In re Wolfe

534 B.R. 158, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 2688, 2015 WL 4734425
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Ohio
DecidedJune 19, 2015
DocketCase No. 14-54523
StatusPublished

This text of 534 B.R. 158 (In re Wolfe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Wolfe, 534 B.R. 158, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 2688, 2015 WL 4734425 (Ohio 2015).

Opinion

[160]*160 ORDER REGARDING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM STAY (DOC. NO. 28)

CHARLES M. CALDWELL, Judge

The Bank of New York Mellon (“Mov-ant”) requests modification of the stay to allow confirmation of the foreclosure sale of property occupied by Richard L. and Helen E. Wolf (“Debtors”). Movant asserts standing to pursue stay relief for cause under Section 362(d)(1) of the United States Bankruptcy Code (“Code”). The property is a single-family residence located at 955 Rock Mill Road, N.W., Lancaster, Ohio 43130, comprised of 1.24 acres. According to an appraisal performed on August 12, 2014, the approximately eight-year-old home is valued at $191,000.00.

The Debtors state that they found the home abandoned, and have resided there since November 2007, premised upon two duly recorded quitclaim deeds. For the last eight years, Debtors assert they made improvements to and paid taxes and maintained insurance coverage for the home. On the other hand, Movant has tried since July 20, 2010, to obtain possession of the home, and the parties have been engaged in litigation in Ohio trial and appellate courts and Federal district court. To date, the parties have not presented any evidence to the Court, and the only bases for this Order is a review of prior pending litigation in Ohio courts, along with pleadings filed in our Court.

This is not the typical case where a creditor holds a recorded mortgage on property purchased by and titled to debtors prior to the bankruptcy filing. Instead, according to the pleadings, the original deeds and Movant’s alleged mortgage, dating back to October 2006, were never recorded, and indeed are now lost. As noted above, the Debtors’ interest in the property comes from two quitclaim deeds that are duly recorded. The parties litigated the efficacy of the deeds in Ohio trial and appellate courts, leading to the imposition of an “equitable lien” of $186,400.00 in Movant’s favor, and a finding that Debtors have no legal or equitable interest under Ohio law to impede foreclosure. How or why the Debtors lived in the home for nearly three years sans Movant’s formal intervention, or how the original deeds and mortgage never graced the public record and went missing, all remain a mystery.

Mystery turns to mayhem, now that Movant does not even believe itself to be a “creditor” of this estate on one hand, while with the other it seeks relief from the very stay it has no obligation to respect, as an alleged “non-creditor”. Movant calls the Debtors “squatters”, and asserts that, on the dual bases of res judicata and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, prior rulings of Ohio courts must control the disposition of what the Debtors now call “home”.

Bold, bordering on brazen, but wrong, is the only logical response. For on June 24, 2014, the date the Debtors filed their Chapter 13 petition, the bankruptcy estate emerged. By definition, it included all legal and equitable interests previously held, in addition to property and earnings acquired after filing. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a). Unless the confirmed plan provides otherwise, debtors retain possession of all estate property. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b). To Mov-ant’s surprise, debtors have “creditors” who hold claims that “... arose at the time of or before the order for relief (bankruptcy filing) ...” 11 U.S.C. § lOl(lOXA).

Even more revealing, “claims” are defined as a “... right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured ...”. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). [161]*161Without regard to any prior rulings, Mov-ant cannot escape the events that fundamentally altered its status and rights on the day the Debtors filed bankruptcy. For better or worse, it is- a creditor. There is more.

On September 30, 2014, the Court confirmed the Debtors’ Chapter 13 Plan. Indeed, confirmation occurred after the Movant files and then withdraws its confirmation objection as a “secured creditor herein”, all in the span of two months. Movant’s withdrawal motion stated no basis. We must remember that for all Chapter 13 debtors with homes, the challenge is to confirm and fund a plan that cures any mortgage arrearage over a reasonable period while maintaining on a current- basis contractually due post-petition mortgage payments. The reward, however, is great because confirmation binds both debtors and creditors to the terms of the confirmed plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a).

Further, upon confirmation, unless the plan or confirmation order provides otherwise, all property of the estate vests in debtors. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b). Finally, the property vested “... is free and clear of any claim or interest of any creditor provided for by the plan.” 11 U.S.C. § 1327(c). In this case, the Debtors can plausibly assert that the property was scheduled and treated in the plan as being lien-free, and by selecting the vesting option, it now belongs to them free of Mov-ant’s judicially imposed equitable lien. The unwitting withdrawal of the confirmation objection triggered all these events, and their effect upon Movant’s interests in the home.

Upon consideration of-the pleadings and statements of Counsel, primarily three issues are in play. The first is to what extent are the parties bound by prior state court rulings. Second, is the question how the bankruptcy filing and plan confirmation have altered the rights of the parties. Third, given the information provided during hearings and detailed in pleadings, may this Court find sufficient cause for lifting or modifying the stay, and indeed should it, given the contorted history of this case. The Court will discuss each issue in order.

Regarding the binding effect of pri- or Ohio court decisions, a review of the documents attached to the pleadings lead the Court to find and conclude that those prior determinations bind both Movant and the Debtors. Specifically, the parties have been in litigation since a July 20, 2010, declaratory judgement action filed in the Fairfield County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas. That litigation essentially resulted in two findings.

The first finding is that the Movant is entitled to an $186,400.00 “equitable lien” on the home, under the terms and conditions of an unrecorded and lost mortgage, dated October 26, 2006. The second finding is that before the bankruptcy filing and under Ohio law, the Debtors had no legal or equitable interest in the property to impede foreclosure. This latter finding resulted from the assertion that the original transferor (Starkey Family Revocable Living Trust) had no interest at the time of its execution of the first quitclaim deed to the Debtors, on October 25, 2007.

After a second quit claim deed was executed by a William Joseph Casey to the Debtors on March 17, 2011, apparently to address this deficiency, the Court of Common Pleas declined reconsideration of its prior order on May 23, 2011, and was affirmed by Fifth District Court of Appeals on December 22, 2011.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Kellner v. Fifth Third Bank (In re Durham)
493 B.R. 506 (S.D. Ohio, 2013)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
534 B.R. 158, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 2688, 2015 WL 4734425, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-wolfe-ohsb-2015.