In Re Walker

114 B.R. 847, 23 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 81, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 1034, 20 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 847, 1990 WL 67286
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. New York
DecidedApril 2, 1990
Docket19-30097
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 114 B.R. 847 (In Re Walker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Walker, 114 B.R. 847, 23 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 81, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 1034, 20 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 847, 1990 WL 67286 (N.Y. 1990).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM-DECISION, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

STEPHEN D. GERLING, Bankruptcy Judge.

This contested matter is before the Court by way of a motion made by Scott A. Walker (“Debtor”), to modify his confirmed Chapter 13 Plan pursuant to § 1329 of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330) (West 1979 and Supp. 1989) (“Code”). The Chapter 13 Trustee has filed a written Objection to the Debtor’s motion. Oral argument on the Debtor’s motion was heard on September 26, 1989 at which the Debtor, the Trustee and unsecured claimant, Paradise Mountain Trailer Park (“Paradise”) appeared. The matter was finally submitted for decision on November 13, 1989.

*849 The Court also considers a companion motion by Debtor’s counsel seeking interim compensation of $200.00 for services rendered in connection with the motion to modify-

FACTS

The Debtor filed his petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Code on October 11, 1988 and his repayment Plan was subsequently confirmed on February 27, 1989. The Plan provided that the Debtor would pay the sum of $215.00 per month over a period of fifty-four months. It further provided that unsecured creditors would receive one-hundred percent of their claims.

At the time of filing, the Debtor resided in a mobile home located at Lot 1C, Paradise Trailer Park, Utica, New York. In his Chapter 13 Statement, the Debtor disclosed a claim held by Key Bank secured by his mobile home in the amount of $4,842.00. He listed the value of the mobile home at $3,000.00. On September 21, 1989, Key Bank filed an amended proof of claim setting forth their claim secured by the mobile home in the amount of $5,010.18. On the proof of claim was the notation, “Security abandoned as junk,” and no amount was provided to indicate the fair market value of the Debtor’s mobile home.

In his Plan, which was filed with the Court on October 11,1988, Debtor provided that he “shall surrender the mobile home to Key Bank and any balance due after shall be paid as an unsecured claim.”

After filing his petition, the Debtor apparently moved from his mobile home. He has also, since confirmation, allegedly married and resides with his spouse and her child.

ARGUMENTS

The Debtor seeks modification of his confirmed Chapter 13 Plan on the basis of a change in his financial circumstances. His proposed modification would extend the Plan from fifty-four to sixty months, reduce his monthly payment to the Trustee from $215.00 to $140.00 and ultimately result in a reduced dividend to unsecured creditors from one-hundred to thirty-four percent.

He grounds his request in the fact that, since confirmation of his Plan, he has been married to a woman with a child. The Debtor asserts that his wife does not work and, therefore, he does not realize any additional income. He argues that he is incapable of making the current payments under the Plan because of the additional expenses incurred through support of his wife and her child. The Debtor maintains that if the modification fails to gain the Court’s approval, he would be forced to convert to Chapter 7 due to his financial inability to comply with the present terms of the Plan.

The Trustee objects, arguing that the unsecured creditors should not be forced to take a lesser dividend because of a voluntary change in marital status by the Debt- or.

In addition, the Trustee alleges the Debt- or negligently vacated the mobile home and never advised Key Bank, as holder of the security interest in the mobile home, that they should commence repossession. The Trustee alleges that the Debtor’s improper abandonment of the mobile home to Key Bank, directly resulted in its diminution in value. This, in turn, argues the Trustee, forces the unsecured creditors to receive less than under the original Plan. Paradise also objected at the September 26, 1989 hearing. Its objection was that the mobile home was occupying the trailer park and continuing to accrue rental charges because the Debtor had not informed Paradise of his abandonment.

DISCUSSION

Pursuant to Code § 1329, a debtor may modify his plan at any time before the completion of the payments under such plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a). The plan may be modified to increase or reduce payments or to alter the time for such payments. 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1), (2).

Post-confirmation modification of a Chapter 13 plan may be accomplished “if a problem arises in the execution of the plan.” H.R.Rep. No. 95-595 p. 125, U.S. *850 Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, pp. 5787, 6086, Bankr.L.Ed., Leg.Hist. § 82.4. The debtor, on request with a showing of changed circumstances, may move to modify a plan only upon showing of change in financial circumstances since the confirmation. See In re Moseley, 74 B.R. 791, 792 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1987).

Post-confirmation modification by a debtor may be allowed where the modified plan would have been appropriate had the present circumstances existed originally. See In re Taylor, 99 B.R. 902 (Bankr. C.D.Ill.1989). In In re Gronski, 86 B.R. 428 (Bankr. E.D.Pa.1988), the creditor moved to modify the Chapter 13 plan after confirmation. The court declined to allow modification solely on the grounds that the debtor apparently intentionally understated his expenses. The court required the creditor to show the occurrence of a “substantial change” in the debtor’s circumstances. Id. at 432.

Other'courts cite the legislative history of Code § 1329 explaining that if the debt- or has a problem with making future payments he may modify the plan. See e.g., In re Evans, 77 B.R. 457 (E.D.Pa.1987). Code § 1329 should be interpreted broadly to allow the plan to accommodate “changed circumstances, so long as the modified plan would have been appropriate had the present circumstances existed originally.” See In re Taylor, supra 99 B.R. at 904.

The Trustee characterizes the Debt- or’s post-confirmation marriage as a voluntary change in circumstances which should be accorded weight against the proposed modification.

The Court finds the Trustee’s objection to be without a sound policy basis. Clearly there is no provision of the Code which is intended to inhibit the right to marry while in bankruptcy. Any such interpretation would turn public policy on its ear by requiring payments to creditors under a confirmed plan at the expense of the debtor’s support of his family. Apparently the Trustee would have Chapter 13 debtors, who incur additional expenses due to their post-confirmation marriage, provide to unsecured creditors notice and an opportunity to object to the proposed marriage. Such a scenario stretches beyond recognition the already controversial limits of the bankruptcy court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

“Marriage is one of the basic rights of man, fundamental to our very existence and survival.” Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia,

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114 B.R. 847, 23 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 81, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 1034, 20 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 847, 1990 WL 67286, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-walker-nynb-1990.