In re Walgreens Boots Alliance Securities Litigation

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedJanuary 5, 2026
Docket1:24-cv-05907
StatusUnknown

This text of In re Walgreens Boots Alliance Securities Litigation (In re Walgreens Boots Alliance Securities Litigation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Walgreens Boots Alliance Securities Litigation, (N.D. Ill. 2026).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

In re Walgreens Boots Alliance Case No. 24-cv-5907 Securities Litigation Judge Mary M. Rowland

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiffs Christopher Collins and the Fire and Police Employees' Retirement System of the City of Baltimore brought this putative class action against Defendants Walgreens, Rosalind Brewer, James Kehoe, John Driscoll, John Standley, Tim Wentworth, and Manmohan Mahajan. The complaint [50] contains two counts: one alleging that Defendants violated Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, and the second alleging that the individual Defendants violated Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. Before the Court now is Defendants’ motion [57] to dismiss the complaint and Defendants’ motion [71] to strike an appendix [69-1] (the “Appendix”) that Plaintiffs filed in support of their opposition to the motion to dismiss. For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part, and Defendants’ motion to strike is denied. I. Background A. Overview The following factual allegations taken from the operative complaint [50] are accepted as true for the purposes of the motion to dismiss. See Lax v. Mayorkas, 20 F.4th 1178, 1181 (7th Cir. 2021).

On October 14, 2021, Defendant Walgreens announced a $5.2 billion investment in VillageMD, a startup primary care provider with a network of thousands of physicians (the “VillageMD Venture”). [50] ¶¶ 1-2. Walgreens and VillageMD planned to roll out doctor-staffed, full-service primary care clinics at roughly 1,000 of Walgreens’ U.S. stores. [50] ¶ 1.1 Defendants touted this investment as a “transformational” new healthcare strategy, and, following its announcement, Walgreens’ stock price rose to $54.33. [50] ¶ 2. For the next several years, Walgreens

continued to represent to the market that this strategy “would be a significant profit driver” and that their model “work[ed],” and Walgreens invested a total of $10 billion in the venture. [50] ¶¶ 2, 191. In November 2022, Walgreen announced that it was purchasing another physician-led healthcare services company called Summit Health-CityMD (“Summit”). In the summer of 2024, however, Walgreens revealed that its foray into primary care health services had been a failure and that the

company was abandoning its healthcare strategy. [50] ¶ 12. After that announcement, the company’s stock price fell to $12.19. [50] ¶ 13. Plaintiffs allege that between the announcement on October 14, 2021, and July 27, 2024 (the “Class Period”), Defendants knew or had reason to know that the VillageMD Venture was a failure but made false representations or omissions to the

1 Walgreens referred to its store locations that contained a VillageMD clinic as a “co-located clinic.” See [50] ¶ 89. market regarding its viability. See generally [50]. To buttress their claims, Plaintiffs interviewed several current former and former Walgreens and VillageMD employees (“Confidential Witnesses” or “CWs”) who provided statements about challenges the

VillageMD Venture purportedly faced during the class period. Id. B. Defendants2 Defendant Walgreens is a retail pharmacy store chain headquartered in Deerfield, Illinois. [50] ¶ 18. It is one of the largest pharmacy chains in the world. Defendant Brewer served as Walgreens’ CEO and a member of its board of directors from March 15, 2021, until August 31, 2023. [50] ¶ 19. Between April 2022 and August 2023, she also served on Village MD’s board of directors. [50] ¶ 19

Defendant Kehoe served as Walgreens’ executive vice president and Global CFO from June 2018 through August 2023. [1] ¶ 20. Defendant Driscoll served as Executive Vice President and President of Walgreens’ U.S. Healthcare segment from October 2022 until February 2024. [1] ¶ 21. He began serving on VillageMD’s board of directors in 2023. [1] ¶ 21. Defendant Wentworth served as Walgreens’ CEO since October 2023 and is a

member of its board of directors. [50] ¶ 23. Defendant Mahajan served as Walgreens’ interim CFO from July 2023 through February 2024 and served as Walgreens’ Executive VP and Global CFO since February 2024. [1] ¶ 24. Mahajan also served on VillageMD’s board of directors beginning in 2024. [1] ¶ 24.

2 Plaintiff named John Standley as an individual defendant in the complaint, but later voluntarily dismissed him. [67]. C. The Confidential Witnesses CW 1 served as the national medical director at VillageMD from September 2020 until July 2022, and Executive Vice President of VillageMD from December 2021

until July 2022. [50] ¶ 86 n.4. He reported directly to the C-Suite. Id. CW 1 reported that throughout his tenure at VillageMD, “the vast majority of the Walgreens co- located clinics were underperforming.” [50] ¶ 89. CW 2 served as an executive director for VillageMD in Arizona from February 2021 until December 2021, and the market president in Arizona from January 2022 until September 2022. [50] ¶ 88 n.5. He was responsible for opening 30 clinics in Arizona in 2021, and he reported that “all of them” underperformed. [50] ¶ 88.

CW 3 served as a business development director for VillageMD from April 2019 through June 2023. [50] ¶ 90. He reported that nationally, only 30% of the co-located clinics “did well,” and the remaining 70% were “dismal failures.” [50] ¶ 90. He explained the clinics struggled in large part because their success depended on finding physicians who were willing to relocate their practices to a co-located clinic. [50] ¶ 94. To get physicians to relocate to a clinic, Walgreens had had to pay them

exorbitant amounts of money. [50] ¶ 95. CW 3 reported that many clinics were never able to recruit a physician at all. [50] ¶ 96. CW 4 served as VillageMD’s director of clinical operations from July 2021 through August 2022. [50] ¶ 97. Like CW 3, he reported that the clinics struggled because Walgreens was unable to adequately staff them. [50] ¶ 97. CW 5 served as a lead for the Walgreens regional implementation team in the Florida market. [50] ¶ 124. He reported that by mid-2022, the entire rollout of VillageMD co-located clinics had been put on hold. [50] ¶ 124. By mid-2023,

Walgreens and VillageMD laid off hundreds of employees nationwide, including the implementation teams responsible for opening co-located clinics. [50] ¶ 141. CW 5 also reported that Walgreens store managers were required to have regular meetings with the managers of VillageMD clinics to discuss the clinics’ performance. [50] ¶ 154. CW 6 served as regional practice administrator for a separate entity in Rhode Island beginning in 2013. [50] ¶ 92. He joined VillageMD in March 2021 when VillageMD acquired his prior employer. [50] ¶ 92 n.9. He reported that it was clear

that VillageMD was a “sinking ship” within six months of joining VillageMD. [50] ¶ 92. CW 7, the VillageMD senior director of strategic growth, reported that he had visibility into all markets and that it was obvious to him by late 2021 that the investment was struggling. [50] ¶ 92. CW 8 served as a lead for the Walgreens regional implementation team in Florida

from January 2019 through June 2023. [50] ¶ 92. He reported that Walgreens opened clinics “too fast and that doctors and nurses could not be recruited to properly staff them,” causing clinics to “s[it] empty for months.” [50] ¶ 103. CW 9 served as the director for revenue cycle management for Walgreens’ U.S. Healthcare segment and reported directly to the segment’s CFO from September 2021 through July 2023. [50] ¶ 92. He reported that “[i]t was very obvious” that Walgreens was not getting the return on the VillageMD Venture that they had hoped for within “a couple of months” of starting. [50] ¶ 92.

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In re Walgreens Boots Alliance Securities Litigation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-walgreens-boots-alliance-securities-litigation-ilnd-2026.