In re the Marriage of Maxfield

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

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No. 25-2020

Filed August 19, 2026

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In re the Marriage of Paige Maxfield and Steven Maxfield Upon the Petition of

Paige Maxfield n/k/a Paige Dix, Petitioner–Appellant,

And Concerning Steven Maxfield, Respondent–Appellee.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, The Honorable David Faith, Judge.

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AFFIRMED

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Benjamin J. Folladori of Shindler, Anderson, Goplerud & Weese, P.C., West Des Moines, attorney for appellant.

Kolby P. Warren and Anna R. Shull of McCormally & Cosgrove, PLLC, Des Moines, attorneys for appellee.

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Considered without oral argument by Buller, P.J., Langholz, J., and Mullins, S.J.

Opinion by Mullins, S.J.

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MULLINS, Senior Judge.

Paige Dix appeals the denial of her petition to modify the decree dissolving her marriage to Steven Maxfield. She contends a substantial change in circumstances has made the decree’s joint legal custody and shared physical care provisions unworkable. The district court was unconvinced. Our review is de novo. In re Marriage of Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d 26, 32 (Iowa 2015).

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Paige and Steven were married in 2018. They divorced five years later.

The dissolution process culminated with a stipulation in which the parties agreed to share legal custody and physical care of their only child, O.M.M. (born in 2019). Parenting time was to be allocated on a split-week basis, with alternating weekends and holidays. In July 2023, the district court entered a decree adopting the parties’ terms in full.

Paige filed a petition to modify the decree five months later, claiming a breakdown in communication was impeding the parties’ ability to make decisions. She also alleged that Steven was struggling with “a substance abuse issue” that “affect[ed] his ability to parent the child.” Not long after Paige filed her petition, Steven was charged for operating while intoxicated (OWI). He later pled guilty, completed a term of probation, and participated in a substance-abuse evaluation that did not recommend treatment.

A trial was scheduled for October 2024. But shortly before it arrived, the parties resolved their dispute through a stipulation refining the sharedcare arrangement. Paige and Steven agreed to use a special messaging app for all communication. They also agreed that Steven would use an at-home breathalyzer to record his blood alcohol content twice a day while supervising

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O.M.M. In the event of a result of “.08 BAC or greater,” he would “forfeit the remainder of that day to Paige.” Once again, the district court entered a modified decree adopting the parties’ terms.

In May 2025, Paige filed a second modification petition, alleging that the parties’ communications had further deteriorated and that Steven had “registered numerous positive readings” on his breathalyzer. She asked the court to modify the decree to place O.M.M. in her sole legal custody and primary physical care. Shortly after that, Paige learned that O.M.M. had discovered a half-empty, THC-infused seltzer in her bedroom at Steven’s house. Paige then sought emergency relief, and the court entered a temporary order in June 2025 prohibiting Steven from any alcohol or cannabis use while caring for the child. He registered no positive tests after that.

At a trial in October 2025, Paige described her concerns with Steven’s communication style, which she characterized as slow, unhelpful, and often incendiary. She introduced a 450-page printout of messaging-app exchanges—the totality of the parties’ communications—pointing to several heated examples. Paige testified this hostility had become “a barrier to getting things done.” For instance, she recounted two situations when disagreement about the severity of O.M.M.’s health issues left the child waiting for doctor’s visits that Paige considered urgent.

Paige also introduced evidence related to Steven’s alcohol use.

Breathalyzer data recorded on custodial days between November 2024 and June 2025 showed occasional missed tests, tamper alerts, and positive results. Although none of Steven’s tests during this period exceeded the .08 limit, there were a few instances when he agreed to end his parenting time early after Paige was notified of a positive result. In one incident on New

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Year’s Day, Paige retrieved O.M.M. from Steven’s house after the child asked to be picked up. She testified that when she arrived, Steven was “stumbling” and “slurring his words.” A video recording of the exchange was admitted at trial.

Steven denied any drinking problem. He testified that prior to the court’s emergency order, he had consumed alcohol one to three times per week—but never to the point of intoxication while caring for O.M.M. He also denied any attempts to subvert his testing requirements or tamper with the breathalyzer. With respect to the communication issues, Steven conceded sending some spiteful messages during the parties’ arguments. But he assured that O.M.M. was never exposed to these exchanges.

Following two days of testimony, the district court entered an order declining to modify the decree. It found “no evidence of any true breakdown in communication that has actually prevented the parties from making any vital co-parenting decisions.” And it found “no evidence in the record that O.M.M. has come to harm or danger as a result of Steve drinking to excess while she was in his care.” The court ordered both parties to bear their own attorney fees. Paige now appeals.

II. Legal Analysis A. Substantial Change in Circumstances

Once a dissolution decree is final, its terms for custody and care may be disturbed “only for the most cogent reasons.” In re Marriage of Kisting, 6 N.W.3d 326, 332 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024) (citation omitted). “A parent seeking modification must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the circumstances have so materially and substantially changed since the decree was entered that the requested modification is in the children’s best

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interests.” In re Marriage of Frazier, 1 N.W.3d 775, 781 (Iowa 2024). These principles “place a heavy burden on a parent requesting a modification.” Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d at 32.

Paige contends she met her burden to show a substantial change of circumstances, pointing first to the evidence of the parties’ strained communications. She dedicates several pages of her appellate brief to cataloguing Steven’s most profane insults. We do not repeat them here, but we agree with the district court that these messages are “inappropriate and immature” at best. Paige argues the parties’ conflict has “exceeded the usual acrimony” of a typical divorce and has begun to cause problems with coordinating O.M.M.’s care. She also asserts that “given Steven’s obvious hostility towards Paige through messages . . . , the court should not trust that Steven’s attitude towards Paige is any better” when he is with O.M.M.

A qualifying change in circumstances “must not have been contemplated by the court when the decree was entered,” and it “must be more or less permanent, not temporary.” In re Marriage of Harris, 877 N.W.2d 434, 440 (Iowa 2016) (citation omitted). Thus, modification may be appropriate where it becomes clear after entry of the decree that the parents “simply cannot cooperate or communicate in dealing with their children.” Id. at 441 (cleaned up); accord Kisting, 6 N.W.3d at 333 (finding modification of shared physical care arrangement was warranted where the parties could not agree “on the most significant parenting decisions”). But mere hostility is not enough. See Hensch v. Mysak, 902 N.W.2d 822, 826 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017). When parents “demonstrate they are able to put aside their differences for the sake of their child,” joint custody should be maintained. Harris, 877 N.W.2d at 440.

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This case falls into the latter category. There is no doubt that tensions remain high for Steven and Paige, each of whom appears to share some blame for sparking conflict. But while this discord has caused headaches for the parents, it has not compromised their ability to care for O.M.M. Both parties testified to situations in which they successfully resolved disagreements about the child’s schooling, transportation, and activities. They navigated their parenting schedule for more than two years without court intervention. And even Paige described their public interactions as “cordial and seemingly appropriate.” In other words, the parties have demonstrated their ability to set their bitter feelings aside in order to advance the interests of their daughter.

We are unpersuaded by Paige’s evidence to the contrary. She cites a pair of episodes in which she claims Steven resisted her efforts to seek medical care for O.M.M. But these disputes—about whether the child was sick enough to see a doctor—do not suggest either parent put personal animosity before O.M.M.’s health needs. They merely show a difference in judgment about the appropriate course of action. And as for Paige’s speculation that Steven berates her in O.M.M.’s presence, we find no support. The record includes examples of candid video calls in which both parents demonstrate their ability to insulate the child from conflict and protect the other parent’s rapport.

The district court summed it up well: “The coparenting relationship between these parties is not to the point where it cannot be repaired. They can and do communicate about the needs of O.M.M. They must learn to recognize that insulting each other accomplishes nothing . . . .” We agree. The acrimony between Steven and Paige is needless and toxic, but it is not a substantial change of circumstances. To date, O.M.M. has enjoyed a

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childhood with two parents who share in her custody and care. It remains in her best interests for them to work out their problems and press forward with the co-parenting relationship they have twice agreed to uphold.

That leaves us with what Paige describes as “Steven’s obvious alcohol issues.” She contends that Steven’s drinking has escalated, pointing to the “numerous tests” that he failed to submit on custodial days and his “numerous other tests that registered positive.” She further argues that Steven’s testimony about his alcohol use was “inconsistent and not credible”—in part because his criminal history and on-camera intoxication contradict his claim to have never struggled with alcohol.

“[I]f a primary caregiver has abandoned responsibilities or had not been adequately performing his or her responsibilities because of alcohol or substance abuse, there may be a strong case for changing the physical care relationship.” In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 697 (Iowa 2007). On more than one occasion, our court has found a parent’s alcohol abuse to weigh against shared care. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Meester, 32 N.W.3d 22, 28–30 (Iowa Ct. App. 2026) (affirming denial of joint physical care where a father with multiple alcohol-related convictions continued to drink excessively after six months of substance-use treatment); In re Marriage of LeGrand, 495 N.W.2d 118, 120–21 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992) (declining to place children in the physical care of “an alcoholic father who denies abusing alcohol and refuses to address the problem effectively”). However, where a parent’s drinking is safe and moderated, it is not a basis for modification. See In re Marriage of Maxwell, No. 24-0893, 2025 WL 2538879, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Sep. 4, 2025) (finding no substantial change of circumstances where there was “no concrete evidence” that a mother’s substance use “ever placed the children in danger”); In re Marriage of Reed, No. 19-1947, 2020

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WL 3265026, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 17, 2020) (affirming denial of modification where although a father “sometimes drank alcohol, there was no direct connection between alcohol and his parenting”).

Steven’s claim that he has never struggled with drinking gives us some pause. It is clear that alcohol has affected his judgment in the past. In one string of text messages from August 2023, Steven concedes he “shouldn’t have had beers and drove with [O.M.M.].” In another exchange from around the same time, he apologizes for his behavior while “buzzed up.” And his OWI conviction speaks for itself. But all of these incidents took place before the parties modified the decree in October 2024. The question before us is whether Steven’s alcohol use has “materially and substantially changed since” then. Frazier, 1 N.W.3d at 781.

When the parties entered their stipulation in October 2024, they agreed that Steven was fit to care for O.M.M. despite his precarious relationship with alcohol. The modified decree did not require Steven to abstain from drinking altogether—only that his blood alcohol content did not exceed the .08 threshold during custodial days. Of the more than two hundred tests Steven submitted over the subsequent months, none returned a noncompliant result. It is true that thirteen tests before June 2025 showed a blood alcohol content of less than .08, and four tests in May reported “tamper” errors. But Steven testified these results were not the product of unsafe drinking or intentional manipulation, and the district court credited his claim over Paige’s speculative counter-explanations. We give deference to that assessment. See Meester, 32 N.W.3d at 27 (noting the district court’s credibility findings are entitled to weight, given its “front-row seat to the parties’ testimonies” (cleaned up)).

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Steven returned no positive tests following the court’s emergency order. He shares his home with a girlfriend who also helps care for O.M.M. He has no founded reports of child neglect or abuse. He has not been charged with a substance-related criminal offense since the entry of the modified decree. And no friends, family members, coworkers, educators, or health professionals have reported concerns about his fitness as a caretaker. On this record, we find insufficient evidence of an alcohol problem that might jeopardize O.M.M.’s safety or care. Paige has failed to show a substantial change in circumstances warranting modification of the decree.

B. Attorney Fees

In a modification proceeding, the district court “may award attorney fees to the prevailing party in an amount deemed reasonable by the court.” Iowa Code § 598.36 (2025). We review those awards for abuse of discretion, intervening only if the district court’s decision “rests on grounds that are clearly unreasonable or untenable.” Kisting, 6 N.W.3d at 337 (citation omitted). Paige challenges the district court’s denial of her request for fees. But because she is not the prevailing party, that decision was proper.

Both parties ask that we award them their fees for this appeal.

“Appellate attorney fees are not a matter of right, but rather rest in this court’s discretion.” In re Marriage of Stenzel, 908 N.W.2d 524, 538 (Iowa Ct. App. 2018) (citation omitted). We consider the needs of the parties, their abilities to pay, and the relative merits of the appeal. See id. Weighing those factors, we decline to award appellate fees. Steven is the prevailing party, but his financial submissions show he has a superior ability to pay. And although Paige raised the same issues in a prior modification proceeding, this is the first time they have been litigated on appeal.

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III. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed, we affirm the district court’s order denying Paige’s petition to modify the joint custody and shared care provisions of the decree. We also affirm the denial of Paige’s request for fees. And we decline to award fees on appeal.

AFFIRMED.