In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-20-00360-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF C.W., A CHILD
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 Randall County, Texas Trial Court No. 76,548-L1, Honorable Jack M. Graham, Associate Judge Presiding
April 29, 2021 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PIRTLE and PARKER and DOSS, JJ.
In this accelerated appeal, appellant, B.D., seeks reversal of the trial court’s
judgment terminating her parental rights to her son, C.W.1 In three issues, B.D.
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s predicate findings of
endangering conditions and endangerment, and failure to comply with the provisions of
the court-ordered family plan of service, in addition to the trial court’s finding that
1 To protect the privacy of the parties involved, we refer to them by their initials. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d) (West Supp. 2020); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b). termination is in the best interest of C.W. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
Background
B.D. is the mother of thirteen-year-old C.W. The father of C.W. is deceased.
In August of 2019, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
received a report alleging that B.D. used drugs and was neglectful in her supervision of
C.W. A department investigator was called to B.D.’s residence by law enforcement
officers who were conducting a welfare check on C.W. After discovering
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia at the residence, B.D. and her boyfriend, D.B.,
were arrested. The Department took custody of C.W. because there was no one else
available to care for him. At the time of her arrest, B.D. admitted to the department
investigator that she used marijuana within the last week and used methamphetamine in
December of 2018.
As a part of the investigation, the Department requested that B.D. submit to a hair
follicle drug test. It was positive for methamphetamine. The department investigator also
interviewed C.W. According to C.W., there is marijuana in the home and his mother
smokes it when he is not around. He also stated that his mother used to smoke
methamphetamine but “she went to rehab in 2016.”
The Department filed its petition for protection, conservatorship, and termination of
parental rights of B.D. as to C.W. Following an adversary hearing, the Department was
appointed temporary managing conservator and C.W. was placed in an emergency
2 shelter. On November 1, C.W. was placed in a therapeutic foster home in Marshall,
Texas.
The Department developed a family service plan for B.D., and, because she was
continuing her relationship with D.B., the Department listed D.B. as a participant in the
plan. The service plan set out several tasks and services for B.D. to complete before
reunification with C.W. could occur. These tasks and services included the following:
complete a psychological evaluation and follow recommendations; maintain regular
contact with her caseworker; abstain from the use of illegal drugs; submit to random drug
screens; locate and maintain stable housing that is free from drugs and violence; locate
and maintain stable employment; complete a psychosocial assessment and follow
recommendations; attend individual counseling; take parenting classes; participate in
rational behavior therapy (RBT); participate in a substance abuse assessment at
Outreach, Screening, Assessment, and Referral (OSAR) and follow recommendations;
and attend visitation with C.W. The purpose of the family service plan was to work with
B.D. to mitigate the reasons for the removal of C.W.
B.D. satisfied the plan’s requirement that she maintain stable housing, complete a
psychosocial evaluation, attend counseling, participate in RBT, and attend parenting
classes. B.D. was employed for a short time after she was released from jail in January
of 2020. B.D. submitted to some but not all of the drug screens requested by the
Department. After testing positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine in April of
2020, B.D. attended Narcotics Anonymous (NA) as recommended by OSAR.
3 B.D. was indicted for child endangerment and possession of a controlled
substance resulting in her incarceration from December of 2019 until the end of January
of 2020. After B.D. was released from jail, she and D.B. relocated to Post, Texas, to live
with D.B.’s mother.
B.D.’s last in-person visit with C.W. was in February of 2020. According to the
department caseworker, C.W. is bonded to B.D. and the visit went well. Due to the
COVID-19 pandemic, restrictions on in-person visitation were instituted from March until
July. B.D. did not exercise any in-person visitations with C.W. after the restrictions were
lifted in July of 2020. B.D. is permitted to have weekly telephone contact with C.W. but
she has been inconsistent with that contact, resulting in distress and disappointment to
C.W. C.W. has reacted with angry outbursts due to B.D.’s missed telephone calls and
his grades have been negatively affected.
The Department presented evidence that B.D. and D.B. pled guilty to the felony
offenses of child endangerment and possession of a controlled substance on January 27,
2020, and received four years’ deferred adjudication community supervision. While on
supervision, B.D. tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine in April and
May. B.D. failed to submit to a court-ordered drug screen in July and she tested positive
for methamphetamine in August. D.B. also tested positive on those same dates, and he
tested positive for methamphetamine in September.
B.D. testified that she has used methamphetamine “off and on” since the “early
2000’s.” She had periods of sobriety for two to three years, then she began to use again
on the weekends. B.D. testified that her last “intentional” use of methamphetamine was
4 in June or July of 2019. B.D. did not submit to a drug screen on September 23, 2019.
Her urinalysis on October 21 and November 20 was negative. In 2020, B.D. tested
negative for illegal substances on January 30, February 15, and March 20. B.D. tested
positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine on April 28. She attributed the positive
test result to using an old vape pen that contained methamphetamine residue. On May
18, B.D.’s hair follicle drug test was once again positive for amphetamine and
methamphetamine. B.D. attributed that positive result to the use of the vape pen in April.
On June 23, B.D.’s drug screen was negative. B.D. was court-ordered to submit to a drug
screen on July 27, but said she had “no transportation, no gas to get to Lubbock” for the
drug screen. B.D.’s urinalysis on August 31 was negative, but her hair follicle test was
positive for methamphetamine. She attributed the positive hair follicle drug test to “taking
Sudafed, nose spray, home medicine” for her severe allergies. B.D.’s drug screens were
negative in September and October.
At the time of the final hearing on November 3, 2020, B.D. and D.B. were living
with his mother in Post. D.B. works for an RV park and provides financially for B.D. B.D.
testified that she was employed “after I got out of jail and then COVID hit. With COVID-
19 and me being a felon, it’s hard to find a job.” B.D. is a full-time student taking online
classes at Strayer University to obtain a bachelor’s degree in business administration.
B.D. relies on loans, grants, and D.B.’s work income as her financial support. B.D. and
D.B. have been attending NA for the past four months. B.D. requested that she be
appointed as a possessory conservator and that C.W. remain in his current placement
“for now.” B.D. also testified, “A friend of mine down here says that she would take [C.W.]
if the [D]epartment approves of her.” 5 C.W. was placed with a foster family in Marshall, Texas, after his removal. C.W.
is doing “quite well” in this placement. C.W.’s grades have improved, he is playing sports,
and his behavior is calmer and more controlled. When C.W. came into the Department’s
care, he was aggressive. C.W. was previously diagnosed with attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), post-traumatic stress disorder, and obsessive-compulsive
disorder. C.W. is prescribed medication for ADHD. C.W. is happy in his current
placement and the structure it provides. The placement is interested in providing a long-
term placement for C.W.
The trial court terminated B.D.’s parental rights on the grounds of endangering
conditions, endangerment, and failure to comply with a court order that established
actions necessary to retain custody of the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (O) (West Supp. 2020).2 The trial court also found that
termination was in the best interest of C.W. See § 161.001(b)(2). The trial court
appointed the Department as the managing conservator of C.W.
Applicable Law
A parent’s right to the “companionship, care, custody, and management” of his or
her child is a constitutional interest “far more precious than any property right.” Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982); see In re
M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 547 (Tex. 2003). Consequently, we strictly scrutinize termination
proceedings and strictly construe the involuntary termination statutes in favor of the
2 Further references to provisions of the Texas Family Code will be by reference to “section __” or “§ __.” 6 parent. Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). However, “the rights of natural
parents are not absolute” and “[t]he rights of parenthood are accorded only to those fit to
accept the accompanying responsibilities.” In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 2003)
(citing In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 195 (Tex. 1993)). Recognizing that a parent may
forfeit his or her parental rights by his or her acts or omissions, the primary focus of a
termination suit is protection of the child’s best interests. See id.
In a case to terminate parental rights under section 161.001 of the Family Code,
the petitioner must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the parent
committed one or more of the enumerated acts or omissions justifying termination, and
(2) termination is in the best interest of the child. § 161.001(b). Clear and convincing
evidence is “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of
fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.”
§ 101.007 (West 2019); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264 (Tex. 2002). Both elements
must be established and termination may not be based solely on the best interest of the
child as determined by the trier of fact. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d
531, 533 (Tex. 1987); In re K.C.B., 280 S.W.3d 888, 894 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, pet.
denied). “Only one predicate finding under section 161.001[(b)](1) is necessary to support
a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child’s best
interest.” In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362. We will affirm the termination order if the
evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support any alleged statutory ground
the trial court relied upon in terminating the parental rights if the evidence also establishes
that termination is in the child’s best interest. In re K.C.B., 280 S.W.3d at 894-95.
7 The clear and convincing evidence standard does not mean the evidence must
negate all reasonable doubt or that the evidence must be uncontroverted. In re R.D.S.,
902 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995, no writ). The reviewing court must recall
that the trier of fact has the authority to weigh the evidence, draw reasonable inferences
therefrom, and choose between conflicting inferences. Id. The factfinder also enjoys the
right to resolve credibility issues and conflicts within the evidence and may freely choose
to believe all, part, or none of the testimony espoused by any particular witness. Id.
Where conflicting evidence is present, the factfinder’s determination on such matters is
generally regarded as conclusive. In re B.R., 950 S.W.2d 113, 121 (Tex. App.—El Paso
1997, no writ).
The appellate court cannot weigh witness credibility issues that depend on
demeanor and appearance as the witnesses are not present. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d
570, 573 (Tex. 2005). Even when credibility issues are reflected in the written transcript,
the appellate court must defer to the factfinder’s determinations, as long as those
determinations are not themselves unreasonable. Id.
Standard of Review
When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence in a termination case, the
appellate court should look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
finding “to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or
conviction that its finding was true.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. To give appropriate
deference to the factfinder’s conclusions, we must assume that the factfinder resolved
disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so. Id. We
8 disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to
have been not credible, but we do not disregard undisputed facts. Id. Even evidence that
does more than raise surmise or suspicion is not sufficient unless that evidence is capable
of producing a firm belief or conviction that the allegation is true. In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d
101, 113 (Tex. 2014). If, after conducting a legal sufficiency review, we determine that
no reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the matter that
must be proven was true, then the evidence is legally insufficient and we must reverse.
Id. (citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266).
In a factual sufficiency review, we must give due consideration to evidence that the
factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d
at 266. We must determine whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could
reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the petitioner’s allegations.
Id. We must also consider whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder
could not have resolved the disputed evidence in favor of its finding. Id. If, in light of the
entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited
in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed
a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient. Id.
Analysis
Sufficiency of the Evidence Under Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E)
In her first issue, B.D. challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence
to support the termination of her parental rights under section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E).
Ordinarily, only one statutory predicate ground is required to support termination when 9 there is also a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d
at 362. However, in light of the Texas Supreme Court opinion in In re N.G., we review
the trial court’s findings under both subsections (D) and (E), when raised on appeal
because of the potential future consequences to B.D.’s parental rights in a future
proceeding concerning a different child. In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 235-37 (Tex. 2019)
(per curiam).
A trial court may order termination of a parent-child relationship if the court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that a parent has knowingly placed or knowingly
allowed a child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or
emotional well-being of the child and/or engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the
child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional
well-being of the child. See § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). Both subsections (D) and (E)
require proof of endangerment. To “endanger” means to expose the child to loss or
injury or to jeopardize the child’s emotional or physical health. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at
533. A child is endangered when the environment creates a potential for danger that
the parent is aware of but consciously disregards. J.S. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family &
Protective Servs., 511 S.W.3d 145, 159 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.). Endanger
means more than a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill effects of a less-
than-ideal family environment, but it is not necessary that the conduct be directed at
the child or that the child suffer injury. In re N.K., 399 S.W.3d 322, 330-31 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2013, no pet.).
10 While both subsections (D) and (E) focus on endangerment, they differ regarding
the source of the physical or emotional endangerment to the child. See In re B.S.T.,
977 S.W.2d 481, 484 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.). Subsection
(D) requires a showing that the environment in which the child is placed endangered
the child’s physical or emotional health. Doyle v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory
Servs., 16 S.W.3d 390, 394 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, pet. denied). Conduct of a
parent or another person in the home can create an environment that endangers the
physical and emotional well-being of a child as required for termination under
subsection (D). In re W.S., 899 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no
pet.). Inappropriate, abusive, or unlawful conduct by persons who live in the child’s
home or with whom the child is compelled to associate on a regular basis in his home
is a part of the “conditions or surroundings” of the child’s home under subsection (D).
In re M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d 494, 502 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) (op. on
reh’g). The factfinder may infer from past conduct endangering the child’s well-being
that similar conduct will recur if the child is returned to the parent. Id. Thus, subsection
(D) addresses the child’s surroundings and environment rather than parental
misconduct, which is the subject of subsection (E). Doyle, 16 S.W.3d at 394.
Under subsection (E), the cause of the danger to the child must be the parent’s
conduct alone, as evidenced not only by the parent’s actions, but also by the parent’s
omission or failure to act. In re M.J.M.L., 31 S.W.3d 347, 350-51 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2000, pet. denied); Doyle, 16 S.W.3d at 395. To be relevant, the conduct does not have
to have been directed at the child, nor must actual harm result to the child from the
conduct. Dupree v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 907 S.W.2d 81, 84 (Tex. 11 App.—Dallas 1995, no writ). Additionally, termination under subsection (E) must be
based on more than a single act or omission; a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious
course of conduct by the parent is required. In re E.P.C., 381 S.W.3d 670, 683 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2012, no pet.). The specific danger to the child’s well-being need not
be established as an independent proposition, but may be inferred from parental
misconduct. In re B.C.S., 479 S.W.3d 918, 926 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.). “[A]
parent’s use of narcotics and its effect on his or her ability to parent may qualify as an
endangering course of conduct.” In the Interest of J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex.
2009). Because the evidence pertaining to subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) is
interrelated, we may conduct a consolidated review. In re M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d at 503.
Here, the Department presented evidence that B.D. used methamphetamine off
and on for more than fifteen years—both before and after C.W.’s birth. B.D.’s use of
methamphetamine and marijuana was such that thirteen-year-old C.W. was familiar with
her use of the substances, and C.W. was present when B.D. and D.B. were arrested.
B.D. was in possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia, and she was
positive for methamphetamine when C.W. was removed from her care. B.D. pled guilty
to possession of a controlled substance and child endangerment, and she was given
community supervision probation. Within three months of being placed on community
supervision, B.D. again tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. The
evidence established that B.D.’s drug use was not an isolated event but part of a course
of conduct involving the use of illegal drugs. Moreover, B.D. failed to appear for a court-
ordered drug test in July knowing that a missed test would be regarded as a positive test
result. It was also established that B.D. maintained her relationship with D.B. despite 12 D.B.’s pleading guilty to child endangerment of C.W. and his multiple positive drug
screens for methamphetamine during the pendency of the case. According to the
caseworker, B.D. failed to abide by the service plan provisions for drug testing, abstinence
from illegal drug use, and visitation with C.W. The caseworker also testified that B.D.’s
pattern of methamphetamine use affected B.D.’s ability to provide for C.W.’s emotional
and physical needs now and in the future. Evidence of illegal drug use supports a
conclusion that a child’s surroundings endanger his physical or emotional well-being. See
In re G.A., No. 01-11-00565-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 2472, at *16 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Mar. 29, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.). A parent’s ongoing drug abuse is
conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability, which endangers the
physical and emotional well-being of the child. See In re A.B., 125 S.W.3d 769, 777 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. denied). “A parent’s continued drug use demonstrates an
inability to provide for the child’s emotional and physical needs and to provide a stable
environment for the child.” In re E.M., 494 S.W.3d 209, 222 (Tex. App.—Waco 2015, pet.
denied) (citing In re F.A.R., No. 11-04-00014-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 234, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Eastland Jan. 13, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.)).
Having examined the entire record, we find that the trial court could reasonably
form a firm belief or conviction that B.D. knowingly placed or knowingly allowed C.W. to
remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered his physical or emotional well-
being and engaged in conduct which endangered C.W.’s emotional and physical well-
being. The same evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court’s affirmative
finding. We overrule issue one.
13 In light of our conclusion regarding the trial court’s findings on subsections (D) and
(E), we need not address the findings under subsection (O). In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at
362.
Best Interest of the Child
In her third issue, B.D. challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the best interest finding made under section 161.001(b)(2). A determination
of best interest necessitates a focus on the child, not the parent. See In re B.C.S., 479
S.W.3d at 927. Appellate courts examine the entire record to decide what is in the best
interest of the child. In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 250 (Tex. 2013). There is a strong
presumption that it is in the child’s best interest to preserve the parent-child relationship.
In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006).
In assessing whether termination is in a child’s best interest, the courts are guided
by the non-exclusive list of factors in Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex.
1976). These factors include: (1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional and physical
needs of the child now and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child
now and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, (5) the
programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child, (6)
the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody, (7) the
stability of the home or proposed placement, (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that
may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not proper, and (9) any excuse
for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id. “[T]he State need not prove all of the factors
as a condition precedent to parental termination, ‘particularly if the evidence were
14 undisputed that the parental relationship endangered the safety of the child.’” In re C.T.E.,
95 S.W.3d 462, 466 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (quoting In re
C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002)). Evidence that supports one or more statutory
grounds for termination may also constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the
child’s best interest. See In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 249. The best interest analysis may
consider circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and the totality of the evidence as
well as direct evidence. In re N.R.T., 338 S.W.3d 667, 677 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011,
no pet.). We must also bear in mind that a child’s need for permanence through the
establishment of a stable, permanent home has been recognized as the paramount
consideration in determining best interest. See In re K.C., 219 S.W.3d 924, 931 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.).
The record indicates that B.D. used methamphetamine off and on for more than
fifteen years and she admitted to recent use of methamphetamine and marijuana prior to
C.W.’s removal. B.D. pled guilty to endangering a child, and C.W. was the victim. After
receiving four years’ deferred adjudication community supervision in January of 2020 for
child endangerment and possession of a controlled substance, B.D. tested positive for
amphetamine and methamphetamine in April and May. In August, two months before the
final hearing, she again tested positive for methamphetamine. Although the evidence
showed that B.D. completed most of the service plan’s requirements, the evidence
showed that B.D. did not comply with the portion of her plan designed to address the
reasons that C.W. was taken into care, including B.D.’s failure to maintain a drug-free
lifestyle and to provide a safe and stable home environment for C.W. B.D. continued to
use drugs in the face of a court order conditioning her reunification with C.W. on her ability 15 to remain drug-free. Despite D.B.’s multiple positive drug screens, B.D. remains in a
relationship with D.B. and she is financially dependent upon D.B. for support. Moreover,
B.D. has taken very little initiative in providing for C.W.’s emotional needs. B.D. has
disappointed C.W. by failing to keep scheduled telephone contact and she has not made
arrangements to participate in face-to-face visits with C.W., instead using the money she
had “towards [her] fines and [her] probation fees in order to stay out of jail.” A trial court
is permitted to consider a parent’s drug use, inability to provide a stable home, and failure
to comply with a family plan of service in its best interest determination. In re S.B., 207
S.W.3d 877, 877-78 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.). B.D.’s ongoing use of
methamphetamine and her willingness to remain in a relationship with D.B., who also
uses methamphetamine, suggests that similar conduct will occur in the future, thereby
constituting evidence of emotional and physical danger to C.W. now and in the future. In
re V.A., No. 07-17-00413-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1521, at *13 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
Feb. 27, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). The evidence before the trial court concerning B.D.’s
drug use was significant and thus, weighs heavily in favor of the trial court’s best interest
finding.
Other evidence supports the trial court’s finding that termination of B.D.’s parental
rights was in C.W.’s best interest. At the time of trial, C.W. was fifteen years old, and he
had remained with the same placement since November of 2019. C.W. expressed to the
caseworker that he was happy in his current placement. According to the caseworker,
C.W. is settled into a structured environment. He is doing well in school, learning to
control his emotions, and getting exceptional help with his ADHD. C.W.’s placement
16 demonstrated an ability to meet C.W.’s needs and provide him with structure and a stable
home environment. The Department’s plan for C.W. is long-term placement.
Stability and permanence are paramount in the upbringing of children. In re J.D.,
436 S.W.3d 105, 120 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The factfinder may
compare the parent’s and the Department’s plans for the child and determine whether the
plans and expectations of each party are realistic or weak and ill-defined. Id. at 119-20.
At the final hearing, B.D. requested that C.W. stay in his current placement “for now,” and
that she be appointed possessory conservator. She suggested a friend was willing to
take C.W., but her friend is a stranger to C.W. In contrast, the Department’s plan for C.W.
was a long-term placement with his current placement. C.W. is happy and thriving in the
consistency and structure provided by his placement. The Department’s plan would
provide permanence and stability for C.W. and weighs heavily in favor of the trial court’s
conclusion that termination of B.D.’s parental rights was in C.W.’s best interest.
We conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to establish a firm
conviction in the mind of the trial court that termination of B.D.’s parental rights is in the
best interest of C.W. Issue three is overruled.
Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court terminating B.D.’s parental rights is affirmed.
Judy C. Parker Justice