Original Proceeding Pursuant to C.A.R. 21 El Paso County
District Court Case Nos. 23JD115, 23JD126, 23JD132, 23JD222,
23JD238, 23JD722 & 23JD726 Honorable Linda M. Billings
Vela, Judge Honorable Diana May, Judge
Order
Discharged
Attorneys for the People of the State of Colorado: Michael J.
Allen, District Attorney, Fourth Judicial District Rachael
Powell, Chief Deputy District Attorney Tanya A. Karimi,
Deputy District Attorney Colorado Springs, Colorado
Attorneys for J.D.: Megan A. Ring, Public Defender Amanda G.
Candileri, Deputy Public Defender Colorado Springs, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent El Paso County District Court:
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General Joseph A. Peters, Senior
Assistant Attorney General Denver, Colorado
2
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Department of Human
Services: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Ann H. Pogue,
First Assistant Attorney General Sarah Richelson, Second
Assistant Attorney General Denver, Colorado
JUSTICE BOATRIGHT delivered the Opinion of the Court, in
which CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE HART, and JUSTICE
SAMOUR joined.
3
OPINION
BOATRIGHT JUSTICE
¶1
In this original proceeding, we consider whether the
Department of Human services ("Department") had the
authority to reevaluate the competency of J.D., a juvenile
defendant. J.D. argues that the juvenile court should not
have accepted and relied upon the Department's
restoration evaluation because the Department lacked the
authority to complete such an evaluation absent a court order
under section 19-2.5-704(2)(c), C.R.S. (2024). The People and
the district court[1] argue that evaluating competency is part
of providing restoration services and, therefore, a separate
court order to conduct such an evaluation is unnecessary.
¶2
We agree with the People and the district court. Section
19-2.5-704(2)(b) expressly designates the Department as
"the entity responsible for the oversight of restoration
education and coordination of services necessary to
competency restoration." Applying the plain language of
the statute, we hold that restoration evaluations are
included in "services necessary to competency
restoration." Hence, the Department may conduct such
evaluations without a court order under subsection (2)(c).
Because the Department's restoration evaluation was
proper, we discharge the order to show cause.
4
I.
Facts and Procedural History
¶3
J.D. faces a series of charges across multiple cases. After
receiving his initial charges, J.D. filed a motion
challenging his competency to proceed, and the juvenile court
ordered the Department to complete an in-custody competency
evaluation. Following this evaluation, the court found that
J.D. was incompetent but restorable and ordered outpatient
restoration services. The following month, the People again
charged J.D. with committing several delinquent acts. The
court extended its finding of incompetency to all seven cases
and ordered the Department to oversee and coordinate
inpatient restoration services. The order further required
the Department to periodically provide the court with status
reports, including documentation of the restoration services
provided, J.D.'s participation in those services, and his
progress toward competency.
¶4
Six months later, at the Department's request, J.D. met
with a Department evaluator to reassess his competency. After
that evaluation, the Department concluded that J.D. had been
restored to competency and reported its finding to the court.
In response, J.D. moved to strike the Department's
report, arguing that the Department lacked the authority to
evaluate his competency without a court order under section
19-2.5-704(2)(c).
¶5
The juvenile court denied J.D.'s motion, finding that the
Department had the authority to conduct a restoration
evaluation on its own initiative under
5
subsection (2)(b) because "[a] restoration evaluation,
by its very nature, is a service necessary to competency
restoration." The court reasoned that although
subsection (2)(c) permits the court to order a
restoration evaluation, that subsection "in no way
limits the ability of the Department to conduct an evaluation
of its own volition if and when it deems such an evaluation
to be appropriate during the course of restoration
treatment." After holding a hearing, and considering the
Department's report, the court found that J.D. had been
restored to competency.
¶6
J.D. then petitioned this court for relief under C.A.R. 21,
arguing that restoration evaluations are not services
necessary to competency restoration; meaning, the Department
lacked the authority to conduct such an evaluation of J.D.
absent a court order under subsection (2)(c). We issued an
order to show cause.
II.
Original Jurisdiction
¶7
Original relief under C.A.R. 21 is an extraordinary remedy
and appropriate only where no other adequate remedy is
available. C.A.R. 21(a)(2). Under such circumstances, we will
generally elect to exercise our original jurisdiction if the
petition raises an issue of first impression that is of
significant public importance. Young v. Hodges, 2014
CO 1, ¶ 7, 318 P.3d 458, 460.
¶8
The exercise of our original jurisdiction is warranted in
this case because there is no other adequate remedy available
to J.D. The normal appellate process
6
is inadequate because the harm resulting from an erroneous
finding of competency necessarily occurs at the time of such
finding, regardless of any ruling on appeal. See,
e.g., In re People in Int. of A.T.C., 2023 CO
19, ¶ 10, 528 P.3d 168, 171 (invoking our original
jurisdiction when there was a risk that the juvenile would be
forced to proceed while incompetent); § 19-2.5-702(2),
C.R.S. (2024) ("A juvenile must not be tried or
sentenced if the juvenile is incompetent to proceed.").
¶9
Furthermore, this case presents an issue of first impression
that is of significant public importance. We have not yet
determined whether a "restoration evaluation" is
included in "restoration services"[2]-a term undefined
by Colorado statute-and thus within the discretion of the
Department under section 19-2.5-704(2)(b). The issue raised
has ramifications for juveniles throughout the state who are
subjected to competency procedures. For these reasons, we
elect to resolve this issue now.
III.
Analysis
¶10
We begin by discussing the applicable standard of review and
the rules of statutory construction. We then turn to the
statutory framework for juvenile competency proceedings and,
applying the plain language of the statute, we hold
7
that restoration evaluations are included in "services
necessary to competency restoration," meaning that the
Department may conduct such evaluations without a court order
under section 19-2.5-704(2)(c). Accordingly, we conclude that
the juvenile court properly accepted and considered the
Department's evaluation in finding J.D. to be restored to
competency. We therefore discharge the order to show cause.
A.
Standard of Review and Rules of Statutory Construction
¶11
Whether the Department has discretion to conduct a
restoration evaluation on its own initiative turns on our
interpretation of section 19-2.5-704, which sets forth the
procedures following an initial finding of competency or
incompetency. Statutory interpretation is a question of law,
which we review de novo. People v. Iannicelli, 2019
CO 80, ¶ 19, 449 P.3d 387, 391. In construing a statute,
our principal purpose is to determine and give effect to the
intent of the legislature. Id. We begin this inquiry
by looking to the language of the statute, giving its words
and phrases their plain and ordinary meanings. Id.
¶12
In doing so, we seek "to effectuate the purpose of the
legislative scheme," considering the statute as a whole
and "giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect
to all of its parts." Id. at ¶ 20, 449
P.3d at 391. We avoid interpretations that would lead to
illogical or absurd results. Id.
8
¶13
Where the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need look no
further. Carrera v. People, 2019 CO 83, ¶ 18,
449 P.3d 725, 729. We apply the language of the statute as
written, and our inquiry ends. Martinez v. People,
2020 CO 3, ¶ 9, 455 P.3d 752, 755.
B.
Substance of the Juvenile Competency Statute
¶14
Colorado's juvenile competency statute establishes a
juvenile-specific definition of incompetency to proceed that
focuses on the juvenile's understanding of the legal
process and ability to meaningfully consult with their
attorney. § 19-2.5-701.5(5), C.R.S. (2024). Juveniles
who are found incompetent to proceed may not be tried or
sentenced. § 19-2.5-702(2). When the issue of competency
is first raised, the court makes a preliminary finding of
competence or incompetence. § 19-2.5-703(1), C.R.S.
(2024).
¶15
If the court "feels that the information available to it
is inadequate for making such a finding," id.,
it must order a competency evaluation, which includes an
opinion as to whether the juvenile is competent or
incompetent to proceed, § 19-2.5-703(4)(c). If the
juvenile is deemed incompetent, then the competency
evaluation must include a recommendation as to whether there
is a likelihood that the juvenile may be restored to
competency. Id. The competency evaluation may also
identify appropriate services to accomplish restoration.
Id.
9
¶16
Section 19-2.5-704 establishes the procedures applicable
after a juvenile's initial competency status has been
determined. Section 19-2.5-704(2) applies if the court finds
that the juvenile is incompetent but restorable. In that
scenario, subsection (2)(a) directs the court to stay the
proceedings, order restoration services, and hold regular
progress review hearings. § 19-2.5-704(2)(a). Subsection
(2)(b) then specifies that the Department is responsible for
"the oversight of restoration education and coordination
of services necessary to competency restoration." §
19-2.5-704(2)(b). Finally, subsection (2)(c) provides that
the court or a party may raise the need for a restoration
evaluation of a juvenile's competency. §
19-2.5-704(2)(c). Once the issue is raised, the court must
order such evaluation when three factors are met:
[(1)] there is credible information that the juvenile's
circumstances have changed, [(2)] the court cannot fairly
determine whether the juvenile has been restored to
competency or will be able to be restored to competency in
the reasonably foreseeable future, and [(3)] the cause for a
restoration evaluation outweighs the negative impact of a
restoration evaluation upon the juvenile and any delay that
will be caused by a restoration evaluation.
Id.
¶17
The court may, when appropriate, order a hearing to determine
whether a juvenile has been restored to competency, or it may
make such determination during a routine review hearing.
§§ 19-2.5-705 to -706(1), C.R.S. (2024). A
10
mandatory restoration hearing is triggered, however, when
there has been a report filed by a qualified competency
evaluator. § 19-2.5-705(1), C.R.S. (2024).
¶18
When the court finds that the juvenile has been restored to
competency, it resumes or recommences proceedings. §
19-2.5-706(1), C.R.S. (2024).
C. The
Plain Language of Section 19-2.5-704 Authorizes the
Department to Perform Competency Evaluations
¶19
The key statute here is section 19-2.5-704, which governs
when the court deems a juvenile incompetent but restorable.
Specifically, the issue involves the interplay between
subsections (2)(b) and (2)(c). Section 19-2.5-704(2)(b)
provides that "the department is the entity responsible
for the oversight of restoration education and coordination
of services necessary to competency
restoration,"[3]while subsection (2)(c) sets forth the
framework for court-ordered restoration evaluations.
¶20
The legislature did not define "services necessary to
competency restoration" or "restoration
services." J.D. argues that these services do not
include restoration evaluations, meaning that section
19-2.5-704(2)(b) does not give the Department the authority
to conduct such evaluations. Instead, he contends that the
Department may only perform a restoration evaluation if a
court
11
orders it to do so under section 19-2.5-704(2)(c), which
requires the court to make several findings before ordering a
restoration evaluation and provides for the possibility of a
hearing on the subject.
¶21
In support of his contention, J.D. notes that the legislature
elected not to define "restoration services," but
it did define "restoration evaluation."
See § 19-2.5-701.5(6). Moreover, while the
definition of restoration evaluation refers to
"court-ordered evaluations," it does not mention
restoration services. See id. J.D. further notes
that the definition of "restoration progress review
hearing" does reference examples of
"restoration to competency education and other
applicable services," yet fails to list restoration
evaluations. See § 19-2.5-701.5(7). He thus
contends that the legislature purposefully distinguished
between restoration services and restoration evaluations.
Finally, J.D. relies on the general statutory scheme for
support, positing that restoration services result
from the findings of the initial court-ordered competency
evaluation and do not include the competency evaluation
itself.
¶22
J.D.'s argument hinges largely on his claim that nothing
in the juvenile competency statute affirmatively provides for
the Department to conduct a restoration evaluation beyond the
procedure laid out in section 19-2.5-704(2)(c). Yet section
19-2.5-704(2)(b) expressly delegates to the Department
"oversight" of restoration education and
"coordination" of competency restoration services.
12
Integral to this mandate is continuous monitoring and
adjustment so as to appropriately tailor restoration
education and other treatment to the juvenile-in other words,
evaluating their progress toward restoration.
Indeed, we have previously acknowledged that competency
evaluations have both diagnostic and treatment purposes.
Zapata v. People, 2018 CO 82, ¶ 36, 428 P.3d
517, 525.
¶23
Contrary to J.D.'s position, the definition of
"[r]estoration evaluation"-"an evaluation
conducted by a competency evaluator to determine if the
juvenile has become competent to proceed or will be able to
be restored to competency in the reasonably foreseeable
future," § 19-2.5-701.5(6)-bolsters our reading
that restoration services include such evaluations. By
J.D.'s own admission, a restoration evaluation is a means
by which to assess a juvenile's progress toward
competency and to acquire new insights as to the prognosis
for restoration. For the Department to effectively coordinate
services designed to restore the juvenile to competency-i.e.,
to provide restoration services-it must be able to monitor
13
the evolution of the juvenile's competency status.
Restoration evaluations, by their very definition, provide a
mechanism for doing so.[4]
¶24
In assigning the Department responsibility over restoration
services, the legislature intended that the Department be
able to independently and continuously evaluate juveniles
receiving such services in its care. A juvenile's
competency status is not static-as demonstrated in a finding
of incompetent but restorable. In fact, the statute
explicitly provides for additional evaluation and progress
review throughout the course of restoration services.
See § 19-2.5-704(2)(a) (requiring courts to
periodically hold "restoration progress review
hearing[s]" following an order for restoration
services). For a court to meaningfully review a
juvenile's progress toward restoration, it must be
informed of the juvenile's current competency status. And
for the Department to provide such information, it must be
able to evaluate the juvenile's competency.
14
¶25
Moreover, section 19-2.5-704(2)(a) requires that the
provision of restoration services "occur in a timely
manner." To require the Department to seek a court order
every time it sought to evaluate a juvenile's progress
toward restoration would frustrate this legislative
directive.
¶26
Finally, section 19-2.5-705(1) requires the court to order a
restoration to competency hearing when a competency evaluator
"files a report certifying that the juvenile is
competent to proceed." Common sense dictates that any
such report would inform the court of the juvenile's
current competency status-information gleaned through a
restoration evaluation. Yet, the statute does not require a
court order before filing such a report, suggesting that the
Department may conduct evaluations absent a court
order.[5]
¶27
Accordingly, we conclude that the Department's
responsibility to provide restoration services under
section 19-2.5-704(2)(b) necessarily includes the authority
to perform restoration evaluations.
15
IV.
Application
¶28
Here, the Department conducted an evaluation reassessing
J.D.'s competency and filed a report with the court
opining that he was competent to proceed, which J.D.
subsequently moved to strike from the record. The juvenile
court found that the Department's statutory obligation to
provide restoration services allowed it to reevaluate
J.D.'s competency, and it thus denied the motion to
strike. The juvenile court then held a hearing and, based on
the Department's report, made a finding of competency.
¶29
Because we hold that restoration evaluations are included in
"services necessary to competency restoration,"
section 19-2.5-704(2)(b) permits the Department to conduct
such evaluations on its own initiative. Thus, the juvenile
court properly denied the motion to strike and properly found
that J.D. had been restored to competency.
V.
Conclusion
¶30
For the foregoing reasons, we discharge the order to show
cause.
JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER concurred in the judgment.
JUSTICE GABRIEL, joined by JUSTICE HOOD, dissented.
16
JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, concurring in the judgment.
¶31
I agree with the dissent that the Colorado Department of
Human Services ("the Department") lacks the
authority to conduct a restoration evaluation absent a court
order that explicitly allows it to do so. Specifically, I
agree that the plain meaning of "restoration
evaluation," a term that is defined by section
19-2.5-701.5(6), C.R.S. (2024), does not include
"restoration services." Dis. op. ¶ 25.
Instead, section 19-2.5-701.5(6) explicitly defines a
"[r]estoration evaluation" as a "court-ordered
evaluation[]."
¶32
Nonetheless, the majority concludes that the Department is
authorized to conduct restoration evaluations because they
are helpful in determining a juvenile's progress toward
competency. I am not persuaded. The question presented here
is one of legal authority, not helpfulness. And it is the
court, subject to the important guardrails I describe
below-not the Department-that the General Assembly entrusted
with this authority.
¶33
I additionally agree with the dissent that the plain meaning
of section 19-2.5-704(2)(c), C.R.S. (2024), comports with the
overarching scheme of the juvenile competency statutes, which
vests the juvenile court and the Department with very
different responsibilities. Dis. op. ¶ 31. As we
observed in People in Interest of A.C., 2022 CO 49,
¶ 13, 517 P.3d 1228, 1234, these statutes require
juvenile judges to actively manage juvenile competency
matters. To that
17
end, as the dissent explains, Dis. op. ¶ 31, it is the
court that is authorized to order competency evaluations,
§ 19-2.5-703(1), C.R.S. (2024); to decide how competency
evaluations are to be conducted, § 19-2.5-703(4)(a); to
explain what specific restoration services are to be
provided, § 19-2.5-704(2)(a); to order restoration
evaluations, § 19-2.5-704(2)(c); and to hold restoration
to competency hearings, § 19-2.5-705(1), C.R.S. (2024).
¶34
The General Assembly also charged juvenile courts with
ensuring the restoration process proceeds apace by holding
restoration progress review hearings every thirty-five days
if the juvenile is in custody and every ninety days if they
are not. § 19-2.5-704(2)(a). Additionally, the court is
charged with considering whether the restoration services are
being provided in the least restrictive environment possible.
Id. And, of course, it is the court that ultimately
decides if a juvenile has been restored to competency.
¶35
The Department's role when it comes to juvenile
competency restoration, while extremely important, is far
more limited. As noted, it is tasked with overseeing the
restoration education ordered by the court and coordinating
the services necessary for competency restoration. §
19-2.5-704(2)(b). Additionally, the Department may be
required to file regular reports regarding the provision of
those services with the court. These reports are essential to
the court's ability to
18
exercise its oversight responsibilities with respect to
juveniles whom the court has determined can be restored to
competency.
¶36
When the legislature amended the juvenile competency statute
in 2023 to add section 19-2.5-704(2)(c), it made explicit the
juvenile court's authority to order restoration
evaluations. The legislature did this in response to this
court's decision in People in Interest of
B.B.A.M., 2019 CO 103, 453 P.3d 1161, and Chief Justice
Boatright's concurrence, joined by Justice Hart, in
A.C. [1] The concurrence urged the
legislature to clarify the juvenile competency statutes by
making the juvenile court's authority to order
restoration evaluations and second evaluations explicit.
A.C., ¶¶ 37-38, 517 P.3d at 1238
(Boatright, C.J., specially concurring). Importantly,
however, the legislature imposed significant guardrails on
that
19
authority: It adopted a balancing test that expressly
requires the court to consider the negative impact of any
restoration evaluation requested before authorizing the
Department to conduct the evaluation. To that end, the court
shall order a restoration evaluation only if it is satisfied
that
there is credible information that the juvenile's
circumstances have changed, the court cannot fairly determine
whether the juvenile has been restored to competency or will
be able to be restored to competency in the reasonably
foreseeable future, and the cause for a restoration
evaluation outweighs the negative impact of a restoration
evaluation upon the juvenile and any delay that will be
caused by a restoration evaluation.
§ 19-2.5-704(2)(c) (emphasis added).
¶37
One problem with the majority opinion is that it fails to
account for the General Assembly's explicit direction
that the juvenile court consider the potential negative
impact of each and every restoration evaluation on each and
every juvenile involved in the restoration process. In the
Department's and the majority's telling, restoration
evaluations are nothing more than a harmless tool to assess a
juvenile's progress toward restoration. This view is at
odds with the General Assembly's direction. Even more
problematic, by emphasizing these evaluations as a tool to
assess progress, the Department and the majority suggest that
it would be proper for juveniles to be routinely subjected to
repeated evaluations without any consideration of their
potential negative impact or oversight by the court.
20
¶38
The majority's view aligns with the Department's
sweeping and ill-founded assertion in its amicus brief that
"the negative impact of a restoration evaluation is
minimal." Brief for the Colorado Department of Human
Services as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, at 8, In
Re People in Int. of J.D., No. 24SA193 (2024).
This statement reflects an alarming disregard, in my view, of
the General Assembly's unambiguous direction: The
negative impact, if any, of a restoration evaluation must be
considered in every instance on a case-by-case basis. The
Department's suggestion that the negative impact of a
restoration evaluation is always minimal calls into question
whether it fully understands the purpose of section
19-2.5-704(2)(c) and illuminates the wisdom of the General
Assembly's approach.
¶39
Let me be clear, I have no doubt that restoration evaluations
are a helpful tool in many situations, especially in those
cases involving juveniles who require medication, rather than
a basic civics education, to be restored. A.C.,
¶¶ 18-20, 517 P.3d at 1235. And I acknowledge that
in the face of an objection, it will take time to allow the
parties and the Department to weigh in based on the section
19-2.5-704(2)(c) balancing test. But concerns about
efficiency in a vacuum miss the mark: When it comes to
restoration evaluations, a court must apply the balancing
test, which considers, among other things, the impact of the
evaluation on the juvenile-not the Department's
convenience.
21
¶40
I do not know how to square the majority's expansive view
of the Department's authority, which seems to have no
limits, with the very specific limits the General Assembly
imposed in section 19-2.5-704(2)(c). It is utterly illogical,
in my view, to conclude that the General Assembly charged
juvenile courts with applying this balancing test but placed
absolutely no guardrails on the Department to protect
juveniles from the potential negative impact of repeated
evaluations by the Department. Put more simply, I do not read
these statutes to suggest that the legislature intended the
Department to be the only check on the Department.
¶41
We need not, in my view, consider the legislative history of
section 19-2.5-704(2)(c) as its meaning is obvious. A review
of that history is, nonetheless, illuminating, given the
testimony describing the balancing test in section
19-2.5-704(2)(c) as establishing guardrails for when
restoration evaluations may occur. Hearing on H.B. 1012
before the H. Judiciary Comm., 74th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess.
(Jan. 24, 2023) (Mr. James Karbach, legislative liaison for
the Office of the State Public Defender, testified that
"this law brings clarity in defining [restoration
evaluations], explains what they are much better, . . . has a
balancing test for when they should be reordered, and allows
a party to weigh whether or not harm will come to the child
and whether or not enough has changed to really warrant use
of that resource.") (Ms. Katie Hecker, an attorney from
the Office of
22
the Child's Representative and a member of the advisory
task force that drafted H.B. 1012, testified that first among
the bill's benefits was that "as written, it
establishes guardrails around when invasive reevaluations can
occur.").
¶42
But what about section 19-2.5-704(2)(b), the provision the
majority leans on to conclude that the Department has the
authority to conduct restoration evaluations without a court
order? Notably, it has remained substantively unchanged since
2017. See § 19-2-1303(2), C.R.S. (2017) (This
statute was relocated in 2021 to section 19-2.5-704(2)(b).
See Ch. 136, sec. 2, § 19-2.5-704(2)(b), 2021
Colo. Sess. Laws 557, 613.). And while the Department now
takes the position in its amicus brief that a restoration
evaluation is a restoration service, this is a significant
pivot from its position in 2022 in A.C. The
litigation in A.C. arose after the Department
asserted that it could not opine about restoration to
competency or progress toward such restoration unless the
court ordered an evaluation to determine if the
juvenile, A.C., had been restored to competency. ¶ 4,
517 P.3d at 1232. If section 19-2.5-704(2)(b) allows the
Department to conduct restoration evaluations as part of its
provision of restoration services, why did it ask the court
for an order allowing it to do so? The Department's
argument in this case conflicts with the interpretation of
section 19-2.5-704(2)(b) that it advanced as recently as
2022.
23
¶43
This is all to say that I agree with the dissent that the
juvenile court erred and that the Department lacks the
authority to conduct a restoration evaluation absent a court
order that explicitly allows it to do so.
¶44
I write separately to concur in the judgment because I do not
believe the appropriate remedy when the Department conducts a
restoration evaluation without first obtaining a court order
is to automatically strike the restoration evaluation. I
share the dissent's concern in the sense that an
unauthorized restoration evaluation is a bell that cannot be
unrung. Having said that, the balancing test set out in
section 19-2.5-704(2)(c) is a benefit conferred by statute;
it is not a constitutional right. And to my mind, if a
restoration evaluation is mistakenly conducted, and the
juvenile objects and asks the court to strike the evaluation,
the best recourse is to have the juvenile court apply the
balancing test after the fact.
¶45
If the court determines, after hearing from the parties and
the Department, that it would-on balance-have allowed the
evaluation, the court should deny the motion to strike the
evaluation. If the court determines, after hearing from the
parties and the Department, that it would not-on balance-have
allowed the evaluation, then it should grant the motion to
strike. This approach most closely honors the concerns
expressed by the General Assembly, tailors the consequences
of a mistaken evaluation to the facts of the case, and
recognizes that the juvenile
24
court is in the best position to make this determination. It
also allows the juvenile court to consider if the challenged
restoration evaluation was a mistake or part of a larger
pattern of conduct that requires a different kind of
remedy.[2]
¶46
It is true here that J.D. did not have the benefit of the
court contemporaneously applying the balancing test set out
in section 19-2.5-704(2)(c). And even though, to my way of
thinking, the juvenile court erred in its analysis, the
evaluation's automatic exclusion would serve no deterrent
purpose in this particular case. Thus, I would remand the
case to the juvenile court to apply the balancing test in the
manner described above. Of course, all this seems fairly
25
academic since the restoration evaluation at issue here was
completed more than a year ago, and thus, even if it is not
stricken, it is decidedly stale.
¶47
For these reasons, even though I agree with the dissent that
the Department does not have the authority to conduct
restoration evaluations absent a court order, I respectfully
concur in the judgment.
26
JUSTICE GABRIEL, joined by JUSTICE HOOD, dissenting.
¶48
The majority concludes that section 19-2.5-704(2)(c), C.R.S.
(2024), which governs the restoration of juvenile defendants
to competency, authorizes the Colorado Department of Human
Services ("the Department") to perform restoration
evaluations of juveniles without first obtaining leave of the
court. Maj. op. ¶¶ 2, 10, 29.
¶49
Because I believe that the statute plainly requires a court
order before the Department may perform such evaluations, I
would conclude that the restoration evaluation that the
Department conducted here was unauthorized and should be
stricken.
¶50
I would therefore make our rule to show cause absolute.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I.
Facts and Procedural History
¶51
The facts that are relevant to my analysis are undisputed.
¶52
The People charged J.D. with a number of counts across
several docketed cases. In May 2023, defense counsel filed a
motion requesting a competency evaluation, and the court
ordered the Department to perform that evaluation.
¶53
Dr. John Edwards subsequently performed the evaluation on
behalf of the Department, and his evaluation was filed with
the court in July 2023. In this evaluation, Dr. Edwards
opined that J.D. was incompetent to proceed but that "it
27
[was] conceivable that he will be restored to competence
within the foreseeable future." The court so found and
ordered that the Department (1) oversee and coordinate
restoration services for J.D.; and (2) provide to the court,
at regular intervals, documentation of the restoration
services provided and of J.D.'s participation in those
services.
¶54
The People subsequently charged J.D. in two new cases, and in
September 2023, the court granted a defense motion to extend
to those cases the court's prior finding that J.D. was
incompetent to proceed but restorable to competence. At about
the same time, the court ordered that (1) J.D. receive
inpatient restoration services; (2) the Department continue
to oversee and coordinate such services; and (3) the
Department provide treatment summaries before each review
hearing, which would occur every thirty-five days thereafter
as required by section 19-2.5-704(2)(a). The court also
appointed a court liaison to assist the court in completing
the process relating to J.D.'s competency evaluation and
restoration to competency.
¶55
Between December 2023 and February 2024, the court held two
review hearings and received three reports from the
Department. The Department did not recommend at either of
these hearings or in any of its reports that J.D. receive a
restoration evaluation, nor did it inform the court that it
planned to conduct a restoration evaluation, and the court
never ordered one.
28
¶56
On March 15, 2024, without notice to the court or,
apparently, to J.D.'s parents and representatives, Dr.
Sean Kelly, on behalf of the Department, performed a
restoration evaluation of J.D. and concluded that J.D. had
been restored to competency. When the Department filed this
evaluation with the court, it inaccurately described the
evaluation as "court ordered."
¶57
Dr. Kelly subsequently informed defense counsel that he had
been advised to perform the restoration evaluation and that
the court's September 2023 order authorized him to do so.
After examining that order, however, Dr. Kelly acknowledged
to defense counsel that the order, in fact, did not
authorize him to perform the evaluation, that he had
erroneously performed it, and that his findings should be
stricken.
¶58
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Dr. Kelly later advised
defense counsel that he had spoken with leadership at the
state hospital at which J.D. was receiving restoration
services and that "internal policy" authorized him
to conduct an evaluation without obtaining permission from
the court, apparently whenever the hospital determined that
such an evaluation was necessary. Similarly, the
Department's Court Services Unit informed Dr. Kelly that
the hospital had determined on its own that a restoration
evaluation was warranted under section 19-2.5-704(2)(c) and
that the cause for such an evaluation outweighed the negative
impact that the evaluation would have had on J.D. and any
delay that would be
29
caused by the evaluation. And Dr. Kelly stated that he had
been advised that the Department had provided notice to the
court on February 6, 2024 that the Department would perform
the evaluation if no party objected.
¶59
In fact, the court liaison had filed the February 6, 2024
report with the court, and that report did not give the court
notice of any forthcoming evaluation. To the contrary, the
report stated, "If the court desires an evaluation to be
completed, an updated order with the evaluation request will
need to be submitted to [the Department's Court Services
Unit]."
¶60
Shortly after Dr. Kelly filed his restoration evaluation,
J.D. filed a motion to strike it. In support of this motion,
J.D. argued that under section 19-2.5-704(2)(c), the
Department may complete a restoration evaluation only upon
receiving a lawful order from the court.
¶61
The court ultimately denied J.D.'s motion, concluding
that the Department had the authority to conduct a
restoration evaluation without a court order because it was
responsible for coordinating restoration services and a
restoration evaluation constitutes a service necessary to
competency restoration. The court further determined that
although section 19-2.5-704(2)(c) provides the court and the
parties a means for requiring the Department to conduct a
restoration evaluation under certain conditions, that
provision does not limit the Department's ability to
conduct a restoration evaluation on its own if, during the
30
course of restoration, it deems such an evaluation to be
appropriate. Finally, the court concluded that it would be
"unproductive" to strike the competency evaluation
conducted by the Department only to order the Department to
perform the same evaluation again. In the court's view,
doing so would subject J.D. to another evaluation and further
delay the case, both of which were contrary to J.D.'s
best interests. Thus, the court found that J.D. had been
restored to competency and was competent to proceed.
¶62
J.D. then petitioned this court for immediate relief, and we
granted a rule to show cause.
II.
Analysis
¶63
I begin by addressing the applicable principles of statutory
construction and the statutory scheme. I conclude, contrary
to the majority, that a restoration evaluation is not a
restoration service under the plain meaning of that term and
that the Department cannot perform a restoration evaluation
without a court order. Having thus perceived error, I proceed
to address the remedy, and I conclude that the proper remedy
is to strike the unauthorized restoration evaluation.
A.
Statutory Construction and the Statutory Scheme
¶64
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.
McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 37, 442 P.3d
379, 389. Our primary purpose in statutory
31
interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the
legislature's intent. Id. To do so, we first
look to the statute's language, giving its words and
phrases their plain and ordinary meanings. Id. In
addition, we read words and phrases in context and construe
them in accordance with the rules of grammar and common
usage. Id.
¶65
We also seek to effectuate the purpose of the legislative
scheme. Id. at ¶ 38, 442 P.3d at 389. In doing
this, we read the statutory scheme as a whole, giving
consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its
parts. Id. We further avoid constructions that would
render any statutory words or phrases superfluous or lead to
illogical or absurd results. Id. If the statute is
unambiguous, then we need not look further. Id.
¶66
The Colorado Children's Code provides that a juvenile
must not be tried or sentenced if the juvenile is incompetent
to proceed. § 19-2.5-702(2), C.R.S. (2024). A juvenile
is incompetent to proceed when, based on the juvenile's
intellectual or developmental disability, mental health
disorder, or lack of mental capacity, the juvenile "does
not have sufficient present ability to consult with the
juvenile's attorney with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding in order to assist the attorney in the
juvenile's defense or that the juvenile does not have a
rational as well as a factual understanding of the
proceedings." § 19-2.5-701.5(5), C.R.S. (2024).
32
¶67
When the issue of a juvenile's competency is raised, the
court must make a preliminary finding as to the
juvenile's competency, and if the court lacks sufficient
information to make this finding, it must order a competency
evaluation. § 19-2.5-703(1), C.R.S. (2024). A competency
evaluation is "an evaluation conducted by a competency
evaluator that meets the requirements described in section
19-2.5-703(4)." § 19-2.5-701.5(1). Section
19-2.5-703(4)(c), in turn, requires that the evaluation
include, at a minimum, an opinion regarding whether the
juvenile is competent to proceed and, if not, a
recommendation as to whether there is a likelihood that the
juvenile may be restored to competency in the reasonably
foreseeable future. The evaluation must also identify
appropriate services necessary to restore the juvenile to
competency. Id.
¶68
If the court finds that the juvenile is incompetent but
restorable to competency, then the court must stay the
proceedings and "order that the juvenile receive
services designed to restore the juvenile to competency,
based upon recommendations in the competency evaluation,
unless the court makes specific findings that the recommended
services in the competency evaluation are not
justified." § 19-2.5-704(2)(a). Upon entry of such
an order, the Department is tasked with "oversight of
restoration education and coordination of services necessary
to competency restoration." § 19-2.5-704(2)(b). In
addition, the court
33
must hold restoration progress review hearings at regular
intervals to review the juvenile's progress with those
services. § 19-2.5-704(2)(a).
¶69
Most pertinent to the matters before us, section
19-2.5-704(2)(c) provides for the possibility of a
restoration evaluation. A restoration evaluation is "an
evaluation conducted by a competency evaluator to determine
if the juvenile has become competent to proceed or will be
able to be restored to competency in the reasonably
foreseeable future." § 19-2.5-701.5(6). A
restoration evaluation "includes both court-ordered
evaluations by the department and second evaluations."
Id. A "[s]econd evaluation" is an
"evaluation in response to a court-ordered competency
evaluation or court-ordered restoration evaluation requested
by the juvenile that is performed by a competency evaluator
and that is not performed by, under the direction of, or paid
for by the department." § 19-2.5-701.5(9).
¶70
Section 19-2.5-704(2)(c) delineates the circumstances under
which the court may order a restoration evaluation:
The court or a party may raise, at any time, the need for a
restoration evaluation of a juvenile's competency. If
raised, the court shall order a restoration
evaluation only when there is credible information that the
juvenile's circumstances have changed, the court cannot
fairly determine whether the juvenile has been restored to
competency or will be able to be restored to competency in
the reasonably foreseeable future, and the cause for a
restoration evaluation outweighs the negative impact of a
restoration evaluation upon the juvenile and any delay that
will be caused by a restoration evaluation.
34
(Emphasis added.)
¶71
Here, the majority concludes that a restoration evaluation is
included within the restoration services provided by the
Department and, therefore, the Department properly conducted
the evaluation without court approval in this case. Maj. op.
¶¶ 2, 10, 23-29. I respectfully disagree with both
points.
¶72
First, in my view, the plain meaning of "restoration
services" does not encompass restoration evaluations.
Although the term "restoration services" is not
expressly defined in the Children's Code, section
19-2.5-704(2)(a) describes such services as "services
designed to restore the juvenile to competency, based upon
recommendations in the competency evaluation."
Consistent with this understanding, the Department
recommended that J.D. receive "1:1 sessions that target
a basic understanding of the various aspects of the judicial
system." Similarly, the Department has cited as
additional examples of appropriate restoration services
"psychoeducation, psychiatric treatment, medication
referral, behavioral therapy, educational assessment, or
services to meet [the juvenile's] developmental
needs." Each of these is a treatment mechanism provided
for the juvenile. None is an evaluation to be provided to the
court.
¶73
In contrast, the Children's Code defines both
"restoration evaluation" and "competency
evaluation" as diagnostic tools. See §
19-2.5-701.5(1) ("'Competency evaluation' means
an evaluation conducted by a competency evaluator that meets
35
the requirements described in section 19-2.5-703(4).
'Competency evaluation' includes both court-ordered
evaluations performed by the department and second
evaluations."); § 19-2.5-701.5(6)
("'Restoration evaluation' means an evaluation
conducted by a competency evaluator to determine if the
juvenile has become competent to proceed or will be able to
be restored to competency in the reasonably foreseeable
future. 'Restoration evaluation' includes both
court-ordered evaluations by the department and second
evaluations.").
¶74
As the foregoing makes clear, a restoration evaluation is
different in kind from restoration services. Restoration
services are forms of education and treatment that are
provided to the juvenile and designed to restore the juvenile
to competency. A restoration evaluation, in contrast, is a
tool to provide information to the court in connection with
the court's determination of competency or incompetency,
and if the latter, to identify the services that would best
fit the juvenile's needs to restore competency.
¶75
Thus, in my view, a restoration evaluation is not a
restoration service under the Children's Code.
¶76
Second, the statutory scheme plainly provides that before the
Department conducts a restoration evaluation, it must seek
and obtain leave of the court.
¶77
Specifically, section 19-2.5-701.5(6) provides that
restoration evaluations include both court-ordered
evaluations performed by the Department and second
36
evaluations that are not performed by, under the direction
of, or at the expense of the Department. See also
§ 19-2.5-707, C.R.S. (2024) (referring to the
restoration evaluation performed by the Department as
"court-ordered"). Nothing in this provision
contemplates a restoration evaluation by the Department that
is not court ordered.
¶78
The other components of the statutory scheme are in accord
and confirm that the legislature vested in the court the
authority to direct the competency evaluation and restoration
processes, with the Department being involved in these
processes only at the court's direction. Thus, the
Children's Code authorizes the court to order (1)
competency evaluations under section 19-2.5-703(1); (2) how
the evaluations are to be conducted under section
19-2.5-703(4)(a); (3) specific restoration services under
section 19-2.5-704(2)(a); (4) restoration evaluations under
section 19-2.5-704(2)(c); and (5) restoration to competency
hearings under section 19-2.5-705(1). In contrast, the
Department's duties in this area consist of "the
provision of competency restoration education services and
coordination of competency restoration services ordered
by the court." § 27-60-105(2), C.R.S. (2024)
(emphasis added).
¶79
Similarly, section 19-2.5-704(2)(a) provides that when a
court finds that a juvenile is incompetent but may be
restored to competency in the reasonably foreseeable future,
"the court shall . . . order that the juvenile
receive services
37
designed to restore the juvenile to competency."
(Emphasis added.) Furthermore, these services must be
"based upon recommendations in the competency
evaluation, unless the court makes specific findings
that the recommended services in the competency evaluation
are not justified." Id. (emphasis added). In
short, the statutory scheme contemplates that the
court will enumerate the specific services that the
Department is to provide; the statute does not delegate
authority to the Department to provide those services that it
deems appropriate whenever it deems them appropriate.
¶80
Finally, and consistent with all of the foregoing provisions,
section 19-2.5-704(2)(c) explicitly provides the
circumstances under which the court may order a restoration
evaluation. These limitations reveal a clear legislative
intent to limit the court's discretion in deciding
whether and when to order a restoration evaluation, and I
perceive no basis in the statutory text that would allow me
to conclude that although the legislature intended to limit
the court's discretion, it gave unlimited discretion to
the Department to conduct restoration evaluations whenever it
sees fit. In my view, had the legislature intended to confer
such broad authority, it would have said so directly.
¶81
The Department's own contemporaneous statements in this
case fully confirm my view. Thus, when the Department filed
Dr. Kelly's evaluation with the court, it described that
evaluation, albeit erroneously, as "court ordered."
And
38
when Dr. Kelly realized that the court had not, in fact,
ordered his evaluation, he candidly acknowledged that his
evaluation was unauthorized and that his findings should be
stricken. These statements show that the Department fully
understood that a restoration evaluation required court
approval.
¶82
I am not persuaded otherwise by the respective contentions of
the majority, Maj. op. ¶¶ 24-27, the Department,
and the district court that the Department must have the
authority to conduct restoration evaluations whenever it
deems appropriate in order to fulfill its statutory
obligations to coordinate restoration services and report to
the court on a juvenile's progress. As both the
Children's Code and our case law indicate, the Department
has many other tools, short of conducting a restoration
evaluation, to carry out its statutory responsibilities.
¶83
For example, the statutory definition of "[r]estoration
progress review hearing" contemplates that the court may
review "restoration education" and "treatment
records" in addition to "any prior competency
evaluation reports." § 19-2.5-701.5(7). Indeed, the
Department itself describes how a juvenile may "appear
to have been restored to competency," a circumstance
that suggests that the Department may ascertain a
juvenile's progress without conducting a formal
restoration evaluation.
¶84
Consistent with the foregoing, section 19-2.5-703(1) provides
that a court may make an initial competency determination
without ordering a competency
39
evaluation, and nothing in the Children's Code suggests
that a court may not similarly make a restoration
determination without a formal evaluation.
¶85
And our decision in People in Interest of A.C., 2022
CO 49, ¶ 18, 517 P.3d 1228, 1235, likewise recognized
that in many cases, a court may find that a juvenile has been
restored to competency based only on evidence from the
restoration process, such as a juvenile's scores on tests
of their knowledge of the legal system.
¶86
Each of these authorities belies any assertion that the
Department must necessarily have the ability to conduct
restoration evaluations whenever it deems such evaluations
necessary.
¶87
Nor is a restoration evaluation necessary to allow the
Department to report on the juvenile's progress at the
statutorily required restoration progress review hearings, as
the district court appears to suggest. If a restoration
evaluation were the only way that the Department could report
on a juvenile's progress at these review hearings, then,
in the case of juveniles who are in custody, the Department
would need to conduct new restoration evaluations every
thirty-five days. The legislature assuredly did not intend to
require such frequent restoration evaluations, particularly
in light of the limitations that it placed in section
19-2.5-704(2)(c) on the court's discretion to order such
evaluations.
40
¶88
For these reasons, I would conclude that the Department had
no authority to conduct the restoration evaluation that it
performed in this case. The question thus becomes what the
appropriate remedy is. I turn to that question next.
B. The
Remedy
¶89
For the reasons set forth above, I believe that J.D. had the
right to be free from a restoration evaluation unless the
court ordered one after making the specific findings required
under section 19-2.5-704(2)(c). The unauthorized evaluation
that the Department conducted in this case violated that
right, and J.D. suffered harm because he was forced to
undergo the evaluation without notice to his family or
attorney and without the opportunity to have a caregiver
present or to consult with his attorney.
¶90
In my view, because J.D.'s substantive rights were
violated, he is entitled to a remedy, and striking the
improperly conducted restoration evaluation would afford an
appropriate remedy for the statutory violation that occurred
here. See United States v. Warrior, No. CR.
16-50132-JLV, 2018 WL 5045771, at *4 (D.S.D. Oct. 17, 2018)
(concluding that excluding any evidence derived from an
improperly performed competency evaluation constituted an
appropriate remedy for the violation).
¶91
In so concluding, I am unpersuaded by the district
court's view that imposing such a remedy here would be
unproductive and against J.D.'s interests
41
because it would force him to endure a second evaluation. I
disagree for three reasons.
¶92
First, striking the restoration evaluation would not
inevitably lead to another evaluation at this point in time.
As noted above, before ordering another restoration
evaluation, the court will need to find that all three
requirements in section 19-2.5-704(2)(c) have been satisfied,
and I am not prepared to presuppose that result.
¶93
Second, even were the court to find that the circumstances
warrant another restoration evaluation, J.D. would have the
benefit of the procedural safeguards that were denied him
when the Department performed its unauthorized evaluation. On
this point, although the Department describes the procedural
protections that it contends minimize harm to juveniles
during a restoration evaluation, the Department ignores the
fact that because of its conduct, J.D. was denied those
protections in this case. For example, the Department
describes how juveniles have the rights to have their
caregiver present with them during the evaluation and to
decline to participate in the interview. Because J.D.'s
family and attorney did not receive notice that the
Department was going to perform a restoration evaluation
here, however, J.D. was not able to have a caregiver present.
Nor could he consult with his attorney about matters related
to that evaluation,
42
including whether to decline to participate in it. Were the
court to order another evaluation, J.D. would be afforded
these protections.
¶94
Finally, although the district court concluded that another
evaluation would be against J.D.'s best interests, I note
that J.D. requested that the unauthorized evaluation be
stricken, thus subjecting himself to the possibility of
another evaluation. I would not presume to know J.D.'s
interests better than he, his caregivers, and his attorneys
do.
¶95
For these reasons, I would strike what I believe to be the
Department's unauthorized restoration evaluation and
place the parties in the positions that they were in before
the Department's statutory violation.
III.
Conclusion
¶96
Because I believe that (1) the Department may not perform a
restoration evaluation of a juvenile absent a valid court
order and (2) striking the unauthorized restoration
evaluation of J.D. would appropriately remedy the violation
of his substantive rights in this case, I would make our rule
to show cause absolute.
¶97
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
---------
Notes:
[1] The district court submitted a brief
in response to this court's order to show cause.
[2] The parties use the term
"restoration services" interchangeably with the
phrases "services designed to restore the juvenile to
competency," § 19-2.5-704(2)(a), and "services
necessary to competency restoration," §
19-2.5-704(2)(b). Accordingly, for purposes of this opinion,
we treat such language as equivalent.
[3] Section 19-2.5-704(2)(b) references
section 27-60-105, C.R.S. (2024), which similarly provides
that the Department is responsible for "the provision of
competency restoration education services and coordination of
competency restoration services ordered by the court."
§ 27-60-105(2).
[4] As previously discussed, J.D. points
to language appearing after the substantive definition of
"restoration evaluation" as precluding the
Department from completing an evaluation without a court
order, arguing that such language provides the only means by
which a restoration evaluation can be completed:
"'Restoration evaluation' includes both
court-ordered evaluations by the department and second
evaluations." § 19-2.5-701.5(6) (emphasis added).
This argument conflates the meaning of "includes"
with that of "exclusive." The word
"include" is ordinarily used in statutes as a word
of extension or enlargement. Lyman v. Town of Bow
Mar, 533 P.2d 1129, 1133 (Colo. 1975); Preston v.
Dupont, 35 P.3d 433, 438 (Colo. 2001). We thus disagree
that this language limits restoration evaluations to these
two circumstances.
[5] J.D. argues that this process would
deny juveniles the procedural protections contained in the
juvenile competency statute. To this end, we note that
including competency evaluations within the meaning of
restoration services does not infringe on J.D.'s ability
to exercise his statutory rights. When the court receives a
restoration evaluation from the Department, juveniles may
request a hearing and a second evaluation just as they might
when the court specifically orders the restoration
evaluation. In fact, a second evaluation could not be
requested until a prior evaluation had been
completed.
[1] The legislative history confirms that
the General Assembly amended this part of the statute in
response to the concurrences in A.C. Hearing on H.B. 1012
before the H. Judiciary Comm., 74th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess.
(Jan. 24, 2023). Chief Justice Boatright, joined by Justice
Hart, concurred in the majority opinion in A.C. but wrote
separately to encourage the General Assembly to clarify the
statute to “empower trial courts to make fully informed
decisions about rehabilitation and, in turn, serve
juveniles' best interests.” ¶ 38, 517 P.3d at
1238 (Boatright, C.J., specially concurring). Justice Samour
concurred in the opinion as well but wrote separately to
alert the legislature to his concern that the Department
continued to prioritize its own policies over its duties
under the juvenile competency statute, particularly given its
ongoing insistence, notwithstanding the court's decision
in B.B.A.M., ¶ 30, 453 P.3d at 1167-68, that
the Department's psychiatrists and psychologists were the
only people qualified to opine on whether a juvenile had been
restored to competency. A.C., ¶¶ 40-43, 517 P.3d at
1238-39 (Samour, J., specially concurring).
[2]It is difficult to know what to make of
the Department's decision to conduct the restoration
evaluation in this case in March 2024. As reflected in the
dissent's detailed recitation of events, its decision
seemed to flow more from a Comedy of Errors than an
intentional flouting of the court's authority. Having
said that, some of the Department's testimony before the
House Judiciary Committee and Senate Judiciary Committee in
connection with H.B. 1012 suggests that the Department still
may be thinking far too narrowly about who is qualified to
testify regarding a juvenile's restoration to
competency.
The Department employee responsible for overseeing
juvenile competency evaluations, for instance, testified that
“the court sometimes expects our restoration educators
to opine on competency, however, our educators are not
qualified, nor do they have the credentials to do
this.” Hearing on H.B. 1012 before the H. Judiciary
Comm., 74th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Jan. 24, 2023). While
this may be true in complicated cases and in cases in which
medication must be prescribed, this court has made it
abundantly clear that a juvenile court may find that a
juvenile has been restored to competency based only on
evidence from the restoration process, such as a
juvenile's scores on tests of their knowledge of the
legal system. A.C., ¶ 18, 517 P.3d at 1235.
Moreover, it is the juvenile court, not the Department, that
ultimately decides who is qualified to testify about whether
a juvenile attended classes and can now pass a test.
---------