In re T.M.

2024 Ohio 2479

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 28, 2024
• Docket: 30881
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re T.M., 2024-Ohio-2479.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT )

IN RE: T.M. C.A. No. 30881

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE No. DN 22 09 0833

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: June 28, 2024

HENSAL, Judge.

{¶1} Appellant, U.M. (“Mother”), appeals from a judgment of the Summit County Court

of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, that placed her minor child in the legal custody of the child’s

paternal grandparents (“Grandparents”). This Court affirms.

I.

{¶2} Mother is the biological mother of T.M., born April 24, 2012. The child’s father

expressed his agreement with Grandparents receiving legal custody and did not appeal from that

judgment. Although the trial court proceedings also involved a younger sibling of T.M., that child

is not a party to this appeal.

{¶3} Summit County Children Services Board (“CSB”) first became involved with the

family during June 2022, after receiving reports that Mother was staying with T.M. at a shelter and

was continually expressing paranoid and delusional thoughts about herself and the child, including

false beliefs that she and the child were being recorded and stalked by people trying to harm them 2

and that the child had been the victim of repeated sexual assaults and sex trafficking. After CSB

first received emergency temporary custody of T.M. during July 2022, it placed the child in a foster

home. Two months later, CSB placed T.M. in the home of Grandparents and she remained in their

home throughout this case.

{¶4} CSB dismissed its original complaint pertaining to T.M because the case did not

proceed to adjudication and disposition in a timely manner. By the time it filed a new complaint

on September 23, 2022, T.M. had been in the agency’s emergency temporary custody for more

than two months. During that period, Mother had a few visits with the child, which were closely

supervised by CSB because of concerns about the negative effects of Mother expressing irrational

and frightening thoughts to the child. CSB personnel who supervised the visits observed that

Mother was sometimes confrontational with T.M., that much of what she said to the child was

irrational, and that T.M. often remained quiet and appeared to be confused and uncomfortable

around Mother.

{¶5} During a visit on September 13, 2022, a CSB staff person who supervised the visit

observed Mother come into the visit angry and heard her repeatedly make statements to the child

that did not make sense because they were not based on anything that was happening in the room.

Also, for no apparent reason, Mother called T.M. a “liar” and a “traitor” and told T.M. that she

was not her mom anymore. T.M. attempted to get Mother to explain what she was talking about,

but eventually became so upset about Mother’s behavior that she asked to leave the visit. CSB

ended the visit after 30 minutes.

{¶6} Consequently, because of concerns that Mother was confusing and frightening

T.M. by continually expressing irrational thoughts, the trial court suspended Mother’s visits and

ordered that she would not be able to resume supervised visitation with T.M. until after the child 3

completed a trauma assessment and “the child’s therapist recommends that it is appropriate for the

child to have visitation with [Mother.]”

{¶7} T.M. completed a trauma assessment, during which she explained that she was

often afraid of Mother because she would express “weird ideas” and that T.M. would often agree

with Mother’s delusional thoughts because Mother would punish her if she did not. T.M. detailed

several situations during which Mother falsely insisted that T.M. had been sexually abused, that

T.M. was calling Mother names, and that T.M. had secretly video recorded Mother’s private parts

through the lights in the home. T.M. reported that Mother’s “paranoid” statements “made [her]

want to run away * * * [b]ut [she] had nowhere to go.”

{¶8} T.M. explained that when she voiced disagreement about the truthfulness of

Mother’s statements, Mother would physically punish her until T.M. agreed with Mother’s false

statements. Consequently, T.M. often “went along” with whatever Mother said just to “get out of

situations.” T.M. further disclosed that she felt “glad on the inside” when CSB removed her from

Mother’s custody. T.M.’s trauma assessment included diagnoses of post-traumatic stress disorder

and adjustment disorder with mixed disturbance of emotion and conduct. The assessment

recommended that the child engage in ongoing trauma therapy, which T.M. began shortly

afterward.

{¶9} The juvenile court adjudicated T.M. a dependent child, placed her in the temporary

custody of CSB, and adopted the case plan as an order of the court. The case plan goals for Mother

focused primarily on her addressing her unstable mental health, but Mother made minimal progress

on that reunification goal.

{¶10} Early in the case, Mother appeared for a psychological evaluation, but the

professional who was scheduled to evaluate her opined that Mother should not complete the testing 4

that day because she was expressing irrational thoughts, and her testing results would not be valid.

He believed that Mother might have been experiencing auditory hallucinations because she

insisted that others in the lobby were calling her names, but no one else was present in the lobby.

{¶11} Mother was evaluated by a psychiatrist, who diagnosed her with paranoid

personality disorder. The psychiatrist recommended that Mother take prescribed psychiatric

medication to control her delusional and paranoid thoughts, but Mother was not willing to take

medication. She insisted that she had no problems and did not need medication. Mother engaged

in counseling with a psychiatrist, but the psychiatrist opined that Mother made minimal progress

toward stabilizing her mental health because she needed psychiatric medication. Consequently,

Mother continued to express angry and delusional thoughts and exhibit irrational behavior

throughout this case.

{¶12} T.M. continued to reside with Grandparents and adjusted well to living there. On

March 3, 2023, CSB moved for T.M. to be placed in the legal custody of Grandparents. At the

final dispositional hearing, Father expressed his agreement with Grandparents receiving legal

custody and Mother alternatively requested that the trial court continue T.M. in CSB’s temporary

custody so she could have more time to work on the reunification goals of the case plan.

{¶13} Following the final dispositional hearing, the magistrate decided that T.M. should

be placed in the legal custody of Grandparents. Mother filed timely objections to the magistrate’s

decision, which were later overruled by the trial court. The trial court placed T.M. in the legal

custody of Grandparents. Mother appeals and raises two assignments of error, which this Court

will address together because they are closely related. 5

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO MOTHER’S PREJUDICE IN GRANTING LEGAL CUSTODY TO THIRD PARTIES WHEN THE COURT DID NOT PROPERLY CONSIDER THE STATUTORY FACTORS IN [SECTION] 2151.414(D) RELEVANT TO THE BEST INTERESTS FINDINGS REQUIRED FOR REMOVAL FROM MOTHER AND PLACEMENT OF THE CHILD WITH THIRD PARTIES.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO MOTHER’S PREJUDICE IN GRANTING LEGAL CUSTODY TO THIRD PARTIES WHEN THE DECISION WAS NOT SUPPORTED SUFFICIENTLY BY COMPETENT, CREDIBLE EVIDENCE GOING TO ALL OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CASE.

{¶14} Through her two assignments of error, Mother asserts that the trial court did not

fully consider the statutory best interest factors and that its legal custody decision was not

supported by the evidence presented at the hearing. On appeal, Mother does not articulate an

argument about why legal custody to Grandparents was not in the child’s best interest, nor does

she propose an alternative disposition for the child. Instead, she asserts that the trial court did not

have enough evidence before it to make an informed decision about the child’s best interest. This

Court’s review of the record reveals otherwise.

{¶15} An award of legal custody will not be reversed if the judgment is supported by a

preponderance of the evidence.

Preponderance of the evidence entails the greater weight of the evidence, evidence that is more probable, persuasive, and possesses greater probative value. In other words, when the best interest of a child is established by the greater weight of the evidence, the trial court does not have discretion to enter a judgment that is adverse to that interest. Thus, our standard of review is whether a legal custody decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

(Internal citations and quotations omitted.) In re M.F., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 15CA010823, 2016-

Ohio-2685, ¶ 7. 6

{¶16} In considering whether the juvenile court’s judgment is against the manifest weight

of the evidence, this Court “weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the

credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [finder

of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment]

must be reversed and a new [hearing] ordered.” (Internal quotations omitted.) Eastley v. Volkman,

132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 20. When weighing the evidence, this Court “must always

be mindful of the presumption in favor of the finder of fact.” Id. at ¶ 21.

{¶17} “Following an adjudication of neglect, dependency, or abuse, the juvenile court’s

determination of whether to place a child in the legal custody of a parent or a relative is based

solely on the best interest of the child.” In re K.H., 9th Dist. Summit No. 27952, 2016-Ohio-1330,

¶ 12. Despite Mother’s argument to the contrary, no specific test or set of criteria is set forth by

statute regarding an award of legal custody. Ohio courts agree, however, that the juvenile court

must base its decision to award legal custody on the best interest of the child. In re B.B., 9th Dist.

Lorain No. 15CA010880, 2016-Ohio-7994, ¶ 18, quoting In re N.P., 9th Dist. Summit No. 21707,

2004-Ohio-110, ¶ 23.

{¶18} The juvenile court is guided by the best interest factors enumerated in Revised Code

Section 2151.414(D) relating to permanent custody. In re B.G., 9th Dist. Summit No. 24187,

2008-Ohio-5003, ¶ 9, citing In re T.A., 9th Dist. Summit No. 22954, 2006-Ohio-4468, ¶ 17. Those

factors include the interaction and interrelationships of the child, the child’s wishes, the custodial

history of the child, and the child’s need for permanence. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(d); see also In

re B.C., 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 26976 and 26977, 2014-Ohio-2748, ¶ 16. Section

2151.414(D)(1)(e) also requires the trial court to consider whether any of the factors set forth in

Sections 2151.414(E)(7)-(11) apply to this case, but those factors are not relevant here. 7

{¶19} The juvenile court may also apply the best interest factors in Section 3109.04(F)(1).

In re K.A., 9th Dist. Lorain Nos. 15CA010850 and 15CA010860, 2017-Ohio-1, ¶ 17. While many

factors overlap with those set forth in Section 2151.414(D)(1), separate factors that are relevant in

this case are the child’s adjustment to their “home, school, and community[]” and the proposed

custodian’s likelihood to honor and facilitate visitation or parenting time. R.C.

3109.04(F)(1)(d),(f).

{¶20} At the final dispositional hearing, Mother did not dispute that she was not prepared

to provide T.M. with a stable home. She had not verified to CSB or the guardian ad litem that she

had stable housing or income and, more importantly, she had not stabilized her mental health. The

trial court emphasized that Mother’s testimony at the hearing “was difficult to follow” as it was

not responsive to the questions she was asked and was “not rooted in reality.” Moreover, although

Mother acknowledged that T.M. needed trauma counseling, she continued to express her belief

that something or someone else had traumatized her child. Mother failed to acknowledge any

responsibility for her child’s custodial situation in this case or the breakdown in their mother-

daughter relationship.

{¶21} On the other hand, the evidence about T.M.’s relationship with Grandparents was

entirely positive. Several witnesses testified that T.M. was comfortable and had adjusted well to

living in Grandparents’ home. Grandparents were meeting her needs and providing her with a safe

and stable home. During her trauma assessment, T.M. described living in Grandparents’ home as

“[g]reat” and “[a]wesome!” She described her close relationship with them and explained that she

had been living with Grandparents “[s]ince I was born.” Although the specific times frames are

not explained in the record, T.M. had lived with Grandparents off and on throughout her life and

maintained a close bond with them. 8

{¶22} The evidence before the trial court was not disputed that Grandparents had

demonstrated a willingness and ability to provide T.M. with a stable home throughout the child’s

life. T.M. and her parents lived with Grandparents when T.M. was first born because her parents

had nowhere else to live. Grandparents have always maintained a bedroom for T.M. in their home

and T.M. has lived with them for several months or years at a time, sometimes with Mother and/or

Father and sometimes without either parent. During a five to six-month period during 2021 and

2022, Mother left T.M. with Grandparents and told them that she was leaving the country.

Grandmother did not know whether Mother left the country or where she was during that extended

period.

{¶23} T.M.’s wishes were expressed by the guardian ad litem. T.M., who was 11 years

old at the time of the hearing, told him that she wanted to be placed in the legal custody of

Grandparents. The guardian ad litem reiterated the concerns of other witnesses that T.M. had

experienced a lot of trauma and instability in her relationship with Mother and needed time to

overcome her past trauma and to try to rebuild a relationship with Mother through counseling. He

agreed with the child’s expressed wishes that placement in the legal custody of Grandparents was

in the best interest of T.M.

{¶24} Finally, the trial court considered whether Grandparents would be likely to facilitate

visitation between Mother and T.M. Grandmother and Grandfather testified that they understood

that Mother would retain residual parental rights. Grandfather testified that he does not have a

good relationship with Mother, but that he would not withhold visits between Mother and T.M.

Grandmother testified that she would be willing to facilitate visits between Mother and T.M. but

that, until Mother stabilized her mental health, she believed that the visits should be supervised. 9

CSB, the guardian ad litem, and the trial court agreed that Mother’s visits with T.M. should be

supervised as long as her mental health remains unstable.

{¶25} Given the evidence presented at the final dispositional hearing, Mother has failed

to demonstrate that the trial court lost its way in determining that legal custody to Grandparents

was in the best interest of T.M. See Eastley at ¶ 20. Mother’s assignments of error are overruled.

III.

{¶26} Mother’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit County

Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 10

Costs taxed to Appellant.

JENNIFER HENSAL FOR THE COURT

CARR, P. J. CONCURS.

FLAGG LANZINGER, J. DISSENTING.

{¶27} I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because I would dismiss this appeal

for lack of a final, appealable order.

{¶28} Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(a) provides that a “magistrate’s decision is not effective unless

adopted by the court.” A juvenile court can enter judgement on the magistrate’s decision before

the time for filing objections has expired. Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(e)(i). When that occurs, the timely

filing of objections “shall operate as an automatic stay of execution of the judgment until the court

disposes of those objections and vacates, modifies, or adheres to the judgment previously entered.”

Id. When ruling on objections, the juvenile court “shall undertake an independent review as to the

objected matters to ascertain that the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and

appropriately applied the law.” Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(d).

{¶29} “In order for a judgment to be final and appealable, a trial court cannot merely adopt

a magistrate’s decision; it must enter its own judgment that sets forth ‘the outcome of the dispute

and the remedy provided.’” Miller v. McStay, 9th Dist. Summit No. 22918, 2006-Ohio-2282, ¶ 4,

quoting Harkai v. Scherba Industries, Inc., 136 Ohio App.3d 211, 218 (9th Dist. 2000); see In re

G.G., 9th Dist. Summit No. 29952, 2022-Ohio-1654, ¶ 9 (acknowledging that caselaw involving 11

Civ.R. 53(D) may be used when analyzing Juv.R. 40(D)). The trial court must do so in a manner

“such that the parties need not resort to any other document to ascertain the extent to which their

rights and obligations have been determined.” Miller at ¶ 4, quoting Reiter v. Reiter, 3d Dist.

Hancock No. 5-98-32, 1999 WL 378354, * 2 (May 11, 1999); Conrad v. Conrad, 9th Dist. Summit

No. 21394, 2003-Ohio-2712, ¶ 4, quoting In re Zakov, 107 Ohio App.3d 716, 717 (11th Dist.1995)

(“The trial court ‘must sufficiently address [the] issues so that the parties may know of their rights

and obligations by referring only to that document known as the judgment entry.’”). “Where ‘the

trial court’s filing improperly requires the parties to refer to and compare two separate documents

to understand their rights and obligations,’ the order is not final and appealable.” In re P.L.H., 2d

Dist. Greene No. 2020CA0019, 2020-Ohio-7029, ¶ 7, quoting Keeney v. Keeney, 2d Dist. Clark

No. 19-CA-0037, 2019-Ohio-4098, ¶ 5

{¶30} Here, the magistrate issued a decision that granted legal custody of T.M. to her

paternal grandparents. The magistrate’s decision also addressed Mother and Father’s residual

parenting rights. The juvenile court adopted the magistrate’s decision on the same day. Mother

then filed timely objections.

{¶31} The juvenile court’s judgment entry overruling Mother’s objections to the

magistrate’s decision does not dispose of all of the matters at issue between the parties “such that

the parties need not resort to any other document to ascertain the extent to which their rights and

obligations have been determined.” Miller at ¶ 4. The juvenile court’s judgment entry does not

mention Father, let alone set forth his residual parenting rights. Nor does it set forth Mother’s

visitations rights. To ascertain those rights, the parties would need to resort to the juvenile court’s

prior judgment entry that adopted the magistrate’s decision. While the juvenile court’s judgment

entry states that “[a]ll prior orders not inconsistent herein shall remain in full force and effect[,]” I 12

would conclude that a judgment entry that requires the parties to “refer to and compare two

separate documents to understand their rights and obligations” is not a final, appealable order. In

re P.L.H. at ¶ 7.

{¶32} Because the juvenile court’s judgment entry does not dispose of all of the matters

at issue between the parties, I would dismiss this appeal for lack of a final, appealable order. See

Miller at ¶ 4. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

APPEARANCES:

ALEXANDRA HULL, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

ELLIOT KOLKOVICH, Prosecuting Attorney, and C. RICHLEY RALEY, JR., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.