In Re Watkins

216 B.R. 394, 12 Tex.Bankr.Ct.Rep. 63, 39 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 344, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2118, 1997 WL 810453
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Texas
DecidedAugust 6, 1997
Docket19-50463
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 216 B.R. 394 (In Re Watkins) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Watkins, 216 B.R. 394, 12 Tex.Bankr.Ct.Rep. 63, 39 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 344, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2118, 1997 WL 810453 (Tex. 1997).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FRANK R. MONROE, Bankruptcy Judge.

The Court held a trial on the Motion of the United States Trustee to Dismiss for Substantial Abuse Under 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) on July 9, 1997 at 1:30 p.m. All parties appeared. Upon the record established at that hearing, the argument of counsel, the briefs of the parties and the Court’s own independent research, this Memorandum Opinion is being issued as written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law under Bankruptcy Rules 7014 and 7052.

This contested matter is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) and because it arises under 11 U.S.C. § 707(b). This Court, therefore, has the jurisdiction to enter a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) and(b); 28 *395 U.S.C. § 157(a) and (b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 151 and the Standing Order of Reference in this District from the United States District Court.

FINDINGS OF FACT

These Debtors filed their Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on April 10, 1997. Mr. Watkins is a senior information systems specialist for Tracor Aerospace with a gross monthly income of $5,444.42. His wife is a nurse for the City of Austin Health Department with a gross monthly salary of $4,494.53. The combined gross income of these Debtors is, therefore, $9,938.95. Annualized their gross income is $119,267.40.

From these amounts of gross income, Mr. Watkins voluntarily had deducted by his employer the amount of $925.56 as additional retirement as of the petition date. , Subsequently, and apparently in response to the United States Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Watkins has amended that deduction to the amount of $160.56 per month. Mrs. Watkins, both on the petition date and presently, has deducted from her gross income on a monthly basis $624.00 in deferred compensation and $314.62 in voluntary retirement. These voluntary deductions total $1,099.18 per month.

The total monthly expenses originally set out by the Debtors on Schedule J are $5,080.15. Not surprisingly, after the United States Trustee filed his Motion to Dismiss, these amounts were modified upward to the sum of $5,608.07. The modifications primarily came from these sources:

1. Home maintenance was increased from $150.00 per month to $191.00 per month.

2. Medical and dental expenses, in excess of medical flex payments to the Debtors’ employers of $304.18, were increased from $165.00 to $279.00 per month.

3. Automobile insurance was decreased from $158.08 to $111.00 per month.

4. Orthodontics was increased for these two adult Debtors from $120.00 to $135.00 per month.

5. A monthly child support payment of $400.00 per month which were due to expire very-shortly after the filing of this petition has now been re-categorized as a potential future automobile installment payment for a car yet to be purchased.

6. Savings/IRA contributions of $300.00 per month have now been re-categorized as miscellaneous/unanticipated expenses.

7. Professional continuing education for Mr. Watkins has been increased from $74.00 per month to $489.00 per month.

Further, the Debtors filed this ease only 15 days after they purchased a 1997 Plymouth Voyager Minivan with an alleged current market value of $25,000.00 [most probably on the advice of counsel]. Plus, the vehicle was conveniently financed for a period of 36 months with an extremely high monthly payment of $822.00. It is not very difficult to conclude that the Voyager was purchased and financed at such a high monthly payment in order that the Debtors monthly disposable income would be accordingly reduced and, therefore, the chances of their being forced into Chapter 13 would be much less.

The Debtors in their schedules also list a very detailed and exceptionally long list of camera equipment valued at what would be appear to be extremely low values. There are also listed 59 items of jewelry for Mrs. Watkins with nominal valuations. The list of miscellaneous household goods and “collections” totals 399 items. Mr. Watkins testified, very ambiguously, concerning why and how it is that they have ended up in bankruptcy with 18 listed credit card debts with a scheduled total claim amount of $87,972.74, or an average of $4,887.37 per credit card notwithstanding their combined gross annual income of $120,000.00.

The Court does not “buy” the testimony of Mr. Watkins that this came to be because of his expenses with his children by a former marriage, payment of child support, and maintenance on his home. One has only to look at the list of personal property to see a great number of reasons why these Debtors’ credit card debt is so excessive.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Court requested briefs on the issue as to whether or not Debtors can make volun *396 tary contributions to retirement accounts, deferred income accounts, etc. and have those amounts deducted in order to determine their “disposable income” and, therefore, their ability to pay creditors under a Chapter 13 plan.

The Court is aware of the various cases attempting to define “substantial abuse” as that term is used in 11 U.S.C. § 707(b). See In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908, 913-15 (9th Cir. 1988), and U.S. Trustee v. Harris, 960 F.2d 74 (8th Cir.1992), Fonder v. U.S., 974 F.2d 996 (8th Cir.1992) looking primarily at the debtor’s ability to repay the debts for which a discharge is sought. See also, Green v. Staples (In re Green), 934 F.2d 568 (4th Cir.1991), for a totality of the circumstances analysis. See In re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123, 126-28(6th Cir.1989) essentially adopting the 9th Circuit Kelly case, but stating that other circumstances may also give rise to substantial abuse. There appears to be no controlling precedent in the 5th Circuit at this time.

This Court will adopt a test which considers the totality of the circumstances with emphasis on the Debtors’ ability to repay debts under a Chapter 13 Plan.

1) In this case the facts show that the bankruptcy petition was not occasioned by any type of calamity, disability, unemployment or sudden unexpected illness.

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Bluebook (online)
216 B.R. 394, 12 Tex.Bankr.Ct.Rep. 63, 39 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 344, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2118, 1997 WL 810453, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-watkins-txwb-1997.