In the Interest of A.K., E.K., E.K., J.K., D.K., and D.K., Children v. the State of Texas

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedAugust 14, 2025
Docket10-25-00047-CV
StatusPublished

This text of In the Interest of A.K., E.K., E.K., J.K., D.K., and D.K., Children v. the State of Texas (In the Interest of A.K., E.K., E.K., J.K., D.K., and D.K., Children v. the State of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In the Interest of A.K., E.K., E.K., J.K., D.K., and D.K., Children v. the State of Texas, (Tex. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-25-00047-CV

In the Interest of A.K., E.K., E.K., J.K., D.K., and D.K., Children

On appeal from the 82nd District Court of Robertson County, Texas Judge Bryan F. Russ, Jr., presiding Trial Court Cause No. 24-05-21858-CV

CHIEF JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Following a bench trial, the parental rights of the father of A.K., E.K.,

E.K., J.K., D.K., and D.K. (Father) were terminated. 1 The trial court found by

clear and convincing evidence that Father had violated Family Code

subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and that termination was in the children’s

best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b). In two issues, Father

contends that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the

trial court’s termination findings. We will affirm.

1 Following a jury trial, the parental rights of the mother of A.K., E.K., E.K., J.K., D.K., and

D.K. (Mother) were also terminated, but she has not appealed. The standards of review for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence

in cases involving the termination of parental rights are well established and

will not be repeated here. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264–68 (Tex. 2002)

(legal sufficiency); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002) (factual sufficiency).

In a bench trial, the trial court, as factfinder, is the sole judge of the witnesses’

credibility and demeanor. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009).

In a proceeding to terminate the parent-child relationship brought under

section 161.001 of the Family Code, the Department of Family and Protective

Services (the Department) must establish by clear and convincing evidence two

elements: (1) that the respondent parent committed one or more acts or

omissions enumerated under subsection (b)(1), termed a predicate violation,

and (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE

ANN. § 161.001(b); In re J.F.-G., 612 S.W.3d 373, 381 (Tex. App.—Waco 2020)

(mem. op.), aff’d, 627 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. 2021). Proof of one element does not

relieve the petitioner of the burden of proving the other. J.F.-G., 612 S.W.3d

at 381.

PREDICATE VIOLATIONS

Father first contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the

trial court’s findings that he violated Family Code subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D)

In the Interest of A.K., E.K., E.K., J.K., D.K., and D.K., Children Page 2 and (E). 2 We begin with Father’s argument that the evidence was insufficient

to support the trial court’s finding that he violated subsection (E).

Termination under subsection (E) requires clear and convincing evidence

that the parent has “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with

persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional

well-being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). To

“endanger” means to expose the child to loss or injury, to jeopardize. Tex. Dep’t

of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987). The relevant

inquiry under subsection (E) is whether sufficient evidence exists that the

endangerment of the child’s well-being was the direct result of the parent’s

conduct, including acts, omissions, or failures to act. In re E.M., 494 S.W.3d

209, 222 (Tex. App.—Waco 2015, pet. denied).

Scienter is not required for a parent’s own acts to constitute

endangerment under subsection (E). See In re L.S., No. 10-22-00119-CV, 2022

WL 3655395, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 24, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). It is

also not necessary to show that the parent’s conduct was directed at the child

or that the child suffered actual injury. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533. The specific

danger to the child’s well-being may be inferred from the parent’s misconduct

2 In the statement of his issues in his initial appellant’s brief and then again in his reply brief,

Father additionally asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding by the trial court that he violated Family Code subsection 161.001(b)(1)(O); however, the trial court did not find that Father violated subsection (O). Accordingly, we need not address this contention by Father.

In the Interest of A.K., E.K., E.K., J.K., D.K., and D.K., Children Page 3 alone. Id. Furthermore, we may consider conduct both before and after the

child’s removal in an analysis under subsection (E). In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d

351, 360 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).

The relevant evidence presented here was as follows: Father and Mother

married in 2010, and although Father testified that he did not intend to remain

married to Mother, they were still married at the time of trial in November

2024. At the time of trial, their daughters A.K. and D.K. were thirteen and six

years old, respectively, while their sons E.K., E.K., J.K., and D.K. were twelve,

eleven, ten, and seven years old, respectively. Mother testified that the

family’s first interaction with the Department was around March 2024, after

A.K. had run away from the family’s apartment home in Hearne. A.K. was

found at a McDonald’s and taken to the police department. A police officer and

someone from the Department returned A.K. home. Mother testified that A.K.

denied any abuse at that time. A.K. then ran away from home a second time.

She was later found at a gas station and returned home by the police. Mother

stated that the Department closed its case at that time but provided her

information about a program and therapy services for A.K. Mother did not

utilize those resources, however, because she could not afford them.

Lidia Chandler Davis testified that she was then called to a certain

restaurant in Hearne at about 7:45 a.m. on May 9, 2024, after the junior high

principal had seen A.K. there. Davis was employed by Hearne ISD at the time

In the Interest of A.K., E.K., E.K., J.K., D.K., and D.K., Children Page 4 and had been A.K.’s academic adviser when A.K. had been enrolled in school

there for about a week. Mother testified that she had enrolled the children in

school at Hearne ISD but that the children had only stayed there for about a

week because she did not like the school system. Mother thereafter

homeschooled all the children.

Davis testified that she arrived at the restaurant and talked with A.K.

A.K. was “cold, dirty, bruised, and hungry” and appeared scared. Davis bought

A.K. five tacos, and she ate them all. Davis believed that A.K. needed help;

therefore, she drove A.K. to the HealthPoint clinic where A.K. was assessed.

Ashley Richardson, a family nurse practitioner at Hearne HealthPoint,

testified that it was her understanding that when school personnel brought

A.K. into the clinic on May 9, 2024, A.K. had been found walking or running

down the street. A.K. arrived at the clinic not wearing any shoes, but she was

wearing a trench coat and a beanie despite it being summertime. A.K. was

cold and trembling and would not make eye contact. Richardson opined that

A.K. did not look like a thirteen-year-old girl. Due to abuse concerns,

Richardson examined A.K.

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In the Interest of A.K., E.K., E.K., J.K., D.K., and D.K., Children v. the State of Texas, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-the-interest-of-ak-ek-ek-jk-dk-and-dk-children-v-the-texapp-2025.