In Re Willis Donald Smith

600 F.2d 714, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 13681
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedJune 26, 1979
Docket79-8090
StatusPublished
Cited by33 cases

This text of 600 F.2d 714 (In Re Willis Donald Smith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Willis Donald Smith, 600 F.2d 714, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 13681 (8th Cir. 1979).

Opinions

LAY, Circuit Judge.

Petitioner, a prisoner in the South Dakota Penitentiary, sought to bring suit against the Warden of the penitentiary and others. The district court by letter dated April 27, 1979, informed petitioner that since he had $65.85 in his penitentiary account he was denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis and his complaint would not be filed until the $15.00 filing fee was paid.

[715]*715On May 1, 1979, petitioner wrote this court that he then had less than $50.00 in his account and no income, and therefore he alleges his assets are insufficient to pay the filing fee, expenses of the United States Marshal’s office for service, and attorney’s fees. We have filed petitioner’s letter as a petition for a writ of mandamus; petitioner requests that he be given leave to proceed in forma pauperis as “guaranteed by the Constitution under U.S.C.A. Title 28-1915.”

Section 1915 is designed to enable impecunious persons to present their claims in federal court. We cannot accept a construction of this statute which conditions the presentation of possibly meritorious claims on the plaintiff’s willingness to become completely destitute. In Adkins v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S.. 331, 339-40, 69 S.Ct. 85, 89, 93 L.Ed. 43 (1948), Justice Black wrote for a unanimous Court:

We cannot agree with the court below that one must be absolutely destitute to enjoy the benefit of the statute. We think an affidavit is sufficient which states that one cannot because of his poverty “pay or give security for the costs and still be able to provide” himself and dependents “with the necessities of life.” To say that no persons are entitled to the statute’s benefits until they have sworn to contribute to payment of costs, the last dollar they have or can get, and thus make themselves and their dependents wholly destitute, would be to construe the statute in a way that would throw its beneficiaries into the category of public charges. The public would not be profited if relieved of paying costs of a particular litigation only to have imposed on it the expense of supporting the person thereby made an object of public support. Nor does the re-suit seem more desirable if the effect of this statutory interpretation is to force a litigant to abandon what may be a meritorious claim in order to spare himself complete destitution. We think a construction of the statute achieving such consequences is an inadmissible one.1

The only decision which provides direct support for the result reached by the district court in this case is Ward v. Werner, 61 F.R.D. 639 (M.D.Pa.1974). In that case the district court stated the “test” for determining eligibility under § 1915 is “whether the party has sufficient funds that access to the courts is not blocked by a denial of the privilege to proceed in forma pauperis.” Id. at 640. Judge Herman’s application of this “test” in Ward reveals that a prisoner, who is provided the necessities of life by the state, is “blocked” from court only if his financial resources are less than the required filing fee.2 Most of the other cases which have denied leave to a petitioner to proceed in forma pauperis are distinguishable. In several of those cases the district court’s denial of petitioner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis resulted from the determination that the complaint was frivolous. See, e.g., Carter v. Thomas, 527 F.2d 1332, 1333 (5th Cir. 1976); Forester v. California Adult Authority, 510 F.2d 58, 60 (8th Cir. 1975); Startti v. United States, 415 F.2d 1115, 1116 (5th Cir. 1969); Tyler v. Callahan, 74 F.R.D. 421, 423 (E.D. Mo.1977), aff’d without opinion, 573 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 947, 98 S.Ct. 2851, 56 L.Ed.2d 788 (1978); Ex parte Tyler, 70 F.R.D. 456, 457 (E.D.Mo.1976). Clearly § 1915 was not enacted for the purpose of requiring the public to underwrite frivolous lawsuits. However, in this case, the district court did not pass upon the merits of the petition, but denied leave to [716]*716proceed on the ground that petitioner had sufficient funds to pay the filing fee.

We cannot endorse a niggardly interpretation or application of § 1915 that so rigidly employs the filing fee as a talisman which demarcates paupers from those considered to have funds sufficient to be able to pay it.

Although we agree the district court must exercise its discretion in determining whether a petitioner qualifies as a pauper under § 1915, the exercise of such discretion should not be applied to deny access to the federal courts simply because of the plaintiff’s ability to pay for small physical or material comforts. As the court stated in Souder v. McGuire, 516 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1975), in reversing a decision by Judge Herman denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis:

[W]e do not think that prisoners must totally deprive themselves of those small amenities of life which they are permitted to acquire in a prison or a mental hospital beyond the food, clothing, and lodging already furnished by the state. An account of $50.07 would not purchase many such amenities; perhaps cigarettes and some occasional reading material. These need not be surrendered in order for a prisoner or a mental patient to litigate in forma pauperis in the district court.3

Id. at 824.

It has long been established that a party need not be penniless in order to invoke forma pauperis. Cf. Sejeck v. Singer Mfg. Co., 113 F.Supp. 281 (D.N.J.1953).

The petitioner’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings.4

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Bluebook (online)
600 F.2d 714, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 13681, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-willis-donald-smith-ca8-1979.