IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-1018 Filed September 4, 2025
IN THE INTEREST OF B.M., Minor Child,
R.M., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clarke County, Andrew Zimmerman,
Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child under
Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e), (h), and (l) (2024). AFFIRMED.
Aaron H. Ginkens of Ginkens Law Firm, P.L.C., West Des Moines, for
appellant mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Lisa Jeanes, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Chira L. Corwin, Des Moines, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and
Sandy, JJ. 2
SANDY, Judge.
The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of the mother and father to
a child born in 2023. The mother appeals.1 She challenges the statutory grounds
authorizing termination, the determination that termination is in the child’s best
interests, the finding that the exceptions to termination did not apply, and the
refusal to grant a six-month extension to reunify.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
B.M. was born in 2023. The child came to the attention of the department
almost immediately, as the infant quickly began presenting with withdrawal
symptoms and respiratory distress. Testing conducted on his umbilical cord
showed a positive result for THC. The child’s mother admitted to using fentanyl,
THC, heroin, and methamphetamine during her pregnancy. After the child was
born, the State petitioned the court to adjudicate B.M. a child in need of assistance
(CINA). The child was adjudicated to be a CINA, removed from his mother’s care
by the department, and placed with his aunt. The child was then later placed with
his great aunt.
A permanency plan was adopted at the dispositional hearing and that plan
required the mother to make various changes in order for the child to safely return
home. These changes included participating in visits with the child at the discretion
of the department and the guardian ad litem, mental-health and substance-abuse
evaluations, abstaining from the use of mind-altering substances, complying with
random substance-use testing as required by the department, as well as
1 The juvenile court’s order also terminated the father’s parental rights, but he has
not filed a separate notice of appeal. 3
maintaining appropriate housing and demonstrating an ability to financially provide
for the child.
The mother failed to complete or comply with drug testing on six separate
occasions. Outpatient treatment was recommended to reduce the likelihood of
relapsing. However, she did not comply with the recommendation. The mother
went months at a time without contacting or visiting the child and was ultimately
incarcerated on charges stemming from a separate case distinct from the above
captioned proceedings.
The juvenile court subsequently terminated the mother’s parental rights to
the child under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e), (h), and (l) (2024).
II. Standard of Review
We review district court orders terminating parental rights de novo. In re
J.V., 23 N.W.3d 595, 603 (Iowa 2024). We use a three-step process to determine
if a statutory ground has been established, if the termination is in the child’s best
interests, and if any permissive exceptions should be applied to preclude
termination. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 294 (Iowa 2021).
III. Discussion
A. Grounds for Termination
When the district court terminates parental rights on multiple statutory
grounds, we may affirm on a single cited ground. In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774
(Iowa 2012).
The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights on three grounds,
set forth in Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(e) (h), and (l). We address termination
under section 232.116(h), which permits termination upon clear and convincing 4
evidence that: (1) “[t]he child is three years of age or younger”; (2) “[t]he child has
been adjudicated a child in need of assistance”; (3) “[t]he child has been removed
from the physical custody of the parents for at least six of the last twelve months”;
and (4) “the child cannot be returned to the custody of the [parent] . . . at the
present time.” The Iowa Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase “at the present
time” to mean at the time of the termination trial. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 473
(Iowa 2018).
The mother challenges only the fourth element: whether the child could
safely be returned to the mother’s custody at the time of the termination trial. But
she does not well articulate an argument specific to attacking that fourth element.2
Rather, she argues more generally that the department failed to meet its burden
of proof and she presented sufficient evidence at the termination trial to show she
maintained significant and meaningful contact with the child. We disagree.
At the termination trial, the mother testified that she was currently in jail but
would soon move to a halfway house. She presented little evidence to suggest
that the child could be safely returned to her home. She presented no evidence
that she could maintain sobriety outside of a correctional facility. Additionally, the
mother testified that she did not visit or interact with the child for multiple months
leading up to her incarceration because she was under the influence of
methamphetamine. She had only visited the child eighteen times in a period of
twenty-one months.
2 She was incarcerated at the time of the termination trial. 5
The mother would certainly not have been able to care for the child while
she was incarcerated or at the halfway house. She testified to this during the
termination trial. Incarceration aside, the mother’s continued use of
methamphetamine and inability to cooperate with drug testing and mental health
services convinces us that the child could not have been returned to the mother’s
custody at the time of the termination. The grounds for termination under
section 232.116(1)(h) were met.
B. Best Interests
The next step in our analysis is to consider the factors under
section 232.116(2). We must “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to
the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child,
and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa
Code § 232.116(2).
We consider the child’s long-term and immediate interests. In re J.H., 952
N.W.2d 157, 171 (Iowa 2020). The analysis requires us to look at what the future
may hold for the child if they are returned to the parents. Id. We look to a parent’s
past performance as it can help predict the quality of care the parent is able to
provide in the future. Id.
Termination is in the child’s best interest here. The mother has been unable
to provide stability for the child since he was born. She had no contact with the
child for the five months prior to termination. She continued to use
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-1018 Filed September 4, 2025
IN THE INTEREST OF B.M., Minor Child,
R.M., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clarke County, Andrew Zimmerman,
Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child under
Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e), (h), and (l) (2024). AFFIRMED.
Aaron H. Ginkens of Ginkens Law Firm, P.L.C., West Des Moines, for
appellant mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Lisa Jeanes, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Chira L. Corwin, Des Moines, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and
Sandy, JJ. 2
SANDY, Judge.
The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of the mother and father to
a child born in 2023. The mother appeals.1 She challenges the statutory grounds
authorizing termination, the determination that termination is in the child’s best
interests, the finding that the exceptions to termination did not apply, and the
refusal to grant a six-month extension to reunify.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
B.M. was born in 2023. The child came to the attention of the department
almost immediately, as the infant quickly began presenting with withdrawal
symptoms and respiratory distress. Testing conducted on his umbilical cord
showed a positive result for THC. The child’s mother admitted to using fentanyl,
THC, heroin, and methamphetamine during her pregnancy. After the child was
born, the State petitioned the court to adjudicate B.M. a child in need of assistance
(CINA). The child was adjudicated to be a CINA, removed from his mother’s care
by the department, and placed with his aunt. The child was then later placed with
his great aunt.
A permanency plan was adopted at the dispositional hearing and that plan
required the mother to make various changes in order for the child to safely return
home. These changes included participating in visits with the child at the discretion
of the department and the guardian ad litem, mental-health and substance-abuse
evaluations, abstaining from the use of mind-altering substances, complying with
random substance-use testing as required by the department, as well as
1 The juvenile court’s order also terminated the father’s parental rights, but he has
not filed a separate notice of appeal. 3
maintaining appropriate housing and demonstrating an ability to financially provide
for the child.
The mother failed to complete or comply with drug testing on six separate
occasions. Outpatient treatment was recommended to reduce the likelihood of
relapsing. However, she did not comply with the recommendation. The mother
went months at a time without contacting or visiting the child and was ultimately
incarcerated on charges stemming from a separate case distinct from the above
captioned proceedings.
The juvenile court subsequently terminated the mother’s parental rights to
the child under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e), (h), and (l) (2024).
II. Standard of Review
We review district court orders terminating parental rights de novo. In re
J.V., 23 N.W.3d 595, 603 (Iowa 2024). We use a three-step process to determine
if a statutory ground has been established, if the termination is in the child’s best
interests, and if any permissive exceptions should be applied to preclude
termination. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 294 (Iowa 2021).
III. Discussion
A. Grounds for Termination
When the district court terminates parental rights on multiple statutory
grounds, we may affirm on a single cited ground. In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774
(Iowa 2012).
The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights on three grounds,
set forth in Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(e) (h), and (l). We address termination
under section 232.116(h), which permits termination upon clear and convincing 4
evidence that: (1) “[t]he child is three years of age or younger”; (2) “[t]he child has
been adjudicated a child in need of assistance”; (3) “[t]he child has been removed
from the physical custody of the parents for at least six of the last twelve months”;
and (4) “the child cannot be returned to the custody of the [parent] . . . at the
present time.” The Iowa Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase “at the present
time” to mean at the time of the termination trial. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 473
(Iowa 2018).
The mother challenges only the fourth element: whether the child could
safely be returned to the mother’s custody at the time of the termination trial. But
she does not well articulate an argument specific to attacking that fourth element.2
Rather, she argues more generally that the department failed to meet its burden
of proof and she presented sufficient evidence at the termination trial to show she
maintained significant and meaningful contact with the child. We disagree.
At the termination trial, the mother testified that she was currently in jail but
would soon move to a halfway house. She presented little evidence to suggest
that the child could be safely returned to her home. She presented no evidence
that she could maintain sobriety outside of a correctional facility. Additionally, the
mother testified that she did not visit or interact with the child for multiple months
leading up to her incarceration because she was under the influence of
methamphetamine. She had only visited the child eighteen times in a period of
twenty-one months.
2 She was incarcerated at the time of the termination trial. 5
The mother would certainly not have been able to care for the child while
she was incarcerated or at the halfway house. She testified to this during the
termination trial. Incarceration aside, the mother’s continued use of
methamphetamine and inability to cooperate with drug testing and mental health
services convinces us that the child could not have been returned to the mother’s
custody at the time of the termination. The grounds for termination under
section 232.116(1)(h) were met.
B. Best Interests
The next step in our analysis is to consider the factors under
section 232.116(2). We must “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to
the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child,
and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa
Code § 232.116(2).
We consider the child’s long-term and immediate interests. In re J.H., 952
N.W.2d 157, 171 (Iowa 2020). The analysis requires us to look at what the future
may hold for the child if they are returned to the parents. Id. We look to a parent’s
past performance as it can help predict the quality of care the parent is able to
provide in the future. Id.
Termination is in the child’s best interest here. The mother has been unable
to provide stability for the child since he was born. She had no contact with the
child for the five months prior to termination. She continued to use
methamphetamine during part of that time, and was incarcerated for the two
months prior to termination. The mother testified at the termination trial that she 6
was in a worse position to take care of the child than she was at the beginning of
the case. Termination is appropriate and in the child’s best interest.
C. Permissive Exceptions and Department’s Reasonable Efforts
Next, we must decide whether any exceptions to termination under
section 232.116(3) apply. The mother argues that her closeness and bond with
the child should preclude termination. She testified at the termination trial that the
child’s eyes light up when she enters the room, and she can tell that something
“clicks” between the two during her visits. Our consideration, however, focuses on
whether termination will disadvantage the child, and whether the disadvantage
overcomes the parent’s inability to provide for the child’s developing needs. In re
D.W., 719 N.W.2d 703, 709 (Iowa 2010).
We do not challenge the mother’s claim that she loves the child. However,
love is not enough to justify our application of the exception. Id. The mother has
not demonstrated any meaningful ability to provide for the child’s needs. She
admitted at the termination trial that she was in a worse place to take care of the
child than she was at the beginning of these proceedings. Further, the department
caseworker testified that there was not a deep bond between the mother and the
child. Rather, the caseworker testified that the child has a bond with his placement
caregiver, and that the child is thriving in his placement. We decline to apply any
permissive exception.
D. Six Month Extension
The mother contends that she should be given a six-month extension to
pursue reunification with the child under Iowa Code section 232.104(2)(b). This is
an option available to us under Iowa Code section 232.117(5), which permits the 7
juvenile court to deny termination and enter a permanency order under
section 232.104. But we will only grant this option “if the need for removal ‘will no
longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.’” In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d
315, 323 (Iowa 2021) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b)). The mother’s
backsliding progress gives us little confidence that the situation will improve in six
months’ time. A child should not be forced to wait for their parent to be able to take
care of them, especially when there is such little evidence to rely on to believe the
circumstances will improve in six months. In re M.M., No. 15-0214, 2015 WL
1332330, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2015). An extension is not warranted.
AFFIRMED.