In the Interest of: B.L., a Minor Appeal of: E.L.

CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedSeptember 9, 2016
Docket201 MDA 2016
StatusUnpublished

This text of In the Interest of: B.L., a Minor Appeal of: E.L. (In the Interest of: B.L., a Minor Appeal of: E.L.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In the Interest of: B.L., a Minor Appeal of: E.L., (Pa. Ct. App. 2016).

Opinion

J-A22039-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: B.L., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: E.L., MOTHER : No. 201 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Dispositional Order December 21, 2015 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-36-DP-0000197-2015

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 09, 2016

Appellant, E.L. (“Mother”), challenges the order entered in the

Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas, which adjudicated B.L. (“Child”) a

dependent child and placed him in the custody of the Lancaster County Child

and Youth Social Service Agency (“Agency”). We affirm.

In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant

facts and procedural history of this case. Therefore, we have no reason to

restate them.

Mother raises the following issues:

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT [CHILD] IS AN ABUSED CHILD AND THAT MOTHER IS A PERPETRATOR OF ABUSE AGAINST CHILD?

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT [CHILD] IS A DEPENDENT CHILD WHERE THE TESTIMONY ESTABLISHED THAT THE PARENTS PROVIDED PROPER CARE AND CONTROL AND THAT SEPARATION FROM THE PARENTS WAS NOT NECESSARY? J-A22039-16

(Mother’s Brief at 4).

The applicable scope and standard of review for dependency cases is

as follows:

[T]he standard of review in dependency cases requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law. Accordingly, we review for an abuse of discretion.

In re A.B., 63 A.3d 345, 349 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting In re R.J.T., 608

Pa. 9, 26-27, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (2010)).

We accord great weight to this function of the hearing judge because [the court] is in the position to observe and rule upon the credibility of the witnesses and the parties who appear before [the court]. Relying upon [the court’s] unique posture, we will not overrule [its] findings if they are supported by competent evidence.

In re A.H., 763 A.2d 873, 875 (Pa.Super. 2000) (quoting In re B.B., 745

A.2d 620, 622 (Pa.Super. 1999)) (citations omitted). See also In re L.Z.,

___ Pa. ___, ___, 111 A.3d 1164, 1174 (2015) (reiterating standard of

review in dependency cases requires appellate court to accept trial court’s

findings of fact and credibility determinations if record supports them, but

appellate court is not required to accept trial court’s inferences or

conclusions of law); In re D.P., 972 A.2d 1221, 1225 (Pa.Super. 2009),

appeal denied, 601 Pa. 702, 973 A.2d 1007 (2009) (stating applicable

standard of review in dependency cases is “abuse of discretion”). Further, in

placement and custody cases involving dependent children:

-2- J-A22039-16

The trial court, not the appellate court, is charged with the responsibilities of evaluating credibility of the witnesses and resolving any conflicts in the testimony. In carrying out these responsibilities, the trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. When the trial court’s findings are supported by competent evidence of record, we will affirm even if the record could also support an opposite result.

In re S.G., 922 A.2d 943, 947 (Pa.Super. 2007).

The Child Protective Services Law defines “child abuse,” in relevant

part, as follows:

§ 6303. Definitions

(b.1) Child abuse.--The term “child abuse” shall mean intentionally, knowingly or recklessly doing any of the following:

(1) Causing bodily injury to a child through any recent act or failure to act.

* * *

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6303(b.1)(1).

The existence of “child abuse” pursuant to Section 6303(b.1) must be

proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re L.Z., supra. Under certain

circumstance, however, the identity of an abuser may be established by

prima facie evidence. Id. See also In re L.V., 127 A.3d 831, 837-38

(Pa.Super. 2015).

[E]vidence that a child suffered injury that would not ordinarily be sustained but for the acts or omissions of the parent or responsible person is sufficient to establish that the parent or responsible person perpetrated that abuse unless the parent or responsible person rebuts the presumption. The parent or responsible person may

-3- J-A22039-16

present evidence demonstrating that they did not inflict the abuse, potentially by testifying that they gave responsibility for the child to another person about whom they had no reason to fear or perhaps that the injuries were accidental rather than abusive. The evaluation of the validity of the presumption would then rest with the trial court evaluating the credibility of the prima facie evidence presented by the CYS agency and the rebuttal of the parent or responsible person.

In re L.Z., supra at ___, 111 A.3d at 1185 (internal footnote omitted).

Significantly, courts do not require a parent’s physical presence during

the injury for “abuse” to occur. Id. at ___, 111 A.3d at 1184. To the

contrary, our Supreme Court has stated, “parents are always responsible for

their children, absent extenuating circumstances….” Id. Moreover, “[t]he

inclusion of ‘omissions’ encompasses situations where the parent or

responsible person is not present at the time of the injury but is nonetheless

responsible due to…her failure to provide protection for the child.” Id.

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the

applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Jay J.

Hoberg, we conclude Mother’s issues merit no relief. The trial court’s

opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions

presented. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed April 4, 2016, at 1-11) (finding:

(1) at time of injury, Child was six months old; on day of injury, Child was

not moving his injured arm, necessitating visit to emergency room; nurse

practitioner who treated Child during emergency room visit initially believed

injury was “nursemaid’s elbow” and performed reduction procedure; after

-4- J-A22039-16

reduction, Child was still unable to use arm and cried in pain when arm was

moved; X-rays revealed Child had suffered spiral fracture of humerus, which

is commonly caused by twisting; Dr. Kathryn Crowell, expert in pediatrics

with specialty in child abuse, who evaluated Child, established Child’s injury

caused Child significant, ongoing pain; spiral fracture caused Child

substantial pain and impaired Child’s physical functioning; Mother initially

stated Child was fine before napping in Child’s swing on day of injury; Child’s

parents later stated injury could have been caused by Child “dancing” with

his four-year-old half-sister; Child’s parents also stated nurse practitioner’s

initial treatment caused Child’s injury; clear and convincing evidence

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