In re T.L.F.

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: June 17, 2014
• Docket: 14-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA14-23 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 17 June 2014

IN THE MATTER OF:

T.L.F. Wilkes County M.D.F. Nos. 12 JT 88-89

Appeal by respondent-mother by writ of certiorari from

order entered 26 September 2013 by Judge Michael D. Duncan in

Wilkes County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29

May 2014.

Paul W. Freeman, Jr., for petitioner-appellee Wilkes County Department of Social Services.

Mark Hayes, for respondent-appellant mother.

Ivey, McClellan, Gatton & Talcott, L.L.P., by Charles (Chuck) M. Ivey, IV, for guardian ad litem.

CALABRIA, Judge.

Respondent-mother (“respondent”) appeals by writ of

certiorari from the trial court’s order terminating her parental

rights to the juveniles T.L.F. and M.D.F. (collectively “the -2- juveniles”). The juveniles’ father is not a party to this

appeal. We affirm.

The Wilkes County Department of Social Services (“DSS”)

first became involved with the family after reports of domestic

violence and substance abuse. In July 2012, DSS filed juvenile

petitions alleging the juveniles were abused, neglected, and

dependent. The juveniles were adjudicated abused, neglected,

and dependent in February 2013. After a permanency planning

hearing, the trial court changed the juveniles’ permanent plan

from reunification to adoption.

In March 2013, DSS filed petitions to terminate

respondent’s parental rights to the juveniles. DSS alleged,

inter alia, that both children were neglected and that

respondent willfully abandoned them for at least six consecutive

months immediately preceding the filing of the petition. In

addition, respondent had committed a felony assault on another

child who resided in the home. See N.C. Gen. Stat. ' 7B-

1111(a)(1), (7)-(8) (2013). After a hearing, the trial court

entered an order concluding that grounds existed to terminate

respondent’s parental rights based on neglect, abandonment, and

felony assault on another child. The trial court determined -3- that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the

juveniles’ best interests. Respondent appeals.

On 6 February 2014, respondent filed a petition for writ of

certiorari, acknowledging defects in her notice of appeal. When

the record indicates that the parent desired to appeal and

cooperated with counsel’s efforts to give proper notice of

appeal, this Court may exercise its discretion and issue a writ

of certiorari to review orders terminating parental rights

pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 21(a)(1). In re I.T.P-L., 194 N.C.

App. 453, 460, 670 S.E.2d 282, 285 (2008), disc. review denied,

363 N.C. 581, 681 S.E.2d 783 (2009). Because it appears from

the record that respondent expressed her desire to appeal and

cooperated with counsel’s efforts to enter notice of appeal, we

allow respondent’s petition for writ of certiorari.

Respondent’s counsel has filed a no-merit brief pursuant to

North Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure 3.1(d) stating that,

after thoroughly reviewing the trial record and transcript, he

has concluded there is no meritorious argument on which to base

an appeal. He requests this Court conduct an independent

examination of the case. Counsel directs this Court’s attention

to potential issues regarding the trial court’s consideration of

the bond between the juveniles and their maternal grandmother as -4- well as the trial court’s consideration of the maternal

grandmother as a possible placement. However, counsel

ultimately concedes that “the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in terminating [respondent’s] parental rights.”

Respondent has not filed her own written arguments.

After reviewing the transcript and record, we are unable to

find any possible prejudicial error in the trial court’s order.

The trial court’s findings of fact support at least one ground

for termination, and the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in determining that termination is in the juveniles’

best interests. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-1110, 7B-1111 (2013).

Therefore, we affirm the order terminating respondent’s parental

rights.

Affirmed.

Judges STROUD and DAVIS concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).