In Re Wenande

107 B.R. 770, 21 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1424, 1989 Bankr. LEXIS 2770, 1989 WL 140978
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Wyoming
DecidedOctober 20, 1989
Docket19-20083
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 107 B.R. 770 (In Re Wenande) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Wyoming primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Wenande, 107 B.R. 770, 21 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1424, 1989 Bankr. LEXIS 2770, 1989 WL 140978 (Wyo. 1989).

Opinion

DECISION DENYING CLAIM OF EXEMPTIONS

HAROLD L. MAI, Bankruptcy Judge.

THIS MATTER came before the court on June 21, 1989, for hearing on the trustee’s Objection to Claim of Exemptions.

The court having considered the Objection, the claim of exemptions, and the amended claim, all papers and pleadings filed herein, having heard argument of counsel, and upon its own review of the applicable statutes and authorities, does hereby render its Decision as follows:

On their Amended Schedule B-4, the debtors claimed the following property as exempt under applicable Wyoming Law as “entireties property”:

All of the debtor’s property that qualifies all, including but not limited to: Stock, mineral interests, real estate, accounts, intangibles and personal property, which includes, but would not necessarily be limited to the following: 1) all of the debtor’s shares in the Wenande Land & Livestock Co. Inc., 2) all of the debtor’s shares in the Trail Creek Grazing Assoc, (sic)

This cryptic description of the property claimed as exempt points out a serious and reoccurring problem with claims of exemptions commonly filed in this District — it is impossible to clearly ascertain exactly what property is claimed as exempt.

The debtors’ Amended Schedule B-4 was filed in response to this court’s January 6, 1987 Order for More Specific Listing of Property for Which an Exemption is Claimed. The January 6, 1987 Order, directed the debtors to “specifically list” the entireties property in which they claim exemptions.

To serve the purpose of a claim of exemption, property must be separately listed on the debtors’ Schedule B-4 with “sufficient detail to put the trustee on notice of questionable assertions.” Payne v. Wood, 775 F.2d 202, 206 (7th Cir.1985) (“property passes to the estate automatically, and it is the debtor’s burden to make out the claim of exemption with adequate specificity”). See 11 U.S.C. § 522(l).

As the Seventh Circuit has noted,

* * * The requirement that the debtor list the property serves at least two functions. One is to settle claims of title, so *772 that on the day of discharge everyone knows who owns what. The other is to allow the trustee to decide which claims to challenge. Debtors are not perfectly trustworthy, and unless the claim of exemption contains sufficient detail to put the trustee on notice of questionable assertions, it will not be possible to administer the statutory scheme.

Id.

Closer adherence to Schedule B-4 as set forth in Official Form 6 will benefit all parties. On Official Form 6, the Schedule B-4 lists headings for “type of Property,” “location, description, and, so far as relevant to the claim of exemption, present use of property,” “specify statute creating the exemption” and “value claimed as exempt.”

In this District a regrettable practice of using a pre-printed “checklist” of exemptions has developed. The Schedule B-4 and the Amended Schedule B-4 filed in this ease, attached hereto as Exhibits A and B, are examples of the checklist which has become widely used in this District.

This checklist substitutes a generic statement of a category of property for the “description, ... present use of property” information required. It also substitutes a preselected dollar amount, or a preselected percentage for the required information on “value claimed.”

For example, in the present case the Amended Schedule B-4 has a check mark for “Tools of the Trade” and a preprinted value shown as “$2,000.” Exactly what property these debtors consider to be “tools of the trade,” where the property is now located, and its present use, are unknown.

The debtors’ cryptic reference to “personal property, which includes, but would not necessarily be limited to” certain specified shares of stock is another example. It is inconceivable that the debtors, or their counsel, believed this to be adequate notice to the trustee and creditors of a claim of exemption in personal property other than the specifically listed shares of stock. Similarly, such a reference does not serve the purpose of establishing “who owns what” on the date of discharge. Payne v. Wood, 775 F.2d at 206.

In view of its January 6, 1987 Order, the court must hold that the debtors’ designations of property by only categories such as “stocks,” “mineral interests,” “accounts,” “intangibles,” and “personal property” are insufficient to constitute a listing of a claim of exemption within the meaning of Bankruptcy Rule 4003. Such a generic description simply does not provide the trustee with adequate notice of the property claimed.

If there are accounts claimed, at minimum they should be listed by institution on the B-4 Schedule. The official form requires that the value of the account also be set forth. Similarly, the “mineral interests” must be more specifically described in order to provide the trustee or creditors with inquiry notice of questionable assertions. 1 “Stocks” should be listed by setting forth the name of the company and the approximate number of shares claimed as exempt.

This court’s position is that “value,” as set forth on the official form, generally means an approximate dollar amount and not a percentage. Naturally, value is the type of information that is not always available on the date a petition is filed. Where it is not, an estimation, so designated, may serve the purpose of the B-4 Schedule, e.g., “approximately $1,500.” If the value is unknown, a simple statement to that effect serves the purpose of the B-4 Schedule.

“Location” of the claimed property is a required item on the B-4 Schedule in Official Form 6, that is often simply omitted.

The better practice is to avoid a reference to another of the debtor’s B Schedules *773 as a substitute for the listing required on the Schedule B-4. This practice of referring to the debtor’s other B Schedules no doubt arises in a commendable attempt to eliminate duplicative lists. However, a problem arises because debtors usually list on their other B Schedules a mix of exempt and nonexempt property.

For example, debtors must list on their Schedule B-2(e) under “[h]ousehold goods, supplies and furnishings,” items such as VCR’s, power tools, and expensive art work that are not generally exempt under the Wyoming Statutes. Similarly, they must list many nonexempt and exempt items together under Schedule B-2(e), “[w]earing apparel, jewelry, firearms, sports equipment, and other personal possessions.” When reference is later made to “see exhibit X” it often refers to the property already listed under B-2(c) or (d), some of which is not exempt, and which the debtors did not intend to claim as exempt.

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Bluebook (online)
107 B.R. 770, 21 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1424, 1989 Bankr. LEXIS 2770, 1989 WL 140978, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-wenande-wyb-1989.