Barnhill, J.
Mrs. Delia Zimmerman, one of tbe caveators, offered to relate a conversation with Mrs. Ball, tbe beneficiary. This alleged conversation took place in 1933, approximately four years after tbe will was executed. At tbe time of tbe trial Mrs. Ball was not living. Tbe evidence was excluded. It relates to proposed future conduct of Mrs. Ball and is of such slight and doubtful probative force we need not decide whether technically there is error in tbe ruling. In any event its exclusion was not prejudicial.
Lee v. Williams,
111 N. C., 200.
In seeking for any possible evidence of undue influence we bave given a somewhat extensive summary of tbe testimony in behalf of caveators. We bave considered excluded testimony without regard to its competency. Hence we need not discuss or decide other exceptions directed to alleged error in rulings upon tbe admissibility of testimony.
This brings us to tbe one decisive question presented on this appeal. Did tbe court err in charging tbe jury there was no evidence of undue influence ?
Considered in tbe light most favorable to caveators tbe testimony tends to show that at tbe time of and prior to tbe execution of tbe will in 1929 tbe testator suffered from chronic ailments, used narcotics, was mentally weak, and possessed a poor memory.
When there is proof, direct or circumstantial, of undue influence, then evidence of old age, mental and physical weakness is pertinent and material. It is admitted upon tbe theory that a person of that type or in that condition can be influenced with more ease than one of strong
mind and body. But evidence of mental or physical condition standing alone is not evidence of undue influence. It is merely evidence of a circumstance to be considered by the jury in connection with and as it may
lend
weight to
other
testimony. When caveators prove susceptibility to undue influence, they establish opportunity — a field fit for cultivation. This alone is not sufficient.
“The general rule established by the overwhelming weight of authority is that declarations of testator not made contemporaneously with the execution of the will, or so near thereto as to constitute a part of the
res gestos,
are not competent as direct or substantive evidence of the truth of the matters therein stated, when offered on the issue of undue influence inducing the execution of the will. If offered as direct or substantive evidence of an external fact, such as undue influence or fraud, statements of testator are mere hearsay, and are liable to all the objections to which mere declarations of third parties are subject. There must be proof of other facts and circumstances tending to prove circumvention or fraud in the procurement of the will, in order that declarations of the testator may be considered at all upon the issue of undue influence. And for the purpose of proving undue influence inducing the execution of a will, the testator’s declarations are of themselves without the least force.” Anno. 79 A. L. R., 1449.
While we have held, in apparent conflict with the general rule, that declarations of the testator which go to show testator believed the contents of his will to be different from what they are, or other circumstances which show that it is not his will, are competent whether made before or after the occurrence;
Reel v. Reel,
8 N. C., 248;
In re Fowler,
159 N. C., 203, 74 S. E., 117;
Linebarger v. Linebarger,
143 N. C., 229;
In re Craven,
169 N. C., 561, 86 S. E., 587; we have also held in
Graven’s case, supra,
that a statement made by the testator six or eight months before the date of execution of the paper writing was not of sufficient importance to make its exclusion the proper basis for a new trial.
In
Linebarger v. Linebarger, supra,
we said it would be “an exceedingly dangerous innovation upon the statute which requires a will to be executed according to the formalities prescribed, to permit it to be set aside upon mere declarations of the testator in regard to undue influence, unaccompanied by any act on the part of any person.”
So then with us the rule comes to this. Evidence of declarations of the testator which disclose his state of mind at the time of the execution of the paper writing or the circumstances under which it was executed, tending to show he did or did not act freely and voluntarily, is competent as substantive proof of undue influence.
In re Fowler, supra.
Other declarations, when relevant, may be admitted as corroborative or sup
porting evidence, but alone they are not sufficient to establish the fact at issue.
Lee v. Williams, supra.
See also
In re Shelton's Will,
143 N. C., 218;
In re Wellborn’s Will,
165 N. C., 636, 81 S. E., 1023;
In re Mueller’s Will,
170 N. C., 28, 86 S. E., 719;
In re Bailey,
180 N. C., 30, 103 S. E., 896.
We find in tbe record no testimony showing any acts on the part of the original propounder or any other person of undue influence. There are no declarations of the testator which show or give any indication of his state of mind at the time he executed the will or of the circumstances under which he signed the same. Hence the declarations made subsequent to the execution of the paper writing propounded have no probative force as substantive evidence of undue influence.
The testator left his property to the natural object of his bounty — his wife, with whom he had lived for more than forty years. Mrs. Ball was not the controlling agency in procuring the execution of the paper writing under which she took as sole beneficiary, and she did not draft or advise the terms of-the will, and the will was not in conflict with a previously expressed intention. Nor did it revoke a prior will of dif-ent tenor.
At the time of the execution of the paper writing, the testator was the “master of ceremonies.” He went freely about his business for fourteen years thereafter with every opportunity to reform it. He elected to permit it to remain as it was. Surely these circumstances have no tendency to show that he was being coerced, compelled or unduly influenced to execute a will that did'not express his then existing desire and purpose.
In re Will of Everett,
153 N. C., 83, 68 S. E., 924;
In re Mueller’s Will, supra.
There is evidence that the beneficiary was present at the time of the execution of the will, but she said nothing. Indeed all the other testimony tends to show that she did not know or understand the nature of the instrument being executed. For many years thereafter she was “importuning” the testator to make a will to such an extent that he said she “worried him to death” about it, when at the very time the will was in existence, devising the property as she wished. Her conduct in this respect repels the suggestion that theretofore she had contrived to induce and compel him to make disposition of his property contrary to his own wishes.
That she importuned him to make a will after the paper writing had been executed is not evidence of undue influence. He was afflicted and was growing old.
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Barnhill, J.
Mrs. Delia Zimmerman, one of tbe caveators, offered to relate a conversation with Mrs. Ball, tbe beneficiary. This alleged conversation took place in 1933, approximately four years after tbe will was executed. At tbe time of tbe trial Mrs. Ball was not living. Tbe evidence was excluded. It relates to proposed future conduct of Mrs. Ball and is of such slight and doubtful probative force we need not decide whether technically there is error in tbe ruling. In any event its exclusion was not prejudicial.
Lee v. Williams,
111 N. C., 200.
In seeking for any possible evidence of undue influence we bave given a somewhat extensive summary of tbe testimony in behalf of caveators. We bave considered excluded testimony without regard to its competency. Hence we need not discuss or decide other exceptions directed to alleged error in rulings upon tbe admissibility of testimony.
This brings us to tbe one decisive question presented on this appeal. Did tbe court err in charging tbe jury there was no evidence of undue influence ?
Considered in tbe light most favorable to caveators tbe testimony tends to show that at tbe time of and prior to tbe execution of tbe will in 1929 tbe testator suffered from chronic ailments, used narcotics, was mentally weak, and possessed a poor memory.
When there is proof, direct or circumstantial, of undue influence, then evidence of old age, mental and physical weakness is pertinent and material. It is admitted upon tbe theory that a person of that type or in that condition can be influenced with more ease than one of strong
mind and body. But evidence of mental or physical condition standing alone is not evidence of undue influence. It is merely evidence of a circumstance to be considered by the jury in connection with and as it may
lend
weight to
other
testimony. When caveators prove susceptibility to undue influence, they establish opportunity — a field fit for cultivation. This alone is not sufficient.
“The general rule established by the overwhelming weight of authority is that declarations of testator not made contemporaneously with the execution of the will, or so near thereto as to constitute a part of the
res gestos,
are not competent as direct or substantive evidence of the truth of the matters therein stated, when offered on the issue of undue influence inducing the execution of the will. If offered as direct or substantive evidence of an external fact, such as undue influence or fraud, statements of testator are mere hearsay, and are liable to all the objections to which mere declarations of third parties are subject. There must be proof of other facts and circumstances tending to prove circumvention or fraud in the procurement of the will, in order that declarations of the testator may be considered at all upon the issue of undue influence. And for the purpose of proving undue influence inducing the execution of a will, the testator’s declarations are of themselves without the least force.” Anno. 79 A. L. R., 1449.
While we have held, in apparent conflict with the general rule, that declarations of the testator which go to show testator believed the contents of his will to be different from what they are, or other circumstances which show that it is not his will, are competent whether made before or after the occurrence;
Reel v. Reel,
8 N. C., 248;
In re Fowler,
159 N. C., 203, 74 S. E., 117;
Linebarger v. Linebarger,
143 N. C., 229;
In re Craven,
169 N. C., 561, 86 S. E., 587; we have also held in
Graven’s case, supra,
that a statement made by the testator six or eight months before the date of execution of the paper writing was not of sufficient importance to make its exclusion the proper basis for a new trial.
In
Linebarger v. Linebarger, supra,
we said it would be “an exceedingly dangerous innovation upon the statute which requires a will to be executed according to the formalities prescribed, to permit it to be set aside upon mere declarations of the testator in regard to undue influence, unaccompanied by any act on the part of any person.”
So then with us the rule comes to this. Evidence of declarations of the testator which disclose his state of mind at the time of the execution of the paper writing or the circumstances under which it was executed, tending to show he did or did not act freely and voluntarily, is competent as substantive proof of undue influence.
In re Fowler, supra.
Other declarations, when relevant, may be admitted as corroborative or sup
porting evidence, but alone they are not sufficient to establish the fact at issue.
Lee v. Williams, supra.
See also
In re Shelton's Will,
143 N. C., 218;
In re Wellborn’s Will,
165 N. C., 636, 81 S. E., 1023;
In re Mueller’s Will,
170 N. C., 28, 86 S. E., 719;
In re Bailey,
180 N. C., 30, 103 S. E., 896.
We find in tbe record no testimony showing any acts on the part of the original propounder or any other person of undue influence. There are no declarations of the testator which show or give any indication of his state of mind at the time he executed the will or of the circumstances under which he signed the same. Hence the declarations made subsequent to the execution of the paper writing propounded have no probative force as substantive evidence of undue influence.
The testator left his property to the natural object of his bounty — his wife, with whom he had lived for more than forty years. Mrs. Ball was not the controlling agency in procuring the execution of the paper writing under which she took as sole beneficiary, and she did not draft or advise the terms of-the will, and the will was not in conflict with a previously expressed intention. Nor did it revoke a prior will of dif-ent tenor.
At the time of the execution of the paper writing, the testator was the “master of ceremonies.” He went freely about his business for fourteen years thereafter with every opportunity to reform it. He elected to permit it to remain as it was. Surely these circumstances have no tendency to show that he was being coerced, compelled or unduly influenced to execute a will that did'not express his then existing desire and purpose.
In re Will of Everett,
153 N. C., 83, 68 S. E., 924;
In re Mueller’s Will, supra.
There is evidence that the beneficiary was present at the time of the execution of the will, but she said nothing. Indeed all the other testimony tends to show that she did not know or understand the nature of the instrument being executed. For many years thereafter she was “importuning” the testator to make a will to such an extent that he said she “worried him to death” about it, when at the very time the will was in existence, devising the property as she wished. Her conduct in this respect repels the suggestion that theretofore she had contrived to induce and compel him to make disposition of his property contrary to his own wishes.
That she importuned him to make a will after the paper writing had been executed is not evidence of undue influence. He was afflicted and was growing old. It was natural that she should be concerned about her own welfare after he was gone. That she was persistent in her discussion of this vital problem was not unnatural. Aside from the fact the importuning occurred after the will was executed, it falls short of proof of coercion.
Nor is the fact testator gave bis property to the childless wife of his bosom to the exclusion of his sister and his nephews and nieces evidence of undue influence.
In re Peterson,
136 N. C., 13 (27) ;
In re Will of Cooper,
166 N. C., 210, 81 S. E., 161;
In re Broach’s Will,
172 N. C., 520, 90 S. E., 681.
The evidence relied on is confined almost entirely to acts, conduct, and declarations subsequent to the execution of the will. No part of it tends to show that the testator acted contrary to his then existing desire or to establish any fraudulent influence uf the beneficiary controlling the mind of the testator so as to induce him to make a will which otherwise he would not have made. Hence the charge of the court is sustained by the record.
In re Will of Harris,
218 N. C., 459, 11 S. E. (2d), 310;
In re Will of Evans,
223 N. C., 206, 25 S. E. (2d), 556.
In the trial below we find
No error.