In re Z.W.

2025 Ohio 1410

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 21, 2025
• Docket: 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re Z.W., 2025-Ohio-1410.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT HANCOCK COUNTY

IN RE: CASE NO. 5-24-18 Z.W.,

ADJUDICATED DEPENDENT CHILD. OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY [MCKENNA P. - APPELLANT]

IN RE: CASE NO. 5-24-19 C.P.,

ADJUDICATED NEGLECTED AND DEPENDENT CHILD. OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY [MCKENNA P. - APPELLANT] [JOHNATHON P. - APPELLANT]

IN RE: CASE NO. 5-24-20 B.P.,

ADJUDICATED NEGLECTED AND DEPENDENT CHILD. OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY [MCKENNA P. - APPELLANT] [JOHNATHON P. - APPELLANT] Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

IN RE: CASE NO. 5-24-21 J.P.,

ADJUDICATED NEGLECTED AND DEPENDENT CHILD. OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY [MCKENNA P. - APPELLANT] [JOHNATHON P. - APPELLANT] [J.P. - APPELLANT]

Appeals from Hancock County Common Pleas Court Juvenile Division Trial Court Nos. 2022 AND 0039, 20213011, 20213012 and 20213013

Judgments Affirmed Date of Decision: April 21, 2025

APPEARANCES:

Dorothy L. Williams for Appellant McKenna P. John C. Filkins III for Appellant Johnathon P. Alison Boggs for Appellant J.P. Miranda M. Lobdell for Appellee

WALDICK, P.J. Case Number 5-24-18

{¶1} In this appeal, mother-appellant, McKenna P. (“McKenna”), appeals

the May 28, 2024 judgment of the Hancock County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile

Division, granting permanent custody of her daughter “Z.W.” to the appellee,

-2- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

Hancock County Job and Family Services – Children’s Protective Services Unit

(“CPSU” or “the agency”). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment

of the trial court.

Case Numbers 5-24-19, 5-24-20, and 5-24-21

{¶2} In these three appeals, mother-appellant, McKenna P. (“McKenna”),

and father-appellant, Johnathon P. (“Johnathon”), separately appeal the June 10,

2024 judgments of the Hancock County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division,

granting permanent custody of their children, C.P., J.P., and B.P., to the appellee,

Hancock County Job and Family Services – Children’s Protective Services Unit

(“CPSU” or “the agency”). Additionally, child-appellant, “J.P”, appeals the June

10, 2024 judgment of the Hancock County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division,

in which permanent custody of J.P. was granted to the agency. For the reasons set

forth below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in all three cases.

Procedural History – Case Number 5-24-18

{¶3} Z.W., a female child, was born in 2022 to McKenna and Quayshawn

L., an unmarried couple. One day after her birth, Z.W. was removed from

McKenna’s custody by the Findlay Police Department, due to McKenna attempting

to leave the hospital with Z.W. against medical advice.

{¶4} On May 20, 2022, a complaint was filed alleging Z.W. to be a neglected

and dependent child. On May 23, 2022, a shelter care hearing was held and Z.W.

was ordered into the temporary custody of CPSU.

-3- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

{¶5} On June 28, 2022, an adjudicatory hearing was held and Z.W. was

found to be a dependent child. Upon motion of the agency, the neglect allegation

was dismissed. A dispositional hearing was held on that same date and Z.W. was

continued in the temporary custody of CPSU.

{¶6} On April 28, 2023, the agency’s temporary custody of Z.W. was

extended for an additional six months.

{¶7} On November 28, 2023, CPSU filed a motion for permanent custody of

Z.W.

{¶8} On May 13 and 14, 2024, a hearing was held on the permanent custody

motion.1

{¶9} On May 28, 2024, the trial court filed a judgment entry in which the

court reviewed the record of the case and detailed the evidence presented at the

hearing. After conducting that review, and upon applying the relevant legal

standards, the trial court granted the agency’s motion for permanent custody and

terminated the parental rights of McKenna and Quayshawn as to Z.W.

{¶10} On June 21, 2024, McKenna filed an appeal of the trial court’s May

28, 2024 decision.

1 Prior to the start of that hearing, Quayshawn consented to the motion for permanent custody of his daughter, and written stipulations relating to his consent were signed by him and submitted to the trial court. Following a detailed inquiry by the trial court, the court accepted Quayshawn’s consent, and then excused him and his counsel from the proceedings.

-4- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

{¶11} On July 10, 2024, this court ordered that the appeal in Z.W.’s case be

consolidated with the appeals that had been filed in the cases relating to C.P., J.P.,

and B.P.

Procedural History - Case Numbers 5-24-19, 5-24-20, and 5-24-21

{¶12} C.P., a male child, was born in 2013 to McKenna and Johnathon, an

unmarried couple. J.P., a male child, was born in 2016 to McKenna and

Johnathon. B.P., a female child, was also born in 2016 to McKenna and Johnathon.

{¶13} On February 24, 2021, complaints alleging C.P., J.P., and B.P. to be

abused, neglected, and dependent children were filed in the trial court. On February

25, 2021, a shelter care hearing was held as to all three children and the trial court

ordered that the children be placed in the temporary custody of CPSU.

{¶14} On May 14, 2021, an adjudicatory hearing was held as to all three

cases, and the trial court found the three children to be neglected and dependent

children. Upon motion by the agency, the abuse allegation was struck from the

complaints. A dispositional hearing was held that same date in the three cases, and

the trial court placed the children in Johnathon’s custody and granted CPSU

protective supervision over the children.

{¶15} On October 26, 2021, CPSU filed an emergency motion to remove the

children from Johnathon, due to bruises on two of the children and abuse

allegations. A hearing was held that same day and the trial court ordered that the

children be placed in the temporary custody of CPSU.

-5- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

{¶16} On October 14, 2022, CPSU filed motions for permanent custody as

to all three children.

{¶17} On February 2, 2023, CPSU withdrew the motions for permanent

custody. On that same date, CPSU filed for a six-month extension of its temporary

custody of all three children. On March 6, 2023, the motions for a six-month

extension of temporary custody were heard, and the trial court granted the motions

as to all three children.

{¶18} On June 22, 2023, CPSU filed new motions for permanent custody of

the three children. However, on August 23, 2023, the trial court filed consent

judgments in the three cases that withdrew the motions for permanent custody,

returned the children to Johnathon’s custody, and continued the protective

supervision of the children by the agency.

{¶19} On October 5, 2023, the trial court signed an ex parte order placing the

children in the temporary custody of CPSU due to unexplained bruises on B.P. and

allegations of sexual acts having been perpetrated on B.P. by C.P. and

J.P. Following hearings held on October 10, 2023 and November 30, 2023, the trial

court found that probable cause existed for the issuance of the ex parte order and the

removal of the children from Johnathon’s home.

{¶20} On October 6, 2023, CPSU filed its third set of motions for permanent

custody of all three children.

-6- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

{¶21} Beginning on May 20, 2024 and concluding on May 23, 2024, a multi-

day hearing was held on the motions for permanent custody.

{¶22} On June 10, 2024, the trial court filed a judgment entry in each of the

three cases, in which the court reviewed the record of the case and detailed the

evidence presented at the multi-day permanent custody hearing. After conducting

that review, and upon applying the relevant legal standards, the trial court granted

the agency’s motion for permanent custody in each case and terminated the parental

rights of McKenna and Johnathon as to each of the three children.

{¶23} On June 21, 2024, McKenna filed appeals of the trial court’s June 10,

2024 decision in all three cases. On July 3, 2024, Johnathon filed appeals of the

trial court’s June 10, 2024 decision in all three cases. On July 9, 2024, J.P. filed an

appeal of the trial court’s June 10, 2024 decision in the case relating to him.

{¶24} On July 10, 2024, this court ordered that the appeals in the cases

relating to C.P., J.P., and B.P. be consolidated with the appeal filed in the case

relating to Z.W.

Assignments of Error on Appeal

{¶25} In Case Number 5-24-18, which relates to Z.W., McKenna appeals the

trial court’s decision, and raises one assignment of error.

McKenna’s Assignment of Error – Case Number 5-24-18

The finding that the mother had failed to remedy the causes of the removal was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

-7- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

{¶26} In Case Numbers 5-24-19, 5-24-20, and 5-24-21, which relate to C.P.,

B.P., and J.P., respectively, McKenna and Jonathon separately appeal the trial

court’s decisions. In the case relating to J.P.’s custody, Case Number 5-24-21, J.P.

has also appealed the trial court’s decision

McKenna’s Assignment of Error – Case Numbers 5-24-19, 5-24-20, and 5-24-21

The finding that the mother had failed to remedy the causes of the removal was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Johnathon’s First Assignment of Error – Case Numbers 5-24-19, 5-24-20, and 5-24-21

The trial court abused its discretion and committed reversible and plain error when it found it was in the best interest of the children to grant permanent custody to appellee because that decision was not in the best interest of the children, was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and was not supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Johnathon’s Second Assignment of Error – Case Numbers 5-24-19, 5-24-20, and 5-24-21

The trial court erred in removing all three of the minor children from the custody of father on October 3, 2023, and by its failure to return at least the two minor boys, C.P. and J.P., to the custody of their father for insufficient evidence was presented as to these two children to justify their removal.

Johnathon’s Third Assignment of Error – Case Numbers 5-24-19, 5-24-20, and 5-24-21

The trial court erred as the result of its refusal to permit appellate counsel to review the in camera interviews of the minor children.

-8- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

J.P.’s First Assignment of Error – Case Number 5-24-21

The trial court erred when it failed to conduct J.P.’s in camera interview before the start of the permanent custody hearing, or any time during the three day hearing, to his prejudice and detriment, preventing his trial attorney from being fully prepared to represent him.

J.P.’s Second Assignment of Error – Case Number 5-24-21

The trial court erred in overruling appellate counsel’s motion to review the transcript of J.P.’s in camera interview in preparation for the appeal.

J.P.’s Third Assignment of Error – Case Number 5-24-21

The trial court abused its discretion when it summarily ignored J.P.’s due-process rights to remain with a biological parent, finding it was in his best interest that his parents’ parental rights be terminated.

J.P.’s Fourth Assignment of Error – Case Number 5-24-21

The trial court did not have jurisdiction to proceed with the permanent custody hearing when the agency dismissed the case.

{¶27} For the sake of orderliness and clarity, we opt to address the

assignments of error out of the order in which they have been raised. Additionally,

to avoid unnecessary repetition in our analysis of similar claims, we shall jointly or

collectively address parallel assignments of error raised by the appellants.

-9- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

J.P.’s Fourth Assignment of Error

{¶28} In J.P.’s fourth assignment of error, he asserts that the trial court lacked

jurisdiction to proceed with the permanent custody hearing. Specifically, J.P.

argues that jurisdiction was lost by the trial court once the agency filed a motion to

dismiss. In support of this claim, J.P. relies on a recent decision of this Court, In re

E.R., 2024-Ohio-4840 (3d Dist.).

{¶29} The case of In re E.R. presented this Court with appeals by two parents

of a trial court’s termination of their parental rights. Id., at ¶ 1. In that case, the

appellee-agency had filed motions in the trial court for permanent custody of two

children on June 5, 2023. Id., at ¶ 3. On October 19, 2023, the agency filed a motion

to dismiss the children’s cases, due to time restrictions. Id., at ¶ 4. The agency also

filed new motions for permanent custody. Id. That same date, the trial court granted

the motion to dismiss and dismissed the complaints. Id. Subsequently, upon the

father filing a motion for return of the children, the trial court reversed the prior

dismissal of the case. Id. On February 26, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the

outstanding motions for permanent custody and, following the hearing, the trial

court granted permanent custody to the agency. Id., at ¶ 5. On appeal, the father

challenged the trial court’s reconsideration of its order granting the agency’s motion

for a voluntary dismissal. Id., at ¶ 6. In addressing that claim, this Court noted that,

“‘[i]n general, when a trial court unconditionally dismisses a case or a case has been

voluntarily dismissed ..., the trial court patently and unambiguously lacks

-10- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

jurisdiction to proceed.’” Id., quoting State ex rel. Hummel v. Sadler, 2002-Ohio-

3605, ¶ 22. We further noted that “the ‘Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure do not

provide a procedure for reconsideration by a trial court of its final judgment;

therefore, any judgment entered in response to such a motion is a nullity.’” Id.,

quoting Wilson v. Johnston, 2002-Ohio-4690, ¶ 6 (3d Dist.). Accordingly, this

Court held that, because the agency had moved for dismissal and the trial court then

unconditionally dismissed the cases, the cases were over and the trial court lost all

jurisdiction to proceed in the dismissed cases. Id., at ¶ 7. We further found that any

subsequent judgments entered in the cases were nullities, based on the lack of

jurisdiction. Id.

{¶30} However, contrary to J.P.’s claim in his appeal in the instant case, the

cases here involve a procedural history distinguishable from that of In re E.R. In

the cases involving J.P. and his two siblings, CPSU initially filed motions for

permanent custody on October 14, 2022. Those motions were withdrawn by the

agency on February 2, 2023, simultaneous to the agency filing for a six-month

extension of its temporary custody of the children. On March 6, 2023, the motions

for a six-month extension of temporary custody were heard, and the trial court

granted those motions. On June 22, 2023, CPSU filed new motions for permanent

custody. However, on August 23, 2023, the trial court signed consent agreements

in the cases that returned the children to Johnathon’s custody and withdrew the

agency’s motions for permanent custody, with the agency retaining protective

-11- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

custody of the children. On October 6, 2023, CPSU filed its third set of motions for

permanent custody, which were the motions that were heard and subsequently

granted by the trial court.

{¶31} Thus, unlike the situation in In re E.R., supra, no unconditional

dismissal of the cases in this matter was ever ordered. Rather, the agency withdrew

its first two sets of permanent custody motions, and did so pursuant to also filing

alternative motions on each occasion that were granted by the trial court and which

permitted the agency to continue working with the parents toward

reunification. Accordingly, we find J.P.’s reliance on In re E.R. to be misplaced and

his argument regarding the trial court’s jurisdiction to be without merit.

{¶32} J.P.’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.

J.P.’s First Assignment of Error

{¶33} In J.P.’s first assignment of error, he asserts that the trial court

committed reversible error in failing to conduct J.P.’s in camera interview prior to,

or during, the permanent custody hearing. J.P. argues that in conducting the

interview with him one week after the permanent custody hearing concluded, the

trial court deprived J.P.’s attorney of the opportunity to attend the interview and to

fully prepare for the hearing.

{¶34} In this case, and in the cases involving C.P. and B.P., counsel for

Johnathon filed motions asking the trial court to conduct in camera interviews with

the children, which the trial court ultimately granted. The record reflects that the

-12- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

court’s interview with J.P. took place on May 29, 2024, several days after the

permanent custody hearing concluded on May 23, 2024. Upon review, we find

J.P.’s claim of error regarding the timing of the interview to lack merit for several

reasons.

{¶35} R.C. 2151.414(D) provides that, in determining the best interest of a

child in a permanent custody action, the court must consider all relevant factors,

including the wishes of the child. However, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) specifically

provides that consideration of the wishes of the child may be “as expressed directly

by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem[.]” (Emphasis added.). Thus,

“a juvenile court has the option of either having the child assert his or her opinion,

through, for example, an in-camera interview or testimony, or the court may rely

upon the guardian ad litem’s representations with respect to the child’s desires.” In

re Funk, 2002-Ohio-4958, ¶ 30 (11th Dist.). “Because the juvenile court has a

choice, the decision not to conduct an in camera interview will be reversed only if

the court abused its discretion in declining to do so.” Id., citing In re Whitaker, 36

Ohio St.3d 213, 219 (1988). Accord, In re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104; In re Sherman,

2005-Ohio-3444, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), opinion vacated on other grounds on

reconsideration, 2005-Ohio-5888, ¶¶ 9-10 (3d Dist.); In re S.V., 2004-Ohio 5445,

¶¶ 26-28 (9th Dist.).

{¶36} In support of the claim regarding the timing of the interview in J.P.’s

case, he cites to no statutory or other legal authority setting forth a requirement that

-13- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

an in camera interview, if held at all, must be held prior to the permanent custody

hearing, nor does our own research reflect the existence of any such legal

authority. Further, the record in the instant case reflects no objection was lodged by

counsel to the fact that the in camera interview had not been conducted prior to the

start of the permanent custody hearing. Additionally, as to J.P.’s claim that his

attorney was deprived of the opportunity to attend the interview, the record does not

definitively reflect whether J.P.’s counsel was present for the interview or not. We

do note, however, that no motion was ever filed by J.P.’s counsel requesting to

attend the interview, nor does the on-the-record discussion of the interviews at the

permanent custody hearing reflect any request by J.P.’s counsel to be present at the

interview. While J.P. asserts that holding the interview after the permanent custody

hearing deprived his counsel of the opportunity to fully prepare for the hearing, we

note that nothing prevented J.P.’s counsel from interviewing J.P. himself, in order

to ascertain what J.P.’s own wishes were as to the custody issue, and then using that

information in preparing for the hearing.

{¶37} More importantly, the record reflects that the guardian ad litem

testified at the permanent custody hearing as to the children’s wishes, and

specifically noted that J.P. wished to be reunited with his father. Therefore, while

the in camera interview with J.P. was not conducted until after the hearing, his

wishes were still made known at the time of the hearing, in a manner compliant with

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b).

-14- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

{¶38} Finally, while the permanent custody hearing concluded on May 23,

2024, the record reflects that the trial court took the issue of permanent custody

under advisement at the close of the hearing and did not render a decision until June

10, 2024. Thus, the in camera interview with J.P. was conducted prior to the trial

court reaching a decision in the case, and the trial court expressly noted in its June

10, 2024 decision that it had considered the wishes of the child as expressed during

the in camera interview.

{¶39} For all the reasons stated, we find that no error occurred as to the

timing of the in camera interview with J.P.

{¶40} J.P.’s first assignment of error is overruled.

Johnathon’s Third Assignment of Error and J.P.’s Second Assignment of Error

{¶41} In Johnathon’s third assignment of error, he asserts that the trial court

erred in denying a post-judgment motion filed by his appellate counsel, which

sought an order permitting counsel access to transcripts of the trial court’s in camera

interviews with the children. Similarly, in J.P.’s second assignment of error, J.P.

argues that the trial court erred in denying a motion filed by his appellate counsel,

in which counsel sought to review the transcript of J.P.’s in camera interview.

{¶42} With respect to those claims, the record reflects that the trial court

granted motions requesting that the in camera interviews be transcribed and

-15- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

transmitted to this Court for inclusion in the record on appeal.2 However, the court

ordered that the interview transcripts be sealed and directed that counsel for the

parties on appeal not be provided access to those transcripts, which Johnathon and

J.P. now both assert was an erroneous decision.

{¶43} We begin our analysis of these claims by noting that closure is the rule,

not the exception, for in camera interviews conducted by a court in a child custody

matter. In re T.B.-G, 2018-Ohio-4116, ¶ 4 (8th Dist.). “This policy of excluding

parties from the interview is so strong that it extends to keeping transcripts of the

interview confidential – parties are not normally entitled to review a transcript of

the in-camera interview.” Id., citing Chapman v. Chapman, 2007-Ohio-2968, ¶ 27

(2d Dist.); Lawson v. Lawson, 2013-Ohio-4687, ¶ 57 (5th Dist.).

{¶44} As to Johnathon’s claim in particular, R.C. 3109.04(B)(2)(c) provides

that neither a parent nor a parent’s attorney has a legal right to be present at an in

camera interview of a child in a custody proceeding. Accordingly, several appellate

districts have held that parents – or their counsel – also do not have a right to review

the transcripts of such interviews, as providing such access would contravene the

intent of keeping the interview confidential. Patton v. Patton, 1995 WL 42497 (5th

Dist. Jan. 9, 1995); In re Longwell, 1995 WL 520058 (9th Dist. Aug. 30, 1005);

Willis v. Willis, 2002-Ohio-3716 (12th Dist.).

2 Transcripts of the interviews with C.P. and J.P. were included in the record transmitted to this Court. In B.P.’s case, an audio-recording of the interview, certified by the trial court as accurate, was provided to this Court in lieu of a transcript.

-16- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

{¶45} Additionally, as the Fifth District Court of Appeals aptly noted in

Patton, supra:

The logic behind the legislative choice of moving the children into a stress-free environment is evident. Children should display candor in setting forth their feelings * * * . The interview is recorded for the purpose of protecting the parties in that an appellate court may review the recorded interviews and determine whether undue influence has been exerted, or whether the court has made proper findings of fact regarding the in chambers interviews. However, the legislative mandate that no person shall obtain from a child any recorded statement regarding the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities concerning such child clearly minimizes the chilling effect of the in chambers interview and provides a protection of the minor children.

Id. at *3.

{¶46} We find such reasoning to be sound, given the restrictions contained

in R.C. 3109.04(B)(2)(c), and particularly as our own independent review of the in

camera interviews on appeal serves to protect both the rights of the parents involved

in the cases as well as preserving the privacy of the children who were

interviewed. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying

Johnathon’s request for the interview transcripts for purposes of

appeal. Johnathon’s third assignment of error is therefore overruled.

{¶47} Regarding J.P.’s claim on appeal, we note that a distinction could

potentially be made between a parent’s right, or lack thereof, to review the

transcription of his children’s interviews for appellate purposes, as opposed to a

child’s right to access the transcript of his own interview for appellate

-17- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

purposes. Unlike the situation involving a parent, when the party requesting to

review an in camera interview transcript is the child who was interviewed, or their

counsel, no clear statutory basis exists for denying such access. At least one

appellate district has drawn a distinction between the right of a parent and the right

of a child to obtain a transcript of the child’s in camera interview. In re A.M.R.,

2017-Ohio-9178 (8th Dist.). In that case, the court of appeals determined that the

trial court erred in denying the child’s attorney access to a transcript of the child’s

in camera interview, although that holding was expressly based on “the limited and

unique circumstances of [that] case.” Id., at ¶ 23.

{¶48} In the instant case, we find it unnecessary to establish a bright-line rule

as to the right of a child to obtain access to his own interview transcript on appeal,

as we ultimately find that J.P. suffered no material prejudice as a result of the trial

court denying J.P.’s counsel access to the interview transcript. Our independent

review of the interview conducted with J.P. by the trial court reflects that the

conversation was extremely brief and very limited in scope. More importantly, no

information was shared by J.P. in that conversation that is not also readily gleaned

from the record of the permanent custody hearing. Finally, as noted in the analysis

of J.P.’s first assignment of error, supra, a trial court’s consideration of a child’s

wishes in a permanent custody action may be accomplished by considering the

wishes as expressed directly by the child or as expressed through the child’s

guardian ad litem. See R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b). Here, J.P.’s guardian ad litem

-18- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

testified at the permanent custody hearing and J.P.’s wishes concerning his custody

were clearly conveyed by the guardian ad litem at that time. As J.P.’s wishes were

made known to both counsel and the trial court at the hearing, and because the record

reflects consideration of those wishes by the trial court in reaching its decision, as

required by R.C. 2151.414(D), J.P.’s substantial rights were not affected by the trial

court limiting J.P.’s access on appeal to his interview transcript. Given the lack of

prejudice to J.P. resulting from the trial court’s ruling, that decision of the trial court,

if error at all, does not rise to the level of error mandating reversal. Therefore, J.P.’s

second assignment of error is also overruled.

McKenna’s Assignments of Error, Johnathon’s First Assignment of Error, and J.P.’s Third Assignment of Error

{¶49} In the four cases in which McKenna appeals, in the three cases in

which Johnathon appeals, and in the one case in which J.P. appeals, the appellants

assert in these assignments of error that the trial court erred in granting permanent

custody of the child(ren) at issue to the agency. Specifically, the appellants argue

that the trial court’s finding that permanent custody was in the best interest of each

child was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶50} “[T]he right to raise one’s children is an ‘essential’ and ‘basic civil

right.’” In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157 (1990), quoting Stanley v. Illinois,

405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). “Parents have a ‘fundamental liberty interest’ in the care,

custody, and management of their children.” Id. quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455

-19- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

U.S. 745, 753 (1982). “The rights and interests of a natural parent are not, however,

absolute: where a court finds that permanent custody is appropriate under the

circumstances of a particular case and all due process safeguards have been

followed, whatever residual rights a parent may have are properly divested.” In

re Leveck, 2003-Ohio-1269, ¶ 6 (3d Dist.).

{¶51} “R.C. 2151.414 outlines the procedures that protect the interests of

parents and children in a permanent custody proceeding.” In re N.R.S., 2018-Ohio-

125, ¶ 12 (3d Dist.), citing In re B.C., 2014-Ohio-4558, ¶ 26. “When considering a

motion for permanent custody of a child, the trial court must comply with the

statutory requirements set forth in R.C. 2151.414.” In re A.M., 2015-Ohio-2740, ¶

13 (3d Dist.). Specifically, “R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) establishes a two-part test for

courts to apply when determining whether to grant a motion for permanent custody:

(1) the trial court must find that one of the circumstances in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-

(e) applies, and (2) the trial court must find that permanent custody is in the best

interest of the child.” In re Y.W., 2017-Ohio-4218, ¶ 10 (3d Dist.).

{¶52} “The first prong of that test requires a finding by clear and convincing

evidence that one of the statutorily-prescribed situations of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) is

satisfied.” In re N.F., 2023-Ohio-566, ¶ 19 (3d Dist.). In that regard, R.C. 2151.414

provides:

(B)(1) Except as provided in division (B)(2) of this section, the court may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the court determines at the hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section,

-20- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for permanent custody and that any of the following apply:

(a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or has not been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period if, as described in division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state, and the child cannot be placed with either of the child's parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents.

(b) The child is abandoned.

(c) The child is orphaned, and there are no relatives of the child who are able to take permanent custody.

(d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state.

(e) The child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents from whose custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated an abused, neglected, or dependent child on three separate occasions by any court in this state or another state.

For the purposes of division (B)(1) of this section, a child shall be considered to have entered the temporary custody of an agency on the earlier of the date the child is adjudicated pursuant to section 2151.28 of the Revised Code or the date that is sixty days after the removal of the child from home.

-21- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

{¶53} As to the second prong of the test, when determining the best interest

of the child, R.C. 2151.414(D) directs the trial court to consider all relevant factors,

including but not limited to: (1) the interaction and interrelationship of the child

with the child’s parents, relatives, foster parents and any other person who may

significantly affect the child; (2) the wishes of the child, with due regard for the

maturity of the child; (3) the custodial history of the child, including whether the

child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services

agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a

consecutive twenty-two-month period; (4) the child’s need for a legally secure

permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without

a grant of permanent custody to the agency; and (5) whether any of the factors in

R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) through (11) are applicable.

{¶54} Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), an award of permanent custody must

be based on clear and convincing evidence. In re H.M., 2019-Ohio-3721, ¶ 44 (3d

Dist.). “Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is

more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such

certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which

will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the

facts sought to be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954),

paragraph three of the syllabus. “Where the degree of proof required to sustain an

-22- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

issue must be clear and convincing, a reviewing court will examine the record to

determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the

requisite degree of proof.” Id. at 477.

{¶55} In reviewing whether a trial court’s permanent custody decision is

against the manifest weight of the evidence, an appellate court “‘weighs the

evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and

determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [finder of fact] clearly

lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment]

must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, at

¶ 20, quoting Tewarson v. Simon, 141 Ohio App.3d 103, 115, 750 (2001).

{¶56} Furthermore, “‘[w]eight of the evidence concerns “the inclination of

the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the

issue rather than the other. It indicates clearly to the [trier-of-fact] that the party

having the burden of proof will be entitled to their verdict, if, on weighing the

evidence in their minds, they shall find the greater amount of credible evidence

sustains the issue which is to be established before them. Weight is not a question

of mathematics, but depends on its effect in inducing belief.”’” (Emphasis

sic.) Eastley, at ¶ 12, quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997),

quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed. 1990).

{¶57} Finally, issues relating to the credibility of witnesses and the weight to

be given to the evidence are primarily for the trier-of-fact. Seasons Coal Co. Inc. v.

-23- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984). Deferring to the trial court on matters of

credibility is “crucial in a child custody case, where there may be much evidence in

the parties’ demeanor and attitude that does not translate to the record well.”

(Emphasis sic.) Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 419 (1997). “‘Thus, if the

children services agency presented competent and credible evidence upon which the

trier of fact reasonably could have formed a firm belief that permanent custody is

warranted, then the court’s decision is not against the manifest weight of the

evidence.’” In re A.B., 2022-Ohio-4234, ¶ 12 (3d Dist.), quoting In re R.M., 2013-

Ohio-3588, ¶ 55 (4th Dist.).

Analysis – Decision Regarding Z.W. (Case Number 5-24-18)

{¶58} In this case, with regard to the first prong of the two-prong test, the

trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Z.W. had been in the

agency’s temporary custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive 22-month

period. Under the plain language of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), when a child has been

in an agency’s temporary custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive 22-

month period, a trial court need not find that the child cannot be placed with either

parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the parents. In re

I.G., 2014-Ohio-1136, ¶ 30 (3d Dist.), citing R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d); In re A.M.,

2015-Ohio-2740, ¶ 14 (3d Dist.).

-24- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

{¶59} On appeal in Z.W.’s case, McKenna does not dispute that CPSU

satisfied the R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) “12 in 22-standard” as found by the trial court,

a finding which is also supported by the record. Therefore, we move on to consider

whether the trial court’s best-interest of the child finding is also supported by clear

and convincing evidence.

{¶60} At the May 13 and 14, 2024 hearing on the motion for permanent

custody relating to Z.W., CPSU presented the testimony of six witnesses and

introduced 27 exhibits, and McKenna introduced the testimony of four

witnesses. The report of the guardian ad litem, attorney Timothy Hoover, was

admitted into evidence as a court’s exhibit.

{¶61} At the hearing, Hope Stanfield testified that she is employed by Open

Arms in Findlay, working as the case manager at Harmony House. Through that

employment, Stanfield became familiar with Z.W. and McKenna, as Harmony

House was used for McKenna’s supervised visitation with Z.W., as well as for

McKenna’s supervised visitation with several of her other children. Stanfield

identified the records relating to McKenna’s visits with Z.W., which included

notations as to any cancellations or missed visits, as well as notes regarding any

incidents occurring during the visits or rule violations. The records reflected that

McKenna was very inconsistent in attending visits with Z.W. Due to missing

scheduled visits, McKenna was twice suspended from visiting with Z.W., with those

suspensions occurring in January of 2023 and October of 2023. Stanfield testified

-25- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

about several instances where McKenna’s supervision of Z.W. during the visits, as

well as that of the other children, was inadequate and put Z.W. at risk of

harm. Stanfield also testified about a recent visit where McKenna spent

approximately twenty minutes paying no attention to Z.W., during which time

McKenna also had her back turned to Z.W. Stanfield testified that, other than the

noted instances of McKenna’s failure to supervise Z.W., the visits seemed to go

well.

{¶62} Amy Ward testified that she is employed as a family support coach at

the Family Resource Center. In that capacity, Ward has worked with

McKenna. For the most part, McKenna was consistent in attending her home

coaching sessions with Ward, although there were times when the home coaching

sessions were suspended due to McKenna not being involved in parenting her

children. Ward testified that she made suggestions to McKenna to help improve her

parenting skills and that McKenna followed through on the suggestions. Ward’s

testimony about some of the history in the case was vague, as her records were

incomplete and she expressed confusion about some of the entries in the

records. Ward testified that McKenna seemed to be bonded with Z.W. and the other

children when she is with them. When asked about the recent visit at Harmony

House during which McKenna ignored Z.W. for the first twenty minutes, Ward

testified that it was odd.

-26- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

{¶63} Jill Titus testified that she and her husband are foster parents who are

also certified as “treatment level” foster parents, in order to provide foster care to

children who have special needs and require additional care. Titus testified that

Z.W. was just shy of two years old at the time of the hearing. When Z.W. was born,

Titus and her husband were called and asked to provide foster care for the

newborn. At that time, Titus and her husband were already fostering three of Z.W.’s

half-siblings, C.P., J.P., and B.P. Titus was shocked when they received the call

about Z.W. having been born because they had seen McKenna just a few months

before and did not know she was pregnant. While Titus was not prepared to accept

a baby into her home at that time, she and her husband agreed to take Z.W. Titus

testified that Z.W.’s birth and her arrival in the Titus household was also a shock to

C.P., J.P., and B.P. Titus explained that the three older children are very delicate

and had not been prepared for a new sibling to come into the home. The Tituses

subsequently cared for and raised Z.W. for the entirety of her young life, and she

was doing well in their care.

{¶64} Titus testified that Z.W. is extremely smart and is a busy little girl who

requires constant supervision. Because Z.W. is two and very active, she must be

supervised at all times. Based on her prior experiences with McKenna, Titus

expressed concern about McKenna’s ability to properly supervise Z.W. Titus

testified about an incident where Z.W. and the other children were visiting

McKenna in her home, and B.P. broke the arm of another sibling when the children

-27- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

were left unattended by McKenna. Titus also testified that there had been a number

of times when she or her husband transported Z.W. to Findlay for a scheduled visit

with McKenna at Harmony House and then McKenna failed to show up without

explanation. At one point, when in-person visits with McKenna were suspended,

Titus arranged video calls between McKenna and the children. Titus testified that

McKenna did not ask many questions of the children during those calls, such as

inquiring about their schooling or sports or other interests. Titus testified that, as to

video calls between McKenna and Z.W., such calls would sometimes go well but

that McKenna was disconnected and quiet and not interactive with Z.W. at other

times. Titus testified that she terminated phone communications with McKenna

after Titus’s husband received two texts of photographs depicting McKenna

topless. Titus and her husband reported the photos to CPSU and the police, deleted

the texts, and then ceased further direct phone contact with McKenna. Titus

testified that she and her husband are willing to adopt Z.W. if the motion for

permanent custody was granted.

{¶65} Jenny Foster testified that she is employed by Hancock County

Children Services, and that she had been involved in the case since Z.W.’s birth,

although the agency had a prior open case with McKenna and her other children

prior to Z.W. being born. The agency initially became involved with McKenna and

her four other children due to concerns of drug use in the home, McKenna not

having a stable home, the children being transported without car seats, and concerns

-28- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

with McKenna’s mental health and her ability to adequately supervise the

children. Prior to Z.W. being born, the agency was not aware that McKenna was

pregnant, as she had kept the fact of the pregnancy from the agency. When Z.W.

was born, McKenna told the hospital that she had no supplies for the baby, such as

diapers or formula. Foster testified that Z.W. was born preterm and the hospital was

concerned over certain health risks and wanted the baby to stay in the hospital for

observation. However, McKenna told the hospital that, while she had an open case

with CPSU, she was permitted to take the baby home, which was not true. Later

that night, McKenna attempted to leave the hospital with Z.W. against medical

advice. At that time, the agency went to the hospital to attempt to work up a safety

plan with McKenna, but McKenna was not willing to comply with the safety plan,

and so law enforcement removed the child from McKenna and placed Z.W. into the

agency’s emergency care. A shelter care hearing was then held and Z.W. was found

to be a dependent child, and Z.W. had remained in the custody of the agency since

that initial removal.

{¶66} Foster testified that, during the time CPSU had been involved in the

case, they had attempted to place Z.W. with three different family members,

including her father, but none of those placements worked out for various

reasons. Foster also identified the case plan where Z.W. was initially added to the

case, as well as subsequent case plans where minor modifications were

made. Foster testified that the case plans were designed to address the concerns

-29- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

causing the removal of Z.W. from her mother, with the goal of reunification. Foster

testified that McKenna initially engaged in mental health counseling and then even

voluntarily continued treatment after completing the initial treatment

goals. However, agency staff continued to have concerns with McKenna’s

depression and the fact it affected her motivation to properly supervise her

children. Foster testified that McKenna maintained an apartment, but there were

concerns about her permitting other persons to stay in the home who were not

approved by the agency, as well as concerns resulting from injuries to the children

that occurred due to not being properly supervised while visiting McKenna’s

home. Foster testified that despite McKenna completing a domestic violence

victim’s class early in the case, she then had another relationship with a person that

resulted in domestic violence. McKenna completed a parent education course but

the agency still noted difficulties with her parenting during visitation, and so home

coaching was added in order to help her apply appropriate parenting

strategies. Foster testified that, due to McKenna still struggling to implement such

strategies, it was felt that McKenna did not successfully complete the home

coaching. Foster was also not able to do unannounced visits at McKenna’s home,

as McKenna always said she was sleeping and did not hear the door, or would not

respond to unannounced visitors. Foster testified that McKenna can do a great job

when attending to one child at a time but, when faced with handling multiple

children, she struggles to divide her attention in order to attend to the children and

-30- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

ensure their safety. Foster testified that McKenna’s visitation with Z.W. was also

sporadic over the time the case was pending. At one point, McKenna went 166 days

without visiting with Z.W. and McKenna was never able to progress to having

unsupervised visitation with Z.W. Foster testified that Z.W. is a happy, easygoing

child who is always excited to interact with anyone, including her mother.

{¶67} Foster further testified that Z.W. is in need of legally secure placement

and that the same cannot be accomplished without permanent custody. Foster also

testified that permanent custody was in Z.W.’s best interest. Foster testified that

those opinions were based on the fact that McKenna failed to remedy the concerns

that led to the agency’s involvement with the family. While McKenna was always

willing to attend sessions with service providers, she still nonetheless missed

appointments that affected her progress on the case and, more importantly, she was

not able to demonstrate changes in her behavior that related to her parenting. Foster

also testified that permanent custody is the least restrictive alternative, particularly

as Z.W. had been placed with the same foster parents since birth and does not

identify anyone else, including McKenna, as being her parent or caregiver.

{¶68} Lexi Goedde testified that she is a CPSU caseworker with Hancock

County, and had been the ongoing caseworker on the case since December of

2023. Goedde testified that the agency felt permanent custody of Z.W. was

necessary due to the lack of significant progress in the case by either parent and

because the child needs permanency. Goedde confirmed that the agency

-31- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

unsuccessfully explored relative-placement for Z.W. and that the only family Z.W.

had ever known is that of her foster parents. Goedde testified that the case plan she

had authored in the case was designed with reunification as the goal and that all of

the objectives in the case plan were reasonably within the capacity of the parents to

complete. Goedde noted that a recent report from McKenna’s mental health

counselor reflected that McKenna was not improving. Goedde also noted her

concern with McKenna’s ability to safely supervise Z.W., and cited the recent visit

where, for a significant period of time, McKenna was not observing the room or

Z.W. Goedde noted that while McKenna was generally compliant with meeting

with providers, she nonetheless still exhibited a lack of supervision toward the

children. Goedde testified that McKenna has always been cooperative with her, but

that McKenna failed to respond any time Goedde had attempted an unannounced

visit at McKenna’s home. Regarding McKenna’s relationship with Z.W., Goedde

testified that she had not observed a bond between them, beyond them just being

familiar with each other. Goedde testified that Z.W. is in need of legally secure

placement, which cannot be accomplished without permanent custody. Goedde also

opined that it is in the best interest of Z.W. for her to be placed in the agency’s

permanent custody, as her biological parents have not demonstrated the ability to

provide a safe and stable environment for her and because her foster family does

provide such an environment. Finally, Foster testified that a grant of permanent

custody is the least restrictive alternative.

-32- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

{¶69} Kelli Miller testified that she is employed by Hancock County

Children Services and served as the ongoing supervisor in Z.W.’s case. Miller

testified that in October of 2023, McKenna had supervised visitation with Z.W. at

Harmony House but, separately, three of McKenna’s other children were permitted

supervised visitation in McKenna’s home. During one visit when the older children

were there, it was reported that McKenna was watching television while the three

older children were upstairs unattended. While the children were unattended, one

of them was allegedly sexually assaulted by the other two. The agency suspended

in-home visitations following that incident, although the assault allegations could

not be substantiated by the agency’s investigation. Miller testified that there is an

extensive history of inappropriate sexual activities amongst the three older children

and so it was extremely concerning that nobody was attending to the children while

they were in McKenna’s home, in order to prevent such things from

occurring. Miller testified that, through most of the agency’s involvement with the

family, McKenna had maintained stable housing. However, every time the agency

permitted the children to visit at McKenna’s home, there was an issue, such as the

children suffering injuries or the children being transported in vehicles without car

seats. Miller also pointed to the recent visitation at Harmony House, just a week

prior to the hearing, as an example of McKenna failing to interact with and supervise

Z.W. Miller testified that, because Z.W. is only two years old, McKenna’s failure

to supervise the child is particularly concerning. Miller testified that Z.W. is in need

-33- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

of legally secure placement, which cannot be accomplished without permanent

custody. Miller testified that permanent custody is in Z.W.’s best interest, as she

has been in foster care for essentially her entire life and neither parent in the case

was able to adequately address the concerns in order to make reunification safe for

Z.W. Miller is also an adoption assessor and she testified that Z.W. would greatly

benefit from adoption. Miller testified that she believes there is a one hundred

percent probability that Z.W. would be adopted.

{¶70} Jade McCloud testified that she is employed as a forensic counselor at

the Family Resource Center, where she had been providing counseling services to

McKenna for approximately two years. McKenna began the counseling due to the

CPSU case, because she was trying to regain custody of her children. McCloud

diagnosed McKenna with major depressive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder,

and adjustment disorder with anxiety. McCloud testified that McKenna had met her

initial treatment goals and McCloud was ready to discharge McKenna from

treatment but McKenna requested to continue the counseling. McCloud testified

that McKenna had been consistent in her treatment and motivated in her counseling,

however McCloud testified that they had never discussed parenting, parenting

techniques, or parenting needs.

{¶71} Hope Stanfield, the case manager at Harmony House, was recalled to

the stand and testified about the period of time in late 2023 when McKenna’s

visitation with Z.W. was suspended and did not resume for several

-34- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

months. Stanfield testified that part of the delay in resuming McKenna’s visitation

with Z.W. was due to difficulty in working out a visitation schedule. Stanfield

testified that part of that difficulty was due to McKenna not wanting to visit with

Z.W. at a time separate from McKenna’s visitation with her other children.

{¶72} Skylar Garza-Ellcessor testified that he has been a close friend of

McKenna’s since she was in fifth grade and he was in seventh grade. On one

occasion during the pendency of the CPSU cases, Garza-Ellcessor served as the

supervisor for a visitation that McKenna had with her children at her home. On that

occasion, one of McKenna’s daughters was injured as a result of fighting with

another sibling over a scooter. Garza-Ellcessor testified that McKenna had stepped

inside to get something and was busy tending to Z.W. but that he was keeping an

eye on the other children outside when the scooter incident occurred. Garza-

Ellcessor testified that the incident happened very quickly in the moment and that

McKenna’s children were very energetic at the time. Garza-Ellcessor also testified

that he had observed McKenna’s parenting over the years and he thinks she is a

great parent.

{¶73} McKenna testified that she resides in Findlay, Ohio, where she had

been living in her current home for approximately three years. McKenna testified

that the biggest change she made as a result of the CPSU cases was that she had quit

dating, as she makes poor choices in men and has more important things to focus

on. As to the circumstances surrounding Z.W.’s birth, McKenna testified that she

-35- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

did not hide her pregnancy from the agency but that she also purposely did not share

the news of the pregnancy. McKenna testified that she had received prenatal care

during her pregnancy with Z.W., although she did not know the name of the

physician who delivered Z.W. After Z.W. was born, McKenna wanted to leave the

hospital with the baby against medical advice. McKenna testified that she had

developed Group B Strep during her pregnancy with Z.W., which was why the

hospital wanted to keep Z.W. for observation following her birth. However,

McKenna was familiar with Group B Strep from a prior pregnancy and had been

told by doctors then that it was nothing to worry about. McKenna testified that

CPSU personnel were very aggressive when they came to the hospital following

Z.W.’s birth. McKenna testified that she refused to agree to a safety plan at that

time on the advice of counsel.

{¶74} McKenna testified that her visitation with Z.W. was suspended the

first time due to a miscommunication with the caseworker, as McKenna believed

the Harmony House visitations were going to be switched to supervised in-home

visits. McKenna testified that the second suspension of visitation occurred because

she had been sick. McKenna testified that her employment obligations made it

impossible for her to have visitation with Z.W. in the evenings, which was when

Harmony House tried to schedule it. With regard to the recent visitation with her

children when she ignored Z.W. for twenty minutes, McKenna testified that she was

upset at that time, due to having realized that the permanent custody hearing was to

-36- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

be held shortly thereafter. McKenna testified that she interacted with Z.W. towards

the end of that same visitation, and acknowledged that she should have positioned

herself differently in the room, so that she could observe all of the children.

{¶75} As to the incident where one of her older daughters was injured in a

fight with a sibling over a scooter, McKenna testified that she had stepped into the

house momentarily to get Z.W., whom she had left inside in a bouncer as a safety

precaution because Z.W. was crawling at the time. With regard to her oldest

daughter alleging that she had been sexually abused by two of her siblings while

visiting at McKenna’s home, McKenna testified that the family was in the car

traveling for most of the day in question. McKenna testified that she had heard

through the agency that her older children were engaging in sexual activity with

each other but that she had never witnessed it and it took place when the children

were visiting their father. With regard to the nude photographs of her that had been

texted to Z.W.’s foster father, McKenna testified that her ex-boyfriend had stolen

her phone and so she assumed he was responsible for sending the photos.

{¶76} McKenna testified that she had experienced difficulties dealing with

CPSU throughout the pendency of the cases she had with them, and that the agency

refused to provide her information about how the children were doing in school,

refused to assist her in scheduling visitation, refused to give her medical information

about Z.W., and refused to give her contact information for Z.W.’s foster

family. McKenna testified that she felt she had completed everything required of

-37- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

her by the case plan. McKenna testified that, in addition to the services suggested

by the agency, she also watched a reality television show and TikTok videos in order

to learn parenting techniques. McKenna testified that she did not believe permanent

custody was in Z.W.’s best interest.

{¶77} At the close of the evidence, upon inquiry by the trial court, the

guardian ad litem indicated that nothing he had heard during the hearing changed

the recommendation made in the report he had submitted to the court. That report,

which was admitted in evidence as Court’s Exhibit A, recommended that the motion

for permanent custody of Z.W. be granted.

{¶78} In the written decision issued by the trial court on May 28, 2024, the

trial court reviewed the evidence presented at the permanent custody hearing in light

of the best-interest analysis required by R.C. 2151.414(D) before determining that

permanent custody of Z.W. should be granted to the agency.

{¶79} Following this Court’s independent review of the record, we find that

the trial court took all relevant evidence into account and properly applied the

relevant statutory factors in making its “best interest of the child”

determination. The trial court’s decision was supported by clear and convincing

evidence, and the weight of the evidence presented at the permanent custody hearing

strongly established that a grant of permanent custody to the agency is in the best

interest of Z.W.

-38- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

{¶80} In particular, we note that Z.W. was born under circumstances

reflecting that McKenna was not prepared, or equipped, for the baby’s arrival. Even

more troubling is the fact that, after hospital medical staff determined that Z.W.

needed to remain in the hospital for observation, McKenna attempted to leave the

hospital with Z.W. against that professional medical advice. In the nearly two years

that followed, McKenna significantly failed to fully participate in the visitation

opportunities made available to her and appeared to develop no real bond with Z.W.

Most importantly, during the pendency of the case, McKenna continued to display

conduct evidencing her inability to supervise and care for Z.W. in an attentive and

safe manner.

{¶81} The factors that must be considered in determining whether permanent

custody is in Z.W.’s best interest are set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D), as detailed

above. In this case, the testimony was clear that Z.W. was thriving in her foster

home and that she was bonded with her foster family. On the other hand, while

Z.W. always seemed happy to see her mother, no real familial-type relationship had

developed between the two. Regarding the wishes of the child, Z.W. is too young

to express her own wishes. However, the guardian ad litem strongly opined that

permanent custody was in Z.W.’s best interest. Regarding Z.W.’s custodial history

and her need for permanency, Z.W. was almost two years old at the time of the

hearing and had been in the temporary custody of the agency since shortly after

birth. The evidence established that Z.W. certainly needs permanency and there

-39- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

was no indication that Z.W. could safely be returned to her mother at any time in

the near future. While McKenna was fairly compliant in participating in the services

recommended by the agency in order to complete the objectives set forth by the case

plans relating to Z.W., case plan compliance does not preclude a grant of permanent

custody to a children’s services agency. E.g., In re Gomer, 2004-Ohio-1723, ¶ 36

(3d Dist.). Further, while the evidence established that McKenna is employed and

had housing suitable for Z.W., which are also factors to McKenna’s credit, the

remaining evidence overwhelmingly established that McKenna had simply not

demonstrated the ability to provide a stable, safe, and nurturing environment for

{¶82} Upon considering all relevant factors and remaining mindful that the

trial court’s judgment may have been based upon observing the demeanor of

witnesses and other nuances that do not translate to the written record, we find that

the trial court’s decision regarding permanent custody of Z.W. was supported by

clear and convincing evidence. For the reasons stated, and in light of all of the

evidence detailed above, the trial court’s decision granting permanent custody to the

agency was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and McKenna’s

assignment of error relating to Z.W. is overruled.

Analysis – Decisions Regarding C.P., B.P., and J.P. (Case Numbers 5-24-19, 5-24-20, and 5-24-21)

-40- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

{¶83} In each of these three cases, with regard to the first prong of the

applicable two-prong test, the trial court found that the child at issue had been in the

agency’s temporary custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive 22-month

period. Again, under the plain language of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), when a child

has been in an agency’s temporary custody for twelve or more months of a

consecutive 22-month period, a trial court need not find that the child cannot be

placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the

parents. In re I.G., 2014-Ohio-1136, ¶ 30 (3d Dist.); In re A.M., 2015-Ohio-2740, ¶

14 (3d Dist.).

{¶84} On appeal, none of the appellants dispute that CPSU met the R.C.

2151.414(B)(1)(d) “12 in 22-standard” as to all three children, and the trial court’s

findings as to that issue are also supported by the record. Therefore, we move on to

consider whether the trial court’s best-interest of the child findings are also

supported by clear and convincing evidence.

{¶85} On May 20 - 23, 2024, a hearing was held on the motions for

permanent custody relating to C.P., J.P., and B.P. At that hearing, CPSU presented

the testimony of twelve witnesses, McKenna called three witnesses, and Johnathon

presented the testimony of one witness. Over 130 exhibits were also entered into

evidence.

{¶86} Jena Meloy testified that she is a kindergarten teacher employed by

the Findlay City Schools. Two years prior to the hearing, J.P. was a student in

-41- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

Meloy’s kindergarten class. On October 25, 2021, Meloy noticed a bruise on J.P.,

which she asked him about and also reported to the school nurse. The nurse then

telephoned either children services or the police to report the injury.

{¶87} Ashley Brauneller testified that she is a school nurse employed by the

Findlay City Schools. In October of 2021, teacher Jena Meloy brought J.P. in to see

Brauneller, because Meloy noticed that J.P. had a large bruise on his right back hip

that extended down his backside. Brauneller asked J.P. what had happened and he

said he had been hit by his dad the night before. Brauneller, who is a mandated

reporter, provided J.P. with an ice pack and called law enforcement.

{¶88} Officer Doug Marshall testified that he is a police officer employed by

the Findlay Police Department. On October 25, 2021, Marshall responded to

Whittier Primary School, as a result of a call reporting possible child abuse. After

speaking with J.P. and looking at his injuries, Marshall contacted CPSU. Marshall

filled out the paperwork to do an emergency child removal, and then J.P. and his

brother C.P. were removed from the school and placed in protective custody with

CPSU. Marshall then went to Johnathon’s residence and removed the boys’ sister,

B.P. While at the residence, Marshall spoke with Johnathon. Johnathon told

Marshall that the kids were not listening and would not go to bed, and so he

“whooped ass.” (Tr., 63).

{¶89} Hope Stanfield testified that she is employed by Open Arms in

Findlay, as the case manager at Harmony House. Through that employment,

-42- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

Stanfield became familiar with C.P, J.P., B.P., and their parents, as Harmony House

was used for Johnathon’s and McKenna’s supervised visitation with the

children. Stanfield identified the records relating to those visitations, which

included notations as to any cancellations or missed visits, as well as notes regarding

any incidents occurring during the visits. As to Johnathon’s visits, the records

reflected that the children were frequently rambunctious, would throw things, and

would kick and hit each other. Johnathon would typically address the children’s

misbehavior in an appropriate fashion, although not always successfully. Johnathon

missed some scheduled visits but never two in a row, which would have resulted in

his visitation being suspended pursuant to Harmony House rules. Stanfield testified

that the two boys were affectionate toward their father, appeared to enjoy visiting

with him, and seemed bonded with him. As to McKenna’s visits, the records

reflected that the children would also misbehave in similarly rambunctious ways, or

speak very disrespectfully toward their mother. J.P. frequently expressed a desire

to cut short the visits with his mother or to not attend them at all. While McKenna

would sometimes try to correct the children when they acted out, there were visits

where McKenna failed to respond to the children or did not pay them close

attention. McKenna also missed enough visits that her visitation was suspended

three different times. McKenna also cancelled a number of visits, giving a variety

of reasons as to why she could not make it.

-43- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

{¶90} Antonique Ingraham testified that she is a Clinical Counselor II for the

Cullen Center, which is associated with the Russell J. Ebeid Children’s Hospital,

formerly known as Toledo Children’s Hospital. In that capacity, Ingraham

counseled B.P. for approximately one month in the fall of 2023, during which time

there were approximately eight counseling sessions. B.P.’s counseling sessions

were set up by Johnathon, following a referral by CPSU for trauma-involved

therapy. Johnathon and his mother, Nancy, reported that B.P. exhibited

inappropriate behaviors, including sexual behavior, with the other children, and she

had problems regulating her emotions at home and at school. B.P. reported to

Ingraham that she and her brothers engaged in sexual behavior, which B.P. called

“pee-peeing”. B.P. said that her brother put his “pee pee” in her vagina. Ingraham

diagnosed B.P. with PTSD, with the nature of the trauma being neglect, emotional

abuse, removal, and family loss. During the timeframe that Ingraham saw B.P. for

counseling, B.P. was not on any medication. B.P. reported that she “loved

mommy.” However, B.P. also told Ingraham that her mother was rude and B.P. said

she hated going to the “stupid visits” with her mother. B.P. also reported that

McKenna’s friend “Nate” had kept B.P. and another sibling in a dark room, would

tie them up in the closet, would not feed them, and would not let them use the

bathroom. During the eight counseling sessions, B.P. never said anything negative

about Johnathon. On October 5, 2023, B.P. was removed from her father’s care by

-44- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

CPSU, and Ingraham’s counseling services were thereafter terminated by the

agency.

{¶91} Michelle Yeasting testified that she is employed as the Forensic Nurse

Program Coordinator at Blanchard Valley Health System. Yeasting is a trained

sexual assault nurse examiner (“SANE”) and is also a pediatric SANE. On October

3, 2023, B.P. was brought to the hospital for a sexual assault exam. Yeasting

obtained a history from B.P.’s father, and then she also spoke with B.P. The chief

complaint reported by Johnathon was that B.P. had told her counselor that one or

both of her brothers had recently sexually assaulted her, during what was supposed

to be a supervised visit at McKenna’s home. Johnathon reported that there may

have been penetration, and that he noticed two bruises on B.P.’s leg. Johnathon also

reported that his mother, B.P.’s grandmother, noticed that B.P. had been itching her

pelvic area. No sexual assault test kit was utilized during the examination due to

the reported timeframe of when the alleged sexual assault had occurred. During the

overall examination of B.P., Yeasting noted an abrasion on B.P.’s nose, a bruise on

her right cheek, an abrasion on her neck, multiple abrasions on her back, a bruise on

her right arm, three abrasions on her upper left arm, a bruise on her left foot, and an

abrasion on her right foot. Yeasting also documented that B.P. had multiple lineal

abrasions on her right upper thigh, and multiple abrasions on her buttocks. The

examination of B.P.’s genital area reflected no unusual injuries, although Yeasting

testified that such a finding does not rule out sexual assault.

-45- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

{¶92} Jade McCloud testified that she is employed as a forensic counselor at

the Family Resource Center in Findlay, where she had been providing counseling

services to McKenna for two years. McKenna reported to McCloud that she was

dealing with some mental health issues as a result of her children being removed

from the home. McCloud diagnosed McKenna with post-traumatic stress disorder,

adjustment disorder, and major depressive disorder. McCloud testified that

McKenna had been meeting treatment goals and that should result in McKenna

being better equipped to handle her stressors in the future. However, McCloud also

testified that she and McKenna had not discussed parenting in the counseling

sessions.

{¶93} Amy Ward testified that she is employed as a family support coach at

the Family Resource Center. In that capacity, Ward has worked with Johnathon and

McKenna. As to Johnathon, Ward reengaged with him in January of 2023. At that

time, Ward noted that Johnathon seemed optimistic about learning new parenting

skills. However, in February of 2023, Johnathon missed all four of the scheduled

appointments made for that month. In March of 2023, Johnathon kept both of two

scheduled appointments. Ward noted that, at that time, Johnathon seemed to

understand that physical punishment of the children is unacceptable and he was

learning new ways to discipline. Ward testified that physical punishment was a

conversation topic during her sessions with Johnathon because that had previously

been an issue. In April of 2023, Johnathon kept one scheduled appointment but was

-46- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

a “no show” for his second one. In May of 2023, Johnathon kept both of his two

scheduled appointments, and took Ward’s suggestion concerning moving furniture

at home to lessen his daughter’s nighttime anxiety and help her sleep better. In June

of 2023, Johnathon kept three of four appointments, during which Ward explained

the harm in Johnathon coaching the children to cover up the truth, or asking them

to lie. In July of 2023, Johnathon kept his only scheduled appointment, during

which Ward counseled him about refraining from discussing CPSU case details in

front of the children, which he had reportedly done. In August of 2023, Johnathon

kept four of four appointments. Ward’s notes indicated that Johnathon’s home in

Pemberville had been approved by CPSU, and that she continued to instruct him

that his discipline of the children needed to be consistent, nonthreatening, and non-

physical. In September of 2023, Johnathon kept two of two appointments. During

one of those appointments, Johnathon reported that the children were getting injured

during visitation with their mother. In October of 2023, Johnathon kept one

appointment, but then Ward cancelled the second one after the children were

removed from Johnathon’s care by CPSU. Ward spoke with Johnathon and she

recommended a one to two time per month check-in with her, in order to discuss

any changes in the CPSU case status. During that conversation, Johnathon asserted

that he had not harmed the children and alleged that all negative events occurred

while they were in their mother’s care.

-47- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

{¶94} Ward testified that in December of 2023 and January and February of

2024, Johnathon did not engage in the recommended monthly check-ins, reporting

to Ward that he felt home coaching was unnecessary because the children had been

removed from his care. Johnathon subsequently reengaged with Ward, and began

keeping appointments and she began observing Johnathon’s parenting time with the

children at Harmony House. Following one of those observed visitations, Ward

spoke with Johnathon about internet safety, as there was an incident at Harmony

House where Johnathon attempted to provide one of the children with a

gamertag. That was a violation of CPSU rules as it would have provided the

children with a form of communication over the internet that could not be monitored

by the agency. Ward also discussed Johnathon’s reluctance to co-parent with

McKenna, which he felt that he could not do. Ward and Johnathon also discussed

the pros and cons of Johnathon not allowing a CPSU caseworker into his residence,

which Johnathon was resistant to doing because the children were not living in his

home at the time. When Ward was asked if she believed the children would be safe

in a home with Johnathon, Ward testified, “I don’t think that I can answer that.”

(Tr., 434).

{¶95} As to McKenna, Ward testified that McKenna was fairly compliant

with keeping her appointments, although there were months when appointments

were missed or cancelled. Over time, Ward counseled McKenna on the potential

harm that could be caused to the children by McKenna letting other people live in

-48- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

her home. Ward also discussed with McKenna the need to pay very close attention

to her children at all times, due to allegations of injuries happening to the children

during McKenna’s parenting time. Ward also discussed internet safety with

McKenna, as it related to the children.

{¶96} Finally, Ward testified that she had observed both Johnathon and

McKenna separately interact with the children three or four times each. Ward did

not observe any discipline issues during those interactions, and both parents

appeared to show love and affection toward the children.

{¶97} Jill Titus testified that she and her husband are foster parents and are

also certified as a “treatment level” foster home, in order to provide foster care to

children who have extra special needs. C.P., J.P., and B.P. were placed with Titus

and her husband in October of 2021. Titus fostered all three children in her home

for approximately two years, and then subsequently fostered only B.P. Titus

testified that when the children first came to live in her home, they were very wild

and “animalistic”, running around, and picking up animals and flinging them. Titus

testified that, due to the children’s trauma history, they each behaved differently and

navigated their issues in different ways. When not well regulated, C.P. would

freeze, then shut down and not respond. The biggest concerns with C.P. were peer

relationships and school-related matters. Titus testified that J.P. is impulsive and

would not make safe choices when not well regulated. He would take off running

-49- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

through parking lots and act in wild ways. Titus testified that B.P. is a fighter, and

would be very physical, destructive, and verbally abusive when not well regulated.

{¶98} Titus testified that, initially, it was very difficult to care for the

children. C.P. was behind academically, and had bullying issues that needed

addressed. Titus arranged for C.P. to be assessed by a psychologist at Nationwide

Children’s and he was diagnosed with ADHD. J.P. had serious behavioral

issues. He was in kindergarten when first placed with Titus, and would clear

classrooms with his destructiveness and would intentionally defecate himself. Titus

also had J.P. assessed by the psychologist at Nationwide Children’s, and J.P. was

also diagnosed with ADHD. B.P. was in preschool when first placed in the Titus

home. B.P. was physical with the other children at preschool and destructive in the

classroom, which resulted in her being suspended and then expelled from

preschool. Titus arranged for B.P. to be assessed through Mary Rutan Pediatrics,

and B.P. was also diagnosed with ADHD.

{¶99} Titus testified that, after those diagnoses, each child was prescribed a

different level of methylphenidate, which is a drug for treating ADHD. Once the

children began taking the medication, they were all monitored through regular

consultations with Mary Rutan Pediatrics, to ensure there were no side effects and

that things were going well. Titus testified that the difference in the children’s

behavior after being on the prescribed medication was life changing. C.P. had

initially been almost two years behind academically and, after his treatment began,

-50- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

he was able to reach his current grade level in all areas. The medication also helped

C.P. significantly with his peer relationships, he gained confidence, and his

tendency to freeze and shut down lessened. Once on the medication, J.P. was like

a different child, and no longer had behavioral problems in the classroom at

school. B.P. also responded positively to the medication, and her behavioral issues

improved. Due to a methylphenidate shortage, the children’s prescription regimen

was interrupted on one occasion because their prescriptions could not be

filled. Titus testified that on that occasion, once the children were not taking the

medication, there was an immediate change for the worse in the children’s behavior,

particularly at school. Titus testified that even missing just one dose of the

medication, which is taken daily in the morning, would cause an immediate change

in the children’s behavior.

{¶100} Titus testified that, during the time she had all three children in her

household, it was important to set strict boundaries for the children’s safety, due to

their past history with each other. Titus enforced strict rules, and the children were

not permitted to be left unattended, nor were any two children permitted to be

together without supervision.

{¶101} While all three children were in Titus’s care, visitation with their

parents began in West Liberty, where the Titus and her husband live. Both parents

were inconsistent in their attendance. To make visitation easier for both Johnathon

and McKenna, the visitations were then moved to the Findlay area. Zoom calls were

-51- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

also utilized as a way for the children to visit with their father. For a period,

visitations with the parents were suspended. During that period, Titus noticed that

the children were much calmer. Once visitation with their parents resumed, the

children’s behavioral issues increased. The more parental visitation was increased,

the worse the children’s behavior became, particularly when the children would

have overnight visits or weekend stays with Johnathon. Titus also realized that

Johnathon was not consistently administering the ADHD medication to the children,

which Titus would provide to Johnathon prior to each visitation in his home and

then inventory afterward. Following unsupervised weekend visits with Johnathon,

C.P. and J.P. would become very physical with B.P., and would hit, shove, and gang

up on her. The two boys would also increase their attempts to persuade B.P. to

engage in sexual activity with them, and J.P. began defecating in the yard again,

which he had not done since first coming to live with Titus. Titus attempted to

explain to Johnathon the differences she observed in the children’s behavior

following visits with him, and she learned that Johnathon did not share her view as

to the importance of the medication. Titus testified that Johnathon did ask her for

advice, and she provided him with information about the structured approach she

utilized in caring for the children in her home.

{¶102} Titus testified that, during the time she had all three children in her

home, they suffered no injuries aside from those occurring from typical outdoor

play. However, when the children began having extended visitation with Johnathon

-52- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

in his home, Titus observed the children to have bumps and bruises, which Titus

documented with photographs and reported to CPSU.

{¶103} Titus testified that she had far less contact with McKenna during the

time Titus was fostering all three children, although she would speak briefly with

McKenna when dropping off the children for visitation and they occasionally

exchanged texts, sharing photographs of the children. Titus quit texting McKenna

after McKenna texted two photographs to Titus’s husband. Those photos depicted

McKenna topless, in provocative poses. McKenna then texted again to say the texts

had been sent to the wrong number. Titus and her husband reported the photos to

CPSU and the police, and then ceased further contact with McKenna.

{¶104} Titus testified that, in August of 2023, the children were returned to

Johnathon’s custody. In October of 2023, B.P. was returned to Titus’s care. At that

time, Titus observed that B.P. “did not come back the child that left a month prior.”

(Tr., 502). When B.P. was returned to foster care in Titus’s home, B.P. was not

medicated, was very detached, and used inappropriate language.

{¶105} Titus also testified that, prior to the time when B.P. was separated

from her brothers and cared for in a different home, B.P. disclosed to Titus that she

and her brothers would “marry” each other. The boys would get on top of B.P. and

also expose themselves to her. While all three children were still in her care, Titus

stopped a sexual incident from occurring in a toy tunnel in her home. Titus testified

-53- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

that all three children had disclosed the fact that they had previously had sexual

encounters with each other.

{¶106} In summary, Titus testified that the three children have extreme

needs, which include an experienced and regulated caregiver who can assist the

children in navigating their issues and behaviors. Additionally, the children need to

be monitored at all times. Titus testified that she would have serious concerns if

B.P. were to be placed back with her brothers, given the history of behavior amongst

them. Titus testified that the children need to be on medication, which has made

such a significant improvement in their relationships and their behavior. Titus

testified that the children need safe adults who can model the behavior that the

children need to show. Finally, Titus testified that she and her husband adopting

B.P. is a possibility.

{¶107} Skylar Garza-Ellcessor was called as a witness by McKenna, out of

order. Garza-Ellcessor testified that he is a close friend of McKenna’s, and has been

for eight to ten years. On one occasion, Garza-Ellcessor served as the supervisor

for a visitation that McKenna had with her children at her home. On that occasion,

two of McKenna’s girls fought over a scooter in the driveway, and one ended up

with a broken wrist. Garza-Ellcessor believed that it was B.P. who pushed another

sister, with the other sister being the one who got hurt. Garza-Ellcessor also testified

that he had previously been around C.P., J.P., and B.P., and that the three of them

-54- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

sometimes played rough and would have bruises on them, but Garza-Ellcessor had

never seen anyone abuse the children.

{¶108} Jenny Foster testified that she is employed by Hancock County

Children Services, and she was the ongoing caseworker in this case from May of

2022 until October of 2023. CPSU involvement in the case began in January of

2021, when the children lived with McKenna, and McKenna’s boyfriend overdosed

at her home when the children were there. In addition to receiving a report about

that incident, CPSU received reports of domestic violence occurring in the home,

and it was alleged that McKenna was using drugs. CPSU attempted to investigate,

but McKenna would not cooperate. McKenna was subsequently hospitalized after

a domestic violence incident involving the same boyfriend who had

overdosed. CPSU developed a safety plan, which McKenna refused to sign. Within

days of discussing the safety plan with CPSU, McKenna broke the terms of the

plan. In February of 2021, CPSU received a report of bruises on the children, and

the children were removed from McKenna at that time. McKenna again refused to

sign a safety plan and would not cooperate with the agency. C.P., J.P., and B.P.

were adjudicated to be neglected and dependent children. At the dispositional

hearing, custody of the three children was given to Johnathon, with the agency

having protective supervision. In October of 2021, the children were reported to

have bruises, and it was alleged that Johnathon had inflicted the injuries. At that

-55- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

time, the police removed the children and placed them into the custody of the

{¶109} Foster testified that, on October 14, 2022, the agency filed its first

motions for permanent custody of C.P., J.P., and B.P., as McKenna had not made

progress with her case plan, her visitation with the three children was inconsistent,

and she had hidden a pregnancy from CPSU, then gave birth and attempted to leave

the hospital with the newborn against medical advice. At that time, Johnathon was

only visiting with the children via video, and also was not making progress with the

case plan. Following mediation, which Johnathon attended but McKenna did not, a

consent agreement was reached. Pursuant to that agreement, the permanent custody

motion was withdrawn by the agency, and CPSU sought a six-month extension of

its temporary custody of the three children, which the trial court granted. As part of

the agreement, Johnathon was given increased parenting time, as he seemed to be

making progress on the case at that time.

{¶110} Foster testified that, on June 22, 2023, the agency filed a second set

of motions for permanent custody of C.P., J.P., and B.P. At that time, there were

concerns because Johnathon was taking the children to an out-of-town home that

was not an approved location for his visitation. Additionally, there were concerns

that Johnathon was coaching the children as to what to say and how to act when

interacting with agency personnel. McKenna was also not making progress with

her case plan, and so the agency felt it was time to file again for permanent

-56- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

custody. In July of 2023, a hearing was held on a motion filed by Johnathon seeking

increased parenting time. As a result, the trial court permitted unsupervised

visitation between Johnathon and the three children to continue. On August 23,

2023, CPSU and all other parties signed a consent entry that returned the three

children to Johnathon’s custody, with protective supervision retained by the agency,

upon the terms and conditions set forth in the agreed order. As part of that

agreement, CPSU also withdrew the pending motion for permanent custody.

{¶111} Foster testified that, on October 5, 2023, an ex parte motion

requesting removal of the children from Johnathon’s custody was filed by the

agency, as it had been reported that B.P. was sexually assaulted during a visit at

McKenna’s house, and there were numerous bruises and marks found on B.P. that

had not been reported to the agency as required by the court order in place at that

time.

{¶112} Foster testified that, on October 6, 2023, the agency filed its third set

of motions seeking permanent custody of C.P., J.P., and B.P., as the children had

been removed twice from Johnathon’s care, and the case had been opened for over

two years with no additional time left to attempt to reunify the family.

{¶113} Foster testified that a grant of permanent custody was the least

restrictive alternative for the three children, as the children need a permanent, safe

and secure home that is free from abuse and neglect. CPSU explored three relatives

-57- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

as custodial options for the children; however, those relatives either were not

approved or declined to take the children.

{¶114} Foster identified various case plans that had been developed over the

pendency of the agency’s involvement with the family, and she detailed changes

that had been made as the family’s situation evolved. Throughout the agency’s

involvement with the family, reunification had been the goal of the case plans, and

services were identified and offered to the family in order to help them address and

remedy safety concerns.

{¶115} As to Johnathon, Foster testified that the case plans included

completing a GAINS assessment, following recommendations, mental health

services, completing parent education, providing safe and stable housing, and

utilizing home coaching. Johnathon completed the parent education class but,

through visitation, CPSU saw problems with his ability to implement the strategies

learned in the parent education, which was why the agency recommended home

coaching. Johnathon’s compliance with home coaching was mixed. Ultimately,

Johnathon did not demonstrate effective parenting strategies. With regard to

housing, Foster testified that Johnathon initially remedied concerns raised by the

caseworker, such as weapons being displayed on the wall or a closet door being off

its track. However, toward the end of Foster’s involvement in the case, Johnathon

moved to a different house, denied Foster access to the home, and he permitted the

children to be at the new home without agency approval. Two allegations of

-58- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

physical abuse occurring in Johnathon’s home resulted in removal of the children,

indicating he was not able to provide a safe and stable home for them. Johnathon

eventually engaged in mental health services but, to Foster’s knowledge, he then did

not follow through on additional mental health services recommended by the family

therapist. Results of the GAINS assessment requested by CPSU were not received

by the agency until February of 2023. Additionally, Foster testified that Johnathon

was initially cooperative with her but, by the spring of 2023, he became very

frustrated and angry when progress was not made on the case according to his own

desires and timeframe. Foster testified that she would characterize Johnathon’s

relationship with the children as manipulative. Based upon staff observations of

Johnathon’s interaction with the children during supervised visitations, the agency

had concerns with his ability to attend to all three children at one time, and also with

the ineffectual way he addressed the children’s behavioral issues.

{¶116} As to McKenna, Foster testified that the case plans focused on

domestic violence issues, parent education, home coaching, mental health services,

safe and stable housing, and visitation. McKenna completed domestic violence

counseling but continued to have issues with domestic violence in her

relationships. McKenna’s attendance with her mental health provider was sporadic,

although she continued with that counseling. McKenna struggled with depression

and with finding the motivation to follow through with recommendations made to

her by the agency. With regard to housing, McKenna initially lived in an unsafe

-59- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

structure but then moved to a different home that was in much better

condition. However, the agency continued to have concerns with other adults that

McKenna permitted to be in her home, as the presence of others impacted her ability

to establish a safe home environment for her children. McKenna completed parent

education, but continued to struggle with adequately supervising her children. At

the agency’s request, McKenna also engaged in home coaching. While she had

some attendance issues with the home coach, McKenna continued to meet with that

coach throughout the pendency of the case. McKenna’s supervision of the children

in her home did not improve over time, and the lack of supervision resulted in a

child being injured and requiring medical treatment on one occasion, and in a sexual

assault against one of the children reportedly occurring in her home on another

occasion. During McKenna’s supervised visits with the children at Harmony

House, it was also noted that she failed to attend to the children, and could not ensure

their safety. McKenna was defensive and uncommunicative with Foster in their

dealings. McKenna was inconsistent in attending visitation with the

children. Foster testified that while McKenna loves the children and the children

love their mother, McKenna was ultimately just not able to adequately supervise the

children in a manner that would keep them safe. Over time, C.P., J.P., and B.P.

began to express frustration over having to visit their mother at Harmony

House. More recently, J.P. began stating that he did not want to see his mother on

-60- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

a weekly basis. At the time of the hearing, there was a “no visitation” order in place

with regard to McKenna and B.P.

{¶117} Finally, Foster testified on direct examination that the three children

were in need of a legally secure placement and that such a placement could not be

accomplished without a grant of permanent custody to the agency. Foster also

opined that permanent custody would be the least restrictive alternative available.

{¶118} Under cross-examination, Foster testified that there had been twelve

different case plans, although the main goals of the plans had remained the

same. Foster agreed that Johnathon had completed most of the case plan

requirements. However, she explained that he did not remedy the issues that had

caused the removal of the children. Foster clarified that she did not expect a parent

to be able to give one hundred percent attention to each child, but that it was

important for a parent to know where the children are and what they are doing on a

consistent basis. When questioned about a sword that Johnathon formerly had

hanging on a wall in his home, Foster confirmed that it was at a height where the

children could reach it. Foster testified that Johnathon stated he did not want his

children on ADHD medication, and he also discontinued the children’s use of the

medication when in his custody or spending overnight visitations with him. Foster

testified that Johnathon took the children off the medication in the absence of any

doctor’s recommendation to do so. Foster confirmed that McKenna had ended

relationships with two abusive boyfriends. However, Foster testified that McKenna

-61- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

continued to have multiple persons frequently present in her home and, while

McKenna denied that those persons were living there, there was evidence that at

least one man had been spending the night and it was unknown whether he was an

appropriate person for the children to be around. Foster testified that McKenna,

similar to Johnathon, had engaged in many of the services recommended by the

agency but that she was unable to remedy the concerns of the agency and effectively

and safely parent the children. Foster confirmed that McKenna has six biological

children and, at the time of the hearing, had custody of none of them. Foster detailed

various sexual behaviors that B.P. had engaged in, including masturbating, sticking

a pencil in her vagina, and participating in sexually-oriented activities with C.P. and

J.P. Foster noted that such behavior by B.P. lessened while she was in foster care

but resumed after B.P. was returned to her father’s custody. Foster testified that

B.P. is a very traumatized child and that it will take a lot of work and specialized

help to get her to a healthy place. Foster opined that B.P. should never be in a home

again with C.P. or J.P. Foster acknowledged that she was removed from the case as

the ongoing caseworker in early October of 2023, due to her becoming emotionally

involved and potentially losing objectivity. Foster was not involved in the agency’s

decision to remove the children from Johnathon’s custody later that month. Finally,

Foster testified that she believed both McKenna and Johnathon to be unfit parents

of the three children at issue in the case.

-62- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

{¶119} Lexi Goedde testified that she is employed by Hancock County

Children Services and was assigned in December of 2023 as the ongoing caseworker

in the cases involving C.P., J.P., and B.P. Goedde testified that the agency filed the

permanent custody complaints at issue due to the lack of significant progress on the

part of either parent to remedy the concerns involved in the earlier removals, as well

as other agency concerns. Goedde testified that she believed permanent custody to

be the least restrictive alternative due to the children needing permanency and the

lack of progress of the parents on the case plan objectives. Reunification was the

ultimate goal of the case plan authored by Goedde with assistance from her

supervisor, and Goedde testified that the plan was reasonably calculated to

accomplish that goal. Changes made to that case plan included additional services,

a change in placement that returned the three children to foster care, and the addition

of Nancy Pfeiffer, Johnathon’s mother, to the plan. Pfeiffer was added because she

owned Johnathon’s home and was in the home. Pfeiffer did not engage in any of

the services recommended by the case plan and did not cooperate with

CPSU. When contacted by telephone by CPSU, Pfeiffer hung up.

{¶120} Goedde testified that the objectives for McKenna in the case plan

were mental health counseling, medication management, safe and stable housing,

home coaching, and parent education. Records from McKenna’s mental health

counselor indicated that McKenna had been compliant with the counseling

throughout the case but was not improving. Goedde completed home visits at

-63- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

McKenna’s residence and found the house to be maintained and structurally

safe. However, Goedde noted that any time visitation had been enlarged to permit

McKenna to visit with the children in her home, the visits were always terminated

due to safety concerns resulting from lack of parental supervision. Goedde testified

that McKenna also continued her pattern of allowing persons to be present in her

home in significant ways without the agency having conducted background checks

on those persons. McKenna completed parent education classes but her

involvement with the home coach was inconsistent. A video from a supervised

visitation occurring on May 8, 2024 reflected that McKenna was attentive to one of

the children present at the time, but not another child who was in the room, with her

back turned toward that child. Goedde testified that communication with McKenna

was not the easiest, particularly when discussing the case plan or things that had

happened to the children, because McKenna would tend to minimize the issue or

blame other people. In any unannounced home visits made by Goedde to

McKenna’s home, the door went unanswered. Goedde confirmed that McKenna

has six children, with C.P., J.P., and B.P. being the first, third, and fourth by birth

order. McKenna did not have custody of any of those six children at the time of the

hearing. Goedde also testified that, at the time of the hearing, C.P. still willingly

attended visits with his mother, J.P. had begun refusing to attend visits with her, and

B.P. had no visitation with McKenna pursuant to court order. Goedde testified that

-64- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

there did not seem to be any significant bond between McKenna and any of her

children.

{¶121} Goedde testified that objectives for Johnathon in the case plan were

to reengage in mental health counseling, safe and stable housing, visitation, and

home coaching. Goedde testified that Johnathon told her he would not reengage in

mental health treatment as he had engaged in mental health services twice

previously and felt he did not need it. With regard to housing, Johnathon permitted

Goedde to visit him at his home in December of 2023 but, after that, it became

difficult for her to schedule home visits and he refused to meet with her in his

home. Johnathon also reported to Goedde that he had been terminated at his place

of employment. Goedde testified that Johnathon had just completed a second

parenting class the week before the hearing, with positive feedback from the

provider. However, Goedde testified that Johnathon had not shown, or the agency

had been unable to monitor, whether Johnathon was able to implement what was

taught in the class. Johnathon declined to participate further with home coaching,

telling Goedde that he did not see the point since the agency had already made up

its mind. Goedde testified about various ongoing concerns of the agency with

regard to Johnathon, including physical abuse and anger management

issues. Goedde indicated that Johnathon tended to minimize those concerns or

blame others.

-65- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

{¶122} Goedde testified that CPSU had made reasonable efforts in the case,

but that she believed a legally secure placement for the three children could not be

accomplished without a grant of permanent custody to the agency. Goedde believed

that it was in the best interest of the children to be placed in the agency’s permanent

custody, and that to do so was the least restrictive alternative. Goedde reiterated

that neither parent had made significant progress in remedying the causes of the

children’s removals or in addressing the agency’s concerns. Goedde testified that

C.P. and J.P. had more recently been living in a foster home separate from B.P.’s

foster home, and Goedde had observed that the boys really seemed to love their new

home. Goedde testified that she observed the two boys showing respect to their

foster mother and that the foster mother had reported that the boys were doing very

well, mainly staying out of trouble, and needed just a little extra direction at

times. Goedde testified that B.P. calls her foster parents “mom” and “dad” and that

B.P. has never inquired of Goedde about McKenna or Johnathon.

{¶123} Under cross-examination, Goedde testified that she was permitted to

form her own opinions on the case. She explained that while she was assigned to

the case in December of 2023, the case plan she developed was not implemented

until March 1, 2024 due to the removal in October of 2023 having been contested

and the agency awaiting a disposition on that. Goedde acknowledged that, had

Johnathon reengaged in mental health counseling, it probably would not have been

completed by the hearing but that reengaging with counseling would indicate he

-66- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

was making an attempt. Goedde testified that Johnathon would not acknowledge

prior injuries reported by the children. Goedde testified that she would never

suggest that a child call their foster parents “mom” and “dad”, but that she was

comfortable with that and it was not uncommon, especially if there are other

children in the foster home using those terms. Goedde acknowledged that the

children seem to have a bond with their father but not a good relationship, based on

the fact the children appear to fear Johnathon. Goedde testified that the foster home

where C.P. and J.P. were living was about three hours away, which contributed to

the children not wanting to make the drive for visitation with their parents. Goedde

testified that the case plan was not calculated for Johnathon to fail, and that the

agency continued to work toward reunification even after the pending motions for

permanent custody were filed. Goedde testified that the agency still encouraged

visitation with McKenna, although she had been told that in-home visitation was

not an option due to the pending motion for permanent custody and lack of

appropriate supervision. Goedde testified that the case had been ongoing for thirty-

nine months. Goedde testified that B.P. was also doing well in foster care, still

living in the Titus home where she had been placed for a substantial part of her

young life. At the time of the hearing, B.P. was engaged in ongoing counseling, as

were C.P. and J.P. Goedde testified that the children had suffered a great deal of

trauma in their early lives and, in her conversations with Johnathon, he tended to

minimize the trauma suffered by the children.

-67- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

{¶124} Kelli Miller testified that she is employed by Hancock County

Children Services, where she is an ongoing supervisor and adoption

assessor. Pursuant to that employment, Miller was involved in the cases involving

C.P., J.P., and B.P. as an ongoing caseworker, then as a supervisor, and also as an

adoption assessor. Miller testified that the original report that caused the agency to

open the cases involving C.P., J.P., and B.P. was received in February of 2021. That

report involved allegations of a drug overdose and domestic violence occurring in

McKenna’s home. When Miller responded to McKenna’s house following a call

from law enforcement, Miller observed all three children to have unexplained

bruises on their faces, and a safety plan was put in place. The first removal of the

children occurred while they were in McKenna’s custody, and then a second

removal took place when Johnathon had custody. Both removals involved the

children having unexplained injuries. In October of 2023, after B.P. was found

during a hospital S.A.N.E. exam to have a number of bruises all over her body,

Miller believed the bruising was consistent with child abuse. The agency made

substantiated findings during its investigation that Jonathon was the

perpetrator. Johnathon appealed that decision, but it was upheld. Miller also

detailed an unusual number of other injuries, such as bruises, cuts, scratches, and

scrapes, suffered by the children over time when in Johnathon’s care or during

visitation with McKenna. Miller testified that, during the course of the agency’s

involvement with the case, Johnathon would claim that the injuries to the children

-68- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

occurred when they were with McKenna, while McKenna claimed the children’s

injuries occurred when they were with Johnathon. The two parents also typically

asserted that they did not know how the children’s injuries occurred. Miller also

testified concerning Jonathon’s refusal to administer the prescribed ADHD

medication, and the negative impact that the lack of medication had on the

{¶125} Miller further testified that the agency never stopped trying to reunify

the children with their parents, even while the motions for permanent custody were

pending. Miller testified that the agency made reasonable efforts toward

reunification, which included providing case management, case plans, visitation,

home coaching, mental health and substance abuse assessments and counseling,

parent education, relative searches, return of the children, and protective

supervision. Miller testified that the children need a legally secure and safe

permanent placement, that permanent custody to the agency is in their best interests,

and is the least restrictive alternative. Miller testified that the children have been

removed three times during the pendency of the case, no relatives were approved

for custody, and McKenna and Johnathon both failed to remedy the reasons for the

removals. Miller testified that, at the time of the hearing, C.P. was ten years old,

J.P. was eight years old, and B.P. was seven years old, with all three children then

being developmentally on target. Miller testified that adoption would benefit the

-69- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

children and she believed it is likely that each of the children would be adopted if

permanent custody was granted to the agency.

{¶126} Under cross-examination, Miller testified that she did not agree with

how things were handled with some of the professional referrals made to provide

assistance to the parents. Miller testified that, during a forensic interview she

conducted with the children, the children ran out of the room to ask Johnathon if

they were allowed to answer the questions, and that is something that Miller had

never experienced in her career. When asked about injuries suffered by B.P. in

October of 2023, Miller confirmed her opinion that the injuries were consistent with

child abuse. Miller confirmed that the sexual abuse allegation made at that time was

unsubstantiated by CPSU. Miller confirmed that no family members were approved

as placement options for the children. Miller testified that Johnathon’s mother,

Nancy, refuses to communicate with the agency. Miller testified that, as to the

various injuries suffered by the children over time, the children gave inconsistent

versions of how the injuries occurred. Miller testified that, while in foster care, she

did not recall the children having any unexplained injuries.

{¶127} Timothy Hoover testified that he is an attorney and the guardian ad

litem for C.P., J.P., and B.P. Hoover had been involved in the case since

approximately August of 2022. Hoover identified the final report that he submitted

in the case on May 20, 2024. Hoover also identified a prior and more detailed report

that he had filed in January of 2024. Hoover recommended that the motion for

-70- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

permanent custody be granted as to all three children, based on his investigation in

the case. Hoover testified that, 39 months into the case, the children are in need of

legally secure and permanent placement, and their best interest dictates that

permanent custody be granted to the agency. Hoover testified that B.P. was in

agreement with that recommendation but that C.P. and J.P. were not, as the boys

wished to be reunited with their father. Hoover testified that the testimony given in

court during the hearing served to reinforce his own opinion that permanent custody

should be granted.

{¶128} On cross-examination, Hoover testified that he believed he had been

in agreement with all the case plans in the case but, following the last removal of

the children from Johnathon’s home in October of 2023, he began seriously thinking

that permanent custody was appropriate. Hoover testified that C.P. and J.P. speak

well of their father, that they love him, and are bonded with him. Hoover testified

that termination of Johnathon’s and McKenna’s parental rights was “10,000

percent” in the best interest of B.P., and that he had grave concerns for her safety

should she be returned to the home of either parent. Finally, Hoover testified that

neither Johnathon nor McKenna should parent children ever again.

{¶129} McKenna P. testified that she is the mother of C.P., J.P., and

B.P. McKenna testified that the children are very playful during their visits with

her. She testified that the boys have asked several times about coming back to her

house. McKenna testified that she found the home coaching helpful and that she

-71- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

had benefitted from it. McKenna stated she engaged in mental health counseling as

soon as she was told to, is compliant with her treatment, and has made progress

dealing with her PTSD and trauma from being sexually abused as a child. McKenna

testified that, before the case was opened, the kids loved school, although there were

attendance issues due to transportation. McKenna testified that the children had

become zombie-like, and were no longer the happy children she knew. McKenna

testified that she has had issues with keeping the children in line, and they are no

better now. McKenna testified that, when the children were in her care, there was

a lot of love and the children were bonded with her. McKenna testified that she

immediately broke up with her former boyfriend when his drug overdose caused the

case to be opened, and she testified that she has not had a boyfriend for nearly two

years. McKenna asserted that CPSU did not try to reunify the children with

her. McKenna testified that she had never seen any sexualized behavior in any of

the children prior to the removal, nor had she witnessed any such behavior

since. McKenna testified that any trauma to the children was caused by CPSU.

{¶130} During cross-examination, McKenna testified that any bumps or

bruises sustained by the children were not caused by her, nor did she believe that

Johnathon caused them. McKenna testified that the children play hard and that is

what causes such injuries.

{¶131} Johnathon P. testified that he has lived in Pemberville, Ohio since

August of 2023, in a five-bedroom home that he rents from his mother. He testified

-72- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

that the children’s bedrooms and bathrooms would be gender-segregated if the

children came to live with him. Johnathon testified that such segregation is

necessary because the children began exhibiting unruly behavior of a sexual nature

when they came to live with him in 2021. Johnathon stated that he reported such

behavior to CPSU but was not given adequate help with it. Johnathon testified that

the children first came to live with him in approximately May of 2021, three weeks

after they had been removed from their mother’s home. The boys were enrolled in

school at that time. C.P. was initially struggling academically but Johnathon

testified that he was able to get C.P. back on track after working with

him. Johnathon testified that J.P. had behavioral issues at school but that those

habits were ultimately curbed. Johnathon testified that the children were removed

from his home in October of 2021 because he spanked J.P. with an open hand,

causing the bruises that J.P.’s teacher then observed. Johnathon denied ever striking

C.P. or B.P.

{¶132} Johnathon testified that, as required by CPSU, he completed a drug

and alcohol assessment and no follow-up treatment was required. Johnathon

testified that he also completed mental health counseling and was successfully

discharged from that. Johnathon stated that the agency was unhappy that he had

been cleared by his counselor. Johnathon testified that, after the children were

placed in foster care in West Liberty, it was difficult to attend visits with them at

times. Johnathon testified he was unable to communicate appropriately with his

-73- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

children because everything is monitored and anything that is said can be

misconstrued. Once the visits were moved to Harmony House in Findlay, it became

easier to visit and Johnathon believed the visits went well. Johnathon testified that

reunification has never been the goal of CPSU, even though he worked the case plan

throughout the pendency of the case. Johnathon denied having coached the children

as to their communications with the agency.

{¶133} Johnathon was asked about the numerous bruises found on B.P.

during the S.A.N.E. exam in October of 2023, and he proffered guesses as to how

of some of those might have occurred, while denying knowledge of

others. Johnathon testified that his children are reckless and hyper and they play

roughly. Johnathon testified that it is against his beliefs to use medicine to fix

certain ailments, but he was not given a say in the children taking medication. He

testified that, if required, he would keep the children on medication, but he

acknowledged that he had previously discontinued their use of the

medication. Johnathon testified that he believes the children have suffered trauma,

resulting initially from poor parenting skills but then compounded by the ongoing

CPSU case as the agency had not given the children a chance to work through the

trauma. Johnathon testified that he has lived in fear throughout the case but that he

has grown to be an awesome father. Johnathon testified that he loves his children

with every fiber of his being and the children love him and want to come home.

-74- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

{¶134} In the written decisions issued by the trial court on June 10, 2024, the

trial court reviewed the evidence presented at the permanent custody hearing in light

of the best-interest analysis required by R.C. 2151.414(D) before determining that

permanent custody of C.P., J.P., and B.P. should be granted to the agency.

{¶135} Following this Court’s independent review of the record, we find that

the trial court took all relevant evidence into account and properly applied the

appropriate statutory factors in making its “best interest of the child” determination

as to each of the three children and with regard to both parents, individually. As

discussed below, the trial court’s decisions were supported by clear and convincing

evidence, and the weight of the evidence presented at the permanent custody hearing

justified the determination that a grant of permanent custody to the agency is in the

best interest of C.P., J.P., and B.P.

{¶136} The evidence in these three cases overwhelmingly established that

C.P., J.P., and B.P. are very troubled children with significant emotional health

issues and behavioral challenges due, at least in part, to the fact they each suffer

from attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”). Due to having ADHD, the

well-being of those children demands near constant parental or adult monitoring of

the children themselves, as well as ongoing psychological and medical oversight

and intervention. While both McKenna and Johnathon appear to love their three

children and are bonded with them to varying degrees, the documented history of

these cases firmly established that neither parent possesses the aptitude or ability

-75- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

necessary to keep the children healthy and safe, much less to help them thrive. The

evidence adduced at the permanent custody hearing clearly and convincingly proved

that neither parent is able to adequately supervise the children or care for their

special needs, and therefore neither McKenna or Johnathon can provide those

children, individually or collectively, with a stable, safe, and nurturing environment.

{¶137} The specific factors that must be considered in determining whether

permanent custody is in a child’s best interest are set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D), as

detailed above. In this case, as to each of the three children, the evidence established

a consistent pattern of behavioral improvement, healthy development, and meeting

of appropriate milestones when in foster care. On the other hand, such

improvements abruptly and significantly declined when the children interacted with

or were cared for by either parent. Regarding the wishes of the children, C.P. and

J.P. wanted to be returned to their father’s custody, while B.P. agreed with the

recommendation of the guardian ad litem that permanent custody should be granted

to the agency. Given the young ages and lack of maturity of the three children, those

wishes are entitled to consideration but very little weight. See R.C.

2151.414(D)(1)(b). The evidence established that all three children desperately

need a legally secure and permanent placement, which is something that neither

parent was historically able to provide, and there was no indication that any of the

three children could be safely returned to either parent in the near future. While

both McKenna and Johnathon complied to a fair extent with the services

-76- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

recommended by the agency in order to complete the objectives set forth in the

applicable case plans, we note again that case plan compliance does not preclude a

grant of permanent custody. E.g., In re Gomer, 2004-Ohio-1723, ¶ 36 (3d

Dist.). Further, while the evidence established that McKenna is employed and has

reasonably safe housing and, likewise, that Johnathon has a retirement income and

suitable housing, the remaining evidence overwhelmingly established that neither

parent demonstrated the ability to provide a consistently safe, stable, and nurturing

environment for any or all of the three children at issue here.

{¶138} Upon considering all relevant factors, and on the basis of all the

evidence detailed above, we find the trial court’s permanent custody decisions as to

C.P., J.P., and B.P. were supported by clear and convincing evidence and were not

against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶139} Therefore, we overrule McKenna’s assignment of error relating to

C.P., J.P., and B.P., we overrule Johnathon’s first assignment of error, and we

overrule J.P.’s third assignment of error.

Johnathon’s Second Assignment of Error

{¶140} In Johnathon’s second assignment of error, he argues that the trial

court erred in removing all three of the children from his custody in October of 2023,

and in then failing to return C.P. and J.P. to his custody after a hearing was held on

the evidence supporting that removal.

-77- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

{¶141} As previously noted, C.P., J.P., and B.P. were in Johnathon’s custody

for the second time from August 23, 2023 until early October of that year, with the

agency retaining protective supervision. On October 5, 2023, the trial court signed

an ex parte order placing the children in the temporary custody of CPSU due to

unexplained bruises on B.P. and allegations of sexual acts having been perpetrated

on B.P. by C.P. and J.P. Following hearings held on October 10, 2023 and

November 30, 2023, the trial court filed a judgment entry on December 6, 2023, in

which the court found that probable cause existed for the issuance of the ex parte

order and the emergency removal of the children from Johnathon’s home.

{¶142} On appeal, Johnathon now assigns error with the trial court’s

December 6, 2023 decision.

{¶143} Regarding this claim, we note that this Court only has jurisdiction to

hear appeals from final orders. See Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(B)(2);

R.C. 2501.02. Also relevant here is the language of R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) providing

that a final, appealable order is an order that “affects a substantial right in an action

that in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment.”

{¶144} In In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155 (1990), the Supreme Court of

Ohio held that “[a]n adjudication by a juvenile court that a child is ‘neglected’ or

‘dependent’ as defined in R.C. Chapter 2151 followed by a disposition awarding

temporary custody to a public children services agency pursuant to R.C.

2151.353(A)(2) constitutes a ‘final order’ within the meaning of R.C. 2505.02 and

-78- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

is appealable to the court of appeals pursuant to R.C. 2501.02.” Id., at syllabus. An

award of permanent custody to a children’s services agency is also clearly a

dispositive final order that is appealable. See In re H.F., 2008-Ohio-499. However,

a juvenile court’s decision following a temporary shelter care hearing, such as the

one with which Johnathon assigns error here, is not an adjudication and, due to its

interlocutory nature and temporary duration, is in no sense dispositive. In re

Moloney, 24 Ohio St.3d, 22, 25 (1986).

{¶145} Accordingly, to the extent that Johnathon’s claim regarding the

shelter care hearing decree of December 6, 2023 is not rendered moot by the trial

court’s subsequent dispositive and final orders granting permanent custody of C.P.,

J.P., and B.P. to the agency, we overrule Johnathon’s second assignment of error on

the basis of our disposition of his first assignment of error, supra.

Conclusion

{¶146} Having found no prejudicial error in the particulars assigned and

argued by mother-appellant, McKenna P., the judgments of the Hancock County

Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, terminating McKenna’s parental rights in

Case Numbers 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, and 5-24-21 are affirmed.

{¶147} Having found no prejudicial error in the particulars assigned and

argued by father-appellant, Johnathon P., the judgments of the Hancock County

-79- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, terminating Johnathon’s parental rights in

Case Numbers 5-24-19, 5-24-20, and 5-24-21 are affirmed.

{¶148} Having found no prejudicial error in the particulars assigned and

argued by child-appellant, J.P., the judgment of the Hancock County Common Pleas

Court, Juvenile Division, in Case Number 5-24-21 is affirmed.

Judgments affirmed

ZIMMERMAN and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur.

-80- Case Nos. 5-24-18, 5-24-19, 5-24-20, 5-24-21

JUDGMENT ENTRY

For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignments of error

are overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgments of

the trial court are affirmed with costs assessed to Appellants for which judgment is

hereby rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of

the judgment for costs.

It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s

judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.

27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the

proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.

Juergen A. Waldick, Judge

William R. Zimmerman, Judge

John R. Willamowski, Judge

DATED: /jlm

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