J-S43031-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: B.M., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: B.M., MINOR : : : : : No. 1380 EDA 2024
Appeal from the Dispositional Order Entered March 5, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-JV-0000185-2023
BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 25, 2025
B.M. appeals from the dispositional order following her delinquency
adjudication of two counts of harassment and one count of aggravated
assault.1 B.M. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for the aggravated
assault charge and the finding of delinquency. 2 After review, we affirm.
____________________________________________
1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709(a)(1) (harassment); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(5) (aggravated assault).
2 B.M. was a minor and a high school student in March 2023 when she committed the acts that led to her delinquency charges. Although she turned eighteen and graduated from high school in June 2023, the juvenile court retained jurisdiction over her. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302 (defining “Child,” in relevant part, as an individual who “is under the age of 21 years who committed an act of delinquency before reaching the age of 18 years”); Pa.R.J.C.P. 630, Comment (“The Juvenile Court has jurisdiction of a delinquent child if the child is under twenty-one years and committed an act of delinquency prior to reaching the age of eighteen.” (citations omitted)); Commonwealth v. Armolt, 294 A.3d 364, 372 (Pa. 2023). J-S43031-24
In its opinion filed pursuant to Appellate Rule 1925(a), the juvenile court
provided the following factual history:
This case involves an incident which occurred on March 21, 2023 at Morrisville Middle/Senior High School in Morrisville, Bucks County. The incident involved B.M. having physical contact with two school staff members — Principal, Heather Brahan (“Ms. Brahan”) and Assistant Principal, Brian Oberdick (“Mr. Oberdick”). Prior to the incident, B.M. had been engaged in a verbal altercation with another student. To keep the argument from escalating, school staff members secured the other student in a classroom and then blocked B.M.’s access to the classroom. B.M. was directed by a school staff member to walk away from the classroom and down the hallway. At first she complied, but then B.M. turned around and began making her way back toward the classroom. Multiple school staff members attempted to prevent B.M. from returning to the classroom, including Mr. Oberdick who B.M. pushed aside. Ms. Brahan, the last staff member between B.M. and the classroom, reached out and grabbed B.M. to stop her. In response, B.M. forcefully twisted and threw about her arms and elbows making hard physical contact with Ms. Brahan. Ms. Brahan hit her head on the wall and fell to the ground. The entire incident involving B.M. and Ms. Brahan was captured on video.
Juvenile Court Opinion (J.C.O.), 8/6/24, at 1.
After the incident, the Commonwealth filed a delinquency petition
charging B.M. with two counts of aggravated assault and two counts of
harassment. Ms. Brahan and Mr. Oberdick were the alleged victims. The
juvenile court held the first part of the adjudicatory hearing on December 5,
2023, and heard testimony from Ms. Brahan and Mr. Oberdick for the
Commonwealth. The video of the incident was entered into evidence without
objection. The court also heard testimony from two witnesses for B.M.:
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Elizabeth Witting, B.M.’s friend and schoolmate and Ms. Bolduc, a special
education teacher.
At the conclusion of the testimony, the court found that the
Commonwealth met its burden of proof for the two counts of harassment (one
count against Mr. Oberdick and one count against Ms. Brahan) and for one
count of aggravated assault against Ms. Brahan. The court also found as a
matter of fact that B.M. had committed the delinquent acts which formed the
basis of those offenses.
The juvenile court began the second part of the adjudicatory hearing on
January 30, 2024. The court entered a YLS Assessment Summary (the YLS)
for B.M. into evidence without objection. Juvenile Probation Officer Richard
Carbo (Officer Carbo) testified that, although B.M. had scored “low” for total
risk/need level on the YLS, B.M. would benefit from treatment and supervision.
B.M. testified that she graduated high school a few months after the incident,
was living with her mother, was employed and working thirty to thirty-five
hours per week, and had not had any police contact since the incident. B.M.
stated that she had applied for a medical marijuana card and expected to
receive it soon. The hearing was continued, to wait for a physical copy of
B.M.’s medical marijuana card.
The hearing resumed on March 5, 2024, and B.M. and Officer Carbo
testified again. The juvenile court adjudicated B.M. delinquent on two counts
of harassment and one count of aggravated assault. The court found that
B.M. needed treatment, specifically as it related to her trauma and anger
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management. The court imposed a disposition which placed B.M. on indefinite
probation and required her to comply with the standard conditions of
probation, have no contact with the victims, write letters of apology, attend
an empathy class, continue to work full time or further her education, take an
anger-management class, and participate in specific therapy.
After filing post-dispositional motions, which the juvenile court denied,
B.M. timely filed this appeal. She presents the following two issues for our
review:
1. Was the evidence insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that [B.M.] committed the crime of aggravated assault where the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she acted intentionally or knowingly?
2. Was the evidence insufficient to support a finding of deliquency [sic] where the Commonwealth failed to establish that [B.M.] was in need of treatment, rehabilitation or supervision?
B.M.’s Brief at 11 (capitalization adjusted).
We begin by observing our standard of review when evaluating the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting an adjudication of delinquency:
When a juvenile is charged with an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult, the Commonwealth must establish the elements of the crime by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence following an adjudication of delinquency, we must review the entire record and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.
In determining whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to meet its burden of proof, the test to be applied is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most
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favorable to the Commonwealth, and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom, there is sufficient evidence to find every element of the crime charged. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by wholly circumstantial evidence.
The facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not be absolutely incompatible with a defendant’s innocence. Questions of doubt are for the hearing judge, unless the evidence is so weak that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances established by the Commonwealth.
Interest of D.J.B., 230 A.3d 379, 386 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted).
Additionally:
As an appellate court, we must review the entire record...and all evidence actually received[.] [T]he trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence. Because evidentiary sufficiency is a question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.
Id. at 387 (citation omitted).
B.M.’s first appellate issue challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the aggravated assault charge.3 A juvenile may be adjudicated
delinquent of aggravated assault if she:
(5) attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to a teaching staff member, school board member or other employee, including a student employee, of any elementary or secondary publicly-funded educational institution, any elementary or secondary private school licensed by the Department of Education or any elementary or secondary parochial school while acting in the scope of ____________________________________________
3 B.M. does not challenge the two harassment charges on appeal.
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his or her employment or because of his or her employment relationship to the school
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(5).
B.M. does not contest that Ms. Brahan was a school employee acting in
the scope of her employment at the time of the incident. See id. B.M. also
does not contest that Ms. Brahan suffered bodily injury. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
2301 (defining “bodily injury”). B.M. only challenges the mens rea element
of this offense i.e whether the Commonwealth proved that she intentionally
or knowingly caused bodily injury to Ms. Brahan. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
2702(a)(5).
A person acts intentionally with respect to a material element of an
offense when, “if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result
thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to
cause such a result.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(1)(i). A person acts knowingly
with respect to a material element of an offense when, “if the element involves
a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct
will cause such a result.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(2)(ii).
B.M. contends there was insufficient evidence to prove that she intended
to cause, or was aware that it was practically certain that her conduct would
cause, bodily injury to Ms. Brahan. See B.M.’s Brief at 18, 22. B.M. asserts
that after being grabbed by Ms. Brahan, she flailed her arm one time to get
away. See id. at 18, 21-22. According to B.M., she did not engage in the
type of continued physical violence that our Court has previously found to be
sufficient evidence of intent. See id. at 18. Instead, her actions amounted
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to mere recklessness at most. Id. at 19. B.M. cites the video of the incident
and the testimony of the witnesses to support her argument that she did not
punch Ms. Brahan, but instead simply flailed her arm one time. See id. at
19-22.
When reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, the evidence is sufficient for a finding of aggravated assault.
The video shows that after staff separated B.M. and the other student, B.M.
initially walked one way down the hallway. She then turned around and came
back towards the classroom with the other student. There were several people
in the hallway, including Mr. Oberdick and Ms. Bolduc, who both unsuccessfully
attempted to block B.M.’s path. B.M. moved past Mr. Oberdick and Ms. Bolduc
and continued down the hallway. Ms. Brahan then attempted to block B.M.’s
path. As B.M. moved around Ms. Brahan, Ms. Brahan reached out and grabbed
B.M. from behind. B.M. then twisted around and threw her arms up multiple
times in the direction of Ms. Brahan, who hit the wall and fell to the floor. As
Ms. Brahan fell, Mr. Oberdick stepped between B.M. and Ms. Brahan, put his
arms around B.M., and moved her across the hallway. B.M. initially continued
to struggle and attempted to move back towards Ms. Brahan, but then
stopped.
Contrary to B.M.’s characterization, the video does not indicate that she
simply flailed her arm one time. See B.M.’s Brief at 18, 21-22. Instead, the
video supports the juvenile court’s determination that, while in close physical
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contact with Ms. Brahan, B.M. violently twisted and threw her arms and elbows
around. See J.C.O. at 20.
Additionally, the testimony of the witnesses indicates this was more than
mere recklessness. The testimony reflects that B.M. was determined to reach
the other student. Ms. Bolduc stated that B.M. was in a verbal altercation with
another student. See N.T., 12/5/23, at 49-50. Ms. Witting testified that she
went with B.M. into the hallway to prevent B.M. from fighting someone. See
id. at 45-46. Ms. Brahan and Mr. Oberdick testified that B.M. was screaming
and trying to push past the adults in the hallway. See id. at 9-13, 26-27.
Regarding the contact itself, Ms. Bolduc testified that B.M. threw her
arms up in the air. Id. at 51. Mr. Oberdick testified that B.M. made hard,
physical contact with Ms. Brahan, in what looked like B.M. shoving Ms. Brahan
with one arm.4 See id. at 31, 35. Notably, the juvenile court found this
testimony to be credible. J.C.O. at 20, n. 10.
The only contradictory evidence was Ms. Witting’s testimony that Ms.
Brahan grabbed B.M. and then tripped and fell to the floor. N.T., 12/5/23, at
45. However, the juvenile court did not find this testimony to be credible.
J.C.O. at 20, n. 10.
Significantly, the juvenile court, as the factfinder, was free to believe
all, part or none of the evidence presented, including the differing testimony. ____________________________________________
4 Although Mr. Oberdick’s testimony at the hearing differed from his written
statement where he indicated that Ms. Brahan slipped, this discrepancy is irrelevant because the court found his hearing testimony to be credible. Exhibit D-1; see N.T., 12/5/23, at 32-34; see also J.C.O. at 20, n.10.
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See D.J.B., 230 A.3d at 387 (citation omitted). Furthermore, the facts and
circumstances need not be absolutely incompatible with a defendant’s
innocence. See id. at 386 (citation omitted). “Questions of doubt are for the
hearing judge, unless the evidence is so weak that, as a matter of law, no
probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances established
by the Commonwealth.” Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, it was the role of
the juvenile court, not this Court, to determine which evidence to believe and
to resolve any questions of doubt.
When reviewing the video and testimony in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth, we cannot say that “the evidence is so weak that, as a
matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined
circumstances established by the Commonwealth.” Id. (citation omitted).
The evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination that, at a minimum,
B.M. was aware that her conduct (violently twisting and throwing her arms
around when in close contact with Ms. Brahan near the hallway lockers and
wall) was practically certain to cause the result (Ms. Brahan suffering bodily
injury). See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(2)(ii). Thus, the evidence was sufficient
to meet the mens rea element of aggravated assault—that B.M. knowingly
caused bodily injury to Ms. Brahan. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(5). B.M.’s first
issue merits no relief.
In her second appellate issue, B.M. challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence that she needed treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation. After
determining that a juvenile committed the relevant acts for which the juvenile
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is alleged to be delinquent, the juvenile court “shall then proceed . . . to hear
evidence as to whether the child is in need of treatment, supervision or
rehabilitation, as established by a preponderance of the evidence[.]” 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 6341(b).
Our Supreme Court has confirmed that the requirement for a
delinquency adjudication is twofold; “the juvenile court must (1) determine
that the juvenile has committed a delinquent act, and (2) determine that the
juvenile requires treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation.” Commonwealth
v. M.W., 39 A.3d 958, 966 (Pa. 2012). “A determination that a child has
committed a delinquent act does not, on its own, warrant an adjudication of
delinquency.” Id.
This is true even in the case of a felony; although a felony presumptively
supports a finding that a juvenile is in need of treatment, supervision, or
rehabilitation, the juvenile court must still make that finding after allowing for
other evidence. See id. at 966, n. 9. Nevertheless, “[i]n the absence of
evidence to the contrary, evidence of the commission of acts which constitute
a felony shall be sufficient to sustain a finding that the child is in need of
treatment, supervision or rehabilitation.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6341(b). We review
the juvenile court’s findings under the second part of the delinquency
adjudication for an abuse of discretion. See Interest of C.B., 241 A.3d 677,
686 (Pa. Super. 2020); cf. In re T.L.B., 127 A.3d 813, 819 (Pa. Super. 2015).
Instantly, the juvenile court found that B.M. had committed the alleged
crimes, including aggravated assault which was a second-degree felony. The
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court then held a separate hearing to determine if B.M. needed treatment,
supervision, or rehabilitation. J.C.O. at 23. The court considered the evidence
B.M. presented that she did not need treatment, which included her progress
since the incident and the positive circumstances in her life. See id. The
court also considered the contrary evidence including, among other things,
the nature of her offenses, and her behavior, trauma, and attitude. See id.
at 23-25. The court concluded that “B.M. had not rebutted the statutory
presumption and was in need of treatment and required supervision to assure
such treatment occurred.” Id. at 23. Thus, the court adjudicated B.M.
delinquent.
B.M. challenges the juvenile court’s finding and argues that the
Commonwealth did not present any evidence regarding her need for
treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation, and that her evidence rebutted the
statutory presumption. See B.M.’s Brief at 24.
Based on the record before us, we discern no abuse of discretion in the
juvenile court’s finding that B.M. was in need of treatment. B.M.’s aggravated
assault charge was a second-degree felony. Absent evidence to the contrary,
this alone created a presumption that she needed treatment, supervision, or
rehabilitation. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6341(b).
Here, Officer Carbo testified that although B.M. had scored as “low” on
the YLS, he felt she would benefit from treatment and supervision given the
seriousness of the alleged felony offense and B.M.’s prior history. See N.T.,
1/30/24, at 6; N.T., 3/5/24, at 9. B.M. discounts Officer Carbo’s opinion partly
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because her history consisted of only one prior adjudication. See B.M.’s Brief
at 25. However, it was the juvenile court’s job as the factfinder, not this
Court’s job, to weigh the evidence. See D.J.B., 230 A.3d at 387 (citation
omitted).
B.M. also argues that the YLS determined she was a “low risk.” B.M.’s
Brief at 24. However, the juvenile court observed that the YLS contained a
professional override which raised B.M. to a moderate risk level. This was due
to the seriousness of the instant crimes, B.M.’s prior trauma, and her prior
history with juvenile court. YLS Assessment Summary at 8 (unnumbered);
see J.C.O. at 9.
Finally, B.M. claims she did not need treatment, supervision, or
rehabilitation because she graduated from high school after the incident,
completed community service, became employed, obtained her medical
marijuana card, has had no police contact since March 2023, and is involved
in therapy. B.M.’s Brief at 25-26. However, her testimony regarding her
therapy was inconsistent. On the first day of the hearing, B.M. testified that
she had not engaged in any anger management or aggression replacement
training or any treatment. See N.T., 1/30/24, at 11. On the second day of
the hearing, only a little over a month later, B.M. testified that she had been
seeing a therapist for three months as a result of trauma from 2019. See
N.T., 3/5/24, at 7-8. Notably, the juvenile court felt B.M. had exaggerated
how long she had been in therapy, and B.M.’s recent interest in therapy was
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“not based upon a genuine wish to address her trauma, but rather, merely
represented an attempt to avoid being adjudicated delinquent.” J.C.O. at 25.
We reiterate that, as the factfinder, the juvenile court was free to believe
all, part or none of the evidence presented. See D.J.B., 230 A.3d at 387
(citation omitted). The juvenile court believed that B.M. needed treatment to
address her history of acting impulsively, being unable to control her anger,
and engaging in aggressive conduct. See J.C.O. at 25. Based on the record
before us, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in finding that
B.M. did not overcome the presumption that she was in need of treatment,
supervision, or rehabilitation. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6341(b); see also C.B.,
241 A.3d at 686. B.M.’s second issue merits no relief.
In sum, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that B.M. committed the delinquent act of
aggravated assault and to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
B.M. was in need of treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation. Thus, the
Commonwealth proved both parts of the delinquency adjudication. We discern
no error of law or abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s findings.
Order affirmed.
Date: 2/25/2025
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