In re: Welscorp, Inc.

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJune 27, 2023
Docket23-1030
StatusUnpublished

This text of In re: Welscorp, Inc. (In re: Welscorp, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re: Welscorp, Inc., (bap9 2023).

Opinion

FILED JUN 27 2023 NOT FOR PUBLICATION SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: BAP No. NV-23-1030-BGC WELSCORP, INC., Debtor. Bk. No. 19-18056-ABL

STEVEN LORE, Adv. No. 21-01175-ABL Appellant, v. MEMORANDUM∗ LENARD SCHWARTZER, Chapter 7 Trustee, Appellee.

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada August B. Landis, Chief Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

Before: BRAND, GAN, and CORBIT, Bankruptcy Judges.

INTRODUCTION

Appellant Steven Lore appeals an order granting appellee, chapter 7 1

trustee Lenard Schwartzer ("Trustee"), summary judgment against him under

§§ 544, 548, 2 and 550 and Nevada law, NRS § 112.180(1)(a). Trustee sought to

∗ This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1. 1 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, all "Rule" references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and all "NRS" references are to the Nevada Revised Statutes. 2 To the extent the bankruptcy court granted relief under § 548, it erred. Trustee did

not seek relief under § 548 in his complaint, and none of the transfers to Lore occurred 1 avoid and recover the debtors'3 actual fraudulent transfers to Lore in

furtherance of an alleged Ponzi scheme. Because Lore failed to establish that

any genuine issue of material fact existed for trial, particularly whether the

debtors were running a Ponzi scheme, the bankruptcy court did not err in

granting Trustee summary judgment and entering a judgment against Lore

for $227,565.16. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

FACTS

A. Events leading to the adversary complaint against Lore

The relevant facts are essentially undisputed. From August 2014 until

shortly before creditors filed their involuntary chapter 7 petitions on

December 20, 2019, debtors Welscorp, Inc. and its affiliates and principals

(collectively, "Debtors") operated an investment scheme that offered investors

250% to 600% returns from a pooled investor fund used to bet on sporting

events. Debtors' principals, John F. Thomas, III (aka Jonathan West, John

Rodgers, John Frank, and John Marshall) and Thomas Becker, claimed to

have created a proprietary sports betting algorithm that was highly accurate

in predicting the outcome of sporting events. 4 Thomas and Becker, through

within two years of the petition date. However, such error was harmless since the relevant transfers occurred within four years of the petition date and relief was warranted under Nevada law and § 544(b)(1). 3 Debtors include several entities and their principals: Welscorp, Inc.; Einstein

Sports Advisory Ltd.; QSA LLC; Wellington Sports Club LLC; Vegas Basketball Club LLC; Vegas Football Club LLC; Boston Biometrics LLC; Sports Psychometrics LLC; ESA Ltd.; No-More-Bad-Hires, Inc.; John F. Thomas, III, and Thomas Becker. 4 In 1991, Thomas and Becker were convicted of felony money laundering and

conspiracy arising from another fraudulent scheme. Thomas used the alias "Jonathan West" during the time Debtors ran their sports betting investment scheme. 2 the Debtor entities and the services of their broker-agents, raised at least $29.5

million from 600 investors in more than 40 states with their "low-risk, high-

yield" sports betting investment scheme. The individual investors deposited

amounts ranging from less than $10,000 to over $500,000. Debtors did not do

any vetting of their investors to determine if they were accredited and could

survive a financial loss. Many investors were unsophisticated and placed a

substantial percentage of their net worth (including savings and retirement

accounts) with Debtors.

Debtors had more than 150 brokers and agents. Each broker signed a

"sports investment broker agreement" agreeing to "promote, market, and sell"

the investor agreements in return for a certain percentage of front-end and

back-end commissions. For every agent a broker brought in, the broker

received a certain percentage of the agent's commissions as well.

Debtors promised their investors "absolute security and instant

liquidity," compounding returns that grow "a quadrillion times faster" than

Warren Buffet's investments, or total growth of funds "a quintillion-fold". The

investor agreements set forth how Debtors would grow the investor's initial

investment to a target amount. Once the target was reached, the investor

could cash out and get 50% of the target amount; Debtors would get the other

50%. An investor could also choose to roll over some or all of the earnings

into a new agreement.

Prospective investors were lured into investing through personalized

access to a website that would provide them with "demonstrations" of how

3 their potential investment would grow over time. Once committing money to

Debtors, the investors' login credentials allowed them to monitor bets and

track their individual "winnings" online.

The websites, however, contained incorrect, falsified, or mismanaged

accounting information. For example, on February 11, 2017, investors were

shown that their accounts increased by $5,344,262, but betting slips from that

day showed they earned only $105,782.50. On May 12, 2018, investors were

shown that betting generated $60.5 million in profits, but betting slips from

that day showed only $119,536.40 in actual winnings. Many investors chose

to reinvest their "winnings" because they were impressed with the rate of

growth they saw in their personalized spreadsheets on the website. In reality,

Debtors' sports betting activity generally lost money. Thomas and Becker

never achieved the winning rates represented to investors.

When investors demanded payment, Thomas and Becker would say

they had the funds but often claimed they could not pay for a host of reasons,

such as the winnings were in cash and they could not deposit large amounts

of cash into bank accounts for fear of being prosecuted for money laundering

or other crimes. Most, if not all, investors were not paid out the full balance

shown in their online accounts, and many were not paid back anything at all,

even their initial investments, despite their accounts reflecting much higher

amounts. If an investor was paid, it was frequently with money from other

investors, not winnings from sports betting. There was evidence that some of

these investors were paid because Debtors' brokers suggested that doing so

4 could lead to a larger amount of new money coming in. The investor

agreements did not disclose any use of investor funds other than for betting,

and investors did not know their funds were being used to pay returns to

other investors – i.e., Ponzi payments – or being used by Debtors' principals

for personal expenses and for payment of broker commissions.

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