In the Int. of: A.D., Appeal of: A.D.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: January 30, 2025
• Docket: 1056 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S48005-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.D., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: A.D., MINOR : : : : : No. 1056 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Dispositional Order Entered February 26, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No: CP-51-JV-0000645-2023

BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JANUARY 30, 2025

Appellant, A.D., a juvenile, appeals from the dispositional order entered

on February 26, 2024, adjudicating him delinquent of receiving stolen

property, unauthorized use of automobiles and evading arrest or detention on

foot. Upon review, we affirm.

On April 6, 2023, at approximately 1:10 A.M., Officer Omair Chughtai of

the Philadelphia Police Department was working undercover and operating an

unmarked vehicle when he observed a white Honda Civic driving without

headlights or taillights.1 N.T. Hearing, 2/26/24, at 16-17. Officer Chughtai

radioed dispatch with the vehicle’s registration number and learned that the

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1 As Officer Chughtai was operating an undercover vehicle, he was equipped

with a body-worn camera. N.T. Hearing, 2/26/24, at 23. The encounter was captured on video and was played for the juvenile court. Id. at 23-28. J-S48005-24

vehicle was reported stolen. Id. at 18-19. He requested additional officers

to the scene and then activated his emergency lights and siren. Id. at 20.

The vehicle did not pull over and initially continued travelling at a normal

speed, and then accelerated to a higher rate. Id. at 21. Officer Chughtai

followed the vehicle for less than a mile when the vehicle became disabled

after hitting a curb. Id. at 22. Multiple people exited the vehicle and fled on

foot. Id. Officer Chughtai chased after the driver, later identified as

Appellant, on foot. Id. Officer Chughtai lost sight of Appellant for

approximately two and a half minutes. Id. at 32. He eventually located

Appellant hiding behind a building in the fetal position. Id. at 23.

On April 7, 2023, the Commonwealth filed a delinquency petition

alleging that Appellant committed the delinquent acts of receiving stolen

property and unauthorized use of automobiles. On August 4, 2023, following

a hearing, the juvenile court permitted the Commonwealth to amend the

delinquency petition to add the delinquent acts of conspiracy, criminal mischief

and evading arrest or detention on foot. Following another hearing, on

February 26, 2024, the juvenile court adjudicated Appellant delinquent of

receiving stolen property, unauthorized use of automobiles and evading arrest

or detention on foot. Appellant was ordered to serve probation with GPS

monitoring and curfew, and to complete the following: (1) random drug tests;

(2) outpatient therapy and take any prescribed medication; (3) attend school

with no unexcused absences, lateness or suspensions; (4) write a 250-word

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apology letter; (5) attend 7.5 hours of PYAP weekly; and (6) continue

functional family therapy.

Appellant filed a post-dispositional motion, which was denied by

operation of law. This appeal followed. Both Appellant and the juvenile court

have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant raises two issues for our

review:

A. Does a juvenile court err as a matter of law and abuse its discretion under Pa.R.E. 404(b)(3) when it permits the Commonwealth to elicit and admit evidence of a defendant’s alleged prior act of stealing a vehicle when the Commonwealth does not provide reasonable notice to the juvenile defendant in advance of the adjudicatory hearing?

B. Does sufficient evidence exist to support a finding that a juvenile has committed the offense of evading arrest under 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 5104.2 when the Commonwealth fails to prove that:

1. the juvenile knowingly and intentionally fled from a public servant, when the person chasing him was in an unmarked car and never identified himself as police; and

2. the juvenile knowingly and intentional[ly] fled from a person he believed was permitted to conduct a lawful detention, where the identity of the officer was unknown, and even if it was known, that he knew the undercover officer was permitted to make an arrest?

Appellant’s Brief, at 3.

In Appellant’s first issue, he argues that the trial court improperly

admitted testimony of other crimes in violation of Pa.R.E. 404(b) because the

Commonwealth failed to give him the required notice. Id. at 13-24. The

Commonwealth presented the complainant, L.M.C., who testified that he

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purchased the white Honda Civic but registered it under his cousin’s name

because he does not have a social security number or ability to obtain a state

identification card. N.T. Hearing, 2/26/24, at 37-38. L.M.C. was the only one

in possession of the vehicle from the time it was purchased until it was stolen

on April 5, 2023. Id. at 39. He was working for DoorDash and left his vehicle

running, but kept the keys in his pocket, while he picked up an order at Panera

Bread. Id. at 39-40. While inside Panera, he looked outside and saw someone

inside of his vehicle. Id. at 39. L.M.C. ran after the vehicle, caught up to it

and tried to open the door, but the individual took off speeding. Id.

The Commonwealth then asked L.M.C. if he could identify the individual

who stole his car. Id. at 40. Appellant objected on the ground that the

Commonwealth failed to provide notice pursuant to Rule 404(b)(3). Id. The

juvenile court overruled the objection, stating that the question was relevant.

Id. L.M.C. identified Appellant as the person who stole his vehicle on April 5,

2023, and testified that he did not give him permission to drive it. Id. at 40-

41, 43.

Appellant contends that L.M.C.’s testimony falls under Pa.R.E. 404(b)

because it related to a distinct act (stealing a vehicle) separate from those

outlined in the delinquency petition (possession of a stolen vehicle).

Appellant’s Brief, at 13-14. Since L.M.C.’s testimony related to a distinct prior

bad act, he argues that the Commonwealth was required to provide notice

pursuant to Pa.R.E. 404(b)(3). Id. at 18-20. Appellant claims he was unfairly

surprised by L.M.C.’s testimony and “was not aware that he would be

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identified, mid-trial, as the person who took the car.” Id. at 17-18. He cites

Commonwealth v. Martin, 577 A.2d 200 (Pa. Super. 2009), as support for

his position. Id. at 15-18.

It is well settled that evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion

of the trial court. Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 265 A.3d 290, 297 (Pa.

2021). A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence will only be

reversed where there has been an abuse of discretion:

An appellate court will not find an abuse of discretion based on a mere error of judgment, but rather . . . where the [trial] court has reached a conclusion which overrides or misapplies the law, or where the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.

Id. at 298 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Generally,

“[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a

person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person

acted in accordance with the character.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). However, such

evidence may be admissible to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,

plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident where the

probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect. Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2). If the

Commonwealth intends to submit evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts, it

“must provide reasonable notice in advance of trial.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(3).

Martin is distinguishable for a couple of reasons. First, Martin is not a

404(b) case. Rather, it addressed the then-recent statute consolidating

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various theft offenses, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 39022, and whether the Commonwealth

was required “to give notice . . . [of] the specific provision of the theft statute

under which it intends to seek a guilty verdict where the specific theft offense

charged is different from the one the Commonwealth is attempting to establish

at trial.” Martin, 577 A.2d at 201. The defendant in Martin was charged and

found guilty of theft of property lost, mislaid, or delivered by mistake. Id.

However, the trial court found that the Commonwealth failed to prove the

elements of theft of property lost, mislaid, or delivered by mistake. Id. at

202. The Commonwealth argued post-trial, and the trial court agreed, that

“regardless of the specific theft provision charged, the Commonwealth can

prevail if it proves beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of any of the theft

offenses defined in Chapter 39 of the Crimes Code . . . so long as the defendant

is not prejudiced by lack of fair notice or surprise.” Id. The trial court found

that even though the Commonwealth failed to prove the elements of theft of

property lost, mislaid or delivered by mistake, the Commonwealth met its

burden of proving receiving stolen property. Id.

This Court reversed. We noted that the trial court was correct that a

verdict based on proof of receiving stolen property may be valid even though ____________________________________________

2 Section 3902 provides: “Conduct denominated theft in this chapter constitutes a single offense. An accusation of theft may be supported by evidence that it was committed in any manner that would be theft under this chapter, notwithstanding the specification of a different manner in the complaint or indictment, subject only to the power of the court to ensure fair trial by granting a continuance or other appropriate relief where the conduct of the defense would be prejudiced by lack of fair notice or by surprise.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3902.

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the defendant was charged with theft of property lost, mislaid or delivered by

mistake. Id. at 203. However, we concluded that the defendant was

prejudiced by lack of fair notice or surprise, because Section 3902 requires

the Commonwealth to give notice as to which theft offense it is attempting to

prove. Id. at 204. We further noted that the jury did not decide the issue of

whether the defendant was guilty of receiving stolen property because the

jury was not instructed on the elements of that crime. Id. Thus, Martin only

addressed an issue arising under Section 3902, not the Rule 404(b) issue now

before us.

Second, unlike Martin, Appellant was charged with the same delinquent

acts for which he was adjudicated – receiving stolen property, unlawful use of

automobiles and evading arrest or detention by foot. He was not charged,

nor adjudicated delinquent, of stealing the vehicle. There was no lack of fair

notice or surprise as to which theft offense the Commonwealth pursued

against Appellant. Thus, Martin is not applicable to this case.

The juvenile court, in permitting L.M.C.’s testimony regarding who stole

his vehicle, reasoned that such testimony was relevant “in establishing that

the Complainant had the vehicle when it was stolen from him on April 5, 2023,

and that the vehicle was in brand new condition before being stolen.” Trial

Court Opinion, 6/13/24, at 9. It further noted that Rule 404 was not applicable

because the evidence was not used as character evidence to prove Appellant

acted in conformity with a prior bad act or to show that he had a propensity

to commit the delinquent act. Id. We agree.

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Rule 404 does not apply to L.M.C.’s testimony because it was not used

to show other uncharged crimes or to prove Appellant’s character. Instead, it

was used to prove the elements of the offenses for which Appellant was

charged, receiving stolen property and unauthorized use of automobiles. “A

person is guilty of [receiving stolen property] if he intentionally receives,

retains, or disposes of movable property of another knowing that it has been

stolen, or believing that it has probably been stolen, unless the property is

received, retained, or disposed with intent to restore it to the owner.” 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a). L.M.C.’s testimony was relevant to establish that

Appellant received or retained L.M.C.’s vehicle and that Appellant knew or

believed the vehicle was stolen. A person commits unauthorized use of

automobiles “if he operates the automobile . . . of another without consent of

the owner.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3928(a). L.M.C.’s testimony was relevant to prove

that Appellant operated L.M.C.’s automobile without his consent. Accordingly,

no relief is due on this claim.

In Appellant’s second claim, he argues that the evidence was not

sufficient to support his adjudication of evading arrest or detention on foot.

Appellant’s Brief, at 24-29. He argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove

the requisite mens rea of the offense. Id. at 24. Specifically, he contends

that the Commonwealth was required to prove that Appellant knew that a

public servant was attempting to lawfully arrest or detain him. Id. Appellant

concedes that Officer Chughtai was a public servant but does not concede that

he knew Officer Chughtai was a public servant prior to his arrest. Id.

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Our standard of review when faced with a challenge to the sufficiency of

the evidence is:

whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 A.3d 544, 559-60 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc)

(citations omitted). For evading arrest or detention on foot, the

Commonwealth must prove that “the person knowingly and intentionally flees

on foot from a public servant attempting to lawfully arrest or detain that

person.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5104.2.

Appellant first contends that he was unaware Officer Chughtai was a

public servant because he did not identify himself as a law enforcement officer.

Appellant’s Brief, at 26-28. This argument is unavailing. Although Officer

Chughtai was operating an undercover vehicle, he activated his emergency

lights and siren to conduct a traffic stop once he learned the vehicle was

reported stolen. Additional officers were also on scene to assist Officer

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Chughtai, which can be seen on his body-worn camera as marked vehicles

using their emergency lights. Emergency lights and sirens are commonly used

to identify a vehicle as a law enforcement officer, as opposed to a potentially

dangerous stranger. See Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 174 A.3d 609,

621 (Pa. 2017). We find the use of emergency lights under the circumstances

present here sufficient for Appellant to know that he was running from a public

servant, namely a law enforcement officer.

Next, Appellant argues that he did not know that he was fleeing from a

lawful detention or arrest. While there is no caselaw relative to this statute,

we are guided by caselaw relative to resisting arrest as both statutes use the

term “lawful arrest” in their definitions. Our Supreme Court has established

that a lawful arrest is an element of the crime of resisting arrest.

Commonwealth v. Jackson, 924 A.2d 618, 620 (Pa. 2007). “[T]he

lawfulness of an arrest depends on the existence of probable cause to arrest

the defendant.” Id. A person’s knowledge of whether a police officer is

attempting to make a lawful arrest or detention is not an element of the

offense.

Here, Officer Chughtai was working undercover when he observed a

vehicle driving without headlights or taillights in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. §

4302 (periods of required lighted lamps). He was informed by dispatch that

the car was reported stolen. When he attempted to stop the vehicle by using

his emergency lights and siren, it fled. When the vehicle became disabled,

the occupants jumped out and ran. Officer Chughtai gave chase and

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ultimately apprehended Appellant. As such, we conclude that Officer Chughtai

had probable cause to detain Appellant regarding the stolen vehicle.

Therefore, there was sufficient evidence presented to support Appellant’s

adjudication of evading arrest or detention on foot.

Order affirmed.

Date: 1/30/2025

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