier. When she was apprehended, Mother told the arresting officer “that she was
looking for her kids” who, she claimed, were “with the devil.” Mother apparently
told the arresting officer that the devil was “everywhere” and that “she was just
trying to do the Lord’s work.” The arresting officer speculated that, at the time of her
arrest, it was “possible” that Mother was suffering from either “mental health
issues” or was “under the influence of drugs and alcohol.” Mother was ultimately
charged with various felony offenses that remained pending at the time of the hearing.
The juvenile court also received testimony from Mother. She testified that she
had a total of five children, two of whom are with Father . According to Mother, she
and Father — along with the two children — lived together for a few years, during
which time Father struck Dy. H. so hard that the child fell from his seat and caused
a picture to fall from the wall.2 On another occasion, Father threatened to throw Dy.
2 A video of this incident was played during the hearing, and Father acknowledged the incident. 4 H. from a window because he would not stop crying. The two parents eventually
parted ways in November 2021, at which point, Mother says, Father “decided that he
didn’t want to be in the boys’ life anymore.” According to Mother, Father did not
have contact with the two boys, visit them, or provide financial assistance between
November 2021 and August 2023 ; Mother reported that Father expressly told her
that she could “have” Dy. H. because he did not “want to be his dad anymore.”
Later, in February 2022, Mother took Dy. H. for counseling because he “started
making these crazy allegations about inappropriate things that [Father] did to him.”
When asked about the February 2024 incident, Mother testified that she did not
recall certain details; alternatively, she asserted her Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination. Mother did acknowledge, however, that, after the incident, a
“psychologist” from “Northeast Medical” told her that she was “having a manic
episode.” Mother also testified that she was overwhelmed and exhausted “from being
a mother;” that she had not been sleeping; that she had been experiencing persistent
“brain fog;” that she had previously had periods of “blacking out;” and that her
instability, brain fog, blackout, and the February 2024 incident were all attributable to
“a piece of metal, [a] foreign object” left in her mouth after a dental procedure.
5 Finally, Mother acknowledged that she was unemployed and that she had a history of
leaving the children with family members — including her husband, mother, and
brother — who had significant criminal histories.3
The juvenile court also heard testimony from an attorney who was a self-
described “auntie” or “godmother” to Mother. The attorney testified that she found
Mother’s parenting style to be “loving, interactive, [and] caring,” and she explained
that, until the February 2024 incident, she had never known Mother to have any
mental health issues. She admitted that she had advised Mother to seek counseling
with a psychologist. The attorney also testified that, while she was initially impressed
with Father’s parenting, “his whole attitude changed” after he “split up” with
Mother; according to the attorney, Father seemed to “just shut down.” The attorney
explained that Father went years without seeing his children — or helping financially
— and that, when she asked Father why he was not visiting or supporting the two
boys, he responded that he had decided to simply “concentrate on his career.”
3 The juvenile court heard testimony that, at the time of the hearing, Mother’s mother was facing felony charges, that Mother’s brother “has a criminal history of homicide,” and that Mother’s husband “is on probation out of the Federal District Court in Tennessee.” 6 As to Father, he acknowledged that, between November 2021 and February
2024, he had no contact with either Dy. H. or Da. H. other than two phone calls;
Father also acknowledged that he had not attempted to reach out to the two boys
through other family members, despite having had the relevant contact information.4
As for parenting the two boys, Father admitted that he “deferred” to Mother in this
respect and that he had little experience raising children. Father also addressed his
criminal history, testifying that he had been convicted of a sexual offense in Michigan
— specifically, criminal sexual conduct in the second degree — and had been required
to register as a sex offender until he successfully petitioned to have that restriction
lifted in 2014.5 As far as his employment, Father testified that he was previously a
“senior vice president” but left that position to be a stay-at-home father to Dy. H.;
Father testified that he now works as a business consultant and that he makes
approximately $22,000 per year. Regarding his living arrangements, Father testified
4 Despite this, Father filed for custody in April 2023. 5 While Father maintained that the offense was a “Romeo and Juliet situation” that had occurred just after he turned 18, the evidence presented below reflects that the offense to which he pled guilty “involve[d an element of] some type of serious injury.” 7 that he lives with his brother and his brother’s fiancee in a two-bedroom townhouse
and pays approximately $500 per month in rent.
The juvenile court also heard from a psychologist who had been treating Dy. H.
for approximately two years. The psychologist testified that, during Dy. H.’s initial
intake session, the child reported that “his father had put a toy car in his butt and had
put fingers in his butt.” According to the psychologist, Dy. H.’s outcry was not an
isolated occurrence; Dy. H. brought up the incidents during subsequent sessions and
was “consistent with his statements [as] to . . . what his father had done” . The
psychologist also testified that the child was observed exhibiting behaviors consistent
with having been sexually abused , such as “humping furniture at home” and
“touch[ing] his younger brother on the bottom.”6 Finally, the psychologist explained
that Dy. H. had been diagnosed with a mood disorder and suspected sexual abuse.
The juvenile court also received testimony from an individual employed with
the Georgia Counseling and Rehabilitative Services as a “transporter” and visitation
supervisor. The employee testified that she transported the boys to visit with Father
6 The juvenile court also received testimony that Mother reported the issue to law enforcement and that Dy. H. underwent a forensic interview; Dy. H. made no outcry during that interview, and law enforcement declined to pursue the matter any further. 8 and that the boys were always very excited to meet with him; according to the GCRS
employee, when Father was around the children, he was “very gentle, very tender .
. . [a] loving . . . caring person and sensitive.” The employee acknowledged, however,
that each of Father’s visits was like a “theme party” complete with presents and
special treats, such as donuts, smoothies, or ice cream.
Finally, the juvenile court received a recommendation from the Guardian ad
Litem. The GAL recommended that the juvenile court conclude that the Department
had “met its burden of proving dependency by clear and convincing evidence . . . that
the children are dependent as to both parents.” With respect to Mother, the GAL
asserted — focusing on OCGA § 15-11-311 — that Mother had suffered a “mental
health breakdown” and that she had “not provided anything where that mental health
ha[d] been addressed.” As to Father, the GAL explained that, based on his own
admission, he had abandoned the children. The GAL asserted that Father had failed
to maintain a meaningful parent relationship with the children and, further, that the
abandonment was not cured by a couple of phone calls within that time frame or his
most recent supervised visits with the children. The GAL also highlighted the fact that
Father lacked stable income, as well as stable and suitable housing; the GAL noted
9 that Father was not on the lease where he lived. Finally, the GAL was further
concerned with the possibility of Father sharing a bedroom with the children in light
of the sexual abuse allegation.
During the hearing, both parties moved for a directed verdict; however, the
juvenile court denied both motions from the bench. Approximately a month after the
conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court entered a detailed order determining that
both children were dependent as to both parents; that order was amended several
weeks later to correct the date of the next hearing
As to Mother, the juvenile court found the following facts in the amended
order: that she was unemployed; that she had struggled with employment and housing
stability; that she had left her children in the care of individuals with significant
criminal histories; that Mother was herself facing felony charges; that Mother acted
as alleged with respect to the February 2024 incident; that police officers believed that
Mother’s behavior could have been “due to mental health issues”; that Mother was
having a “manic episode” during the February 2024 incident; that Mother was
overwhelmed by being a parent; that Mother has suffered from memory problems,
blackouts, and brain fog; that, while Mother attributed these ailments to dental
10 problems, dental records showed no issues; and that Mother had been recommended
to seek therapy from a psychologist.
As to Father, the juvenile court found the following facts in the amended order:
that Father relied on Mother because he did not have parenting experience; that video
evidence showed Father hitting or slapping Dy. H. with such force that it caused the
child to fall from his seat and a picture to fall from the wall; that Father once
threatened to throw Dy. H. from a balcony; that Father had not seen or financially
supported the two boys since November 2021, despite having the means to
communicate with Mother and her family; that, in November 2021, Father expressed
that he no longer wanted to be a father to the two boys; that, at the time of the
dependency petition, the youngest child did not know Father; that Father’s
subsequent supervised visits were not “meaningful parenting time” but, instead,
“were a party with a theme”; that Father is not employed full time, has failed to verify
his income, and reports a yearly income of only $22,000, yet drives a BMW
automobile; that Father resides in a two-bedroom townhouse with two other adults;
that Father has been convicted of a sexual offense, that he was previously a registered
sex offender, and that Father had not been forthcoming about the details of that
11 conviction; that Dy. H. has made an outcry of sexual abuse by Father; and that the
child has consistently repeated the abuse allegation and has exhibited behaviors
consistent with a child who has been sexually abused.
Based on these findings, the juvenile court concluded that, as a matter of law,
the two brothers are “dependent children as defined in OCGA § 15-11-2 (22) in that
they have been abused or neglected and are in need of the protection of the Court.”
Specific to Mother, the juvenile court — citing OCGA § 15-11-311 (1) — concluded
that Mother had neglected Dy. H. and Da. H. by failing to provide “proper parental
care and control” owing to “a medically verified deficiency of [her] physical, medical,
or emotional health that is of such duration or nature so as to render [her] unable to
provide adequately for . . . her child[ren].” In support of this conclusion, the juvenile
court pointed to the February 2024 incident — which the Mother testified a
psychologist had diagnosed as a “manic episode” — as well as Mother’s self-reported
history of brain fog, blackouts, and memory loss. Indeed, the juvenile court expressly
concluded that the two boys “cannot be adequately and safely protected at home
[because] Mother has untreated mental health issues[.]”
12 As to Father, the juvenile court concluded that there was clear and convincing
evidence that he had abandoned the children, that he had failed to provide proper
parental care and control of the children, and that he had sexually abused Dy. H. The
juvenile court emphasized that Father admittedly had no contact with the children for
approximately two years; that Father did not refute the evidence that he had told
others that he no longer wanted to be a parent to the boys; that Father lacked stable
housing and income; and that he had physically and sexually abused Dy. H.
Following the juvenile court’s order, Father and Mother each individually filed
a motion for new trial and a motion to vacate.7 The juvenile court denied these
motions following a hearing. Both parents now appeal the juvenile court’s order, and
we address each appeal below.
A24A1822
1. On appeal, Mother argues that the juvenile court’s reliance on OCGA § 15-
11-311 (1) was misplaced and that the record is “devoid of the detail necessary to make
7 Mother later withdrew her motion for new trial. 13 conclusions about the mother’s medical conditions, its effect on [her] parenting skills,
or the likelihood that it would continue.” We disagree.8
We start with the relevant statutory authorities. We turn first to OCGA § 15-11-
2 (22), which provides, in relevant part, that the term “‘[d]ependent child’ means a
child who . . . [h]as been abused or neglected and is in need of the protection of the
court[.]” Here, the juvenile court determined that Mother had neglected the two
brothers, which, as defined in OCGA § 15-11-2 (48)9 means, as relevant here, “[t]he
failure to provide proper parental care or control[.]” To find that a child is “without
proper parental care and control” the juvenile court may consider the “medically
verified deficiency of such child’s parent’s physical, mental, or emotional health that
is of such duration or nature so as to render such parent unable to provide adequately
8 Mother’s motion to strike the GAL’s appellate brief as untimely and her motion for leave to file a reply brief are hereby DENIED. See Luca v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 281 Ga. App. 658, 663 (3) (637 SE2d 86) (2006) (failure to timely file brief may result in non-consideration of brief, but Court may consider late-filed brief in its discretion). 9 Effective July 1, 2025, the General Assembly amended the definition of “neglect” found in OCGA § 15-11-2 (48) (A), which now provides that “means” “[t]he failure to provide necessary parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for a child’s physical, mental, or emotional heath or safety[.]” See Ga. L. 2025, Act 284, § 1. 14 for his or her child.” OCGA § 15-11-311 (a) (1) (emphasis supplied). Because the
statute is phrased in the disjunctive, a juvenile court’s finding that a parent’s
medically verified deficiency was of such duration or nature as to render the parent
unable to meet the needs of the child would support a finding of dependency. See
Mornay v. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, P.A., 331 Ga. App. 112, 115 (2) (769
SE2d 807) (2015) (“Where a legislative provision is phrased in the disjunctive, it must
be so construed absent a clear indication that a disjunctive construction is contrary to
the legislative intent.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). As noted above, when
reviewing a juvenile court’s determination that a child is dependent, we are required
to defer to the juvenile court’s fact finding and credibility determinations, “bearing
in mind that the juvenile court’s primary responsibility is to consider and protect the
welfare of [children] whose well-being is threatened.” In the Interest of S. C. S., 336
Ga. App. at 244-245 (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied). With this
framework in mind, we conclude that the juvenile court was authorized to find that
the mother suffered from a medically verified deficiency of her mental health that was
of such a duration and nature as to render her children dependent.
15 Mother argues that the juvenile court’s order is insufficient because the State
did not present testimony from a medical professional as to Mother’s diagnosis and
prognosis. As an initial matter, OCGA § 15-11-311 (a) (1) does not specify any
particular type of evidence that is required to support a juvenile court’s finding of a
medically verified mental health deficiency that renders a parent unable to meet the
needs of her children. More importantly, we are unpersuaded that the lack of such
testimony in the instant case warrants reversal of the juvenile court’s order under the
particular circumstances present here. Specifically, evidence adduced at the hearing
showed that during the February 2024 incident, Mother rammed her vehicle through
a metal gate and beat on an apartment door, demanding to be let in. She then retrieved
a firearm, loaded it, led police on a two-to-three mile pursuit, and almost drove her
vehicle into Lake Lanier. When the arresting officer asked Mother what was going on,
she explained that she was looking for her children. The officer asked her where her
children were, and she responded: “with the devil.” When asked where the devil was,
Mother answered: “Everywhere.” The officer confirmed that her behavior was
possibly consistent with someone experiencing mental health issues. Mother admitted
that a psychologist at a hospital informed her that the February 2024 incident was the
16 result of a manic episode, and the juvenile court was permitted to credit this
testimony. Despite the psychologist’s diagnosis, Mother insisted that her actions in
the February incident were the result of metal left in her mouth following a root canal
in 2021.
In addition, as noted by the juvenile court, Mother’s mental health issues —
which she testified also include blackouts, memory loss, and “brain fog” dating back
at least two years — are not being treated because she attributes her psychotic episode
to a dental issue and has thus failed to seek treatment. Mother also refused to answer
several questions about the February 2024 incident, invoking her Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination, and “inferences can be drawn from the mother’s
invocation of her privilege against self-incrimination in a civil action, and such
inferences may constitute admissions unfavorable to her.” In the Interest of K. N. C.,
264 Ga. App. 475, 481-482 (4) (a) (590 SE2d 792) (2003) (citation and punctuation
omitted); In the Interest of R. D., 346 Ga. App. 257, 258 n. 2 (816 SE2d 132) (2018).
The facts recited above, including Mother’s admitted medical diagnosis,
coupled with the extreme nature of the February incident (which included a loaded
firearm, a police pursuit, and delusions directly pertaining to the children), authorized
17 the juvenile court to find that Mother’s mental health deficiency was medically
verified and of such duration or nature as would render her unable to provide
adequately for her children. Accordingly, the juvenile court’s determination that the
children are dependent is supported by clear and convincing evidence. See In the
Interest of R. E. M. B., 374 Ga. App. 564, 569 (1) (b) (ii) (913 SE2d 425) (2025)
(affirming juvenile court’s dependency finding based on lack of proper care and
control where evidence showed mother suffered from severe mental illness that
prevented her from properly caring for minor child, mother was noncompliant with
prescription medication regimen, and one symptom of mother’s untreated conditions
was blackouts during which she had no recollection of events, including episode where
mother left child unattended in hot car); In the Interest of D. H. D., 289 Ga. App. 32,
35-36 (656 SE2d 183) (2007) (clear and convincing evidence supported deprivation[10]
finding where mother admitted to suffering from schizoaffective disorder which was
characterized by delusions and hallucinations, that she ignored the condition, and that
she no longer took medication; courts need not wait until child suffers harm before
10 See generally In the Interest of S. C. S., 336 Ga. App. at 244 n. 4 (“Given the similarities between the definition of a ‘deprived child’ [under the former Juvenile Code] and that of a ‘dependent child,’ . . . our previous decisions addressing the deprivation of a child are relevant to appeals involving dependency of a child.”). 18 finding child to be deprived); In the Interest of M. D., 283 Ga. App. 805, 807 (642 SE2d
863) (2007) (affirming finding of deprivation based on mother’s admission that her
psychological disorder led to delusions and hospitalization); In the Interest of D. D. B.,
263 Ga. App. 325, 328 (1) (c) (587 SE2d 822) (2003) (explaining that mother’s
unwillingness to consistently treat her mental health condition may support
determination that child’s depravation was likely to continue).
Accordingly, the judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed with respect to
Mother.
A25A0351
2. On appeal, Father asserts numerous enumerations of error, including claims
that the juvenile court violated his due process rights, that the evidence fails to
support the juvenile court’s order, that the juvenile court misconstrued the evidence,
that the juvenile court improperly ruled on his motion for directed verdict, and that
the juvenile court’s order was insufficient. As detailed below, Father has failed to
demonstrate error; consequently, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court with
respect to Father.
19 (a) Father first argues that the juvenile court “violate[d] [his] state and federal
constitutional right to due process” by making a “finding of abandonment . . . [where]
abandonment was not alleged in the dependency complaint, in the dependency
petition, or in the amended dependency petition.” This argument is without merit.11
OCGA § 15-11-152 provides, in relevant part, that “[a] petition alleging
dependency . . . shall set forth plainly and with particularity . . . [t]he facts which bring
a child within the jurisdiction of the court.” As we have recently explained, “[t]his
language, together with the principles of procedural due process, require a
dependency petition to set forth the facts supporting the child’s alleged dependency
so that parents have sufficient information to allow them to prepare a defense.” In the
Interest of H.H., 347 Ga. App.468, 475 (1) (b) (913 SE2d 107) (2025).
Here, the State complied with this requirement by filing a detailed, two-page
dependency petition which included the allegations that Father had “had no contact
with the children for over two years” and that there had been “an unsubstantiated
allegation of sexual abuse involving Father and [Dy. H.].” While Father contends that
11 We note that our review of this claim is hampered by Father’s failure to cite to meaningful legal authority. Father cites only OCGA § 15-11-152 (1) and OCGA § 15-11-2 (1) in support of this argument; in fact, Father has failed to identify the constitutional rights to due process that he alleges were violated. 20 this language is “ambiguous” and that abandonment must be considered on a “case-
by-case basis,” Father cites no authority requiring the State to exhaustively detail the
factual underpinnings of such a claim, and Father does not explain how these
allegations were insufficient to prepare his defense. Compare In the Interest of D. R. C.,
191 Ga. App. 278, 278 (1) (381 SE2d 426) (1989) (denial of due process where the
State’s dependency petition “failed to provide any facts upon which it [was]
predicated,” but, instead, “merely provide[d] a condensation of the [relevant]
statutory provisions”) (emphasis supplied). Accordingly, Father has failed to
demonstrate error, and he is not entitled to relief on this claim.
(b) Father next argues that, even if abandonment had been properly asserted in
the dependency petition, the State failed to satisfy its burden of proof. This argument,
too, lacks merit.
We again note that Father’s argument is supported by a single citation of
authority, namely, a passing reference to the statute defining abandonment. Indeed,
although Father asserts that there are “specific elements” that the State had to prove
in order to establish abandonment, Father neither identifies nor addresses them;
instead, Father simply characterizes the evidence in a light most favorable to him,
21 claiming that the GAL and Mother were “somewhat duplicitous” in asserting that
“he did not want to be the children’s father any longer.” As explained above,
however, this Court defers to the credibility determinations and fact findings of the
juvenile court where supported by the record; accordingly, we are not authorized to
re-weigh or reconsider the evidence, which is what the Father asks us to do. See, e.g.,
In the Interest of S. C. S., 336 Ga. App. at 247 (2) (“[W]e emphasize that as an
appellate court, we do not decide what weight should be afforded to specific
evidence.”). Viewed through the appropriate lens, it is clear that the juvenile court’s
determination in this regard is sound.
“Abandonment . . . means any conduct on the part of a parent . . . showing an
intent to forgo parental duties,” which may be evidenced by, as relevant here, either
the “failure, for a period of at least six months, to communicate meaningfully with the
child” or the “failure, for a period of at least six months, to maintain regular visitation
with a child.” OCGA § 15 -11-2 (1) (A) and (B). Here, the evidence presented below
demonstrated that Father went extended periods of time — well in excess of six
months — without communicating or visiting with the minor children and, further,
that Father plainly expressed his desire to cease acting as a Father to the children.
22 Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court’s conclusion
that Father had abandoned his children, and Father is not entitled to relief on this
claim.
(c) Father next argues that “[t]he juvenile court abused its discretion by failing
to properly weigh and consider pertinent evidence for establishing abuse or neglect[,]
any correlating harm to the children, and parental unfitness.” Specifically, Father
asserts that the State failed to show that “the allegations contained in its initial
[petition] constituted dependency or that there was harm to the children at the time
of the filing of the petition.” Despite how this argument is framed, Father is not
challenging some failure of proof by the State or some error by the juvenile court;
instead, he is, again, asking this Court to reconsider and re-weigh the evidence.12 We
12 Over the course of approximately 12 pages — which amounts to nearly a third of his brief — Father spends considerable effort attacking the juvenile court’s findings of fact and re-weighing the evidence. Father first complains that the juvenile court disregarded the positive reports pertaining to his supervised visitation with the children and that the GAL used cross-examination to “distort” the nature of his visits with the children. Likewise, Father contends that he presented “compelling and credible testimony” concerning his sexual misconduct conviction. Next, Father asserts that the video evidence of him striking Dy. H. was an isolated incident, that it did not result to law enforcement being contacted, and that Mother supposedly never testified that she felt the children were in danger with him. Father then turns to the sexual abuse of Dy. H. — which he characterizes as an “unsubstantiated allegation of sexual abuse” — and highlights testimony that, he believes, tends to show that the 23 reiterate that “[t]his Court neither weighs evidence nor determines the credibility of
witnesses; rather, we defer to the trial court’s fact-finding and affirm unless the
appellate standard is not met.” In the Interest of W.W., 308 Ga. App. 407, 407 (707
SE2d 611) (2011) (citation omitted).
Moreover, the record supports the juvenile court’s findings of fact that Father
physically and sexually abused Dy. H., that Father intentionally absented himself from
the lives of the children, that Father’s visitation with the children was frivolous, and
that Father’s housing and income were unstable. Further, these findings of fact
authorized the juvenile court’s conclusions of law, namely, that both children are
dependent with respect to Father owing to abuse, neglect, and abandonment. See, e.g.,
In the Interest of H.B., 346 Ga. App. 163, 166 (1) (816 SE2d 313) (2018) (juvenile court
authorized to conclude that children were sexually abused even where the children
case was “unfounded” and that he was unlikely “to have committed the offenses alleged.” As to the juvenile court’s conclusion that Father’s income and housing were unstable, Father complains that the GAL never “attempted a walk-through of [his] home to even see where [he] lives” and that there is no law suggesting that his living arrangements or income are “automatically insufficient” to support his children; he also claims that there was no evidence “that the children would be unsafe in the home with [him].”
24 denied the abuse during a forensic interview); In the Interest of M.M., 315 Ga. App. 673,
677 (2) (727 SE2d 279) (2012) (juvenile court authorized to find minor children
dependent as to mother where she left the children with father for an extended period
of time — without visiting or providing financial support — and where mother lacked
appropriate housing and stable employment).
(d) Father’s third enumeration of error asserts as follows:
the trial court erred as a matter of law because it failed to conduct the [p]reliminary [p]rotective [h]earing and the [a]djudication [h]earing properly, by conflating evidence and standards of proof, by not issuing a written ruling in Appellant’s motion for directed verdict, and by allowing the [State] and the GAL to expand the assertions of dependency during the [hearings] and finding dependency beyond that which were stated in the dependency petition and amended dependency petition.
However, the three-paragraph, stream-of-consciousness argument that accompanies
this enumeration bears little resemblance to the enumeration of error itself; further,
the argument fails to include any meaningful citation of legal authority.13 Instead,
13 The Father cites only to OCGA § 15-11-152 (1), which, as explained above, merely provides as follows: “A petition alleging dependency shall be verified . . . and shall set forth plainly and with particularity: (1) The facts which bring a child within the jurisdiction of the court, with a statement that it is in the best interests of the child and the public that the proceeding be brought[.]” 25 Father vaguely argues that the State “failed to establish that there was a safety risk
that warranted continued removal for the purposes of the PPH” and that the issues
raised in the amended petition — which concerned proof of housing and employment
— were “unripe” and “too amorphous to defend against.” To the extent that Father
has failed to support this compound enumeration of error with specific argument or
citation of legal authority, it is deemed waived. See In the Interest of M.J.G., 203 Ga.
App. 452, 454 (4) (416 SE2d 796) (1992); Court of Appeals Rule 25 (d) (1). Likewise,
to the extent that Father is attempting to expand his enumeration of error through
argument in his brief, this, too, is improper. See, e.g., In the Interest of T.J., 281 Ga.
App. 308, 314 (2) (636 SE2d 54) (2006).
Finally, even if this Court wished to exercise its discretion to consider this
alleged error, Father’s argument with respect to this enumeration is inscrutable, and
there is no legal authority cited that could assist this Court in gleaning Father’s actual
contentions. Because it is impossible for this Court to discern the actual substance of
Father’s arguments or to glean any allegation of possible error, we deem this argument
waived, and we do not address it. See DeKalb County School Dist. v. DeKalb Agriculture
Technology and Environment, 369 Ga. App. 829, 834 (3) (894 SE2d 646) (2023) (“[A]s
26 we have previously explained, vague assertions of error are not entitled to appellate
review because ‘it is not this Court’s job to cull the record on behalf of Appellant to
find alleged errors, as appellate judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in
briefs.’”), overruled on other grounds by Pollard v. Great Dane, 371 Ga. App. 872, 876
(2) (a) n.5 (903 SE2d 338) (2024).
(e) In his final enumeration of error, Father alleges as follows:
The juvenile court’s dependency and adjudication rulings should be reversed because the . . . court’s amended order . . . did not state findings of fact or conclusions of law relating to the preliminary protective hearing nor were the findings of fact or conclusions of law sufficient to establish dependency or parental fitness in the adjudication proceeding, hence rendering said [amended order] insufficient on [its] face, and necessitating the vacatur of all subsequent orders.
However, as with his previous enumeration, the argument section accompanying this
enumeration of error bears little resemblance to the enumeration of error itself and
includes sparse legal authority, if any. Instead, Father asserts that the juvenile court’s
amended order is legally insufficient in approximately 11 different ways14 and, further,
14 Father claims that the juvenile court’s order (1) fails to “establish[] the initial legal basis for the juvenile court to have subject matter jurisdiction as it relate[s] to the initial probable cause portion of dependency” ; (2) “does not state the statutory basis 27 that the juvenile court erred by failing to enter a written order on his motion for
directed verdict.15
As with his prior enumeration, to the extent that Father has failed to support
this compound enumeration of error with specific argument or citation of legal
authority, it is deemed waived. See In the Interest of M.J.G., 203 Ga. App. at 454 (4);
Court of Appeals Rule 25 (d) (1). Likewise, to the extent that Father is attempting to
expand his enumeration of error through argument in his brief, this, too, is improper.
See In the Interest of T.J., 281 Ga. App. at 314 (2). Moreover, there is no indication
for how venue is proper in [Gwinnett] County” ; (3) “does not state . . . how [the juvenile court] has jurisdiction to preside over this matter” ; (4) does “not contain the necessary statement of nexuses between the findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its rulings” ; (5) does not include findings pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-146 (a) (1) concerning probable cause of dependency ; (6) does not address OCGA § 15-11- 146 (d) concerning reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for the removal of the child ; (7) does not reference OCGA § 15-11-202 (f) (2) concerning whether the State “made reasonable efforts to finalize an alternative permanent home for the children upon them being adjudicated dependent” ; (8), (9), and (10) does not reference the diligent search provisions of either OCGA § 15-11-211 (a), (c) or (e) ; and (11) does not state the basis for any determination of parental unfitness. 15 For all that appears, Father is attempting to assert approximately 15 alleged errors in the final six pages of his brief. This “scattershot” approach — which lacks citations to relevant legal authority and includes nothing more than cursory allegations — is not the meaningful argument envisioned by the rules of this Court. See, e.g., Farmer v. Dept. of Corrections, 346 Ga. App. 387, 394 (2) (816 SE2d 376) (2018). 28 that Father raised these arguments below. Consequently, they are deemed abandoned.
See In the Interest of H. B., 346 Ga. App. at 172-173 (6) (declining to consider
complaint concerning timing of juvenile court’s order when it was raised for the first
time on appeal).
Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution, we will broadly address several
of Father’s arguments. Father initially asserts that the order fails to “establish[] the
initial legal basis for the [juvenile] court to have subject matter jurisdiction as it
relate[s] to the initial probable cause portion of dependency,” that the order fails to
state “how venue is proper in [Gwinnett16] County,” or how the juvenile court had
jurisdiction to preside over this matter.17 However, the juvenile court’s amended order
references the names and ages of the children, declares that the children reside in
Gwinnett County, states that the juvenile court “has subject matter jurisdiction and
personal jurisdiction over the children and parents,” declares that venue is proper,
and reflects that the proceedings stem from “complaints and a dependency petition.”
16 Father’s brief questions how venue was proper in Douglas County; however, the matter was heard in the Juvenile Court of Gwinnett County. 17 We note that these arguments, like many of Father’s other arguments, are unsupported by citation of legal authority. 29 Consequently, the face of the juvenile court’s order shows the requisite jurisdictional
facts. See, e.g., In the Interest of H. B., 346 Ga. App. at 174 (7).
Father also asserts that the juvenile court “failed to state in its order the basis
of any determination of parental unfitness” and that the order does “not contain the
necessary statement of nexuses between the findings of fact and conclusions of law to
support its rulings.” However, as discussed above, the juvenile court entered a
detailed, 11-page order including approximately 50 findings of fact and extensive
conclusions of law with respect to Father. While the juvenile court may not have tied
all of its findings of fact to a conclusion of law, the converse is not true; the juvenile
court’s conclusions of law are all tied to findings of fact, which, as discussed above,
are supported by the clear and convincing evidence. Further, the juvenile court’s
findings relate both to dependency and unfitness. See In the Interest of S. C. S., 336 Ga.
App. at 248-249 (2)-(3) (recognizing that same evidence pertains to dependency can
also pertain to whether parent is unfit). Moreover, we are not required to parse the
juvenile court’s order for thaumaturgic language; instead, “when reviewing a juvenile
court’s order, we are mindful that such orders are construed according to their
substance and function and not merely by nomenclature.” In the Interest of K. R., 367
30 Ga. App. 668, 671 (1) (888 SE2d 204) (2023) (affirming sufficiency of juvenile court’s
dependency order) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Finally, we note that the juvenile court’s order expressly declares that the
children are dependent as to both parents, plainly reflects that “reasonable efforts”
were made “to eliminate the need for removal of the children from the home and to
reunify the children with their family at the earliest possible time,” specifically notes
that returning the children home is contrary to their welfare, and clearly indicates that
the State “shall continue reasonable efforts to eliminate the need for placement
outside the home.” In sum, Father is not entitled to relief as to this enumeration.
For the reasons explained above, the judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
Judgments affirmed in Case Nos. A24A1822 and A25A0351. Barnes, P. J., concurs.
Pipkin, J., dissents.
31 In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A24A1822. In the Interest of D. H. et al., CHILDREN (MOTHER).
A25A0351. In the Interest or D. H. et al., CHILDREN (FATHER).
PIPKIN, Judge, dissenting.
While I agree with the majority opinion that the judgment of the juvenile court
should be affirmed with respect to Father, I conclude that the juvenile court erred in
its application of OCGA § 15-11-311 (a) (1) and, thus, that the judgment of the juvenile
court should be reversed with respect to Mother; consequently, I respectfully dissent. A child is “neglected,” as that term is used in our Juvenile Code -- and as
relevant here -- where there is a “failure to provide proper parental care or control,”
OCGA § 15-11-2 (22), and a child may be deemed to be “without proper parental care
and control” where there is a “medically verified deficiency of [a parent’s] physical,
mental, or emotional health that is of such duration or nature so as to render such
parent unable to provide adequately for his or her child,” OCGA § 15-11-311 (a) (1).
The question presented in this appeal is whether the facts, as found by the juvenile
court, satisfy this standard; while we must afford the juvenile courts (and, more
generally, trial courts) the substantial deference to which they are entitled, this appeal
requires the application of the juvenile court’s findings to the law, which is a legal
question. See, e.g., Garden Club of Georgia v. Shackelford, 274 Ga. 653, 655 (1) (560
SE2d 522) (2002) (recognizing that, where the question presented involves a “mixed
question of law and fact . . . we defer to the trial court’s factual findings unless clearly
erroneous, but are not bound by its legal conclusions”).
Here, even accepting the juvenile court’s factual findings, the State presented
insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s legal conclusion with respect to
Mother. While the evidence undoubtedly shows that Mother reported some
2 concerning physical ailments -- and while the February 2024 incident is patently
disturbing -- nothing presented at trial was medically verified, as required by statute. At
best, the State presented testimony from lay witnesses concerning Mother’s behavior
and elicited testimony from Mother that she had been told by some unnamed and
unidentified psychologist that she had suffered a “manic episode.” While the majority
opinion is correct that OCGA § 15-11-311 (a) (1) does not “specify any particular type
of evidence” required to establish such deficiency, it is beyond dispute that any
determination of a mental, physical, or emotional deficiency must be medically verified;
if that phrase is to mean anything, it must mean something, and merely highlighting
testimony from lay witnesses that paints Mother as mentally ill -- and drawing
“inferences” from that testimony -- does not satisfy this standard. In short, OCGA
§ 15-11-311 (1) has no application here because there was no
evidence of the mother’s present mental impairment. . . . . There is no psychological evaluation included in the record, or reports from treating physicians, or medical reports indicating any mental impairment or how said mental impairment might limit the mother’s parental abilities.
In the Interest of D.W., 318 Ga. App. at 730 (3). Indeed,
3 [t]he mother’s own testimony, although troubling, simply does not include the detail necessary to make conclusions about her mental condition, its effect on her parenting skills, or the likelihood that it will continue. Although she clearly has mental problems, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show the nature of her problems and the prognosis for her future.
In the Interest of C.C., 257 Ga. App. 543, 550 (571 SE2d 537) (2002) (physical
precedent only).1 See also In the Interest of C.D.E., 248 Ga. App. 756, 764-766 (546
SE2d 837) (2001).
Notably, while Mother relies heavily on In the Interest of D.W., In the Interest of
C.C., and In the Interest of C.D.E., among others, the majority has wholly failed to
address these decisions. Instead, the majority relies on In the Interest of R.E.M.B., 374
Ga. App. 564 (913 SE2d 425) (2025), and In the Interest of D.D.B., 263 Ga. App. 325
1 I recognize that our decisions in In the Interest of K.S., In the Interest of D.W., and In the Interest of C.C., among others, were decided before the effective date of the new Evidence Code, at which point “hearsay evidence ha[d] no probative value even when . . . admitted without objection.” In the Interest of C.D.E., 248 Ga. App. 756, 764 (2) (546 SE2d 837) (2001). Compare In the Interest of R.D., 346 Ga. App. 257, 261 (1) n.10 (816 SE2d 132) (2018) (recognizing that, under the new Evidence Code, any unobjected-to hearsay is deemed legal, admissible evidence). Consequently, those decisions are concerned, at least in part, with the competency and admissibility of the second-hand testimony used to establish dependency. That said, I nevertheless find these decisions instructive as to the nature and quality of evidence needed to establish a medically verified deficiency of the mother’s physical, mental, or emotional health. 4 (587 SE2d 822) (2003), cases in which the juvenile court was presented with actual
evidence of mental illness. The juvenile court in In the Interest of R.E.M.B., was
presented with, among other things, a psychological assessment of the mother, 374
Ga. App at 570 (1) (a) (ii), while the juvenile court in In the Interest of D.D.B., heard
testimony from a licensed psychologist, 263 Ga. App. at 326. There is no such
evidence here. Further, while the majority relies on two related cases -- In the Interest
of D. H. D. and In the Interest of M. D. -- those appeals were decided under the former
version of the Juvenile Code and under a completely different statutory provision.2
Because the evidence fails to establish that Mother has a medically verified
mental illness and because the majority opinion has failed to address or consider
persuasive precedent, I respectfully dissent.
2 Specifically, those cases involved OCGA § 15-11-2 (8) (A) (2007), which concerned whether a child “[i]s without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health or morals,” as well as case law under the prior statutory scheme applying a different standard, namely, whether there was a showing “tantamount to physical or mental incapacity to care for the child.” In the Interest of U. B., 246 Ga. App. 328, 328 (1) (540 SE2d 278) (2000). 5