2025 CO 35
In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning Children: K.M.S., M.D.S., and R.E.S., and Concerning Petitioners Suzanne Nicolas and August Nicolas, and Jayne Mecque Sullivan and Daniel Francis Sullivan, Respondents
No. 24SC788
Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc
June 9, 2025
Attorneys for Petitioners: Connelly Law, LLC Sean Connelly,
Hogan Omidi, PC, Hollie A. Hinton
Attorneys for Respondents: Grob & Eirich, LLC Timothy J.
Eirich.
JUSTICE BOATRIGHT delivered the Opinion of the Court, in
which JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE HART, and JUSTICE SAMOUR joined.
2
OPINION
BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE.
¶1
This appeal considers grandparent visitation rights for three
young children whose biological parents, Brandon and Amanda
Sullivan, are deceased. After the children's biological
mother and father died, Suzanne and August Nicolas ("the
Nicolases")- Amanda's parents - adopted them. After
the adoption was finalized, Jayne Mecque and Daniel Francis
Sullivan ("the Sullivans")- Brandon's parents -
moved for, and were granted, grandparent visitation pursuant
to section 19-1-117, C.R.S. (2021).[1] The Nicolases later moved to
vacate the visitation order, arguing that the Sullivans
lacked standing to seek visitation. The domestic relations
court found that the Sullivans did have standing and denied
the motion to vacate the visitation order. A division of the
court of appeals affirmed. In re Parental
Responsibilities Concerning K.M.S., No. 24CA253, ¶
1 (Nov. 7, 2024). We granted certiorari to review whether the
division erred in affirming the domestic relations
court's order upholding the Sullivans' standing to
seek grandparent visitation.[2]
3
¶2
We now determine that grandparent standing is limited by
section 19-1-103(70)(a), C.R.S. (2021), to one who is
presently the parent of a child's father or mother.
Accordingly, following an adoption, the parents of a
child's former mother or father are no longer
"grandparents" under the statute. We therefore hold
that after children are adopted, the parents of a deceased
father or mother lack standing to seek grandparent
visitation. Because the Nicolases were the children's
parents when the Sullivans filed their petition for
visitation, the Sullivans were no longer legal grandparents;
hence, the Sullivans lacked standing to seek grandparent
visitation. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of
appeals and remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
I.
Facts and Procedural History
¶3
In 2020, Brandon killed both his wife, Amanda, and himself,
leaving behind a two-year-old child and infant twins: R.E.S.,
K.M.S., and M.D.S. During the ensuing probate proceedings,
the court appointed the Nicolases as the children's
emergency, and then permanent, guardians.[3] The court also
approved a stipulated grandparent visitation plan allowing
the Sullivans to regularly visit the children.
4
¶4
The following year, the Nicolases adopted the three children.
The probate court thereafter closed the proceedings and
transferred all matters concerning the children into a
previously stayed domestic relations case initiated by the
Sullivans. The Sullivans then filed a motion for grandparent
visitation in that case under section 19-1-117.[4] The domestic
relations court issued a visitation order awarding
grandparent visitation to the Sullivans.
¶5
A year and a half later, the Nicolases filed a C.R.C.P.
60(b)(3) motion for relief from judgment, seeking to vacate
the visitation order as void. The Nicolases argued that,
following their adoption of the children, the Sullivans were
no longer the children's grandparents, meaning they
lacked standing to seek grandparent visitation. In doing so,
the Nicolases relied on the present-tense language in section
19-1-103(70)(a), which defines "[grandparent" as
"a person who is the parent of a child's
father or mother, who is related to the child by blood, in
whole or by half, adoption, or marriage." (Emphasis
added.) The Nicolases asserted that, because they (rather
than Brandon and Amanda) were the children's parents when
the Sullivans filed their petition for visitation, the
Sullivans were no longer the children's legal
grandparents. The domestic relations court denied the motion,
5
reasoning that a "literal interpretation of the term
'parent' would be inconsistent with the intent of the
statute and the interpretation of grandparent visitation in
[prior] appellate cases."
¶6
The Nicolases appealed, and a division of the court of
appeals affirmed. K.M.S., ¶ 1. In upholding the
Sullivans' standing to seek grandparent visitation, the
division rejected the Nicolases' interpretation of
section 19-1-103(70)(a) as inconsistent with the overarching
statutory scheme for grandparent visitation and one that
would render other statutes superfluous-namely section
19-1-117(1)(b), which allows grandparents to seek visitation
when custody has been allocated to a non-parent,
except when the child has been adopted. Id.
at ¶¶ 15, 19. Moreover, the division concluded that
section 19-1-103(70)(a) "contained no language
temporally restricting the definition of grandparent to the
parents of the child's father or mother as of the
date of the petition [for grandparent visitation]."
Id. at ¶ 21. ¶7 We granted certiorari.
II.
Analysis
¶8
We must first acknowledge the tragic nature of the case
before us. Both families have suffered irreparable harm, and
it is clear from the record that both the Nicolases and the
Sullivans care deeply for the children and wish to be
involved in their lives. As the domestic relations court
noted in its order for grandparent visitation: "[T]he
underlying tragedy that resulted in this proceeding,
6
the guardianships, and the adoptions, was the simultaneous
death of the children's parents." We recognize that
this loss, and the uniquely difficult circumstances that
surround it, present profound challenges for those involved,
for which there is almost assuredly no satisfactory legal
outcome. Despite this, we must rule for one party and against
the other. We granted certiorari to review the court of
appeals' decision upholding the Sullivans' right to
grandparent visitation, and we now turn to the matter at
hand.
¶9
We begin by discussing the applicable standard of review. We
then turn to the relevant provisions of the Children's
Code, particularly the grandparent visitation statute.
Construing the statutory language to effectuate its plain and
ordinary meaning, we hold that after children are adopted,
the parents of a deceased father or mother lack standing to
seek grandparent visitation.
A.
Standard of Review and Rules of Statutory Construction
¶10
"Whether a party has standing is a question of law that
we review de novo." Aurora Pub. Schs. v. A.S.,
2023 CO 39, ¶ 25, 531 P.3d 1036, 1044. Standing pertains
to "a litigant's right to raise a legal argument or
claim," Reeves-Toney v. Sch. Dist. No. 1 in City
& Cnty. of Denver, 2019 CO 40, ¶ 21, 442 P.3d
81, 85-86, and is "a threshold issue that must be
satisfied in order to decide a case on the merits,"
Ainscough v. Owens, 90 P.3d 851, 855 (Colo. 2004).
7
¶11
"When a plaintiff brings a claim under a statute, the
standing inquiry turns on whether the statutory provision
'can properly be understood as granting persons in the
plaintiff's position a right to judicial
relief.'" Vickery v. Evelyn V. Trumble Living
Tr., 277 P.3d 864, 868 (Colo.App. 2011) (quoting
Pomerantz v. Microsoft Corp., 50 P.3d 929, 932
(Colo.App. 2002)). Addressing this inquiry concerns
"matters of statutory interpretation that we review de
novo." Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Scardina,
2024 CO 67, ¶ 22, 556 P.3d 1238, 1245.
¶12
In construing the relevant statutes, our primary task
"is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the
General Assembly." In re Marriage of Ikeler,
161 P.3d 663, 666 (Colo. 2007). In doing so, we consider the
statute as a whole, giving "consistent, harmonious, and
sensible effect to all its parts." Id. at
666-67. We begin by looking to the language of the statute,
giving words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning.
People v. Dist. Ct., 713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo. 1986).
When possible, "we must give effect to every word of the
statute." Charlton v. Kimata, 815 P.2d 946, 949
(Colo. 1991). We defer to the legislature's choice of
language, and "we will not add words to a statute or
subtract words from it." Dep't of Revenue v.
Agilent Techs., Inc., 2019 CO 41, ¶ 16, 441 P.3d
1012, 1016. If the language of the statute is clear and
unambiguous, we "need not resort to other rules of
statutory construction." Id. We apply the
statute as written. Id.
8
B.
Parents of a Deceased Father or Mother Lack Standing to Seek
Grandparent Visitation Post-Adoption
¶13
Section 19-1-117(1) allows a grandparent to seek visitation
rights "when there is or has been a child custody case
or a case concerning the allocation of parental
responsibilities relating to that child." The statute
delineates three circumstances that may give rise to motions
for grandparent visitation: (1) marriage dissolution
proceedings, (2) the allocation of custody or parental rights
to a non-parent, or (3) the death of a child's parent.
§ 19-1-117(1)(a)-(c). Specifically, the statute provides
that a grandparent may seek visitation rights in the
following situations:
(a)That the marriage of the child's parents has been
declared invalid or has been dissolved by a court or that a
court has entered a decree of legal separation with regard to
such marriage;
(b)That legal custody of or parental responsibilities with
respect to the child have been given or allocated to a party
other than the child's parent or that the child has been
placed outside of and does not reside in the home of the
child's parent, excluding any child who has been placed
for adoption or whose adoption has been legally finalized; or
(c)That the child's parent, who is the child of the
grandparent . . . has died.
Id.
¶14
For purposes of the visitation statute,
"[g]randparent" is defined as "a person who
is the parent of a child's father or mother, who
is related to the child by blood, in whole or by half,
adoption, or marriage." § 19-1-103(70)(a) (emphasis
9
added). The statute further provides that for purposes of
visitation, "'grandparent' does not include the
parent of a child's legal father or mother whose parental
rights have been terminated." § 19-1-103(70)(b).
The question here is whether the Sullivans, following the
Nicolases' adoption of the children, still qualify as the
children's grandparents.
¶15
The Sullivans first argue that, because the exclusion of
"grandparent" in section 19-1-103(70)(b) is
specific to the termination of parental rights, they remained
"grandparents" for purposes of section
19-1-117(1)(c) (allowing grandparents to seek visitation when
the child's parent has died). They contend that the
Nicolases' present-tense reading is overbroad because it
would mean that the Sullivans lost their status as
grandparents immediately upon Brandon's death-an absurd
result.
¶16
The Sullivans also note that, although section 19-1-117(1)(b)
contains an adoption exclusion, subsection (c) contains no
such limitation. § 19-1-117(1)(b) (grandparents cannot
seek visitation rights for a child "who has been placed
for adoption or whose adoption has been legally
finalized"); § 19-1-117(1)(c) (providing for the
death of a child's parent as a basis upon which to seek
visitation). Therefore, the Sullivans maintain that the
legislature did not intend for any exclusion to apply when
one or both parents have died.
10
¶17
In addressing these arguments, we begin with the principle
that, under this state's law, "a child is limited to
having just two legal parents." People in Int. of
K.L.W., 2021 COA 56, ¶ 21, 492 P.3d 392, 397. And
Colorado law is clear that "[a]fter the entry of a final
decree of adoption, the person adopted is, for all intents
and purposes, the child of the petitioner."
§19-5-211(1), C.R.S. (2024). Concordantly, upon
adoption, the child's former parents are "divested
of all legal rights and obligations with respect to the
child."[5] § 19-5-211(2). Thus, adoption by two
new parents necessarily terminates any prior parental
relationships. See In Int. of Baby A, 2015 CO 72,
¶ 17, 363 P.3d 193, 200 (recognizing that, where a
biological father sought to void his termination of parental
rights after an adoption had been finalized, "we must
make a determination adverse to one party" -implying all
three could not be parents); see also D.P.H. v.
J.L.B., 260 P.3d 320, 323 (Colo. 2011) (noting that
"a proceeding for stepparent adoption necessarily
includes the termination of the parental rights of the
non-custodial parent").
¶18
The Sullivans assert that their son continued to be a parent
to the children-even after his death and their
adoption by the Nicolases. But this argument goes too far. To
be sure, the death of a parent does not instantly nullify
11
grandparentage. Yet, an adoption does just that.
Specifically, "[p]arent" is defined as
"either a natural parent of a child . . .
or a parent by adoption." §
19-1-103(105)(a) (emphases added). This disjunctive phrasing
suggests that once adoptive parties become parents, decedents
are no longer recognized as legal parents. See Armintrout
v. People, 864 P.2d 576, 581 (Colo. 1993) ("[W]hen
the word 'or' is used in a statute, it is presumed to
be used in the disjunctive sense, unless legislative intent
is clearly to the contrary.").
¶19
Turning to section 19-1-103(70)(a), the statutory definition
of "[g]randparent" is written in the present tense:
"a person who is the parent of a child's
father or mother." (Emphasis added.) Again, "[t]he
fundamental rule of construction is to ascertain the intent
of the legislature, and to give effect to every word
of an enactment." Johnston v. City Council, 493
P.2d 651, 654 (Colo. 1972) (emphasis added). Yet the
Sullivans' proposed construction essentially alters the
statutory definition to read that a grandparent "is
or was" or "has been" the
parent of a child's father or mother. We decline to adopt
such an interpretation. See Dep't of Revenue,
¶ 16, 441 P.3d at 1016 ("[W]e will not add words to
a statute . . . ."). Therefore, we determine that the
statute's plain language imposes a temporal limitation,
restricting "grandparent" to one who is a
grandparent at the time the petition for visitation is filed.
12
¶20
The Sullivans assert that this interpretation conflicts with
section 19-1-103(70)(b), which excludes from the definition
of "grandparent" the parent of a "legal father
or mother whose parental rights have been terminated."
We disagree. Just because the Sullivans are not
excluded by subsection (70)(b) does not mean they
are included in subsection (70)(a). Rather,
subsection (70)(b)'s exclusion merely clarifies the
limits of the general definition, making it evident that for
visitation purposes, subsection (70)(a) "does not
include" the parent of one "whose parental rights
have been terminated," § 19-1-103(70)(b).
¶21
Nor does this interpretation negate section
19-1-117(1)(b)'s adoption exclusion, which specifically
precludes a motion for grandparent visitation when a child
"has been placed for adoption or whose adoption has been
legally finalized" in cases allocating custody or
parental responsibilities to a non-parent. The court of
appeals division determined that construing section
19-1-103(70)(a) as preventing grandparents from seeking
visitation following the adoption of a child by two new
parents would render section 19-1-117(1)(b)'s adoption
exclusion "largely superfluous." K.M.S.,
¶ 19. But the adoption exclusion applies to additional
circumstances-such as when a child is placed for
adoption, yet the parents of the child's mother and
father remain grandparents under section 19-1-103(70)(a).
Moreover, as both parties acknowledged, the legislature may
take a "belt-and-suspenders" approach to
"avoid unintended gaps." Pugin v. Garland,
599 U.S. 600, 609, 610 n.3 (2023).
13
Rather than being superfluous, section 19-1-117(1)(b)'s
adoption exclusion simply extinguishes any potential
ambiguity regarding whether the right to seek visitation
survives a finalized adoption. Thus, while perhaps
repetitious in certain cases, the adoption exclusion is not
rendered meaningless by our interpretation of
"grandparent" as one who is presently the parent of
a child's mother or father.
¶22
Our interpretation accords with "the bedrock principle
that the right to parent one's children is a fundamental
liberty interest." People in Int. of J.G., 2016
CO 39, ¶ 20, 370 P.3d 1151, 1158; see also Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72 (2000) (upholding a
mother's fundamental right to make decisions about her
children in the context of grandparent visitation).
Consistent with this right, the decisions of parents receive
primary consideration as to the care, custody, and control of
their children. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65-66;
see also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents.").
Notably, as stated by the Supreme Court in Troxel,
the decision whether "an intergenerational relationship
[between grandparents and their grandchildren] would be
beneficial in any specific case is for the parent to make in
the first instance." 530 U.S. at 70. And, as we have
recognized, "adoptive parents have the same right as
natural parents in controlling the upbringing of their
child." In re Adoption of C.A., 137 P.3d 318,
326 (Colo. 2006).
14
¶23
We therefore find that standing to seek grandparent
visitation is limited to one who is the present parent of a
child's father or mother.[6] Accordingly, we hold that after
children are adopted, the parents of a deceased father or
mother lack standing to seek grandparent visitation. To hold
otherwise would defy the statutory premise that a
"person adopted is, for all intents and purposes, the
child of the [new parents]." § 19-5-211(1).
C. The
Sullivans Lacked Standing Under the Grandparent Visitation
Statute
¶24
Immediately after the deaths of the children's biological
parents, both the Nicolases and the Sullivans remained the
children's legal grandparents. However, the Nicolases
then adopted the children, at which point the Nicolases
became the children's parents. We again
emphasize that the children's adoption was the legally
dispositive event in this case, rather than the death of
their biological
15
parents. Accordingly, when the Sullivans thereafter
petitioned for grandparent visitation under section 19-1-117,
they were not the "parent[s] of [the children's]
father or mother," meaning they were no longer
grandparents under section 19-1-103(70)(a).[7] Thus, the
Sullivans lacked standing to seek grandparent visitation
under section 19-1-117(1).[8]
III.
Conclusion
¶25
For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of
appeals and remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, joined by CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ,
and JUSTICE GABRIEL, dissented.
16
JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, joined by CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ,
and JUSTICE GABRIEL, dissenting.
¶26
When the General Assembly passed the Grandparent Visitation
Statute, § 19-1-117(1), C.R.S. (2021), it created three
distinct paths for grandparents to request a court order
granting them reasonable visitation rights with their
grandchildren. One of these paths grants grandparents
standing to seek visitation rights in certain domestic
relations cases. Another does so in certain dependency and
neglect cases, subject to what is known as the "adoption
exclusion." The third path grants grandparents standing
to seek visitation if their child (the grandchild's
parent) has died.
¶27
Notwithstanding the plain language creating these three
independent bases for grandparent standing, the majority
looks to the definition of grandparent in section
19-1-103(70)(a), C.R.S. (2021), and concludes that the
Grandparent Visitation Statute doesn't actually say what
it says. A grandparent, in the majority's view, is
limited to a person who "is presently the
parent of a child's father or mother." Maj. op.
¶ 2. To illustrate, this means that if twelve-year-old
Patrick is adopted by a great-aunt and great-uncle after
losing both of his parents in a tragic car accident, his
grandparents are no longer his grandparents. Instead, using
the words of the majority, upon his adoption, his
grandparents became the parents of Patrick's
"former mother or father." Id.
This time-bending notion of
17
parenthood and grandparenthood was not contemplated by the
legislature, particularly in light of the explicit path it
carved out in section 19-1-117(1)(c) to allow a grandparent
to seek grandparent visitation upon the death of their child.
It also is at odds with the General Assembly's expansive
definition in section 19-1-103(70) of what it means to be a
grandparent.
¶28
I write separately because the majority's interpretation
(1) disregards the plain language of the Grandparent
Visitation Statute and (2) misconstrues the definitions of
"grandparent" in sections 19-1-103(70)(a) and (b).
For these reasons, which I further detail below, I
respectfully dissent.
I.
Analysis
¶29
I begin with the Grandparent Visitation Statute. The statute
"allows a grandparent to seek 'reasonable grandchild
visitation rights' when there is a child custody case or
a case concerning the allocation of parental
responsibilities." In re Adoption of C.A., 137
P.3d 318, 323 (Colo. 2006) (quoting § 19-1-117(1),
C.R.S. (2005)). Section 19-1-117(1) provides three bases upon
which grandparents may petition for visitation:
(a)That the marriage of the child's parents has been
declared invalid or has been dissolved by a court or that a
court has entered a decree of legal separation with regard to
such marriage;
(b)That legal custody of or parental responsibilities with
respect to the child have been given or allocated to a party
other than the child's parent or that the child has been
placed outside of and does not reside
18
in the home of the child's parent, excluding any child
who has been placed for adoption or whose adoption has been
legally finalized; or
(c) That the child's parent, who is the child of the
grandparent or grandchild of the great-grandparent, has died.
(Emphasis added.)
¶30
The plain language of the statute demonstrates that the
General Assembly intended to treat each of these
circumstances differently. Its use of the disjunctive
"or" at the end of section 19-1-117(1)(b), in
particular, confirms that it intended each circumstance to
constitute an independent basis for grandparent visitation
requests. "[W]hen the word 'or' is used in a
statute, it is presumed to be used in the disjunctive sense,
unless legislative intent is clearly to the contrary."
Armintrout v. People, 864 P.2d 576, 581 (Colo.
1993).
¶31
Thus, a grandparent whose child is a respondent in a
dependency and neglect proceeding may request reasonable
visitation under section 19-1-117(1)(b) if their grandchild
is placed outside of the respondent's home. But, under
the adoption exclusion, if the respondent's parental
rights are terminated and the grandchild is placed for
adoption or an adoption has been finalized, the grandparent
no longer has standing to seek visitation. By contrast, a
grandparent whose child has died may request reasonable
visitation with their deceased child's minor offspring
under section 19-1-117(1)(c) at any time. This is because
section 19-1-117(1)(c) does not include an adoption or any
other kind of exclusion.
19
If the General Assembly intended to treat both of these
circumstances the same, it would not have included a specific
provision that grants standing to grandparents who have lost
a child, § 19-1-117(1)(c), and a separate, far narrower
provision that grants grandparent standing in certain
dependency and neglect proceedings, § 19-1-117(1)(b).
This difference is a forceful indication that the legislature
intended to treat the familial relationships legally severed
via termination and adoption differently than those touched
by the death of a child's parent. See In re
Petition of R.A., 66 P.3d 146, 149-50 (Colo.App.
2002) (holding that a parent's death results in a lapse,
and not a termination, of parental rights).
A.
The Majority's
Reasoning Does
Not Square
with Section 19-1-117(1)
¶32
Nonetheless, the majority concludes that "after children
are adopted, the parents of a deceased father or mother lack
standing to seek grandparent visitation." Maj. op.
¶ 23. In my view, this interpretation, with its
universal bar following adoption, is undermined by section
19-1-117(1) for three reasons. First, as noted, the
majority's interpretation disregards the use of the
disjunctive "or" in the statute. Second, the
majority's interpretation doesn't honor the General
Assembly's decision to explicitly carve out the death of
a child's parent as an independent basis to seek
grandparent visitation because it only permits visitation, if
both parents have died, until the child is
adopted-essentially merging sections 19-1-117(1)(b) and
(1)(c). And third, if the General Assembly
20
intended to limit a grandparent's standing in this
fashion, it could have included an adoption exclusion in
section 19-1-117(1)(c). Yet, it did not do so. "Under
the rule of interpretation expressio unius exclusio
alterius, the inclusion of certain items implies the
exclusion of others." Beeghly v. Mack, 20 P.3d
610, 613 (Colo. 2001). Here, the legislature specifically
limited grandparent standing in section 19-1-117(1)(b) in a
way that it did not in section 19-1-117(1)(c). As I've
explained, this choice has substantive meaning. It also shows
that the legislature knows how to craft this type of
exclusion when it wants to do so.
B.
The Majority's
Reasoning Is
Also at
Odds with Section
19-1-103(70)
¶33
The language in section 19-1-103(70) also undermines the
majority's reasoning. The differences in the text in
section 19-1-103(70)(a) and section 19-1-103(70)(b), in
particular, are instructive. In section 19-1-103(70)(a),
grandparent is defined expansively as: "a person who is
the parent of a child's father or mother, who is related
to the child by blood, in whole or by half, adoption, or
marriage." Section 19-1-103(70)(b), in turn, limits the
term grandparent, explaining that it "does not include
the parent of a child's legal father or mother
whose parental rights have been terminated" under other
specified Colorado laws. (Emphasis added.) Notably, the
language in section 19-1-103(70)(b), which seems to neatly
align with section 19-1-117(1)(b), explicitly excludes the
parent of a child's legal father or mother whose parental
21
rights have been terminated. It does not exclude a
grandparent whose child has died. See R.A., 66 P.3d
at 149-50.
¶34
The majority reads the language in section 19-1-103(70)(a) as
a sort of temporal limit on who can be a grandparent. In its
view, only "a person who is presently the
parent of a child's father or mother" is a
grandparent. Maj. op. ¶ 2. It claims that the use of the
present tense unambiguously restricts a grandparent to one
who is a grandparent at the time the petition is
filed. Id. But the statute does not actually
say this. The statute contains no language temporally
restricting the definition of grandparent to the parent of
the child's father or mother as of the date of the
petition.
¶35
Moreover, a biological parent is a parent in life
and in death. That is, when a child loses a parent, whether
the child is three or fifty-three, their parent remains their
parent forever. The biological relationship does not change
if a young child loses both parents and is later adopted.
That is not to take anything away from the adoptive parent,
who is also a parent. It's simply that the relationship
between the parent who died and the child who survived
transcends time in a way our language reflects. We refer, for
example, to our deceased family members even if they died
decades ago as "my father" and "my
mother," not "my former father" and
"my former mother."
22
¶36
This commonsense understanding of the enduring nature of this
relationship does not, however, run afoul of the principle
that a child can't have more than two legal parents at a
time. Moreover, upon death, the deceased parent's
parental rights lapse, but they are not terminated.
R.A., 66 P.3d at 149-50. Thus, acknowledging the
blood relation between a grandparent and grandchild, after
the child's parents have died, does not create the
possibility of the child having a third parent. Further, this
understanding doesn't alter the broader statutory
definition of grandparent, which as I explain next, is not
limited to "legal" grandparents.
¶37
The majority's interpretation of the word grandparent in
section 19-1-103(70)(a) is also inconsistent with the
term's expansive definition. The majority repeatedly
emphasizes that that the Sullivans were no longer
"legal" grandparents. Maj. op. ¶¶ 2, 5.
In doing so, it distorts and narrows the definition of
grandparent in section 19-1-103(70)(a). Consequently, the
majority fails to recognize the expansive scope of the
definition, which explicitly encompasses both biological
grandparents ("related to the child by blood, in whole
or by half") as well as persons who become related to
the grandchild through legal proceedings ("[by]
adoption, or marriage"). § 19-1-103(70)(a). This
misstep-and its focus on the word "is"-distracts
the majority from recognizing that the Sullivans are
unquestionably grandparents under section 19-1-103(70)(a).
23
¶38
What's more, the majority's interpretation of section
19-1-103(70)(a) is in direct conflict with section
19-1-103(70)(b), which excludes from the definition of
"grandparent" those grandparents whose
children's parental rights have been terminated. Unlike
section 19-1-103(70)(a), the exclusion in section
19-1-103(70)(b) explicitly includes the phrase
"legal father or mother." §
19-1-103(70)(b) (emphasis added). Given that the basic
definition of "parent" includes both
biological parents ("a natural parent of a child")
and legal parents ("a parent by adoption"),
see § 19-1-103(105)(a), it is clear that the
legislature knows how to distinguish the broader definition
of parent or grandparent from a narrower one limited to
"legal" parents and "legal" grandparents.
¶39
In my view, the majority's reading of section
19-1-103(70)(a) runs afoul of one of our basic rules of
statutory interpretation. We "must respect the
legislature's choice of language," and thus "we
may not add words to a statute or subtract words from
it." People in Int. of B.C.B., 2025 CO 28,
¶ 25, P.3d . The specific inclusion of the word
"legal" in section 19-1-103(70)(b) clearly evinces
the General Assembly's intent to not limit section
19-1-103(70)(a) to legal parents; indeed, had it
intended to, it would have explicitly included the word
"legal" just like it did in section
19-1-103(70)(b).
¶40
The majority's approach also makes the adoption exclusion
in section 19-1-117(1)(b) largely superfluous. If a
grandparent is automatically
24
disqualified from petitioning for reasonable visitation upon
a grandchild's adoption pursuant to section
19-1-103(70)(a), then the adoption exclusion, as found solely
in section 19-1-117(1)(b), serves no purpose. And "we
must avoid constructions that would render any statutory
words or phrases superfluous or that would lead to illogical
or absurd results." B.C.B., ¶ 24.
¶41
The majority's interpretation of the word grandparent
also renders section 19-1-103(70)(b) largely superfluous.
Why? Because if the majority's interpretation of section
19-1-103(70)(a) is correct, then there is no need for section
19-1-103(70)(b) because, as soon as a grandchild is adopted
post-termination, a grandparent would no longer be the parent
of the adopted child's parent. That is, section
19-1-103(70)(a) would already cover that situation. ¶42
I note as well that the majority's pronouncement that
adoption "instantly nullif[ies] grandparentage,"
Maj. op. ¶ 18, is belied by the language of section
19-1-103(70)(a). What if twelve-year-old Patrick is adopted,
not by his great-aunt and great-uncle, but by his maternal
aunt after his parents die in a car accident? One of his
maternal grandparents could still-under the explicit language
of section 19-1-103(70)(a)-seek reasonable grandparent
visitation with the child. The grandmother could do this as
"a person who is the parent of a child's father or
mother [the maternal aunt], who is related to the child by
blood." § 19-1-103(70)(a). But Patrick's
paternal grandparents could not seek visitation.
25
Thus, it appears that the rule the majority announces is
perhaps not so logical after all.
¶43
Each of these many flaws in the majority's reasoning
highlights that adoption does not instantly nullify
grandparentage. They illustrate, instead, that the only way
to construe subsections (70)(a) and (b) harmoniously is to
read section 19-1-103(70)(a) as applying to all
parents, not just the current legal parents, and to
read section 19-1-103(70)(b) as creating an exception for
grandparents when their child's parental rights-their
legal rights as parents-are terminated.
¶44
Thus, as I see it, the Sullivans qualify as grandparents
because they are still the parents of the
children's father and are still related to the
children by blood. And under the Grandparent Visitation
Statute, the Sullivans may seek visitation rights because,
under section 19-1-117(1)(c), the child's parent, who
is their child, has died. This relationship is not
extinguished by death, and the General Assembly has not
adopted some time-bending definition of grandparent that says
that it does. The Sullivans are the biological
parents of the children's father; they are related to
K.M.S. and M.D.S. by blood, and R.E.S. by adoption; and their
son's parental rights as to the children had not been
terminated at the time of his death. Thus, the Sullivans have
standing to seek reasonable visitation with their three
grandchildren under the Grandparent Visitation Statute.
26
¶45
Finally, I note that the question of whether the Sullivans
should be allowed to have grandparent visitation with their
three grandchildren is not the issue before us. Rather, the
question we address is whether the Sullivans have the legal
right to even ask for visitation. It is ultimately up to the
trial court, applying Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.
57, 68, 70 (2000), to decide if the Sullivans should be
granted visitation. To make this determination, the court
must apply the traditional presumption that a fit parent will
act in the best interest of his or her child, and thus the
court must give "special weight" to the
Nicholases' determination regarding what is in the
children's best interests. Id. at 69.
II.
Conclusion
¶46
Because section 19-1-117(1)(c) grants grandparents standing
to seek visitation rights if their child (the
grandchild's parent) has died, and nothing in the
expansive definition of the term grandparent in section
19-1-103(70)(a) changes that, I would affirm the judgment of
the court of appeals.
---------
Notes:
[1] Section 19-1-117, along with portions
of section 19-1-103, C.R.S. (2021), were later amended and
recodified as section 14-10-124.4, C.R.S. (2024).
See Ch. 243, sec. 2, § 14-10-124.4, 2023 Colo.
Sess. Laws 1302, 1302-05. Because the statutes in effect in
2021 control this case, we apply them in our
analysis.
[2] Specifically, we granted certiorari to
review the following issue:
Whether parents of a deceased father or mother have
standing to seek "grandparent" visitation of
children adopted by two new parents.
[3] Following the death of the
children's biological parents, the Nicolases petitioned
for emergency guardianship in the probate cases. The
Sullivans later filed competing requests for guardianship in
those same cases.
[4] While the Sullivans did submit other
filings to the court across the relevant cases pertaining to
their involvement with the children, they did not file a
verified motion for grandparent visitation until
after the Nicolases adopted the children.
[5] There is an exception when the
adopting parent is a stepparent who is married to the other
natural parent. See § 19-5-211(3).
[6] Other jurisdictions that have
addressed post-adoption visitation have similarly denied
standing to former grandparents where the statute at issue
defines "grandparent" as the parent of a
child's mother or father. See, e.g., Lindsay v.
Walker, 356 P.3d 195, 199 (Utah Ct. App. 2015)
(concluding that the biological grandparent was unable to
meet the statutory definition of a "grandparent"
after the child's adoption by new parents); see also
Jocham v. Sutliff, 26 N.E.3d 82, 87 (Ind.Ct.App. 2015)
(concluding that a biological grandparent had no standing to
seek visitation with the adopted child). Courts have also
relied on adoption statutes to hold that an "adoption
completely abrogates the legal relationship between a child
and his natural grandparents." Bopp v. Lino,
885 P.2d 559, 563 (Nev. 1994); see also Sowers v.
Tsamolias, 941 P.2d 949, 950 (Kan. 1997) (noting that an
adopted child "has new parents and new grandparents as
well").
[7] The Sullivans argue that the Nicolases
should be estopped from claiming that the Sullivans lack
standing to seek grandparent visitation. Specifically, the
Sullivans contend that they relied on the Nicolases'
prior representations-i.e., that the Nicolases intended for
the Sullivans to retain visitation rights post-adoption-such
that it is now unjust for the Nicolases to reverse course and
attempt to void the visitation order. But the Sullivans
cannot rely on estoppel to revive their since-extinguished
lack of standing, which is a jurisdictional question. Cf.
Mesa Cnty. Valley Sch. Dist No. 51 v. Kelsey, 8 P.3d
1200, 1206 (Colo. 2000) ("[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction
cannot be waived or conferred by consent, estoppel, or
laches.").
[8] Because we find that the Sullivans are
precluded from seeking visitation under the statutory
definition of "grandparent," we need not decide
whether the adoption exclusion contained in section
19-1-117(1)(b) applies to this case.