SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI en banc
Opinion issued December 10, 2024 IN RE: TODD N. AGRON, ) ) No. SC100543 Respondent. )
ORIGINAL DISCPLINARY PROCEEDING
In this original attorney disciplinary proceeding, Todd Agron stipulated to
professional misconduct. The parties’ only dispute is the appropriate discipline for Agron’s
ethical violations. Because Agron made payments to an illicit pay-per-lead referral service
and knowingly made dishonest statements to those investigating his misconduct, this Court
suspends Agron’s license to practice law indefinitely with no leave to apply for
reinstatement for 12 months.
Factual Background and Procedural History
Agron was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 2004 and has no prior disciplinary
history. For the first four years of his career, Agron was an assistant prosecutor in the
Jackson County prosecutor’s office. Afterward, Agron transitioned into private practice,
focusing on personal injury cases. In October 2020, Agron entered into a business
relationship with the Personal Injury Group d/b/a National Accident Consulting, LLC (“NAC”), which advertised itself as providing “referral services to personal injury
attorneys specializing in automobile accidents.” In other words, NAC referred individuals
injured in automobile accidents to personal injury lawyers. NAC was not a qualified
lawyer referral service nor registered with the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel
(“OCDC”) as required by the Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct. Agron paid NAC
$500 per referral.
From October 2020 to April 2021, Agron paid a total of $77,000 to NAC for 154
referrals in 16 separate checks. During this time period, Agron did not make any
reasonable efforts to ensure NAC was a properly registered or qualified referral service.
In October 2020, Agron wrote a $500 check to R.W., who presented himself as an
NAC employee, in exchange for a client referral. Four months later, R.W. solicited a
potential personal injury client for Agron. R.W. unlawfully obtained personal and private
information about the potential client. Agron did not investigate whether R.W. was an
attorney or otherwise qualified to refer clients to attorneys.
In April 2021, OCDC sent Agron a letter requesting a written response regarding a
complaint by an attorney whose client had been contacted by a runner named R.W., who
claimed to work with Agron. 1 Agron responded that R.W. was “wholly unknown” to him,
1 A runner is a non-lawyer “who solicits personal-injury cases for a lawyer.” Runner, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024); see also Runner, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (defining a “runner” as a “[p]erson who solicits business for [an] attorney from accident victims” and noting runners could also be referred to as “[a]mbulance chaser[s]”). R.W., for example, served as a runner when he solicited a client for Agron in return for $500. 2 claimed no one “representing [his] office would be authorized to call and solicit
representation,” and suggested the complaint was made in bad faith.
One week later, an OCDC special representative e-mailed Agron requesting
additional information in the form of written responses to eight questions. The special
representative warned that “[a]ny lack of candor on your part . . . will only serve to
aggravate the situation.” Agron denied using investigators or runners, participating in any
referral programs, or paying for referrals within the prior 12 months.
On May 7, 2021, the special representative inquired whether Agron was familiar
with R.W., NAC, and another individual, T.S., who had formed NAC. The special
representative sent Agron a photocopy of R.W.’ s NAC business card. Agron responded,
“I do recall a guy named [R] that came by my office saying he had some kind of website
for attorney referrals some time ago. Nothing ever came of it.” Regarding T.S., Agron
stated he knew T.S. worked at a chiropractic office where Agron had dropped off business
cards but claimed he was unaware that T.S. had formed NAC.
Two months later, OCDC requested copies of Agron’s law office operating account
bank statements from October 2020 to April 2021. Agron retained counsel and sent the
requested bank statements to OCDC.
In September 2021, Agron sent OCDC a “STATEMENT OF CLARIFICATION
&/OR CORRECTION.” Agron confessed that his initial responses to OCDC “were
misleading” and he also confessed to knowing R.W., T.S., and NAC, and paying them for
referrals. Further, Agron professed that he was aware T.S. worked for NAC. Agron
acknowledged that he knew NAC was a pay-per-lead referral service despite T.S.’s
3 representation that the firm was merely an advertising service. Agron claimed he had
reached out to peers in the legal community for mentorship and advisement moving
forward. Concluding his statement, Agron admitted his “actions were not correct,”
expressed remorse for his “lack of transparency with OCDC’s investigators,” and asserted
he had suspended all pay-per-lead advertising. Eventually, OCDC scheduled a disciplinary
hearing panel (“DHP”) proceeding for January 2024.
Between OCDC’s initial investigation and the DHP hearing, Agron undertook
remedial measures. He stopped utilizing pay-per-lead referral services, expanded his
professional network, and secured mentor-attorneys to supervise his practice.
In November 2023, in advance of the hearing, Agron and OCDC submitted to the
DHP a joint stipulation agreeing the above facts are true. The parties also stipulated to
violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, agreeing Agron violated Rule 4-5.3 by
failing to make reasonable efforts to ensure R.W.’s and NAC’s conduct was compatible
with the professional obligations of attorneys under Rule 4; that Agron participated in an
unlawful and improper lawyer referral scheme by paying $77,500 in total to R.W. and NAC
in violation of Rules 4-9.1(b) and 4-7.2(c); and that Agron’s dishonest and intentional
misrepresentations to OCDC during its investigation violated Rules 4-8.1(a), 4-8.4(c), and
4-8.4(d). 2 Additionally, the parties stipulated to aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. 3
2 Unless otherwise noted, all rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2023), which govern this proceeding because the information was filed in June 2023. 3 OCDC initially charged Agron with additional violations of Rules 4-7.3(a), 4-8.4(a), 4-8.4(b), and 4-9.1(m). OCDC dropped those charges prior to the DHP hearing. 4 While Agron and OCDC stipulated to the facts and violations of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, they did not agree on a recommended discipline. OCDC concluded
Agron’s actions did not warrant disbarment and recommended indefinite suspension
without leave to seek reinstatement for 12 months or, alternatively, six months. Agron
requested probation or that any suspension imposed be stayed while he completed a term
of probation. 4
At the DHP hearing, Agron explained that, when he lied to OCDC investigators, he
was under significant stress. Agron divulged that he was having marital issues when
OCDC contacted him and was dismayed to learn a friend filed the initial complaint.
Additionally, Agron claimed that he was mistrustful of the special representative’s inquiry
because he received it by e-mail and was unsure whether the sender was truly affiliated
with OCDC. Agron stated that these stressors were “not an excuse in any way, shape, or
form” for his misconduct. Agron also admitted that he had come to understand, prior to
OCDC’s inquiry, that NAC was not an advertising agency and was, in fact, securing
referrals using illicit means. 5
Shortly after the disciplinary hearing, the DHP issued a decision. The DHP adopted
the parties’ stipulations of fact and agreed with the parties that Agron violated Rules 4-5.3,
4-9.1(b), 4-7.2(c), 4-8.1(a), 4-8.4(c), and 4-8.4(d). Referring to sections 9.22 and 9.32 of
4 Agron claims the mentor-attorneys he secured following OCDC’s investigation would be willing to monitor his practice during any probation imposed. 5 Before the DHP, Agron testified that he tried to “work with” NAC by “explain[ing] to them how these things shouldn’t happen” and telling them to stop doing “focused advertising.” 5 the American Bar Association’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1992) (“ABA
Standards”), the DHP found aggravating and mitigating factors. The DHP found Agron’s
selfish motives, dishonesty, multiple offenses, and substantial experience in the practice of
law to be aggravating factors. As for mitigating factors, the DHP then found Agron’s lack
of prior complaints or discipline, his pursuit of peer mentorship and advisement after
confessing to his misconduct, his subsequent cooperation in the proceedings and remorse
for his actions, and that, when his misconduct occurred, Agron was under a large amount
of stress due to marital issues.
Looking to the range of sanctions in sections 4.3 and 4.4 of the ABA Standards and
considering aggravating and mitigating factors, the DHP recommended that Agron be
suspended from the practice of law without leave to seek reinstatement for six months but
that the suspension be stayed during a one-year probation. Notably, the lay member of the
three-person DHP filed a dissent “strongly disagree[ing]” with the DHP’s decision, opining
that Agron should be suspended indefinitely without staying the suspension for a term of
probation. The lay member stated that, as a member of the public, he viewed Agron’s
attempts to cover up his misconduct by lying to be a “serious error” and that, in light of
Agron’s dishonesty, “he should not be representing anybody.”
OCDC rejected the DHP’s recommended discipline and sought this Court’s review.
Standard of Review
“This Court has inherent authority to regulate the practice of law and administer
attorney discipline.” In re Crump, 688 S.W.3d 569, 575 (Mo. banc 2024) (internal
quotations omitted). “Professional misconduct must be proven by a preponderance of the
6 evidence before discipline will be imposed.” In re McMillin, 521 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Mo.
banc 2017) (internal quotations omitted). “This Court reviews the evidence de novo,
independently determines all issues pertaining to credibility of witnesses and the weight of
the evidence, and draws its own conclusions of law.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
“This Court treats the [DHP]’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and []
recommendations as advisory” and “may reject any or all of the [DHP]’s
recommendations.” 6 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Analysis
This Court finds Agron committed the following violations of the Rules of
Professional Conduct.
Rule 4-9.1(b)
Under Rule 4-9.1(b), an attorney “may participate in a service that refers them to
prospective clients, but only if the service is a qualified service because it conforms to Rule
4-9.1.” A qualified referral service must be registered with OCDC “and demonstrate its
compliance with Rule 4-9.1 before commencing to operate.” Rule 4-9.1(i)(1). Only
qualified referral services are permitted to “operate for a direct or indirect purpose of
referring potential clients to particular lawyers.” See Rule 4-9.1(d). 7
6 Agron cites In re Donaho, 98 S.W.3d 871, 873 (Mo. banc 2003), proposing this Court should give “considerable weight” to the DHP’s disciplinary suggestions. The DHP is essential to the disciplinary process, and this Court highly values its role. As Donaho states, however, this Court is not bound to follow the DHP’s suggested discipline: “the [DHP]’s recommendation as to the appropriate measure of discipline is merely advisory.” Id. 7 Qualified referral services must operate for the good of “public interest.” Rule 4-9.1(c). To protect the public and preserve the integrity of the legal profession, compliance 7 This Court finds Agron violated Rule 4-9.1(b) by partnering with unregistered
referral services. R.W. and NAC were not registered with OCDC; therefore, neither was
qualified to refer clients to Agron. Nonetheless, Agron paid for their services without
investigating whether they were qualified to provide referrals. Agron admitted to the DHP
that he continued to receive referrals even after he learned neither R.W. nor NAC was a
qualified referral provider.
Rule 4-5.3
This Court finds Agron violated Rule 4-5.3. Rule 4-5.3 mandates that an attorney
supervise the conduct of non-attorney assistants. A supervising attorney is responsible for
any conduct by non-attorney assistants that would violate the Rules of Professional
Conduct if the attorney authorizes such conduct.
As explained above, Agron paid R.W. and NAC to refer him clients. Neither was
an attorney or qualified to refer clients. By paying R.W. and NAC for referrals, both
became Agron’s non-attorney assistants operating in violation of Rule 4-9.1. Agron failed
to make reasonable efforts to ensure R.W. and NAC’s conduct conformed to the Rules of
Professional Conduct and continued to enlist their services after learning they were illicit
referral providers.
requirements for referral services under Rule 4-9.1 are arduous and extensive. See Rule 4-9.1(c), (e), (f), (g), (i). The most basic and simplistic requirement, however, requires referral services to register with OCDC. Rule 4-9.1(i)(1). 8 Rule 4-7.2(c)
This Court finds Agron violated Rule 4-7.2(c). Rule 4-7.2(c)(3) prohibits an
attorney from giving anything of value to a person or entity for recommending the
attorney’s services unless the person or entity is a qualified lawyer referral service
registered under Rule 4-9.1. Agron paid R.W. and NAC $77,500 for 155 referrals and, as
explained above, neither R.W. nor NAC was qualified to make lawyer referrals under Rule
4-9.1.
Rule 4-8.1(a)
This Court finds Agron violated Rule 4-8.1(a). Rule 4-8.1(a) states, in relevant part,
that “a lawyer . . . in connection with a disciplinary matter shall not . . . knowingly make a
false statement of material fact.” Agron knowingly lied to the OCDC investigator about
his knowledge of, interactions with, and payments to R.W. and NAC.
Rule 4-8.4
This Court finds Agron violated two sections of Rule 4-8.4 by attempting to deceive
OCDC.
First, Rule 4-8.4(c) provides that an attorney commits professional misconduct
when he “engage[s] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”
Agron repeatedly violated this section when he responded dishonestly to OCDC’s inquiries
regarding his relationship with R.W. and NAC and misrepresented his knowledge of and
relationship with both.
Second, under Rule 4-8.4(d), an attorney commits professional misconduct by
“engag[ing] in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Agron intended
9 to hinder OCDC’s investigation when he made dishonest, deceitful misrepresentations and
intentional false statements about his payment for referrals and relationship with R.W. and
NAC. These attempts to impede OCDC’s investigation were prejudicial to the
administration of justice.
Appropriate Discipline
Having found that Agron committed multiple acts of misconduct by violating the
Rules of Professional Conduct, the remaining issue to be decided is the appropriate
disciplinary sanction.
“The purpose of attorney disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public and
maintain the integrity of the legal profession.” In re Eisenstein, 485 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Mo.
banc 2016) (internal quotations omitted). “Those twin purposes may be achieved both
directly, by removing a person from the practice of law, and indirectly, by imposing a
sanction [that] serves to deter other members of the Bar from engaging in similar conduct.”
In re Kazanas, 96 S.W.3d 803, 808 (Mo. banc 2003).
In addition to the attorney’s ethical violations, the Court looks to “the attorney’s
mental state, the extent of actual or potential injury caused by the attorney’s misconduct,
and any aggravating or mitigating factors.” McMillin, 521 S.W.3d at 610; see ABA
Standard 3.0. “This Court determines appropriate discipline by considering its prior cases
and the [ABA Standards].” In re Kayira, 614 S.W.3d 530, 533 (Mo. banc 2021) (internal
citation omitted).
“When this Court finds an attorney has committed multiple acts of misconduct, the
ultimate sanction imposed should at least be consistent with the sanction for the most
10 serious instance of misconduct among the violations.” McMillin, 521 S.W.3d at 610.
Agron’s most egregious acts of misconduct are his false and deceitful statements to OCDC.
The Presumptive Discipline
Section 6.0 of the ABA Standards addresses violations of duties owed to the legal
system. ABA Standard 6.11 provides that “[d]isbarment is generally appropriate when a
lawyer, with the intent to deceive the court, makes a false statement . . . or improperly
withholds material information, and causes . . . a significant or potentially significant
adverse effect on the legal proceeding.”
Under ABA Standard 6.12:
“Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that false statements . . . are being submitted to the court or material information is improperly being withheld, and takes no remedial action, and causes injury or potential injury to the legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding.”
Section 7.0 of the ABA Standards addresses violations of duties owed as a legal
professional. Standard 7.1 provides that “[d]isbarment is generally appropriate when a
lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional
with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.”
Under ABA Standard 7.2, “[s]uspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and
causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.”
“Misconduct involving subterfuge . . . and untrustworthiness undermine[s] public
confidence in not only the individual but in the bar.” Donaho, 98 S.W.3d at 874.
11 Accordingly, “[t]o protect the public, and maintain the integrity of the profession, a
substantial [discipline] must be imposed” when an attorney knowingly makes dishonest
statements. Id. “This Court considers the veracity of the attorney in disciplinary
proceedings to be of great importance.” In re Stricker, 808 S.W.2d 356, 361 (Mo. banc
1991); see also In re Waldron, 790 S.W.2d 456, 461 (Mo. banc 1990) (suspending an
attorney for dishonesty during disciplinary investigations).
The ABA Standards define “intent” as “the conscious objective or purpose to
accomplish a particular result,” and “knowledge” as “the conscious awareness of the nature
or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose
to accomplish a particular result.”
In his “STATEMENT OF CLARIFICATION &/OR CORRECTION,” Agron
admitted that his responses to OCDC were “somewhat misleading.” His statements,
however, were more than “somewhat” misleading—they were purposeful
misrepresentations. Agron lied about his relationship with and payments to R.W. and NAC
with the intent to impede OCDC’s investigation. Agron’s lack of veracity and intentional
obfuscation of facts pertinent to OCDC’s inquiry warrant disbarment, or at the very least,
suspension.
Accordingly, disbarment or suspension is the presumptive discipline. While OCDC
stipulated that Agron’s actions do not merit disbarment, its stipulation merely indicated
OCDC would not seek disbarment. OCDC’s stipulation does not fetter this Court’s
discretion to select appropriate discipline. Rule 5.17(a) permits disbarment when this
Court finds “one or more violations” of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and Agron’s
12 intentional misrepresentations of fact to OCDC investigators alone are sufficient to merit
disbarment as the presumptive discipline. Before determining the appropriate discipline
for Agron, however, this Court first must weigh mitigating and aggravating factors. See In
re Belz, 258 S.W.3d 38, 42-44 (Mo. banc 2008).
Aggravating factors relevant to Agron’s conduct are his: (1) substantial experience
in the practice of personal injury law; (2) multiple violations; (3) pattern of misconduct;
(4) dishonest responses to OCDC’s inquiries, which Agron made to avoid the consequences
of an investigation that revealed significant professional misconduct; and (5) selfish
motives in paying for improper client referrals for personal financial gain. See ABA
Standard 9.22.
Mitigating factors relevant to determining appropriate discipline are Agron’s:
(1) absence of prior discipline; (2) cooperative, if delayed, attitude towards disciplinary
proceedings; (3) good reputation in his personal injury practice and prior role as an assistant
prosecutor; (4) significant personal and emotional problems and substantial stress at the
time of his dishonest responses to OCDC inquiries; (5) professed remorse for his initial
failure to cooperate with OCDC; and (6) good faith efforts to rectify his misconduct by
reaching out to fellow attorneys for advisement and mentorship. See ABA Standard 9.32.
Agron argues these mitigating factors—particularly the absence of prior discipline
in his 20 years of practice and good reputation in his prior role as an assistant prosecutor—
merit departure from the presumptive discipline. Mitigating factors, however, do not
constitute a defense to misconduct. Belz, 258 S.W.3d at 42. Rather, mitigating factors
“may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed.” ABA Standard 9.31.
13 Agron asserts In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d 294 (Mo. banc 2016), supports his requested
discipline—probation with a stayed suspension. Krigel intentionally mislead a circuit court
to believe a child’s father did not want to exercise his parental rights. See id. at 297. Krigel
actively concealed information from the child’s father. Id. He also misrepresented the
father’s involvement in the child’s life and submitted two misleading documents to the
circuit court. Id. at 297-300. Krigel did not admit to any of the violations of the Rules of
Professional Conduct OCDC alleged against him. Id. at 298. The presumptive discipline
for Krigel was disbarment because his most egregious misconduct was lack of candor
toward the court. Id. at 301 (citing ABA Standard 6.11). This Court, however, determined
the appropriate discipline was a stayed suspension with two-year probation. Id. at 302.
Because he took responsibility for his ethical violations and his misrepresentations
to OCDC do not rise to the same level of misconduct as Krigel’s misrepresentations to the
circuit court, Agron asserts this Court should apply the same progressive discipline
approach to impose a lesser sanction than the presumptive discipline.
Krigel, however, was an anomaly and should not be relied upon as persuasive
authority for determining the appropriate discipline in a professional misconduct
proceeding. The misconduct in Krigel was egregious, and it is highly unlikely current
disciplinary norms could support the substantial deviation from the presumed discipline
imposed in that case. Moreover, the circumstances of this case do not merit the substantial
deviation from the presumed discipline imposed in Krigel.
This case also brings to the fore the deleterious consequences of attorneys using
illicit referral schemes. In In re Randolph, 347 S.W.2d 91,111 (Mo. banc 1961), this Court
14 disbarred an attorney for paying non-attorneys for client referrals and splitting resulting
fees with them. The Court stated that paying non-attorneys for referrals “lead[s] to many
evils.” Id. at 110. Paying for illicit referrals is “unfair to other members of the Bar” and
“tend[s] to degrade the legal profession and breed disrespect for the courts.” Id. Overall,
“solicitation of cases and splitting fees with [non-attorneys] are in all aspects detrimental
to the public interest.” Id. (emphasis added). Rule 4-9.1 establishes stringent guidelines
for attorneys and referral services in order to preserve the integrity of the legal profession
and, more importantly, protect the public. Agron’s payments to R.W. and NAC for
referrals constitute serious ethical violations and merit appropriate discipline.
The ABA Standards’ theoretical framework provides that all attorneys owe ethical
duties to the general public: “The community expects lawyers to exhibit the highest
standards of honesty and integrity, and lawyers have a duty to not engage in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, or interference with the administration of justice.”
After considering the facts, Agron’s violations, and all aggravating and mitigating
factors, this Court concludes that suspension is the appropriate discipline in this case.
Agron’s use of illicit referral services and attempts to mislead OCDC investigators and
avoid discipline are not sufficiently mitigated to warrant probation or a stayed suspension
with probation as he requests. As the DHP lay member’s dissent noted: Agron’s violations
of the Rules of Professional Conduct constitute a “serious error” warranting discipline
necessary to protect the public from his dishonesty. But Agron eventually confessed his
misdeeds, cooperated with OCDC, exhibited remorse, and made good faith efforts to
rectify his misconduct. These mitigating factors justify departing from disbarment.
15 Conclusion
To protect the public and the integrity of the legal profession, Agron is suspended
indefinitely from the practice of law with no leave to apply for reinstatement for 12 months.
W. Brent Powell, Judge
All concur.