In re the Marriage of Stallman

139 P.3d 1116, 134 Wash. App. 254
Court of Appeals of Washington·Decided May 30, 2006·No. No. 56555-9-I·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

Coleman, J.

¶1 Donald Stallman was ordered to pay child support for his three children. The order specified the [256] amount to be paid each month for each child. Samuel, one of the children, died, and Donald reduced his monthly payment by subtracting the amount the order had specified for that child. Susan Stallman, Donald’s ex-wife, obtained a judgment against Donald for delinquent child support for Samuel under the theory that he could not unilaterally reduce his child support payment. The obligation to pay support terminated at the death of Samuel. Because the child support order segregated the total support paid into amounts per child, Donald was entitled to reduce his monthly payment by the amount allocated to support Samuel.

FACTS

¶2 Donald and Susan Stallman’s marriage was dissolved in 2002. At the time of the divorce, their three children Russell, Samuel, and Jake were 12, 10, and 7, respectively. Donald was ordered to pay child support to Susan, and the order provides:

The obligor parent shall pay the following amounts per month for the following children:

Name Amount
Russell Stallman $428.79
Samuel Stallman $276.22
Jake Stallman $276.22
TOTAL MONTHLY AMOUNT $981.23

In September 2003, Samuel died. For payments made after Samuel’s death, Donald subtracted $276.22, the amount assigned to Samuel in the child support order. In April 2005, the child support order was modified on Donald’s motion for the remaining children under the two-child schedule. Susan filed a motion for order to show cause, seeking to hold Donald in contempt and asking for a judgment in the amount of $5,125.70 plus $474.06 interest for delinquent child support for Samuel from September 2003 through March 2005. The motion was denied, and the [257] commissioner ruled that support for a child automatically terminates upon the child’s death.

¶3 Susan then filed a motion to revise the commissioner’s order, and it was granted. The court found no contempt but entered a judgment for $5,125.70 delinquent child support plus $474.06 interest. Donald filed a motion for reconsideration, but the court denied the motion. This appeal timely followed.

ANALYSIS

¶4 Donald argues that his duty to pay child support for Samuel ended when Samuel died; thus, he was entitled to reduce his child support payment by the amount that the order allocated for Samuel’s support. Susan argues that without a provision in the child support order stating that the support obligation ceases upon a child’s death, the child support amount due remains unmodified.

¶5 Unless a child support order expressly provides otherwise, a parent’s duty to pay support for a child generally continues until the child is emancipated. RCW 26.09-.170(3); Ditmar v. Ditmar, 48 Wn.2d 373, 374, 293 P.2d 759 (1956).

It follows that a mother cannot compel payments of support money for children whose dependency upon her has ceased by reason of death, emancipation by marriage, attainment of majority, service in the Armed Forces of the United States, adoption, incarceration in penal or other custodial institutions, or economic sufficiency resulting from earnings, gifts, or inheritance.

Ditmar, 48 Wn.2d at 374-75. Here, the event triggering the termination of the support obligation was even clearer than nondependency—the death of a child leaves no room for dispute as to whether he or she is still dependent. The obligation terminated by operation of law upon his death. The question remaining is the amount by which Donald was entitled to reduce his transfer payment.

[258] ¶6 In Ditmar, a father was ordered to pay $80 in child support per month to his ex-wife for their three children. One child left to live with the father and another child married before the support term ended. The father reduced his support payment to approximately one-third of the original award, and the mother sued the father for back child support. The trial court’s approval of the reductions was affirmed on appeal because the court found that a child support order is no longer operative as to a child who is no longer dependent. “In the absence of specific provisions to the contrary, there is a necessary implication in every decree for child support, that its binding effect shall extend into the future only for the period during which the children’s dependency upon their custodian continues.” Ditmar, 48 Wn.2d at 375.

¶7 A similar result was reached in In re Marriage of Main, 38 Wn. App. 351, 684 P.2d 1381 (1984). In that case, a father was ordered to pay $150 per month for each of his three children “ ‘until said children are no longer dependent, are emancipated, or until further order of [the] court.’ ” Main, 38 Wn. App. at 351. After the oldest child turned 18, the father reduced his payment by one-third. The mother obtained a judgment for back child support because the oldest child was still living at home and was dependent. The father appealed and the court reversed, construing the child support order to mean that the obligation continued until a child was either no longer dependent, emancipated, or until further order of the court. Thus, because the oldest child was emancipated because he had turned 18, the father was entitled to proportionally decrease his payment.1

[259] ¶8 An opposite result was reached in State ex rel. Kibbe v. Rummel, 36 Wn.2d 244, 217 P.2d 603 (1950), due to the wording of the child support order. There, a father was ordered to pay $35 per month for the support of his two children, and the amount was stated as a lump sum, not segregated between the children. When the older child became emancipated, the father reduced his payments by half. The court concluded that because the father had been ordered to pay a lump sum for his children, he was not entitled to unilaterally reduce the payment amount. The court noted that the father should have petitioned for a reduction in his payment, rather than reducing the payment on his own.

¶9 Ditmar, Main, and Kibbe address the nature of a child support obligation upon emancipation or nondependency of a child, which can be based solely on age or on a combination of economic factors. The result in Kibbe was due to the fact that the support order had been drafted to require a lump sum payment for the children, not a per-child payment. But in Ditmar and Main, the court concluded that because the child support order had specified an amount to be paid per child, the obligor-parent could simply reduce the payment by the amount due for an emancipated or nondependent child.

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In re the Marriage of Stallman, 139 P.3d 1116, 134 Wash. App. 254 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).

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