In re G.N.

2025 Ohio 4999

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 3, 2025
• Docket: 10-24-09 & 10-24-10
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re G.N., 2025-Ohio-4999.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT MERCER COUNTY

IN RE: CASE NO. 10-24-09 G.N.,

ADJUDICATED NEGLECTED AND DEPENDENT CHILD. OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY [ALICIA N. - APPELLANT] [CATLIN N. - APPELLANT]

IN RE: CASE NO. 10-24-10 H.N.,

ADJUDICATED NEGLECTED AND DEPENDENT CHILD. OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY [ALICIA N. - APPELLANT] [CATLIN N. APPELLANT]

Appeals from Mercer County Common Pleas Court Juvenile Division Trial Court Nos. 3-2022-051 and 3-2022-052

Judgments Affirmed

Date of Decision: November 3, 2025 Case Nos. 10-24-09, 10

APPEARANCES:

Thomas Lucente, Jr. for Appellant, Catlin N.

Christopher Bazeley for Appellant, Alicia N.

Rebecca S. King-Newman for Appellee

MILLER, J.

{¶1} Catlin N. and Alicia N. appeal the November 15, 2024 judgments of the

Mercer County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, placing G.N. and H.N.

in the permanent custody of the Mercer County Department of Job and Family

Services (“the Department”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

{¶2} Notices of appeal in both cases were also filed by Acobie Yoder

(“Yoder”), the adult half-brother of G.N. and H.N. However, Yoder, a non-party,

failed to file appellate briefs or articulate any assignments of error. Accordingly,

Yoder’s appeals are dismissed for lack of standing and want of prosecution. See

App.R. 18(C).

Facts and Procedural History

{¶3} Alicia N. and William N.1 are the biological parents of G.N. (born

2009). Catlin N. and Alicia are the biological parents of H.N. (born 2015). On

1 Initially, Alicia indicated that Catlin was also the biological father of G.N. However, the Department located G.N.’s birth certificate listing William as the father, and subsequent paternity testing confirmed William as the father of G.N. The Department made contact with William who indicated that he does not have a relationship with G.N. and did not desire to be part of the Department’s case plan. The Department reached out to William on several occasions until he reportedly blocked the caseworker’s telephone number.

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September 29, 2022, Alicia was arrested by the Coldwater Police Department on an

outstanding warrant. Alicia had an additional felony warrant from the State of

Indiana, with a request for her extradition. Catlin was living several hours away,

and it was unclear when he would arrive to care for G.N. and H.N. Accordingly,

the Coldwater Police Department removed the children from the home. Later that

day, a shelter-care hearing was held and the trial court found probable cause to

remove the children and that the Department had made reasonable efforts to prevent

the removal and find a relative placement. The same day, the Department filed

complaints alleging that G.N. and H.N. were neglected children pursuant to R.C.

2151.03(A)(2) and dependent children pursuant to R.C. 2151.04(C) and requesting

the trial court place the children in its protective supervision.

{¶4} An adjudication hearing was held on November 18, 2022. After hearing

the evidence presented by the parties, the trial court found that G.N. and H.N. were

neglected and dependent children. A disposition hearing was held on December 16,

2022. At that hearing, Alicia raised concerns alleging that her due process rights

were violated upon her arrest. She further alleged that the removal of her children

was not justified because there was allegedly an adult in the residence who could

care for the children upon her arrest and, further, Catlin was traveling to the

residence from his home in Michigan to care for the children upon Alicia’s arrest.

Alicia and Catlin both made motions to dismiss the case, which the trial court

overruled. After hearing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court

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continued the children in the temporary custody of the Department. The trial court

also approved the case plan which allowed Alicia and Catlin supervised visitation

with the children and included the requirement that Alicia and Catlin complete twice

weekly drug screens to exercise that visitation.

{¶5} On May 31, 2024, Catlin filed motions for custody of G.N. and H.N.

On July 11, 2024, the Department filed motions for permanent custody of the

children.

{¶6} On August 9, 2024, the Department made motions to suspend visitation

between Alicia, Catlin, and the children immediately due to allegations that Alicia

provided G.N. with a THC vape pen during a visit. Later that day, the trial court

granted the Department’s motions to suspend visitations. On August 20, 2024,

Alicia filed motions requesting the trial court reinstate her visitation rights with

appropriate safeguards. The Department filed its briefing in opposition to Alicia’s

motions.

{¶7} On August 20, 2024, Alicia filed requests for the trial court to conduct

in-camera interviews of the children. On September 27, 2024, the trial court filed

judgment entries denying Alicia’s motions for in-camera interviews. On October

17, 2024, Alicia filed motions requesting that the trial court consider placement of

the children with her adult son, Yoder.

{¶8} A permanent custody-hearing was held on October 31, 2024 and

November 1, 2024. On November 15, 2024, the trial court filed its judgment entries

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granting permanent custody of G.N. and H.N. to the Department. Accordingly, the

trial court found Catlin’s motions for legal custody and Yoder’s motions2 requesting

the court consider placement of the children with him to be moot.

{¶9} Alicia filed her notices of appeal on December 12, 2024. She raises

three assignments of error for our review. On December 13, 2024, Catlin filed his

notices of appeal.3 He raises five assignments of error for our review. Due to the

considerable overlap between Alicia’s assignments of error and Catlin’s

assignments of error, we elect to address the assignments of error in an order that

facilitates our resolution of the case.

Alicia’s First Assignment of Error

The trial court’s decision terminating [Alicia’s] parental rights is not supported by the weight of the evidence.

{¶10} In her first assignment of error, Alicia argues that the trial court erred

by finding that the Department proved by clear and convincing evidence that the

Department should be granted permanent custody of G.N. and H.N. and that the trial

court’s decision to grant permanent custody to the Department was in the children’s

best interest.

Manifest-Weight Review of Permanent-Custody Decisions

2 The trial court considered the motions relating to Yoder’s desire to be considered for placement of the children as though they had been filed by Yoder; however, we note that the motions were actually filed by Alicia on October 17, 2024. 3 We note that in his appellate brief, Catlin frequently makes arguments relating to G.N. despite not being a party in that case. Additionally, he makes several arguments relating to the trial court’s decisions with respect to Alicia and William. We will consider Catlin’s arguments in this regard only to the extent that he has standing to make such challenges and as they may relate to H.N and his motions for custody of both children.

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{¶11} “When an appellate court reviews whether a trial court’s permanent

custody decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the court “‘weighs

the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and

determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [finder of fact] clearly

lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment]

must be reversed and a new trial ordered.”’” In re Dn.R., 2020-Ohio-6794, ¶ 16 (3d

Dist.), quoting Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 20,

quoting Tewarson v. Simon, 141 Ohio App.3d 103, 115 (9th Dist. 2001).

{¶12} In a permanent custody case, the ultimate question for a reviewing

court is “whether the juvenile court’s findings . . . were supported by clear and

convincing evidence.” In re K.H., 119 Ohio St.3d 538, 2008-Ohio-4825, ¶ 43.

“Clear and convincing evidence” is the “‘measure or degree of proof that will

produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations

sought to be established. It is intermediate, being more than a mere preponderance,

but not to the extent of such certainty as required beyond a reasonable doubt as in

criminal cases. It does not mean clear and unequivocal.’” In re Dn.R. at ¶ 17,

quoting In re Estate of Haynes, 25 Ohio St.3d 101, 104 (1986). “In determining

whether a trial court based its decision upon clear and convincing evidence, ‘a

reviewing court will examine the record to determine whether the trier of facts had

sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.’” Id. at ¶ 18,

quoting State v. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 (1990). “Thus, if the children

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services agency presented competent and credible evidence upon which the trier of

fact reasonably could have formed a firm belief that permanent custody is

warranted, then the court’s decision is not against the manifest weight of the

evidence.” In re R.M., 2013-Ohio-3588, ¶ 55 (4th Dist.).

{¶13} “Reviewing courts should accord deference to the trial court’s decision

because the trial court has had the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor,

gestures, and voice inflections that cannot be conveyed to us through the written

record.” In re S.D., 2016-Ohio-7057, ¶ 20 (5th Dist.). “A reviewing court should

find a trial court’s permanent custody decision against the manifest weight of the

evidence only in the ‘“exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily

against the [decision].”’” In re Dn.R. at ¶ 19, quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio

St.3d 380, 387 (1997), quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.

1983).

Standard & Procedures for the Termination of Parental Rights

{¶14} The right to raise one’s child is a basic and essential right. In re

Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157 (1990), citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651,

92 S.Ct. 1208 (1972) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625

(1923). “Parents have a ‘fundamental liberty interest’ in the care, custody, and

management of the child.” Id., quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102

S.Ct. 1388 (1982). However, the rights and interests of a natural parent are not

absolute. In re Thomas, 2003-Ohio-5885, ¶ 7 (3d Dist.). These rights may be

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terminated under appropriate circumstances and when the trial court has met all due

process requirements. In re Leveck, 2003-Ohio-1269, ¶ 6 (3d Dist.).

{¶15} “R.C. 2151.414 outlines the procedures that protect the interests of

parents and children in a permanent custody proceeding.” In re N.R.S., 2018-Ohio-

125, ¶ 12 (3d Dist.), citing In re B.C., 2014-Ohio-4558, ¶ 26. “When considering a

motion for permanent custody of a child, the trial court must comply with the

statutory requirements set forth in R.C. 2151.414.” In re A.M., 2015-Ohio-2740, ¶

13 (3d Dist.). “R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) establishes a two-part test for courts to apply

when determining whether to grant a motion for permanent custody: (1) the trial

court must find that one of the circumstances in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) applies,

and (2) the trial court must find that permanent custody is in the best interest of the

child.” In re Y.W., 2017-Ohio-4218, ¶ 10 (3d Dist.).

As relevant to this case, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) provides:

[T]he court may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the court determines at a hearing held pursuant to [R.C. 2151.414(A)], by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for permanent custody and that any of the following apply:

...

(d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period[.]

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d).

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{¶16} “‘If the trial court determines that any provision enumerated in R.C.

2151.414(B)(1) applies,’ it must proceed to the second prong of the test, which

requires the trial court to ‘determine, by clear and convincing evidence, whether

granting the agency permanent custody of the child is in the child’s best interest.’”

In re K.M.S., 2017-Ohio-142, ¶ 23 (3d Dist.), quoting In re A.F., 2012-Ohio-1137,

¶ 55 (3d Dist.) and citing R.C. 2151.414(B)(1). “The best interest determination is

based on an analysis of R.C. 2151.414(D).” Id.

{¶17} “Under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), the trial court is required to consider all

relevant factors listed in that subdivision, as well as any other relevant factors.” Id.

at ¶ 24, citing In re H.M., 2014-Ohio-755, ¶ 27 (3d Dist.). The factors specifically

listed in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) are:

(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child;

(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child;

(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period. . . ;

(d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency;

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(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply in relation to the parents and child.

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). “Under this test, the trial court considers the totality of the

circumstances when making its best interest determinations. No single factor is

given more weight than others.” In re N.R.S., 2018-Ohio-125, at ¶ 16.

Analysis

{¶18} Alicia does not dispute that the children have been in the Department’s

temporary custody for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period at the

time the Department filed its motion for permanent custody. Therefore, she does

not challenge the trial court’s determination that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) applies to

the children. Rather, in her assignment of error, Alicia argues that the trial court

erred by determining that granting the Department permanent custody is in the

children’s best interest. However, after examining the trial court’s findings and

reviewing the record, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the

trial court’s best-interest determination.

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)

{¶19} With respect to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a), the trial court found, with

respect to H.N. as follows:

[T]he Court finds that the parents have failed to address their respective drug abuse issues, and have demonstrated through their lack of visitation and inappropriate conduct during that visitation that the child is in need of a legally permanent, stable placement.

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The child is firmly bonded with the foster family. The foster parents have indicated a desire to provide a stable home for the child for the long term.

(Case No. 3-2022-052, Nov. 15, 2024 Judgment Entry).

{¶20} As it relates to G.N., the trial court made identical findings relating to

Alicia’s failure to address her drug abuse issues as demonstrated through her lack

of visitation and conduct during the visitations. The trial court found that William

“has abandoned” G.N. With respect to his bonds to the foster family, the trial court

also found that G.N. is “firmly bonded” and that the foster family desires to provide

a stable home for G.N. long-term.

{¶21} At the permanent-custody hearing, Latasha Miller (“Miller”), the

initial caseworker, testified that Alicia initially missed many visitations due to her

refusal to complete the drug screens that the case plan required in order for her to

receive visitation. Additionally, Miller reported that when Alicia did exercise her

rights to supervised visits, she had to be repeatedly corrected not to discuss the case

with the children. Although Alicia would redirect the conversation after being

corrected by Department staff, inevitably, at subsequent visits the same concerns

would arise.

{¶22} The Department provided evidence that the children are living with

the same foster family and have a strong and secure attachment with the foster

family. The caseworker testified that in her observations, both children appear

comfortable and happy in the foster home and have positive interactions with the

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foster parents and foster siblings and with each other. The caseworker testified that

although, initially, G.N. and H.N. struggled to get along with each other, there has

been a substantial improvement in their interactions with one another.

{¶23} G.N.’s school counselor, Sue Lovell (“Lovell”) testified that she got

to know the foster family during her involvement with G.N. and that the foster

family was “[v]ery involved.” Lovell observed that the foster father “had a visibly

good relationship” with G.N. and was particularly close to him. Additionally, G.N.

also got along well with his foster mother. Lovell further testified that it was “very

evident” that the foster parents were “very supportive” of G.N. and encouraged him

to get involved in extracurricular activities. Yoder opined that G.N.’s closest friend

was his foster brother.

{¶24} G.N. and H.N.’s counselor, Aimee Highley (“Highley”), testified

regarding the children’s progress and continuing concerns. Highley stated that G.N.

has expressed concerns regarding his relationship with Alicia. As a result of those

conversations, Highley and G.N. worked on challenging his belief systems,

specifically regarding the roles of children versus the role of a parent because in his

relationship with Alicia, G.N. was frequently in the role of a parent.

{¶25} According to Highley, H.N. is “avoidant” when she and H.N. address

H.N.’s feelings about her relationship with her mom. In contrast, Highley described

that H.N. has an “emotion of belonging” in her current placement. The counselor

testified that, H.N. requires stability and the counselor testified that she would have

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concerns about H.N. if she were removed from her foster family. The counselor also

testified that H.N. was not anxious about being separated from Alicia.

{¶26} For her part, a number of Alicia’s family and friends testified on her

behalf regarding her relationship with her children. Avery Eternecka (“Eternecka”),

Alicia’s sister, testified that Alicia, G.N., and H.N. are “best friends” and “three peas

in a pod.” She testified that, in her opinion, Alicia is “a perfect parent.” Yoder,

Alicia’s adult son and H.N. and G.N.’s half-brother, testified that that Alicia has

done “an amazing job” raising him and his two half-siblings. Yoder opined that his

half-siblings are not as happy in their foster home as they were when they were

living with Alicia. Several witnesses testified regarding Alicia’s enjoyment of

cooking for her children and the playful relationship they enjoy.

{¶27} In its judgment entries granting permanent custody, the trial court

summarized Alicia’s character witnesses as follows:

Mother offered numerous character witnesses who all noted mother’s ability to cook and everyone saw a great relationship between Alicia and her kids. These character witnesses were not entirely credible given their disbelief and/or the government was out to get Alicia mentality when confronted with facts, such as mother passing her son vapes on several occasions and testing positive for methamphetamine. In fact, one witness, Cadence Snider, the girlfriend of mother’s oldest son testified that if her boyfriend were given custody of the children on his motion for legal custody that the children would, “need counseling to establish trust in the legal system.” She also stated that she does not believe the positive drug results for methamphetamine because she had “[d]one her own research on Adderall and the fact that it created false positive tests.”

(Nov. 15, 2024 Judgment Entries).

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{¶28} Based on the evidence presented at the trial, it is clear that the children

are well-bonded with her foster family and feel a sense of belonging around them.

It is also clear that Alicia loves her children, but that her own actions, such as failing

to comply with the case plan by not completing the required drug screens, testing

positive for methamphetamine, and repeatedly discussing the case with the children

and speaking poorly of the foster family, has negatively impacted the children’s

relationship with Alicia. Accordingly, record supports the trial court’s findings

under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a).

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b)

{¶29} Regarding R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b), in its judgment entries granting

permanent custody to the Department, the trial court found that “[t]he CASA

provided her report and recommendation in accordance with Rule of

Superintendence 48. She voiced her opinion prior to the conclusion of the hearing

that she felt that a Permanent Custody finding would be in the best interest of this

child.” The guardian ad litem’s report detailed the children’s desire to stay in the

home of their foster family.

{¶30} Accordingly, we find that granting permanent custody was in concert

with the desires of the children as described by the guardian ad litem in her report.

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c)

As to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c), the trial court found as follows:

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In this case, the uncontroverted evidence shows that the child has been in the temporary custody of the Department for 12 or more months of a consecutive 24-month period. The Department testified that the child was placed in foster care in October of 2022 and was still in foster care as of the date of this hearing. Also, uncontroverted in the testimony, is that there was only a brief period of time where [Alicia and Catlin] [exercised] unsupervised visitation.

{¶31} It is not contested that the children were in the temporary custody of

the Department beginning in October 2022 and were consistently in the care of the

Department since that time. Additionally, according to the testimony adduced at

trial, Alicia and Catlin’s visitation with the children was not consistent and was,

aside from a brief period, supervised. Furthermore, the testimony at the hearing

indicates that the reason that the visitation was not consistent or unsupervised was

due to Alicia and Catlin’s lack of compliance with the required drug screens,

positive drug screens, and failure to comply with visitation. For instance, on several

instances, Alicia missed visitation due to issues with transportation. Furthermore,

several witnesses testified to the turmoil and difficulty that the inconsistent visits

caused for the children. Most recently, visitations were suspended by the Agency

due to an allegation that Alicia provided G.N. with a THC vape.

{¶32} Thus, after reviewing the evidence presented at the permanent-custody

hearing, we find that the record supports the trial court’s findings under R.C.

2151.414(D)(1)(c).

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d)

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{¶33} With respect to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d), the trial court found that G.N.

and H.N. “cannot and should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable

time.” The trial court cited Alicia and Catlin’s failures to remedy their “issues with

illicit drug use, potential mental health issues, and inability to maintain bonds” with

G.N. and H.N. With respect to G.N., the trial court found that William has

abandoned him.

{¶34} The trial court also made the following findings with respect to both children:

The Court further finds that Permanent Custody is the only available means, at this time of providing permanency and stability. Despite mother’s insistence that the words on the initial Case Plan that there is an “unmistakable bond between the mother and child,” the child’s best interest [is] reserved by remaining in a stable, permanent placement with the foster parents.

{¶35} The record supports the trial court’s findings that permanent custody

is the only available means of providing permanency and stability to the children.

Several reoccurring issues, most notably, Alicia and Catlin’s illicit drug use

continued to be a concern throughout the case.

{¶36} As part of the case plan, Alicia and Catlin were required to be drug

screened twice a week in order to exercise visitation with the children. However,

Mindy Serr (“Serr”), one of the caseworkers, testified that as of summer 2024, out

of the 163 possible visits for Alicia and Catlin, Alicia attended 63 visits (38% of the

visits offers) and Catlin attended 41 visits (25% of the visits offered). Relatedly, of

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the 280 drug screens that Alicia and Catlin were required to complete to maintain

visitations and case plan requirements, Alicia skipped or refused to test 99 times and

Catlin skipped or refused to test 253 times. Alicia tested positive for substances 166

times and negative for all substances, including THC, 15 times. Catlin tested

positive for substances 26 times and negative for all substances only once. In

addition to THC, Alicia tested positive for methamphetamine a number of times and

tested positive for cocaine once.

{¶37} For her part, Alicia denied that she uses illicit drugs, specifically

methamphetamine. Rather, she contends that her prescription for Adderall can

result in a false positive drug screen for methamphetamine. However, the testimony

of Jerome Reed (“Reed”), the certified scientist from Forensic Fluids lab

contradicted this claim by his testimony that Adderall could not return a false

positive screen for methamphetamine.

{¶38} In addition to concerns regarding her drug use, Alicia and Catlin’s

visitations were suspended as a result of an incident in which G.N. received a THC

vape during a visitation with Alicia and Catlin. Alicia was interviewed with law

enforcement as a result of the situation and the officer testified at the permanent-

custody hearing that Alicia admitted that she gave G.N. the THC vape and cartridge.

However, Alicia testified that although she does not vape herself, it was possible

that G.N. took the vape from her purse without her knowledge. Alicia alleged that

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although she did not provide the vape to G.N., she would suffer the consequences

in order for G.N. not to get into trouble for stealing it from her.

{¶39} Furthermore, when the children entered foster care, they had

reportedly been homeschooled by Alicia for the last several school years and both

children were significantly behind academically. Lovell, G.N.’s school counselor

testified that G.N. entered school approximately two years behind his peers. Lovell

detailed the school’s concerns that G.N. had received no academic instruction for

several years and detailed the efforts taken by the school and G.N. to help fill in the

gaps in his education. Lovell testified that G.N. worked hard and with the support

of his teachers, was able to make up significant ground academically.

{¶40} Evidence was presented that, in the foster parents’ care, H.N. has been

attending school and thriving in that environment. It was reported by several

witnesses that H.N. “loves” school and enjoys being involved in extracurricular

activities, such as baton twirling.

{¶41} Lovell and Dan Pohlman (“Pohlman”), the principal of Coldwater

Middle School, testified regarding concerns relating to G.N.’s behavior in school.

Specifically, they testified that G.N. did not have notable behavioral issues during

his first year at Coldwater Middle School. Pohlman described G.N. as very polite,

but noted that G.N. preferred talking to adults initially because the social setting of

school was not something that he was used to after his years being homeschooled.

Lovell and Pohlman noted that beginning in the fall of his eighth-grade year, G.N.

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started getting into trouble. Pohlman described an issue in which G.N. refused to

put his cell phone away after being instructed to do so by a teacher. Pohlman

recalled G.N. being concerned about being able to send text messages to his mother.

Around this time, Lovell and Pohlman also noted G.N. beginning to have difficulties

socially and began to distance himself from his friends. Several more incidents

occurred, including a final incident in which G.N. hit another student. Following

that incident, school officials determined that G.N. should transfer to the educational

service center (“ESC”). The principal of the ESC testified that after a period of

adjustment, G.N. began to excel in that environment and continues to thrive.

{¶42} Lovell and Pohlman testified that during the period of time that G.N.

was having behavioral issues at school, they came to realize that the behavioral

issues correlated with Alicia missing visitations with G.N. Specifically, they began

to pinpoint that a lot of the behaviors would happen on Fridays and visits with Alicia

were on Wednesdays and Thursdays. When school officials met with a team of

people after a behavior happened, they discovered that the behavior would

correspond to a “rough visit” or a missed visitation.

{¶43} Evidence was introduced that H.N. has been in therapy since the

beginning of the case to address some behavior concerns and other mental health

concerns. Her counselor, Highley, testified that H.N. has made significant progress

in counseling, formed secure bonds with her foster parents, and benefited from her

foster family’s support in managing her emotions. Highley also testified that H.N.

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has a sense of belonging in her foster home. Alicia alleges that G.N. and H.N. have

had no behavior problems whatsoever prior to entering foster care and she blames

the removal of the children from her home as the sole cause of her children’s

behavioral concerns or mental-health challenges.

{¶44} After reviewing the testimony and evidence elicited from the

permanent-custody hearing in concert with the trial court’s findings, we find that

the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d) were supported by the

record.

R.C. 2951.414(D)(1)(e)

{¶45} The trial court did not make specific findings that any of the factors in

R.C. 2941.414(E)(7) to (11) applied, and upon review of the record, we likewise do

not find that any of those factors are applicable in the instant case.

Conclusion

{¶46} In sum, competent and credible evidence supports each of the trial

court’s best-interest findings. Considering the evidence of the children’s bond with

the foster family, the length of time they have been in the Department’s custody,

and Alicia and Catlin’s failure to comply with the case plan and remedy the

conditions that required the continued removal of the children from Alicia and

Catlin’s homes, clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s

determination that granting permanent custody to the Department is in G.N. and

H.N.’s best interest. Therefore, we conclude the trial court’s decision awarding

-20- Case Nos. 10-24-09, 10

permanent custody of G.N. and H.N. to the Department is not against the manifest

weight of the evidence.

{¶47} Alicia’s first assignment of error is overruled.

Alicia’s Second Assignment of Error

The trial court abused its discretion when it overruled [Alicia’s] motion for an in camera interview with the children.

{¶48} In her second assignment of error, Alicia argues that the trial court

abused its discretion by not granting her motions for in-camera interviews with the

{¶49} When determining the best interest of a child in a permanent custody

action, the trial court must consider all relevant factors outlined in R.C.

2151.414(D), including, the wishes of the child. “However, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b)

specifically provides that consideration of the wishes of the child may be ‘as

expressed directly by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem[.]”

(Emphasis sic.) In re Z.W., 2025-Ohio-1410, ¶ 35 (3d Dist.), quoting R.C.

2151.414(D)(1)(b). “Thus, ‘a juvenile court has the option of either having the

child assert his or her opinion, through, for example, an in-camera interview or

testimony, or the court may rely upon the guardian ad litem’s representations with

respect to the child’s desires.’” Id., quoting In re Funk, 2022-Ohio-4953, ¶ 30 (11th

Dist.). “‘Because the juvenile court has a choice, the decision not to conduct an in-

camera interview will be reversed only if the court abused its discretion in declining

-21- Case Nos. 10-24-09, 10

to do so.’” Id., quoting Funk at ¶ 30, citing In re Whitaker, 36 Ohio St.3d 213, 219

(1988). A trial court’s decision whether to interview a child will not be reversed

absent an abuse of discretion. Funk at ¶ 30, citing Whitaker at 219.

{¶50} On August 20, 2024, Alicia filed motions for the trial court to conduct

an in-camera interview of the children. On September 27, 2024, the trial court filed

its judgment entries denying Alicia’s motions for in-camera interviews on the basis

that “there is nothing in the Ohio Revised Code or Juvenile Rules that compels the

Court to do an In Camera [interview] before a Permanent Custody Hearing.”

{¶51} In support of her contention that the trial court abused its discretion by

denying her motions for in-camera interviews, Alicia alleges that the trial court did

not ascertain the children’s wishes because the guardian ad litem only expressed her

opinion that it was in the children’s best interest for the trial court to grant the

Department’s motion for permanent custody. However, the guardian ad litem’s

report was entered as an exhibit in the permanent-custody hearing. Throughout the

report, the guardian ad litem noted the children’s wishes as expressed throughout

the pendency of the case.

{¶52} With respect to G.N., the guardian ad litem noted that, initially, he

expressed a desire to be reunited with Alicia. As the case progressed, G.N.

expressed that he also viewed the foster family as his family. In spring 2024, G.N.

expressed that he would like to be with Alicia but that if it is in his best interest to

stay with the foster family, then that is what he wants. However, he expressed

-22- Case Nos. 10-24-09, 10

concern about Alicia finding out. But, in October 2024, G.N. told the guardian ad

litem that he would like to stay with his foster parents long term.

{¶53} In regard to H.N., the guardian ad litem’s report details that although

at the beginning of the case, H.N. expressed some desires to be reunified with her

mother, as time went on, H.N. became more conflicted on whether she wanted to go

back to Alicia’s home or stay with her foster family. H.N. shared more concerns

about returning to Alicia’s home. For instance, she was afraid that Alicia would not

allow her to attend school or give her the support needed, such as making sure she

has clean clothes that fit her properly. From the spring of 2024, H.N. began

consistently telling the guardian ad litem that she would like to live with her foster

family long term. In August 2024, H.N. began expressing to Alicia and Catlin that

she did not want to go home.

{¶54} Finally, on October 21, 2024, the guardian ad litem reported that G.N.,

H.N. and the foster parents “are not interested in legal custody” and “want

adoption.”

{¶55} Accordingly, the guardian ad litem report included detailed accounts

of the children’s wishes regarding their placement. Thus, the report does not support

Alicia’s allegations that the trial court had “no way” “to discern the children’s

wishes.” (Alicia’s Appellant Brief at 9). Furthermore, although Alicia argues in

her brief that “[t]he testimony regarding the children’s wishes strongly suggest that

-23- Case Nos. 10-24-09, 10

they were in line with hers,” the weight of the evidence indicates that the children

desired to stay with their foster family.

{¶56} Thus, after reviewing the record, we find that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion by denying Alicia’s motions for an in-camera interviews of the

children. Accordingly, Alicia’s second assignment of error is overruled.

Alicia’s Third Assignment of Error

The trial court abused its discretion when it placed the children in shelter care and awarded temporary custody to the State immediately after they were taken from [Alicia].

Catlin’s First Assignment of Error

The trial court violated appellants’ due process rights by failing to provide a fair adjudicatory hearing.

Catlin’s Fifth Assignment of Error

The trial court erred in denying Appellants’ Motion to Dismiss for failure to establish dependency by clear and convincing evidence.

{¶57} Alicia’s third assignment of error and Catlin’s first and fifth

assignments of error challenge the proceedings at the shelter care hearing and

adjudicatory hearing.

{¶58} In Alicia’s third assignment of error, she argues that the trial court

abused its discretion by placing the children in foster care and awarding temporary

custody of the children to the State. Specifically, Alicia argues that at the time of

her arrest around midnight on September 29, 2024, she immediately informed

-24- Case Nos. 10-24-09, 10

Catlin, who was living in Michigan, of her arrest. According to Alicia, Catlin

immediately began driving to Alicia’s Coldwater, Ohio home to care for H.N. and

G.N.

{¶59} Alicia challenges the trial court’s finding at the shelter-care hearing

that the trial court made reasonable efforts under the circumstances to prevent the

removal of the children from the home. Alicia contends that it would not have been

unreasonable for the officers at the scene to wait several hours for Catlin to arrive

at her house to care for the children.

{¶60} In his first assignment of error, Catlin argues that his due-process

rights, were violated, particularly during the adjudicatory phase of the case. He

argues that the State’s evidence at the adjudicatory hearing was insufficient for the

trial court to continue the children in the temporary custody of the Department.

Thus, Catlin reasons that the trial court erred by denying his and Alicia’s motions

to dismiss the case at the close of the adjudicatory phase.

{¶61} In his fifth assignment of error, Catlin challenges the trial court’s

adjudication of G.N. and H.N. as a dependent and neglected children. Specifically,

Catlin alleges that because the dependency determination was not supported by clear

and convincing evidence, the trial court should have granted the parents’ motion to

dismiss the case at the close of the adjudicatory phase.

{¶62} However, the time for making these arguments has long passed. “‘An

adjudication by a juvenile court that a child is “neglected” or “dependent” as defined

-25- Case Nos. 10-24-09, 10

by R.C. Chapter 2151 followed by a disposition awarding temporary custody to a

public children services agency pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(A)(2) constitutes a “final

order” . . . and is appealable to the court of appeals[.]’” In re H.F., 2008-Ohio-6810,

¶ 8, quoting In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155 (1990), syllabus. However, Catlin and

Alicia failed to file any such appeal challenging the children’s adjudication and

initial disposition. “Res judicata bars litigation of ‘“a matter that was raised or could

have been raised on direct appeal when a final, appealable order was issued in

accordance with the law at the time.”’” In re B.F., 2021-Ohio-4251, ¶ 21 (3d Dist.),

quoting In re L.S., 2020-Ohio-5516, ¶ 20 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Griffin, 2013-

Ohio-5481, ¶ 3. Thus, because Catlin and Alicia could have raised their challenges

to the trial court’s findings on appeal from the children’s adjudication and initial

disposition, res judicata now precludes Alicia and Catlin from making these

arguments. See In re B.F. at ¶ 21; In re L.S. at ¶ 31 (because Mother did not

challenge the trial court’s reasonable-efforts findings it is barred by res judicata

“because the parents could have raised the issue in a direct appeal from the court’s

dispositional order”); In re A.S., 2012-Ohio-3197, ¶ 53 (3d Dist.).

{¶63} Accordingly, Alicia’s third assignment of error and Catlin’s first and

fifth assignments of error are barred by res judicata and are, therefore, overruled.

Catlin’s Second Assignment of Error

The trial court erred in admitting and relying on unreliable and prejudicial drug test evidence.

-26- Case Nos. 10-24-09, 10

{¶64} In his second assignment of error, Catlin argues that the trial court

erred by admitting and considering testimony and evidence relating to the drug tests.

Although his argument lacks specificity, we can glean that Catlin attempts to

challenge the admissibility of several of the Department’s exhibits, specifically, two

certified packets of drug screen results relating to Alicia (JFS Exhibit 13, JFS

Exhibit 14), a certified packet of laboratory results relating to Catlin (JFS Exhibit

15), and single certified result for Catlin that occurred in October 2024 (JFS Exhibit

16) as well as the testimony of Jerome Reed (“Reed”), a certified scientist at

Forensic Fluids laboratory who testified regarding the results of the drug screens

given to Alicia and Catlin.

{¶65} To the extent that Catlin is attempting to argue that the trial court erred

by admitting JFS Exhibits 13 through 16, we note that at the hearing, counsel did

not object to the admission of the exhibits and noted that because the records were

certified, they were admissible. Accordingly, Catlin is limited to plain error analysis

on appeal. State v. Fisher, 2020-Ohio-6829, ¶ 7 (7th Dist.). We recognize plain

error “‘with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to

prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.’” State v. Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d 107,

111 (1990), quoting State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91 (1978), paragraph three of the

syllabus. For plain error to apply, the trial court must have deviated from a legal

rule, the error must have been an obvious defect in the proceedings, and the error

must have affected a substantial right. State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27 (2002).

-27- Case Nos. 10-24-09, 10

Under the plain error standard, the appellant must demonstrate that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for the trial court’s error, the outcome of the

proceeding would have been otherwise. State v. West, 2022-Ohio-1556, ¶ 35-36.

Here, Catlin summarily argues that the “admission of unreliable drug testing

evidence prejudiced Appellants and influenced the outcome of the proceeding” and

should therefore not have been admitted. (Catlin’s Appellant Brief at 11).

Accordingly, we do not find that Catlin has demonstrated that the trial court

committed plain error by admitting the exhibits.

{¶66} Insofar as Catlin argues that the trial court erred by relying on Reed’s

testimony and the results of the drug screenings, we find that argument to be

unavailing. At the permanent-custody hearing, Reed, a certified scientist at Forensic

Fluids Laboratory testified to his extensive background in drug testing. Reed

described the process and procedures the laboratory uses when processing samples.

Reed detailed the process by which the technicians inspect samples upon arrival at

the laboratory to confirm they have been properly sealed, have not been tampered

with or damaged, and to ensure proper chain of custody.

{¶67} Reed then described the initial testing process, which tested for the

various chemical compounds. According to Reed, if the initial screening returns a

positive result, the sample is retested using liquid chromatography-mass

spectrometry. If the spectrometer yields a positive result, the results are interpreted

by certifying scientists.

-28- Case Nos. 10-24-09, 10

{¶68} Reed detailed some of the processes the laboratory utilizes to ensure

the accuracy of their results, such as proficiency testing. Reed testified that the mass

spectrometer allows the laboratory to avoid false positives by allowing them to

observe “the deep molecular fingerprint” of the drugs, which are akin to human

finger prints, “no two look the same.”

{¶69} According to Reed, the samples the lab received relating to Alicia and

Catlin were processed in accordance with the procedure Reed described. Reed then

interpreted the results of the multiple drug screens the lab processed for Alicia and

Catlin. Most notably, Alicia tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine

15 times, and Catlin tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine two

times. Reed explained that once methamphetamine enters the blood stream, the

liver filters the blood and, in the process, converts the methamphetamine to

amphetamine and amphetamine is therefore a metabolite of methamphetamine.

Accordingly, when there is a positive result for methamphetamine, there will also

be a positive result for amphetamine. However, the reverse is not true, and there is

not a substance that could break down and turn into methamphetamine.

{¶70} Reed testified that if a person was taking Adderall, it would show up

on the drug screen as amphetamine. However, it would not be possible for Adderall

to show as a positive for methamphetamine on a drug screen. Reed also described

the limitations on the sensitivity of the saliva drug screens the laboratory processed.

Specifically, he testified that the amount of the drug present in the oral fluids are

-29- Case Nos. 10-24-09, 10

“pretty small.” As a result, if someone was taking a drug the day before the saliva

screen, the drug may not be detectable in their blood. Accordingly, even if someone

was taking a prescribed drug which should, theoretically, yield a positive result on

the drug screen, if the individual was not taking the drug as prescribed, the drug

screen may not yield a positive result even if the person had indeed recently used

the drug.

{¶71} Catlin contends that the trial court erred by considering the evidence

and testimony relating to the drug screens because he alleges that it is not reliable

or credible. In support, he argues that because Alicia testified that she was taking a

number of prescription drugs that should have yielded positive results on the drug

screens, but did not, that the drug screen evidence was unreliable. Specifically,

Catlin challenges the positive screens for methamphetamine. He reasons that

because the drug screens did not detect some prescription medications that Alicia

testified she was taking regularly, the positive drug screens for methamphetamine

must have been in error. He further alleges that because those drug screens were

allegedly made in error, the results of all of the drug screens were unreliable.

Accordingly, he argues that the trial court erred by relying on the results of the drug

screens when determining the best interest of the children.

{¶72} We are not persuaded. First, we note that Catlin’s argument is not

consistent with the evidence. Reed testified that the saliva drug screens that the

laboratory processed were somewhat limited in their ability to detect the presence

-30- Case Nos. 10-24-09, 10

of drugs because the concentration of drugs in the saliva is quite low. Accordingly,

Reed stated that even if someone was using a particular drug, the level of that drug

on the screen would potentially be too low to detect. Reed did testify that if someone

was taking a particular drug consistently, as prescribed, it would show up on a

screen. Yet, a missed dose could result in a drug screen coming back negative

despite the individual taking the drug.

{¶73} Furthermore, Catlin seems to be arguing that the drug screens included

false positive screens. However, Reed testified to the processes the laboratory

employs to safeguard against false positives. Specifically, Reed stated that the type

of equipment the lab uses and the type of testing it employs does not allow for false

positive results. No party presented any evidence to contradict Reed’s testimony

relating to the unlikelihood of false positive results. “We are mindful that the

juvenile court, as the trier of fact, was in the best position to weigh the evidence and

evaluate testimony so every reasonable presumption must be in favor of the

judgment and the finding of facts.” In re T.J., 2024-Ohio-110, ¶ 13 (6th Dist.).

Accordingly, we do not find that the trial court erred by relying on the testimony of

Reed and the laboratory test results indicating that the parents tested positive for

certain drugs.

{¶74} Furthermore, testimony regarding the sensitivity of the tests and the

limitations that the tests may have, were part of the weight of the evidence, and we

do not find the trial court erred by finding the evidence adduced at trial supported a

-31- Case Nos. 10-24-09, 10

finding that Alicia and Catlin used illicit drugs at various times throughout the

pendency of the case.

{¶75} Catlin’s second assignment of error is overruled.

Catlin’s Third Assignment of Error

The trial court improperly admitted hearsay evidence in violation of the Ohio Rules of Evidence.

{¶76} In his third assignment of error, Catlin argues that the trial court erred

by improperly admitting hearsay evidence in violation of the Rules of Evidence.

{¶77} “Ordinarily, we review a trial court’s hearsay rulings for an abuse of

discretion.” State v. McKelton, 2016-Ohio-5735, ¶ 97, citing State v. Hymore, 9

Ohio St.2d 122, 128 (1967). See HSBC Bank U.S.A., Natl. Assn. v. Gill, 2019-Ohio-

2814, ¶ 6-10 (1st Dist). However, if Catlin failed to object to the admission of the

alleged hearsay by which he now complains, it is reviewed for plain error. State v.

Obermiller, 2016-Ohio-1594, ¶ 72.

{¶78} Here, Catlin summarily argues that “[t]estimony from agency workers

frequently included references to statements allegedly made by third parties,

including foster parents, relatives, and unidentified community members.” (Catlin’s

Appellate Brief at 12). Catlin alleges that these “included statements suggesting

parental unfitness, describing the children’s emotional state, or making claims about

past drug use or behaviors.” Catlin also asserts without elaboration that the trial

court erred by permitting the introduction or written reports and summaries from -32- Case Nos. 10-24-09, 10

third-party sources, including the guardian ad litem and caseworkers which

contained embedded hearsay statements.

{¶79} Through his brief and ambiguous argument, Catlin invites this court

to comb through the record of the permanent-custody hearing, which spanned two

full days, to identify potential hearsay statements. “‘[A] defendant has the

burden of affirmatively demonstrating the error of the trial court on appeal.’” State

v. Costell, 2016-Ohio-3386, ¶ 86 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Stelzer, 2006-Ohio-

6912, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.). If an argument exists that can support an assignment of error,

it is not this court’s duty to root it out. State v. Shanklin, 2014-Ohio-5624, ¶ 31 (3d

Dist.).

{¶80} “App.R. 12(A)(2) provides that an appellate court ‘may disregard an

assignment of error presented for review if the party raising it fails to identify in the

record the error on which the assignment of error is based or fails to argue the

assignment separately in the brief, as required under App.R. 16(A).’” State v.

Jackson, 2015-Ohio-3322, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.), quoting App.R. 12(A)(2).

“Additionally, App.R. 16(A)(7) requires that an appellant’s brief include ‘[a]n

argument containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to each

assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support of the

contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on

which appellant relies.’” Id., quoting App.R. 16(A)(7). Here, not only did Catlin

fail to include an argument specifying which statements and exhibits were alleged

-33- Case Nos. 10-24-09, 10

hearsay, he also failed to provide citations to the parts of the record support his

argument. Thus, we need not address Catlin’s argument that the trial court

improperly admitted hearsay.

{¶81} Consequently, Catlin’s third assignment of error is overruled.

Catlin’s Fourth Assignment of Error

The trial court failed to adequately consider and weigh alternative placements for the children.

{¶82} In his fourth assignment of error, Catlin argues that the trial court

failed to adequately consider kinship placements for the children. According to

Catlin, although he and Alicia identified potential individuals who could care for

the children, the trial court did not adequately explain why those alternative

placements were rejected. Catlin reasons that “[r]ather than weighing those

placements under the best interest factors or citing any legal disqualifications, the

court defaulted to the Department’s preference for state custody without exploring

the statutory preference for kinship placements.” (Catlin’s Appellate Brief at 14).

{¶83} However, Catlin’s argument lacks the specificity to allow us to

conduct a meaningful review. At the time of the permanent-custody hearing, the

only potential kinship placement that expressed an interest and ability to care for the

children was Yoder, the children’s adult half-brother. However, according to

Yoder’s testimony and the testimony of Department representatives, he was not

identified as a potential placement for H.N. and G.N. until August 2024 when he

-34- Case Nos. 10-24-09, 10

reached out a caseworker to express his interest in being considered as a placement

for his younger half-siblings. Yoder did not make his desires known until August

24, 2024 and the caseworker responded on August 30, 2024 asking Yoder to provide

his address, his employment, his work hours, and the criminal records for himself

and any members of his household. However, Yoder admitted that he did not

provide the information to the caseworker until October 16, 2024, approximately

two weeks prior to the commencement of the permanent-custody hearing. The

caseworker testified that, in the event the trial court did not grant the Department’s

motion for permanent custody, Yoder was still being considered as a kinship

placement. However, due to how late in the case Yoder was identified as a possible

placement, Yoder’s delay in providing the caseworker with the requested

information, and the lengthy process of vetting an out-of-state individual for

potential placement, his application was still pending.

{¶84} Two of Alicia’s sisters were also discussed at the permanent-custody

hearing as possible kinship placements at various times during the pendency of the

case. One of the caseworkers testified that Alicia’s sister, Tiffany, had expressed

an interest in becoming a kinship placement for the children. Early on in the case,

H.N. and G.N. enjoyed an extended weekend with Tiffany and her family and, very

shortly after that visit, Tiffany contacted the caseworker to inform her that she no

longer wished to be considered as a placement for the children. Avery Etereka,

-35- Case Nos. 10-24-09, 10

Alicia’s other sister, testified that she is not a candidate for placement of the children

because she lives in a 700-square-foot one-bedroom home.

{¶85} Given the totality of the circumstances and the lack of specificity of

the brief argument outlined in Catlin’s assignment of error, we do not identify

reversible error in the trial court’s consideration of possible kinship placements.

{¶86} Catlin’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.

{¶87} Having found no error prejudicial to Alicia and Catlin herein in the

particulars assigned and argued, we overrule the assignments of error and affirm the

judgments of the Mercer County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division.

WALDICK, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.

-36- Case Nos. 10-24-09, 10

JUDGMENT ENTRY

For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the appeals filed by Acobie

Yoder are dismissed. Furthermore, the assignments of error filed by Alicia N. and

Catlin N. are overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the

judgments of the trial court are affirmed with costs assessed to Appellants for which

judgment is hereby rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for

execution of the judgment for costs.

It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s

judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.

27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the

proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.

Mark C. Miller, Judge

Juergen A. Waldick, Judge

John R. Willamowski, Judge

DATED: /jlm

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