In re the Marriage of Kiser

32 P.3d 244, 176 Or. App. 627, 2001 Ore. App. LEXIS 1415
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedSeptember 26, 2001
Docket15-99-05543; A110070
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 32 P.3d 244 (In re the Marriage of Kiser) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re the Marriage of Kiser, 32 P.3d 244, 176 Or. App. 627, 2001 Ore. App. LEXIS 1415 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).

Opinion

SCHUMAN, J.

Wife appeals from a dissolution judgment, seeking modification of the spousal support award and clarification of details regarding the division of husband’s federal retirement benefits. We affirm the spousal support award and remand with instructions regarding the proper division of retirement benefits.

The parties were married for 30 years. At the time of trial, husband was 49 years old and wife was 51 years old. They have four children, two of whom are under 21 years old and whose custody was awarded to wife. Wife was the primary homemaker and parent throughout the marriage; she worked outside of home only sporadically, primarily on a part-time basis so that she could be with the children when they were not in school. At the time of trial, she was employed full time as a salesperson at a floor covering store, earning a gross income of $24,000 per year with no benefits.

Husband is a regional manager at the Bonneville Power Administration, where he has worked for the past 27 years; his current salary is approximately $92,000 per year plus retirement, life, and health insurance benefits. As a federal employee, husband participates in the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS), under which he will be entitled to a monthly benefit of an amount to be calculated at retirement based on the length of his federal service and the average of his three highest salary years. This type of plan is called a “defined benefit” plan, as opposed to a “defined contribution” plan, under which benefits derive from the amount of contributions and their earnings. Husband does not plan to retire for another 10 or 11 years. Further, husband has the option of increasing the monthly benefit at retirement by purchasing credits for the three years and 11 months he served in the military when the couple was first married. Husband also may elect a survivor annuity option, which would allow wife to continue receiving retirement benefits if husband predeceases her. Finally, husband has a second federal retirement benefit called a “Thrift Savings Plan.” That is a retirement savings and investment account administered [630]*630by the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board. Its contribution and benefit structure is similar to a 401(k) retirement plan in that it is a defined contribution plan where benefits are based on contributions and their earnings.

The trial court awarded spousal support to wife in the amount of $1,500 per month for six years and $1,000 per month for four years thereafter. On de novo review, and in light of our disposition of the retirement benefits issues, we find the amount and duration of that award to be “just and equitable.” ORS 107.105(l)(d) (1997). Neither the bench nor bar would benefit from discussion of that issue.

At trial, the parties agreed that the retirement benefits should be divided equally. The trial court awarded wife “fifty percent (50%) of [husband’s] Civil Service Retirement System benefits and Thrift Savings Plan benefits as of the date of entry of this decree.” The court retained jurisdiction to implement division of the retirement accounts and directed husband’s attorney to “prepare the appropriate orders to divide the retirement accounts in accordance with applicable provisions of federal regulations and the Internal Revenue Code.” There is no evidence in the record that husband’s attorney or any other person ever prepared such an order or that a judge signed one.

On appeal, wife argues that the ruling is defective in four respects.

First, wife requests that we modify the judgment to specify when her 50 percent of the Thrift Savings Plan is to be distributed and that she is entitled to earnings on her portion that accrue between the date of the dissolution judgment and distribution. The trial court held she was entitled to 50 percent of retirement benefits “as of the date of this decree.” As applied to the Thrift Savings Plan, we understand that language to mean she is entitled to half of the total account balance accumulated under the plan as of the date of dissolution. That is an appropriate method of dividing defined contribution retirement plans. See Caudill and Caudill, 139 Or App 479, 481 n 1, 912 P2d 915 (1996). Because wife’s portion may be immediately distributed on receipt of a qualifying order, see 5 CFR § 1653 (2001), we see no reason why payment should not be made as soon as administratively [631]*631feasible. We also agree that wife is entitled to interest on her portion of the plan that accrues between the date of dissolution and distribution. On remand, the trial court is directed to issue orders that so specify.

Wife next contends that the trial court erred because the language of the judgment is unclear about how to calculate and distribute wife’s interest in the CSRS benefits. We agree that the court’s award to wife of “50 [percent] of [husband’s CSRS] benefits as of the date of entry of this decree” does not adequately explain how wife’s interest is to be calculated or distributed. On remand, the trial court is directed to issue an appropriate order specifying wife’s share of husband’s CSRS annuity.

Husband suggests that the trial court should award wife 50 percent of the monthly payout he would receive if he retired at the date of dissolution. He argues that it is inappropriate to calculate wife’s interest on the basis of benefits he will actually receive at retirement because that amount will, in turn, be calculated in part on the basis of potential salary increases husband earns after the dissolution, thus allowing wife a share of benefits that accrue after the divorce.

We decline to follow husband’s suggested approach. We have repeatedly emphasized that, when retirement benefits have not matured and are thus not presently liquid, it is equitable to look to the value of the benefit at retirement, because “it is not proper to assume, for purposes of computing the value of these rights, that husband would immediately leave public service and * * * ignore the vested pension benefits.” Minnis and Minnis, 54 Or App 70, 75, 634 P2d 259 (1981) (quoted in and followed by Cunningham and Cunningham, 74 Or App 311, 315, 702 P2d 1157 (1985)); see also Reich and Reich, 150 Or App 311, 314, 946 P2d 319 (1997) (same); Mahaffey and Mahaffey, 96 Or App 617, 621, 773 P2d 806 (1989) (same).

Husband’s argument also ignores the straight-line appreciation of benefits under a defined benefit plan. See Caudill, 139 Or App at 483-84. This type of plan typically calculates retirement benefits by applying a given percentage to the applicable average salary at retirement; that product is then multiplied by the participant’s total years of service [632]*632under the plan to determine the benefit at retirement. Thus, benefits actually accrue in equal increments for each year of participation in the plan. Awarding wife half of the marital portion1 of benefits calculated at retirement is consistent with this straight-line valuation method.

For the foregoing reasons, a defined benefit plan such as husband’s is not appropriately divided on the basis of the account balance or contributions made as of the date of dissolution. Hester and Hester, 122 Or App 147, 856 P2d 1048 (1993). Rather, such plans are divided on the basis of actuarial present value,

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Bluebook (online)
32 P.3d 244, 176 Or. App. 627, 2001 Ore. App. LEXIS 1415, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-marriage-of-kiser-orctapp-2001.